Like the run up to the start of WW2, ships lost will change the attitudes and ideals and current stupid training for social reasons will get dumped off the starboard quarter.
Indeed, and he falsely reported that CANOPUS was limited to 12 knots--which was decisive in not keeping her with the main force. In fact, she was capable of at least 15 knots. Had she been with Cradock, the German squadron would have been pretty much forced to stay out of her vicinity. They could still run, having superior speed, but Cradock and his ships probably would not have been lost. A lesson in trust but verify, but given the RN ship commamnd arrangements, difficult to do. Deck officers were pretty much completely ignorant of engineering matters. Pretty intersting back story about WSC and Fisher at the Admiralty and miscommunications among them and Cradock too. RN didn't learn that lesson until PQ-17 in the next war.
The story of Admiral von Spee's squadron is one of the great naval stories, even if it ends in tragedy. He's stuck on the other side of the world from home when war breaks out, with the entire Royal Navy between him and Germany. He's got a choice between internment, surrender - or selling the lives of his squadron as dearly as possible, wreaking as much damage on British commerce as possible. And he chose the latter, without hesitation.
With considerable success. SMS Emden he dispatched to the Indian Ocean, the rest of his squadron he took across the Pacific. And even at the Falklands, he sacrificed his armored cruisers (and his own life) to cover the scattering of his light cruisers - which would head to Africa and give the British headaches.
I first read of this action in Oliver Warner's majestic "Great Sea Battles", along with the corresponding Battle of the Falkland Islands. Sometimes, the right forces aren't available. Captain Luce did a great job getting his ship and crew out, and able to fight another day.
Gone were the days when the RN had both the confidence and experience to assume that any 3, well handled 74's should expect to deal destruction on 4-5 of Bony's best.
Gosh, as an aviator it would seem that outgunned and under-armored ships have little to no advantage (or hope) of a victory in a purely surface engagement, but I could be wrong. So what do we do with LCS and frigates with a 57 mm "main gun" facing a threat with a 127 mm? With ships that could never handle those sea states and be effective? With equipment that doesn't work and sailors can't operate? As Jetcal1 posts "there's a lesson here", which surely will fall on deaf ears.
"Now hear this - man all diversity and pronoun battle stations"! Victory at Sea - not.
Did you know that Canopus did not have engine troubles and was still capable of a sprightly 16 knots? You'll notice in Canopus's report that she reduced speed to 16 knots when calling off the gallop to the rescue.
What happened was her chief engineer had a nervous break down, and fearing for his "wee bairns" reported to his captain that the ship was only capable of 12 knots. Craddock couldn't use so slow a ship, so used her to escort the colliers.
As it turned out Von Spee's squadron would probably have taken on, and sunk, Canopus along with the armoured cruisers, but it does make for one of those "what ifs" moments in warfare.
There's a lesson here vis-à-vis our fleet and the PLAN. Our Flag would do well to study this battle.
We will continue to sail on the smooth following seas of sweet lies rather than the tumultuous waves of bitter truths. I have no faith.
Like the run up to the start of WW2, ships lost will change the attitudes and ideals and current stupid training for social reasons will get dumped off the starboard quarter.
We've needlessly killed sailors in avoidable collisions and destroyed capital ships pierside.
We need to major and catastrophic defeat at sea before the President will reach down below the Admirals to pick new leadership.
A very sad tale, I have always thought.
IIRC the engineer on Canopus was having a mental breakdown. I'm sure that did not help matters.
Indeed, and he falsely reported that CANOPUS was limited to 12 knots--which was decisive in not keeping her with the main force. In fact, she was capable of at least 15 knots. Had she been with Cradock, the German squadron would have been pretty much forced to stay out of her vicinity. They could still run, having superior speed, but Cradock and his ships probably would not have been lost. A lesson in trust but verify, but given the RN ship commamnd arrangements, difficult to do. Deck officers were pretty much completely ignorant of engineering matters. Pretty intersting back story about WSC and Fisher at the Admiralty and miscommunications among them and Cradock too. RN didn't learn that lesson until PQ-17 in the next war.
The story of Admiral von Spee's squadron is one of the great naval stories, even if it ends in tragedy. He's stuck on the other side of the world from home when war breaks out, with the entire Royal Navy between him and Germany. He's got a choice between internment, surrender - or selling the lives of his squadron as dearly as possible, wreaking as much damage on British commerce as possible. And he chose the latter, without hesitation.
With considerable success. SMS Emden he dispatched to the Indian Ocean, the rest of his squadron he took across the Pacific. And even at the Falklands, he sacrificed his armored cruisers (and his own life) to cover the scattering of his light cruisers - which would head to Africa and give the British headaches.
I first read of this action in Oliver Warner's majestic "Great Sea Battles", along with the corresponding Battle of the Falkland Islands. Sometimes, the right forces aren't available. Captain Luce did a great job getting his ship and crew out, and able to fight another day.
Gone were the days when the RN had both the confidence and experience to assume that any 3, well handled 74's should expect to deal destruction on 4-5 of Bony's best.
Gosh, as an aviator it would seem that outgunned and under-armored ships have little to no advantage (or hope) of a victory in a purely surface engagement, but I could be wrong. So what do we do with LCS and frigates with a 57 mm "main gun" facing a threat with a 127 mm? With ships that could never handle those sea states and be effective? With equipment that doesn't work and sailors can't operate? As Jetcal1 posts "there's a lesson here", which surely will fall on deaf ears.
"Now hear this - man all diversity and pronoun battle stations"! Victory at Sea - not.
We shall watch them sink and hope, pray we have six months to change course.
And build more ships.
The sea is a harsh mistress.
No one knows this who has not sailed her surface or sub surface and flown over it.
Add War and you have a lethal situation that only trained seamen and Officers can survive.
Into the valley of death they sailed.
Excellent write up. But at least the RN was able to inflict a sturdee riposte...
Four midshipmen from the first class of the RCN Naval Academy were lost in the Good Hope.
CANN, Malcolm
Midshipman, RCN
Killed - 01 Nov 1914
HATHEWAY, John V. W.
Midshipman, RCN
Killed - 01 Nov 1944
PALMER, William A.
Midshipman, RCN
Killed - 01 Nov 1914
SILVER, Arthur W.
Midshipman, RCN
Killed - 01 Nov 1914
Glasgow extracted a degree of revenge, helping to sink both Dresden and Leipzig.
Did you know that Canopus did not have engine troubles and was still capable of a sprightly 16 knots? You'll notice in Canopus's report that she reduced speed to 16 knots when calling off the gallop to the rescue.
What happened was her chief engineer had a nervous break down, and fearing for his "wee bairns" reported to his captain that the ship was only capable of 12 knots. Craddock couldn't use so slow a ship, so used her to escort the colliers.
As it turned out Von Spee's squadron would probably have taken on, and sunk, Canopus along with the armoured cruisers, but it does make for one of those "what ifs" moments in warfare.