Went aboard her in '08 at Portland Flt Week. Typing this msg while wearing a CG-71 souvenir ballcap... From what I could tell, she was still squared away when I visited her!!
"Can only make 80% of your max speed due to maintenance? OK. What is your weapons state? Fine? Good. You're good to go." We still have those Sailors, just not enough of them in Senior Command.
Good point. Another reason to "deep-select" personnel instead of relying on the good old boy network. I still believe we lost a lot of desired qualities from our Services when we ended the draft, but that is a discussion for another day and forum.
As a “Little Beaver” in my staff puke days, I love here stories almost as much as looking at the paintings that lined England Hall, while on roving patrol on the ASW base in San Diego. Full bore indeed!
An interesting contrast to recent posts about optimal manning, deferred maintenance, what can be sustained in peacetime vs wartime etc. It suggests to me that the difference between Fitz/McCain & Norwegian navy outcomes and Desron 23 outcomes may have more to do with the quality of command leadership, than strictly the existence of optempo, manning, and deferred maintenance issues (real though they no doubt are).
One can differ, of course, about the relative weight of 2-3 years of combat deployment vs a decade of peacetime optempo; staffing with hastily expanded and inexperienced wartime crews vs undertrained peacetime crews; operating with battle damage vs operating with CASREPs, etc, etc, etc. But if you think we have never done better in similar peacetime circumstances you would be flat wrong. The decade of the 70's saw similar overextension of naval commitments, under support of material readiness, and a hemorrhage of experienced personnel. Yet by and large naval commands rose to the occasion. They set standards, provided inspiration to find ways to meet them within such constraints, and operated safely to meet their overextended commitments. One cannot read the Navy's internal report on the Fitz collision and fail to conclude that a generation of naval leadership has lost its way in this regard.
A large portion of that "standard setting" in the 1970s was the result of the exacting demands of Fleet Training Group Guantanamo Bay (and PACFLT counterparts). Total dedication to getting things right, and repeating it until it became ingrained habit. You will fight as you train, if if you fail to train to high standards, you will just show up to be defeated.
I see things like the loss of GITMO, the environmentally friendly changes made to the fire fighting schools, loss of Navy shipyards, dilution of training, etc.
It's the loss of infrastructure, training, and overall dilution of the core fundamentals that allowed the Navy to fight and deal with major casualties like the Forrestal and Enterprise that leave one less optimistic. Mix in the DEI and other cultural changes? Well, subtract a few more optimism points.
“THIRTY-ONE KNOT BURKE GET ATHWART THE BUKA-RABUAL EVACUATION LINE … IF ENEMY CONTACTED YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO.” - That's the way to give orders: Tell them what needs to be accomplished, then get out of the way and let them get to it.
I like the way naval messages went back then. In our time they're very formal, but back then during wartime they sometimes were conversations. The one above from Admiral Halsey is case in point. The Submarine Force had some good ones, like VADM Lockwood telling a CO his picture was on the piano after said CO massacred a Japanese convoy or the CO of <i>Sturgeon</i> (SS 187) finishing up a report of her first sinking with "STURGEON NO LONGER VIRGIN." Aggressiveness and accomplishment meant more than formality.
yes, not with 5 drones, 2 satellites and a regional command plus probably someone in DC overseeing every step of the group's progress and changing their orders, often conflicting, the whole time. No wonder our leaders of ships today have to be almost timid in how they approach anything, we have a big brother mentality. Soviets had political officers and we have, well, you get the point, needless oversight.
One of Grandpa Scoobs' prized possession was a framed photograph of then CAPT Arleigh Burke and VADM Marc Mitscher from when they led TF-38 aboard USS Lexington (CV-16) in 1944. Grandpa Scoobs was a JO in Lex's Air Group 19 and frequently interacted with Burke, including being called to flag plot to brief Mitscher and him on what he had seen during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October 1944. That framed photo, and a handwritten note from ADM (Ret) Burke, proudly hung in Grandpa Scoobs' living room for the remainder of his days - now it's proudly on display at Casa de Papa Scoobs.
ADM Burke set up the the other major engineering office that works very well; Strategic Systems Programs (as Special Projects). One of the many great officers from that period.
Burke was smart enough to learn from his own mistakes and embrace the new technology of radar.
We were fortunate to have adept, aggressive Commanders with ships manned by well trained and motivated crews. (We were fortunate to have the industrial base and logistics train in place to provide even a small percentage of support he needed in 11/43 compared to what it was producing by 11/44.)
I've got a framed and autographed photo of Arleigh on my office wall taken at the commissioning of DDG 51. As an aviator and flag aide at NavSea during the construction I had the great opportunity to talk to him one on one as he waited to get into NavSEA 00's office. He asked me what a pilot was doing at NavSea and I told him (per my Admiral) that I was broadening my far-too-narrow parochial horizons. I got to listen to his comments and criticism of the planned DDG-51, and he would regale us in the conference room with tales of the the Little Beaver squadron.
Alas, we need that kind of leadership again in our Navy. He was a Warrior. He was a Gentlemen.
Arleigh Burke was later the CNO from 1955-61. His first assignment after graduating from the Academy was aboard the USS Arizona. When your home state is Arizona, you get the best history of that wonderful ship.
Went aboard her in '08 at Portland Flt Week. Typing this msg while wearing a CG-71 souvenir ballcap... From what I could tell, she was still squared away when I visited her!!
"Can only make 80% of your max speed due to maintenance? OK. What is your weapons state? Fine? Good. You're good to go." We still have those Sailors, just not enough of them in Senior Command.
understanding and factoring in "Risk/reward" is no longer a key skill in a zero defects world
Good point. Another reason to "deep-select" personnel instead of relying on the good old boy network. I still believe we lost a lot of desired qualities from our Services when we ended the draft, but that is a discussion for another day and forum.
As a “Little Beaver” in my staff puke days, I love here stories almost as much as looking at the paintings that lined England Hall, while on roving patrol on the ASW base in San Diego. Full bore indeed!
Sometimes getting your whole force to the objective, albeit at a slower speed, is best move.
Sometimes, like the Mongols taught, having 10 men on the objective on time was better than having 10,000 there later.
The good commanders know the difference.
In my field, Patton was a proponent of:
" A good decision, implemented promptly with vigor, always beats the perfect course of actual, timidly executed, too late"
Hence changing the axis of advance for the 3rd Amy, and attacking 100 miles into the flank of Bastogne in the middle of Winter, in 3 days.
Patton versus Montie
"Hence changing the axis of advance for the 3rd Amy, and attacking 100 miles into the flank of Bastogne in the middle of Winter, in 3 days."
Especially when your enemy assumes you are incapable or doctrinally unwilling to take a particular course of action.
Fustest with the mostest
Of course, that's really a false trade-off.
Fustest with "enough" is the real life call. And the winners are the ones to better estimate "enough"
🫡
Good luck, good decisions, and that led to victory.
Do good decisions and a sharp, well trained crew make for good luck?
Helps make good luck.
An interesting contrast to recent posts about optimal manning, deferred maintenance, what can be sustained in peacetime vs wartime etc. It suggests to me that the difference between Fitz/McCain & Norwegian navy outcomes and Desron 23 outcomes may have more to do with the quality of command leadership, than strictly the existence of optempo, manning, and deferred maintenance issues (real though they no doubt are).
Beg to differ slightly, they were not suffering from a sustained multi-decade decline of all the factors you mentioned.
One can differ, of course, about the relative weight of 2-3 years of combat deployment vs a decade of peacetime optempo; staffing with hastily expanded and inexperienced wartime crews vs undertrained peacetime crews; operating with battle damage vs operating with CASREPs, etc, etc, etc. But if you think we have never done better in similar peacetime circumstances you would be flat wrong. The decade of the 70's saw similar overextension of naval commitments, under support of material readiness, and a hemorrhage of experienced personnel. Yet by and large naval commands rose to the occasion. They set standards, provided inspiration to find ways to meet them within such constraints, and operated safely to meet their overextended commitments. One cannot read the Navy's internal report on the Fitz collision and fail to conclude that a generation of naval leadership has lost its way in this regard.
A large portion of that "standard setting" in the 1970s was the result of the exacting demands of Fleet Training Group Guantanamo Bay (and PACFLT counterparts). Total dedication to getting things right, and repeating it until it became ingrained habit. You will fight as you train, if if you fail to train to high standards, you will just show up to be defeated.
All of this. 100% of this. Every day of this.
Simply...amen!!
Similar in the submarine community, which is my background.
I see things like the loss of GITMO, the environmentally friendly changes made to the fire fighting schools, loss of Navy shipyards, dilution of training, etc.
It's the loss of infrastructure, training, and overall dilution of the core fundamentals that allowed the Navy to fight and deal with major casualties like the Forrestal and Enterprise that leave one less optimistic. Mix in the DEI and other cultural changes? Well, subtract a few more optimism points.
“THIRTY-ONE KNOT BURKE GET ATHWART THE BUKA-RABUAL EVACUATION LINE … IF ENEMY CONTACTED YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO.” - That's the way to give orders: Tell them what needs to be accomplished, then get out of the way and let them get to it.
I like the way naval messages went back then. In our time they're very formal, but back then during wartime they sometimes were conversations. The one above from Admiral Halsey is case in point. The Submarine Force had some good ones, like VADM Lockwood telling a CO his picture was on the piano after said CO massacred a Japanese convoy or the CO of <i>Sturgeon</i> (SS 187) finishing up a report of her first sinking with "STURGEON NO LONGER VIRGIN." Aggressiveness and accomplishment meant more than formality.
yes, not with 5 drones, 2 satellites and a regional command plus probably someone in DC overseeing every step of the group's progress and changing their orders, often conflicting, the whole time. No wonder our leaders of ships today have to be almost timid in how they approach anything, we have a big brother mentality. Soviets had political officers and we have, well, you get the point, needless oversight.
Halsey's mission order was perfect.
One of Grandpa Scoobs' prized possession was a framed photograph of then CAPT Arleigh Burke and VADM Marc Mitscher from when they led TF-38 aboard USS Lexington (CV-16) in 1944. Grandpa Scoobs was a JO in Lex's Air Group 19 and frequently interacted with Burke, including being called to flag plot to brief Mitscher and him on what he had seen during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October 1944. That framed photo, and a handwritten note from ADM (Ret) Burke, proudly hung in Grandpa Scoobs' living room for the remainder of his days - now it's proudly on display at Casa de Papa Scoobs.
ADM Burke set up the the other major engineering office that works very well; Strategic Systems Programs (as Special Projects). One of the many great officers from that period.
Burke was smart enough to learn from his own mistakes and embrace the new technology of radar.
We were fortunate to have adept, aggressive Commanders with ships manned by well trained and motivated crews. (We were fortunate to have the industrial base and logistics train in place to provide even a small percentage of support he needed in 11/43 compared to what it was producing by 11/44.)
I've got a framed and autographed photo of Arleigh on my office wall taken at the commissioning of DDG 51. As an aviator and flag aide at NavSea during the construction I had the great opportunity to talk to him one on one as he waited to get into NavSEA 00's office. He asked me what a pilot was doing at NavSea and I told him (per my Admiral) that I was broadening my far-too-narrow parochial horizons. I got to listen to his comments and criticism of the planned DDG-51, and he would regale us in the conference room with tales of the the Little Beaver squadron.
Alas, we need that kind of leadership again in our Navy. He was a Warrior. He was a Gentlemen.
Do you think there is even 1 squadron today that could carry out this order?
I love Halsey's order. "You know what to do". If only that spirit and trust was around nowadays!
Arleigh Burke was later the CNO from 1955-61. His first assignment after graduating from the Academy was aboard the USS Arizona. When your home state is Arizona, you get the best history of that wonderful ship.