The primary lesson, you cannot always choose the time and place you will fight. Contrast the Italian experience against that of the Japanese who also faced an enemy with radar while they had none.
The Italians also seem to have been hesitant to use large numbers of torpedoes. Their Destroyers tended to have only a small number of torpedo tubes. Their smaller escorts did not have enough tubes to launch an effective spread.
"In retrospect, the results of this action, at least from the Italian point of view, indicated the need for more training and a re-thinking of their doctrine. Gallantry was not the primary quality required by the situation. Control and coordination would have served the Italians far better."
How true that is: there was no shortage of gallantry among USN forces in the night actions in the Solomons in 1942, but it arguably took the insights and efforts of Burke and Moosbrugger to harness the full potential of American destroyers in night surface actions.
On a tangentially related note, O'Hara's Struggle for the Middle Sea is a masterpiece, and his On Seas Contested is also a highly valuable reference work. I own copies of both and recommend them heartily.
When your torpedoes fail you are sunk
The primary lesson, you cannot always choose the time and place you will fight. Contrast the Italian experience against that of the Japanese who also faced an enemy with radar while they had none.
The Italians also seem to have been hesitant to use large numbers of torpedoes. Their Destroyers tended to have only a small number of torpedo tubes. Their smaller escorts did not have enough tubes to launch an effective spread.
"In retrospect, the results of this action, at least from the Italian point of view, indicated the need for more training and a re-thinking of their doctrine. Gallantry was not the primary quality required by the situation. Control and coordination would have served the Italians far better."
How true that is: there was no shortage of gallantry among USN forces in the night actions in the Solomons in 1942, but it arguably took the insights and efforts of Burke and Moosbrugger to harness the full potential of American destroyers in night surface actions.
On a tangentially related note, O'Hara's Struggle for the Middle Sea is a masterpiece, and his On Seas Contested is also a highly valuable reference work. I own copies of both and recommend them heartily.