“You’ve taken the Queen’s shilling. Now you’re going to have to bloody earn it. And your best way of getting back alive is to do your absolute utmost. So go and do it.”
Simply put. And that's the kind of straight talk sailors appreciate.
"I was embarked on the Conveyor (848 NAS) at this time. There has always been a debate as to whether we were hit by one or two missiles – it doesn’t really matter I guess, despite gallant efforts, there was nothing we could do to save her. The lone question I have always carried with me is, if she was so important to the success of the landings, why weren’t we better protected?"
The Falklands campaign was one with many challenges, especially waging war at the end of a long and fragile logistics chain. The lack of transports, lack of carriers and harsh weather made things more difficult. You DO go to war with the Navy you've got.
The Brits threw aside all sorts of procedures and policies and improvised, innovated and adapted to expeditiously get a significant force underway. When we are called on to sail into harms way far from our shores, likely absent the support bases we have become accustomed to, do we have leaders who can improvise, innovate and adapt, and put aside the barnacle encrustations of bureaucratic rice bowls, red tape, rules and procedures?
The Falklands also reinforced that mastering the basics of fighting the ship, fire fighting and damage control are essential. And, that there will be inevitable losses of ships and crews, proving Murphy right that "No plan survives contact with the enemy." Contingency and back up plans are essential, but they need to be known and rehearsed.
Remember, the Falklands involved a major power against a regional power hobbled by decades of economic weakness. It was not a major power at the end of its logistics leash against a technologically near equal, fighting with home field advantage.
There is much to be learned from the Falklands, but how often is it discussed in detail in schools, or in wardrooms? Are they truly "lessons learned" if no one pays attention to the lessons, seen as merely musty history stuff, shoved aside by woke nonsense?
It’s doubtful the UK could execute such a feat now. I remember being a young third class and checking into my first squadron. Our H-3’s were all without MAD birds. The reserves were stripped of their ASQ-81 towed bodies and 32 recorders. We finally got them back around 1989…
One thing that struck me about that battle was that most of the damage and loss was caused by old-fashioned gravity bombs in the face of modern gun and missile defenses. And the fact that there would have been a lot more damage but for faulty fuzes on some of the bombs.
Have a grand recollection of that time and the move into modernity. CNN was available on Cable TV. Cable TV was not yet widespread. Had transferred to Staff duty at CINCPACFLT as a junior mid-level minion six months previous to the Falklands War and promoted to CWO2 (7121) the day before the war began in earnest. Had 16½ years in at the time, all of it at sea or on neutral duty...in an analog world. I marveled at the technology that gave us access to information watching CNN (not yet a tool of the Ministry of Truth and seeming to me to have better coverage than the 30 minute Big 3 network news in the evening) and sitting in the peanut gallery of command center at PacFlt taking in the blow-by-blow narrative of it all. We had no involvement in the war. We just watched. I listened, I saw, I even learned but mostly I marveled at the newness of all this. I believe many take technology for granted now. Old wars were fought brutally with less information. Modern wars can now be fought with more information and with a systematically more brutal outcome.
Spent a lovely spring at Southwick as an instructor for the NATO course, which had command-select officers heading to their ship/squadron/sub. This was about 10 years after the "Free the Malvinas" dust up. Incidentally, White House at Southwick was Ike's D-Day headquarters and the parlor still has all the original maps, charts, message traffic, weather reports, etc, and during "tea" you could peruse at your leisure.
The staff was top notch and about 70% were Falklands vets, and generally they all agreed that if the A-4s had dropped the bombs with enough time to arm, or had more attacks on multiple vectors, the game might have been different. Then got to play golf with a nice elderly man and his son was the Navigator on the HMS Conqueror which sank the Belgrano. Over the desk in his home office was the photo of the Belgrano with decks awash. Living history is fun to listen to, re-hash, and provides a degree of authenticity that just can't be handed down.
The Argentines as well as the British were fighting at the end of a long supply line (albeit shorter than the British one), and the Argentine air forces were also improvising and "operating on a shoestring".
Both militaries were stretched just beyond their capabilities, the Argentines had home-field advantage, and the UK had zero reserve, there was no back-up. Everything was brought to the fight and the very limits of platform range. The trusty A-4 was given one last act, modern amphibious landings are just as harrowing as ever and submarines still rule.
"Good Enough" is the motto of every war. CAC Boomerangs, Curtiss P-40 Hawks, and Grumman FM Wildcats were still in service during World War II, despite being outclassed, because they were effective enough in their roles.
You're not wrong, my reference was mainly directed around the RN and RFA attempting to use RO/RO, container ships and heavy ferries to transport aircraft, and other unique heavy cargo. Along with the RAF cobbling together missions given the remote-distant location of the islands.
The reality (no matter what all that fancy game analysis may show...) of "EABO"...
"They believed that the ships would be hidden from Arg eyes - which were in any case a long way off to the northeast - firstly by the weather, which was still very nasty, and by the shallow cliff at Fitzroy"
I had the good fortune to meet Admiral Woodward at a Falklands historical conference in 2012.
Royal Navy down from 80 major ships in 1980 to 30 in 2019 - a loss more devastating than a major fleet action. Parliament a much more dangerous enemy than any foreign navy.
Hell of a story, hell of a commander. The Brits were perhaps a year or so away from not being able to muster the forces needed for that 'close run thing.' Had the junta held off for a year to skip the symbology of the move as an attempt to distract/quell the growing domestic agitation, they'd have had more Exocets and Brits fewer transports as they narrowed into an optimized/more affordable NATO roles & missions construct emphasizing the sub force.
A great commander on a par with many of his WWII peers in my opinion.
“You’ve taken the Queen’s shilling. Now you’re going to have to bloody earn it. And your best way of getting back alive is to do your absolute utmost. So go and do it.”
Simply put. And that's the kind of straight talk sailors appreciate.
Almost Nelsonian
The comment at the end, Eisenhower's victory telegraph, etc. need to be taught to our FOGOs so they avoid word salad.
A cautionary tale completely lost on the current, 'Smartest People [equipped with acceptable pronouns] In The Room'...
In 100 Days, Adm. Wooward recounts how he nearly abandoned the landings after the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor...
(She was "Hiding In Plain Sight" donchyah know)
https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2023/08/the-atlantic-conveyor/
The Atlantic Conveyor
"I was embarked on the Conveyor (848 NAS) at this time. There has always been a debate as to whether we were hit by one or two missiles – it doesn’t really matter I guess, despite gallant efforts, there was nothing we could do to save her. The lone question I have always carried with me is, if she was so important to the success of the landings, why weren’t we better protected?"
Peter Burris
Who needs damage control or survivability? All a ship actually needs is a way for the crew to abandon ship in an orderly way.
Good thing for the Marines on Guadalcanal that the Alchiba didn't follow that model after eating 2 Long Lance's
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/USS_Alchiba_%28AK-23%29_aground_and_afire_off_Lunga_Point_in_November_1942.jpg
The Falklands campaign was one with many challenges, especially waging war at the end of a long and fragile logistics chain. The lack of transports, lack of carriers and harsh weather made things more difficult. You DO go to war with the Navy you've got.
The Brits threw aside all sorts of procedures and policies and improvised, innovated and adapted to expeditiously get a significant force underway. When we are called on to sail into harms way far from our shores, likely absent the support bases we have become accustomed to, do we have leaders who can improvise, innovate and adapt, and put aside the barnacle encrustations of bureaucratic rice bowls, red tape, rules and procedures?
The Falklands also reinforced that mastering the basics of fighting the ship, fire fighting and damage control are essential. And, that there will be inevitable losses of ships and crews, proving Murphy right that "No plan survives contact with the enemy." Contingency and back up plans are essential, but they need to be known and rehearsed.
Remember, the Falklands involved a major power against a regional power hobbled by decades of economic weakness. It was not a major power at the end of its logistics leash against a technologically near equal, fighting with home field advantage.
There is much to be learned from the Falklands, but how often is it discussed in detail in schools, or in wardrooms? Are they truly "lessons learned" if no one pays attention to the lessons, seen as merely musty history stuff, shoved aside by woke nonsense?
It’s doubtful the UK could execute such a feat now. I remember being a young third class and checking into my first squadron. Our H-3’s were all without MAD birds. The reserves were stripped of their ASQ-81 towed bodies and 32 recorders. We finally got them back around 1989…
One thing that struck me about that battle was that most of the damage and loss was caused by old-fashioned gravity bombs in the face of modern gun and missile defenses. And the fact that there would have been a lot more damage but for faulty fuzes on some of the bombs.
Have a grand recollection of that time and the move into modernity. CNN was available on Cable TV. Cable TV was not yet widespread. Had transferred to Staff duty at CINCPACFLT as a junior mid-level minion six months previous to the Falklands War and promoted to CWO2 (7121) the day before the war began in earnest. Had 16½ years in at the time, all of it at sea or on neutral duty...in an analog world. I marveled at the technology that gave us access to information watching CNN (not yet a tool of the Ministry of Truth and seeming to me to have better coverage than the 30 minute Big 3 network news in the evening) and sitting in the peanut gallery of command center at PacFlt taking in the blow-by-blow narrative of it all. We had no involvement in the war. We just watched. I listened, I saw, I even learned but mostly I marveled at the newness of all this. I believe many take technology for granted now. Old wars were fought brutally with less information. Modern wars can now be fought with more information and with a systematically more brutal outcome.
He has a certain Nelson quality. “England expects every man to do his duty”
The Brits appeared to know they had big shoes to fill at the time. I wonder if modern FOGO respect and honor their leadership heritage.
Doubtful. There is literally a handful that understand warfare period. The majority couldn’t lead their way out of a burning Walmart.
Ouch.
This inspired me to break out both books...Been a decade plus since I read them.
As I remember, Clapp was pretty critical of Woodward.
But "Command Friction" can be healthy.
One of my heroes as a young officer. And as a retarded one, now.
Spent a lovely spring at Southwick as an instructor for the NATO course, which had command-select officers heading to their ship/squadron/sub. This was about 10 years after the "Free the Malvinas" dust up. Incidentally, White House at Southwick was Ike's D-Day headquarters and the parlor still has all the original maps, charts, message traffic, weather reports, etc, and during "tea" you could peruse at your leisure.
The staff was top notch and about 70% were Falklands vets, and generally they all agreed that if the A-4s had dropped the bombs with enough time to arm, or had more attacks on multiple vectors, the game might have been different. Then got to play golf with a nice elderly man and his son was the Navigator on the HMS Conqueror which sank the Belgrano. Over the desk in his home office was the photo of the Belgrano with decks awash. Living history is fun to listen to, re-hash, and provides a degree of authenticity that just can't be handed down.
Great story!
The Argentines as well as the British were fighting at the end of a long supply line (albeit shorter than the British one), and the Argentine air forces were also improvising and "operating on a shoestring".
I think the Falklands War motto was 'Good Enough'
Both militaries were stretched just beyond their capabilities, the Argentines had home-field advantage, and the UK had zero reserve, there was no back-up. Everything was brought to the fight and the very limits of platform range. The trusty A-4 was given one last act, modern amphibious landings are just as harrowing as ever and submarines still rule.
"Good Enough" is the motto of every war. CAC Boomerangs, Curtiss P-40 Hawks, and Grumman FM Wildcats were still in service during World War II, despite being outclassed, because they were effective enough in their roles.
You're not wrong, my reference was mainly directed around the RN and RFA attempting to use RO/RO, container ships and heavy ferries to transport aircraft, and other unique heavy cargo. Along with the RAF cobbling together missions given the remote-distant location of the islands.
The reality (no matter what all that fancy game analysis may show...) of "EABO"...
"They believed that the ships would be hidden from Arg eyes - which were in any case a long way off to the northeast - firstly by the weather, which was still very nasty, and by the shallow cliff at Fitzroy"
pp 318-319 100 Days
[Hiding In Plain Sight]
https://youtu.be/Nh8c8SgaN5M?si=IeSKrCPAMgVnOmso
(longer version)
https://youtu.be/Eo0BNYGgEV4?si=ewjfgcPnlRjbZ1cF
https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/bolia1.pdf
"The Bluff Cove Disaster"
I had the good fortune to meet Admiral Woodward at a Falklands historical conference in 2012.
Royal Navy down from 80 major ships in 1980 to 30 in 2019 - a loss more devastating than a major fleet action. Parliament a much more dangerous enemy than any foreign navy.
https://i.dailymail.co.uk/1s/2019/07/22/15/16350368-0-image-a-54_1563805707636.jpg
Hell of a story, hell of a commander. The Brits were perhaps a year or so away from not being able to muster the forces needed for that 'close run thing.' Had the junta held off for a year to skip the symbology of the move as an attempt to distract/quell the growing domestic agitation, they'd have had more Exocets and Brits fewer transports as they narrowed into an optimized/more affordable NATO roles & missions construct emphasizing the sub force.