Their criticism is somewhat true in that the Dems have ruined the "politics stops at the waters edge" ethos some time ago. So now rather than a united front, we see saw our allies as successive administrations change.
However, that the Germans can't see the way the wind is blowing STILL, AFTER Russia invaded Ukraine, is just incomprehensible. It was thought that they, and the rest of the EU finally got the danger (I won't say all of NATO because the former Soviet countries ALWAYS got it) that Trump warned them about. That they laughed about, thinking that war could never come to Europe again.
Reading this, if there was a way to let Germany twist in the wind without endangering NATO, I would say screw them (and France and Spain) and let the Russians have them. They wonder why America First sounds so good some days.
I'm starting to wonder whether the Three Seas Initiative (plus the US, UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ukraine, and any NATO members who still take the idea of a military alliance seriously) can or should supplant NATO.
I get the feeling the Germans would still hem and haw about an obvious Article 5 scenario, like if Russia invaded Lithuania. ("See, we must take Russian concerns about feeling surrounded by enemies seriously, and how they simply want to maintain links to the sovereign territory of Kaliningrad. Of course we favor peace, but when? Who is to say?")
This is only true if the Germans are wrong about their worries. If Putin eventually gets everything he wants and forces a Ukrainian surrender, the Germans will 'balance' themselves right back into Moscow's favor. While of course continuing to pretend otherwise.
While I agree with your comments about Germany, I do not about the US. Germany needed the people to be more participative in Gov't post WWII to prevent militarism from returning. Japan was similar, and we did our job well because both are still hesitant to get into wars. Both approaches pretty much worked and we together successfully weathered the cold war against crazy Ivan through basing and logistical support from them both. We even helped unify Germany under the hard work of Reagan, Weinberger and Schulz.
Russia is not a non-nuclear threat to NATO anymore and so appeasement seems rational to the old European ways (as you point out). RU is weak and we could take them but who wants to be saddled with that, or risk a nuclear exchange. Putin understands this and is a gambler. We just want RU to be responsible and not turn into a despotic dictatorship. Instead they have a cult of personality bent on a 16th century expansion of the glory of mother Russia. The Nordic and Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova get it. France and Germany don't really get how important it is to stop this. Does it end with Putin's natural death? We have no choice but to keep grinding RU down as long as Ukraine is willing to fight. The risk of further and future conflict is only delayed by not standing firm.
That cheap energy from Russia is just leverage, the Russians have plans for far more than Ukraine - and they involve Germany as well - and Europe to the Atlantic coast: "One way in which Russia will be able to turn other states against Atlanticism will be an astute use of the country's raw material riches. "In the beginning stage [of the struggle against Atlanticism]," Dugin writes, "Russia can offer its potential partners in the East and West its resources as compensation for exacerbating their relations with the U.S." (276). To induce the Anaconda to release its grip on the coastline of Eurasia, it must be attacked relentlessly on its home territory, within its own hemisphere, and throughout Eurasia. "All levels of geopolitical pressure," Dugin insists, "must be activated simultaneously" (367). ...
The basis of the Moscow-Berlin axis, Dugin writes, will be "the principle of a common enemy [that is, the United States]" (216). In exchange for cooperating with Russia in this project, Dugin proposes that Germany be given back "Kaliningrad oblast' (Eastern Prussia)" (228). As a result of a Grand Alliance between Russia and Germany, the two countries will divvy up the territories lying between them into de facto spheres of dominance. There is to be no "sanitary cordon." "The task of Eurasia," Dugin emphasizes, "consists in making sure such a [sanitary] cordon does not exist" (370). Russia and Germany together, he insists, "must decide all disputed questions together and in advance" (226).
The integration of swaths of Western and Central European territory into a German sphere of dominance will be encouraged directly and abetted by Eurasia-Russia. The formation of a "Franco- German bloc" especially is to be supported (171). "In Germany and France,'" Dugin asserts, "there is a firm anti-Atlanticist tradition" (369). Germany's influence likely will spread to the south--to Italy and Spain (220). Only Britain, "an extraterritorial floating base of the U.S." is to be cut off and shunned (221)." https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics
Maybe the Germans in the SDU know about this - and are dumb enough to trust Moscow to deliver on its part of the bargain...
Excellent article. Many thanks.
-M
Their criticism is somewhat true in that the Dems have ruined the "politics stops at the waters edge" ethos some time ago. So now rather than a united front, we see saw our allies as successive administrations change.
However, that the Germans can't see the way the wind is blowing STILL, AFTER Russia invaded Ukraine, is just incomprehensible. It was thought that they, and the rest of the EU finally got the danger (I won't say all of NATO because the former Soviet countries ALWAYS got it) that Trump warned them about. That they laughed about, thinking that war could never come to Europe again.
Reading this, if there was a way to let Germany twist in the wind without endangering NATO, I would say screw them (and France and Spain) and let the Russians have them. They wonder why America First sounds so good some days.
I'm starting to wonder whether the Three Seas Initiative (plus the US, UK, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ukraine, and any NATO members who still take the idea of a military alliance seriously) can or should supplant NATO.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Seas_Initiative
I get the feeling the Germans would still hem and haw about an obvious Article 5 scenario, like if Russia invaded Lithuania. ("See, we must take Russian concerns about feeling surrounded by enemies seriously, and how they simply want to maintain links to the sovereign territory of Kaliningrad. Of course we favor peace, but when? Who is to say?")
"At some point she will have to pick a side."
This is only true if the Germans are wrong about their worries. If Putin eventually gets everything he wants and forces a Ukrainian surrender, the Germans will 'balance' themselves right back into Moscow's favor. While of course continuing to pretend otherwise.
While I agree with your comments about Germany, I do not about the US. Germany needed the people to be more participative in Gov't post WWII to prevent militarism from returning. Japan was similar, and we did our job well because both are still hesitant to get into wars. Both approaches pretty much worked and we together successfully weathered the cold war against crazy Ivan through basing and logistical support from them both. We even helped unify Germany under the hard work of Reagan, Weinberger and Schulz.
Russia is not a non-nuclear threat to NATO anymore and so appeasement seems rational to the old European ways (as you point out). RU is weak and we could take them but who wants to be saddled with that, or risk a nuclear exchange. Putin understands this and is a gambler. We just want RU to be responsible and not turn into a despotic dictatorship. Instead they have a cult of personality bent on a 16th century expansion of the glory of mother Russia. The Nordic and Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine and Moldova get it. France and Germany don't really get how important it is to stop this. Does it end with Putin's natural death? We have no choice but to keep grinding RU down as long as Ukraine is willing to fight. The risk of further and future conflict is only delayed by not standing firm.
That cheap energy from Russia is just leverage, the Russians have plans for far more than Ukraine - and they involve Germany as well - and Europe to the Atlantic coast: "One way in which Russia will be able to turn other states against Atlanticism will be an astute use of the country's raw material riches. "In the beginning stage [of the struggle against Atlanticism]," Dugin writes, "Russia can offer its potential partners in the East and West its resources as compensation for exacerbating their relations with the U.S." (276). To induce the Anaconda to release its grip on the coastline of Eurasia, it must be attacked relentlessly on its home territory, within its own hemisphere, and throughout Eurasia. "All levels of geopolitical pressure," Dugin insists, "must be activated simultaneously" (367). ...
The basis of the Moscow-Berlin axis, Dugin writes, will be "the principle of a common enemy [that is, the United States]" (216). In exchange for cooperating with Russia in this project, Dugin proposes that Germany be given back "Kaliningrad oblast' (Eastern Prussia)" (228). As a result of a Grand Alliance between Russia and Germany, the two countries will divvy up the territories lying between them into de facto spheres of dominance. There is to be no "sanitary cordon." "The task of Eurasia," Dugin emphasizes, "consists in making sure such a [sanitary] cordon does not exist" (370). Russia and Germany together, he insists, "must decide all disputed questions together and in advance" (226).
The integration of swaths of Western and Central European territory into a German sphere of dominance will be encouraged directly and abetted by Eurasia-Russia. The formation of a "Franco- German bloc" especially is to be supported (171). "In Germany and France,'" Dugin asserts, "there is a firm anti-Atlanticist tradition" (369). Germany's influence likely will spread to the south--to Italy and Spain (220). Only Britain, "an extraterritorial floating base of the U.S." is to be cut off and shunned (221)." https://tec.fsi.stanford.edu/docs/aleksandr-dugins-foundations-geopolitics
Maybe the Germans in the SDU know about this - and are dumb enough to trust Moscow to deliver on its part of the bargain...
AMEN!