It all seems pretty simple to me based on the complete history of our country. We have two really big oceans that have protected us from harm and allowed our security. The first priority of our national defense has to be protecting that buffer. Beyond that are expeditionary forces...all so we fight THERE rather than HERE. Any defense budget that doesn't (and they haven't) reflect that reality is bunk.
The question is why and, beyond all the comments by Sal about the Cult of the Joint etc., it is because the bureaucrats in DC want to spend the money on other things - foreign and domestic.
But there can be no greater priority for the country than increasing the industrial base (both to "make things here" for commercial purposes, but also to support defense), increasing our shipyard capacity (for production and REPAIRS/SUSTAINMENT), and developing what we need to support those Navy/expeditionary operations. It isn't about being parochial, it is about threats and priorities. Support NATO, let European countries take on the land burden though. Work with them on building up their and our Navies through their capacities and ours. We'll dominate of 5C, ISR platforms, coordination, next-gen tech, stealth, etc.
This is NOT rocket science...and the fact it is this hard for the weanies in DC tells you everything.
Your comments on deindustrialization, decline and defeat are spot on.
But your comments on the cause, GNA of 1986 are so completely off the mark that they merit my attention. Jointness has nothing to do with the Navy's cluelessness on building a war winning force. If a service cannot successfully compete for resources among its own peers, then it doesn't deserve those resources because it hasn't developed a good narrative.
I personally saw that dynamic in action during the first QDR go-around in 1997. I was part of the Army team that was pre-briefing the Deputy OSD PAE (now CAPE) on our requirements; I was with NGB and was present to make sure the Army didn't screw the RC in their brief (they didn't - then. But that's another story.) Air Force led the services with a whiz bang presentation that made sense and was coherent. Army then presented with its overwrought slides presenting many facts making little coherent sense. The Navy came next. The Rear Admiral (I never did get his name) came up to the blackboard (it could have been a whiteboard but memory fades) and writes the number "11" and sits down. Everyone in the room immediately understood what that meant, and you do too. Succinct to say the least.
I have always thought of that anecdote in a good way for a narrative. However, as I reflect across the decades at that stunt, it was incomplete and incoherent. Why "11"? why not "12"? Why not "9"? All those options were on the table then. The admiral never connected strategy with force. Just stated we need "X" force. And only focused on CSGs. Not Amphibs. Not subs. Not mines. Definitely not USVs. Therein lies the heart of the Navy's problem, I think. Not Jointness but hubris. Or perhaps as the Japanese used to characterize their problem in WWII, "Victory Disease." We are complacent, and the Navy as an institution especially so. The Marines are not; the Air Force is not. Even the Army is demonstrating an immediacy of action different from their past habits. Nothing about this has to do with Goldwater Nichols.
IIRC, these are the same cruisers that the Potomac Fleet has been trying to slow roll Congress on. That is, everyone spending all of their time arguing and posturing instead of getting on the SOME sort of plan for facing up to our obvious enemies. Unless, of course, the same GOFOs have figure out a way to use their DEI efforts as offensive weapons.
The Navy spent something like $60 billion dollars on a fleet of worthless and defective little crappy ships and three giant DDs without any ammo or required radars. Is that the fault of Goldwater–Nichols? Is the fact that the Navy takes 8 years to overhaul a sub, long enough that she lost her diving cert, the fault of Goldwater–Nichols? I think it was just incompetence and hubris. The Army fiasco of FCS also wasn't Goldwater–Nichols, it was just incompetence and hubris.
First and foremost we are now men and women out of time.
We seek a Navy while those in charge on the waterfront and offices are rent seekers little interested in the pride of seeing their work get underway when they can prolong to either make more money, or avoid making a mistake that ends their naval career.
86,000 NAVSEA employees plus the experts at the Broken And Expensive (BAE) yards. All with eight years of safe sinecure under their belts. - Why take a risk?
40% of defense spending for Navy/Marines, 35% for Air/Space Forces, and 25% for Army sound about right if China really is the pacing threat? Or will the Army's new procurement chief, Vladimir Putin continue to win budget negotiations?
And given the extra money, will the Navy spend it on maintenance, supply/support vessels, escort vessels, munitions, and training; or will we get Little Crappy Ships 2.0?
A 1 trillion "infrastructure" bill that was a green cult boondoggle. 100+ billion to bleed out a second rate land power in Ukraine. I realize that realistic fungibility is an issue, the whole if we could put a man on the moon why can't we eliminate poverty b.s. I think we will look back and say a fraction of that might have saved the day. Was reading a book called The Lonely Ships about the US Asiatic Fleet in late 41/early 42. If we do that well, I'd be amazed.
I may not be up-to-date in current naval affairs, having retired in 1991, but aren't there enough MU's in the Reserves that could be called up to play Souza music in parades and concerts in support of selling war bonds in order to reindustrialize to built and repair ships should we ever go to war again? What worked for us in WWII could work again. Assuming there is even a market for U.S. bonds anymore.
There's a distinct unseriousness amongst the senior ranks of the Navy and their civilian department lifers who make up the Pentagon.
Since jointness and satisfying the CoCom requests are enshrined in law...I'm not sure what the answer is. We've seen Henrix, McGrath and Clark point out the shortcomings and possible solutions for the Navy but, I've yet to read any solution to unraveling the knot that's been twisted as a result of Goldwater-Nichols. Is the Navy the only one reeling because of this? Is the Navy just the most unfocused of the services?
1) If you could have 5 changes to GN that would reflect an updated maritime reality or correct original flaws, what would they be?
2) If you could have 5 emergency measures put in place to bolster USN lethality/deterrence around Taiwan and Philippines “quickly” what would those be?
3) If you could remove funding from 5 other service programs to fund longer term Navy weapons/maintenance programs what would they be?
4) What would you push that funding you pirated from the other services to?
Note: Elimination of DEI under #2 is allowed, and hereby granted as a free wish.
8 years for a remodel? YGBSM. How much have reasonable requirements changed in that period?
This is spending a ton of taxpayer money on an old (25+) year old warship that has been updated - to only 9 years old, or older?
It all seems pretty simple to me based on the complete history of our country. We have two really big oceans that have protected us from harm and allowed our security. The first priority of our national defense has to be protecting that buffer. Beyond that are expeditionary forces...all so we fight THERE rather than HERE. Any defense budget that doesn't (and they haven't) reflect that reality is bunk.
The question is why and, beyond all the comments by Sal about the Cult of the Joint etc., it is because the bureaucrats in DC want to spend the money on other things - foreign and domestic.
But there can be no greater priority for the country than increasing the industrial base (both to "make things here" for commercial purposes, but also to support defense), increasing our shipyard capacity (for production and REPAIRS/SUSTAINMENT), and developing what we need to support those Navy/expeditionary operations. It isn't about being parochial, it is about threats and priorities. Support NATO, let European countries take on the land burden though. Work with them on building up their and our Navies through their capacities and ours. We'll dominate of 5C, ISR platforms, coordination, next-gen tech, stealth, etc.
This is NOT rocket science...and the fact it is this hard for the weanies in DC tells you everything.
Yes, but....our pronouns are in order...and the real enemy is “Climate Change,” right?
To all those who say “Yes but our ships and crews are better,” remember that quantity has its own quality...
Time for the children of liberalism and feel good defense to give the keys to DOD back to their parents.
Your comments on deindustrialization, decline and defeat are spot on.
But your comments on the cause, GNA of 1986 are so completely off the mark that they merit my attention. Jointness has nothing to do with the Navy's cluelessness on building a war winning force. If a service cannot successfully compete for resources among its own peers, then it doesn't deserve those resources because it hasn't developed a good narrative.
I personally saw that dynamic in action during the first QDR go-around in 1997. I was part of the Army team that was pre-briefing the Deputy OSD PAE (now CAPE) on our requirements; I was with NGB and was present to make sure the Army didn't screw the RC in their brief (they didn't - then. But that's another story.) Air Force led the services with a whiz bang presentation that made sense and was coherent. Army then presented with its overwrought slides presenting many facts making little coherent sense. The Navy came next. The Rear Admiral (I never did get his name) came up to the blackboard (it could have been a whiteboard but memory fades) and writes the number "11" and sits down. Everyone in the room immediately understood what that meant, and you do too. Succinct to say the least.
I have always thought of that anecdote in a good way for a narrative. However, as I reflect across the decades at that stunt, it was incomplete and incoherent. Why "11"? why not "12"? Why not "9"? All those options were on the table then. The admiral never connected strategy with force. Just stated we need "X" force. And only focused on CSGs. Not Amphibs. Not subs. Not mines. Definitely not USVs. Therein lies the heart of the Navy's problem, I think. Not Jointness but hubris. Or perhaps as the Japanese used to characterize their problem in WWII, "Victory Disease." We are complacent, and the Navy as an institution especially so. The Marines are not; the Air Force is not. Even the Army is demonstrating an immediacy of action different from their past habits. Nothing about this has to do with Goldwater Nichols.
IIRC, these are the same cruisers that the Potomac Fleet has been trying to slow roll Congress on. That is, everyone spending all of their time arguing and posturing instead of getting on the SOME sort of plan for facing up to our obvious enemies. Unless, of course, the same GOFOs have figure out a way to use their DEI efforts as offensive weapons.
The Navy spent something like $60 billion dollars on a fleet of worthless and defective little crappy ships and three giant DDs without any ammo or required radars. Is that the fault of Goldwater–Nichols? Is the fact that the Navy takes 8 years to overhaul a sub, long enough that she lost her diving cert, the fault of Goldwater–Nichols? I think it was just incompetence and hubris. The Army fiasco of FCS also wasn't Goldwater–Nichols, it was just incompetence and hubris.
Are YOU ready to fight climate change?
First and foremost we are now men and women out of time.
We seek a Navy while those in charge on the waterfront and offices are rent seekers little interested in the pride of seeing their work get underway when they can prolong to either make more money, or avoid making a mistake that ends their naval career.
86,000 NAVSEA employees plus the experts at the Broken And Expensive (BAE) yards. All with eight years of safe sinecure under their belts. - Why take a risk?
We might as well shout at the clouds.
Terrifying!
Thanks so very much for keeping us posted. - Sid
40% of defense spending for Navy/Marines, 35% for Air/Space Forces, and 25% for Army sound about right if China really is the pacing threat? Or will the Army's new procurement chief, Vladimir Putin continue to win budget negotiations?
And given the extra money, will the Navy spend it on maintenance, supply/support vessels, escort vessels, munitions, and training; or will we get Little Crappy Ships 2.0?
A 1 trillion "infrastructure" bill that was a green cult boondoggle. 100+ billion to bleed out a second rate land power in Ukraine. I realize that realistic fungibility is an issue, the whole if we could put a man on the moon why can't we eliminate poverty b.s. I think we will look back and say a fraction of that might have saved the day. Was reading a book called The Lonely Ships about the US Asiatic Fleet in late 41/early 42. If we do that well, I'd be amazed.
I may not be up-to-date in current naval affairs, having retired in 1991, but aren't there enough MU's in the Reserves that could be called up to play Souza music in parades and concerts in support of selling war bonds in order to reindustrialize to built and repair ships should we ever go to war again? What worked for us in WWII could work again. Assuming there is even a market for U.S. bonds anymore.
There's a distinct unseriousness amongst the senior ranks of the Navy and their civilian department lifers who make up the Pentagon.
Since jointness and satisfying the CoCom requests are enshrined in law...I'm not sure what the answer is. We've seen Henrix, McGrath and Clark point out the shortcomings and possible solutions for the Navy but, I've yet to read any solution to unraveling the knot that's been twisted as a result of Goldwater-Nichols. Is the Navy the only one reeling because of this? Is the Navy just the most unfocused of the services?
Maybe it's time to get rid of Goldwater Nichols, cut the civilian employees by 50% and flag officer by 75%
All:
1) If you could have 5 changes to GN that would reflect an updated maritime reality or correct original flaws, what would they be?
2) If you could have 5 emergency measures put in place to bolster USN lethality/deterrence around Taiwan and Philippines “quickly” what would those be?
3) If you could remove funding from 5 other service programs to fund longer term Navy weapons/maintenance programs what would they be?
4) What would you push that funding you pirated from the other services to?
Note: Elimination of DEI under #2 is allowed, and hereby granted as a free wish.
Thanks for focusing on the facts
These are good numbers to have in discussion our lack of capability. Thanks.