“ I’ll throw this out to the Front Porch - please tell me it isn’t as bad as it seems where once again we are talking a big game,..”
You know the answer to that Phib. And yes, we are all getting recalled to active duty. At least the majority of members of the front porch recalled won’t be concerned about fitreps or PFA or woke tranny training.
“On a different note I just spent an hour and a half listening to the joint testimony of the USTRANSCOM commander before the SASC. …. General Van Ovost, the TRANSCOM commander pointed out that the 44 RORO vessels in our inventory are all 44 years old or older with 17 that are 50 years older. She did not go as far as her predecessor did in admitting insufficient capacity but she did a very good job of arguing that we need to recapitalized the vessels run by the Maritime Administratoin (Ready Reserve). She admits serious problems in INDOPACOM.
…. We are not in good shape. Tanker fleet is very old and not being rebuilt quickly enough. The same is true of our haze gray transports. Van Ovost’s written posture statement is written in DOD gibberish and she speaks the same way but in the end she is clear about the shape we are in.”
Damn sure glad Ike and Churchill weren’t facing this problem set 79 years ago….
Old National Guard/USAR MSG here. Not only does the USAR do this well, but there are kinds of units that are (or at least used to be) primarily army reserve units. The Army learned some hard lessons in Desert Storm I about ensuring that these units have all their equipment and actually gets out into the field to use it in semi-real-world situations (and again as we rolled into Afghanistan/Iraq) One key value I noted at the time is that in many cases in the USAR and NG units were civilian SMEs in the field.
The only way that this will work in the reserves is if we use 1) Exclusively commercial equipment and 2) Commit to not scrapping the units. We relegated the Inshore Boat Units, Coastal Riverines, and Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units to the reserves and it was their death knell. The only thing that the reserves are able to do without getting stabbed in the back is Coffee / Donuts units in Newport and the Pentagon, or some cush Naval Readiness Center job to support IA's. By using commercial equipment, the Navy's maintenance and operations budgets won't be taxed, we'll only pay to practice on commercial equipment, and if the balloon goes up we can lease the equipment at risk or ouright purchase it.
“...every other service seems to do a better job getting a bang for its buck from the reserves. The Navy seems to let so much human capital go uncaptured - even in part - when they leave the active force.”
100% correct (unless things have changed, which I doubt.)
First-hand experience: when the first Gulf War went down, me and a couple of buds - we all had been F-14 FRS instructors, now SELRES - went to the skipper of the F-14 RAG, said, if any of your pilots get ordered to the Fleet, we volunteer to come back to the FRS on active duty, or as SELRES, to cover the loss. I was more than willing to CQ and deploy.
We got told, to our faces, “I don’t need the Reserves”...all the while we watched Guard F-16 pilots going in on the first wave. In fact, an F-14 bubba that switched to the ANG (Syracuse, IIRC) was in on that first strike.
We got told later, after the war,it was all about funding. If the REGNAV could show they were 100% combat capable and ready, met all war tasking without “needing” the Reserves, then a claim could be made on reservist funding. “Why spend all this money on the Reserves when we just fought a war and didn’t need them?” so the argument went.
It is more than likely even worse than we think. I was recently by Suisun Bay several times in the past two months. There is one RORO and about 5 or 6 Liberty ships and an old single stack DE. That’s it. The RORO appears to be mid 70’s vintage. On top of that, we have grossly neglected our merchant fleet. We do little to promote and encourage maritime careers. The learning curve is much more difficult when you have people shooting at you. It’s good that some are ready to be recalled, because what I see from the MElinneals is not encouraging.
I have been retired for a long time and spent most of my USN years in USNR.
Biggest problem with USNR is the TAR program. In my opinion, the TAR program is just a way to insulate the active reserve from the regular Navy. Being in the Ready Reserve means one weekend a month, or equivalent, and 14 days a year on ACDUTRA.
I think the reserve program should be administered by an augmentation officer in every command with need for reserve help. They could control and assign personnel where needed rather than asking a third party to do the same.
It might make the reserve member a little closer to the active Navy and help in readiness when they train with their parent command.
Ditch the TAR program, save some money and have a real Ready Reserve.
A second post in a row connected to my areas of expertise! Post about SSBNs, and we'll hit the trifecta.
When I left LCS last year, I moved to a Military Sealift Command Expeditionary Port Unit. Now, my job is running liaison between a port and a MSC ship(s). I did have the MSC intro course this spring, and we did talk about the OPDS. As in, it was mentioned. MSC, because of the Strategic Sealift Officer force, (1665 Officer Designators), is heavily reserve manned. It's going to be an interesting few years. I may end up making decisions of consequence.
This most recent reserve weekend, I did have a conversation about human capital and training with an admiral. If, we as a Navy, are going to have a relevant Navy Reserve that puts sailors into roles ready to go, there needs to be more training. As I said yesterday, I've gotten very little formal training related to my billets in the past 11 years. In truth, it ends up being about 6 weeks of time. Sailors should not be responsible for doing all the work for a school, especially if it's remote. It should be run by the gaining command's Reserve Program Director. Give the sailors a choice of dates, and the RPD then works with the training command.
So, when China decides to start The Great Pacific War, we will be fighting it without a proper Fleet Train?
We once knew that a wartime fleet train needed hundreds of ships, so we better start building them in peacetime, with MARAD loans and grants.
My Dad's ship, USS ALDEBERAN ( AF-10 ), was built for United Fruit, as a high speed reefer, under a MARAD loan, with the conditions that she was made to USN standards, and could be taken as a AR, in time of war. SS STAG HOUND made one round trip for United Fruit, when Pearl Harbor changed her name to ALDEBERAN.
EABO was a capability the Navy had in WWII. Question that Congress needs to demand of DOD leadership and service chiefs: why is the force less capable now then it was eighty years ago?!?
“ I’ll throw this out to the Front Porch - please tell me it isn’t as bad as it seems where once again we are talking a big game,..”
You know the answer to that Phib. And yes, we are all getting recalled to active duty. At least the majority of members of the front porch recalled won’t be concerned about fitreps or PFA or woke tranny training.
Or how about this….from a similar-leaning blog…
“On a different note I just spent an hour and a half listening to the joint testimony of the USTRANSCOM commander before the SASC. …. General Van Ovost, the TRANSCOM commander pointed out that the 44 RORO vessels in our inventory are all 44 years old or older with 17 that are 50 years older. She did not go as far as her predecessor did in admitting insufficient capacity but she did a very good job of arguing that we need to recapitalized the vessels run by the Maritime Administratoin (Ready Reserve). She admits serious problems in INDOPACOM.
…. We are not in good shape. Tanker fleet is very old and not being rebuilt quickly enough. The same is true of our haze gray transports. Van Ovost’s written posture statement is written in DOD gibberish and she speaks the same way but in the end she is clear about the shape we are in.”
Damn sure glad Ike and Churchill weren’t facing this problem set 79 years ago….
Old National Guard/USAR MSG here. Not only does the USAR do this well, but there are kinds of units that are (or at least used to be) primarily army reserve units. The Army learned some hard lessons in Desert Storm I about ensuring that these units have all their equipment and actually gets out into the field to use it in semi-real-world situations (and again as we rolled into Afghanistan/Iraq) One key value I noted at the time is that in many cases in the USAR and NG units were civilian SMEs in the field.
Perhaps we need the Navy equivalent of the Army Corps of Engineers.
The only way that this will work in the reserves is if we use 1) Exclusively commercial equipment and 2) Commit to not scrapping the units. We relegated the Inshore Boat Units, Coastal Riverines, and Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units to the reserves and it was their death knell. The only thing that the reserves are able to do without getting stabbed in the back is Coffee / Donuts units in Newport and the Pentagon, or some cush Naval Readiness Center job to support IA's. By using commercial equipment, the Navy's maintenance and operations budgets won't be taxed, we'll only pay to practice on commercial equipment, and if the balloon goes up we can lease the equipment at risk or ouright purchase it.
“...every other service seems to do a better job getting a bang for its buck from the reserves. The Navy seems to let so much human capital go uncaptured - even in part - when they leave the active force.”
100% correct (unless things have changed, which I doubt.)
First-hand experience: when the first Gulf War went down, me and a couple of buds - we all had been F-14 FRS instructors, now SELRES - went to the skipper of the F-14 RAG, said, if any of your pilots get ordered to the Fleet, we volunteer to come back to the FRS on active duty, or as SELRES, to cover the loss. I was more than willing to CQ and deploy.
We got told, to our faces, “I don’t need the Reserves”...all the while we watched Guard F-16 pilots going in on the first wave. In fact, an F-14 bubba that switched to the ANG (Syracuse, IIRC) was in on that first strike.
We got told later, after the war,it was all about funding. If the REGNAV could show they were 100% combat capable and ready, met all war tasking without “needing” the Reserves, then a claim could be made on reservist funding. “Why spend all this money on the Reserves when we just fought a war and didn’t need them?” so the argument went.
It is more than likely even worse than we think. I was recently by Suisun Bay several times in the past two months. There is one RORO and about 5 or 6 Liberty ships and an old single stack DE. That’s it. The RORO appears to be mid 70’s vintage. On top of that, we have grossly neglected our merchant fleet. We do little to promote and encourage maritime careers. The learning curve is much more difficult when you have people shooting at you. It’s good that some are ready to be recalled, because what I see from the MElinneals is not encouraging.
I know we need more fighting hulls, but until we can support them, better not Jack up production of Virginias, Burkes, Constellations, and Fords.
MORE TANKERS, TENDERS, AND TUGS.
I have been retired for a long time and spent most of my USN years in USNR.
Biggest problem with USNR is the TAR program. In my opinion, the TAR program is just a way to insulate the active reserve from the regular Navy. Being in the Ready Reserve means one weekend a month, or equivalent, and 14 days a year on ACDUTRA.
I think the reserve program should be administered by an augmentation officer in every command with need for reserve help. They could control and assign personnel where needed rather than asking a third party to do the same.
It might make the reserve member a little closer to the active Navy and help in readiness when they train with their parent command.
Ditch the TAR program, save some money and have a real Ready Reserve.
ahem. still here.
......I am the "WALRUS" (see DARPA)
"I don’t see any sane argument that would make the position that we need less instead more of both of these"
I thought the current administration said we need to be fully electric by 2035 or so. Petroleum is so 20th century anyway
What's worse is that USNR capabilities in this space have also been cut. But we still have a grunch load of RC sailors supporting LCS...
Only one OPDS? Do we even have the wherewithal to protect just one?
A second post in a row connected to my areas of expertise! Post about SSBNs, and we'll hit the trifecta.
When I left LCS last year, I moved to a Military Sealift Command Expeditionary Port Unit. Now, my job is running liaison between a port and a MSC ship(s). I did have the MSC intro course this spring, and we did talk about the OPDS. As in, it was mentioned. MSC, because of the Strategic Sealift Officer force, (1665 Officer Designators), is heavily reserve manned. It's going to be an interesting few years. I may end up making decisions of consequence.
This most recent reserve weekend, I did have a conversation about human capital and training with an admiral. If, we as a Navy, are going to have a relevant Navy Reserve that puts sailors into roles ready to go, there needs to be more training. As I said yesterday, I've gotten very little formal training related to my billets in the past 11 years. In truth, it ends up being about 6 weeks of time. Sailors should not be responsible for doing all the work for a school, especially if it's remote. It should be run by the gaining command's Reserve Program Director. Give the sailors a choice of dates, and the RPD then works with the training command.
So, when China decides to start The Great Pacific War, we will be fighting it without a proper Fleet Train?
We once knew that a wartime fleet train needed hundreds of ships, so we better start building them in peacetime, with MARAD loans and grants.
My Dad's ship, USS ALDEBERAN ( AF-10 ), was built for United Fruit, as a high speed reefer, under a MARAD loan, with the conditions that she was made to USN standards, and could be taken as a AR, in time of war. SS STAG HOUND made one round trip for United Fruit, when Pearl Harbor changed her name to ALDEBERAN.
It worked then, hopefully, it would work now.
EABO was a capability the Navy had in WWII. Question that Congress needs to demand of DOD leadership and service chiefs: why is the force less capable now then it was eighty years ago?!?