Israel's Measured Response

communications by other means

Early Thursday afternoon, a pure-civilian from my work-world asked me what I thought Israel might do in response to the almost 300-400 warheads sent its way from Iran.

Once an Operational Planner, always an Operational Planner.

I outlined three possible Courses of Action (COA) for him in my usual “graduated response” format. I have zero access to Higher Direction and Guidance (D&G) and Commander’s Intent, so there isn’t much specificity here with the full expectation that additional work would be required once briefed up the chain to those who would have at least unofficial visibility on Higher D&G.

Well, that is how the theory works where I were running a team in that parallel universe. This is what I came up with on the spot:

• COA-A: Desert Storm Redux: like in 1991 when Iraq threw Scud missiles Israel’s way to bring them in the fight, Israel decided to just take it and not give Iraq what it wanted…at least for a while.

• COA-B: At My Leisure: As the attack did not create mass casualties or damage, Israel will respond, but in kind and manner of their choosing. Things will go bump in the night.

• COA-C: See ‘ya & Raise ‘ya: All the conventional high-end toys the Israel Air Force and submarine service will be let out of the barn for an extended range day.

I told him if I had to place a bet, I would pick COA-B as COA-A’s world no longer exists, and COA-C simply has too much risk in the larger view.

Well, a few hours later, we found out. In the unlikely event that the COAs presented would roughly align with the three above, it appears that Israel’s leadership - if that is what they were offered - told the planning staff; “Give me three different versions of COA-C from small to large and rebrief.”

Pondering the additional information that came out this weekend, it looks like Israel took the lower end of the COA-C option. I would have done a bit more, but I think this made the point that needed to be made.

Mike Brest over at the Washington Examiner has a nice overview and post-strike commentary;

Israeli officials, for their part, indicated that they designed the attack to send a message to Tehran that it has the capabilities to hit targets within their borders and evade their air defense systems. The operation was designed to demonstrate that Israel “chose not to hit your nuclear sites this time, but we could have done worse right here,” an Israeli source told the Jerusalem Post.

Israel was responding to last weekend’s unprecedented attack against Israel. Iran fired more than 300 cruise and ballistic missiles and attack drones at Israel on April 13-14. The attack was unprecedented both in the number of munitions fired but also because many of them were fired from Iranian territory.

…

“Although some commentators have argued that this was a halfhearted effort by Iran, intended to make a political point and not inflict damage, the facts do not support that. Iran launched over 300 missiles,” Mark Cancian, a senior adviser for the Center for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the Washington Examiner. “A reasonable prewar calculation would have estimated that several dozen at least would get through, causing many casualties and much destruction. Further, the attack used every missile in Iran’s inventory. Iran did not [hold] anything back.”

…

“There will be voices that will urge the Israelis to take out the Iranian nuclear program, which I think is a false chimera anyway. But I would argue that if you’re going to do something, and they may have to do something, I would be precise, I would be short,” former U.S. Central Command Commander retired Gen. Frank McKenzie said last week. “But sometimes, when you’re in that position, showing some restraint is the best strategic option that you can take.”

That last point - and I’ll give credit to McKenzie as he seems to be slowly coming to terms with what really happened in Kabul (no, I will not let that go) - is, I believe, correct.