The LCS 2 metallurgy equation first went wonky when the aluminum hull was combined with stainless steel water jet components, without first ensuring that the ship’s impressed current system (plus a backup system) would be available BEFORE launching it. Most engineers call that scenario a battery. I will also submit that the Navy effectively ignored the hull-cracking history of the high speed ferry Austal delivered to the Pacific Northwest - the crew’s normal schedule included weld repairs between commuter runs. It appears that once again, the Navy’s version of risk management was the usual mixture of poorly mapping the risk outcome matrix to program failure points, and happy talk designed to reflect the PM’s hopes rather than objective facts. My doctoral dissertation on DoD cost overruns shows how prevalent this problem has become.
The LCS is indicative of the cancer in Navy Leadership. They do not live in the real world. They are proving neither responsible or patriotic. We cannot even maintain the force we have so they want to get rid of the cruisers, and Congress wants to increase the number of the new destroyer buy form 10 to 15. Who is running scared now. Congress may have to provide the leadership for Navy shipbuilding plan because the Navy is just not up to it. They cannot even do more with less by building smaller less expensive vessels. We STILL do not have a Frigate Keel laid yet.
I still remember sitting in a this auditorium with two 1 stars trying to sell the crowd LCS. They were trying to convince us that they got a better deal and saved money by buying 10 at once when they supposed to have decided which hull to go with. I had long decided by that time, neither was the way.
The LCS 2 metallurgy equation first went wonky when the aluminum hull was combined with stainless steel water jet components, without first ensuring that the ship’s impressed current system (plus a backup system) would be available BEFORE launching it. Most engineers call that scenario a battery. I will also submit that the Navy effectively ignored the hull-cracking history of the high speed ferry Austal delivered to the Pacific Northwest - the crew’s normal schedule included weld repairs between commuter runs. It appears that once again, the Navy’s version of risk management was the usual mixture of poorly mapping the risk outcome matrix to program failure points, and happy talk designed to reflect the PM’s hopes rather than objective facts. My doctoral dissertation on DoD cost overruns shows how prevalent this problem has become.
The LCS is indicative of the cancer in Navy Leadership. They do not live in the real world. They are proving neither responsible or patriotic. We cannot even maintain the force we have so they want to get rid of the cruisers, and Congress wants to increase the number of the new destroyer buy form 10 to 15. Who is running scared now. Congress may have to provide the leadership for Navy shipbuilding plan because the Navy is just not up to it. They cannot even do more with less by building smaller less expensive vessels. We STILL do not have a Frigate Keel laid yet.
I still remember sitting in a this auditorium with two 1 stars trying to sell the crowd LCS. They were trying to convince us that they got a better deal and saved money by buying 10 at once when they supposed to have decided which hull to go with. I had long decided by that time, neither was the way.
The A-12. The Seawolf class. The LCS. It’s almost like there’s little accountability.
don't worry LLooyd will get right on it as soon as he finishes his de-brief concerning his latest phone call to the Russian Defense chief.
1/5 2/3 8th Comm 61-65