No harm in reminding people of the guidelines but yes, a bit of blocking and tackling there. Nobody liked FFG-7s but the idea to build them with one of the intentions to allow (to the degree that could be foreseen) future upgrades by using modularity as a design approach wherever possible, is a good goal. Also, if you build fewer ships, make sure they are more survivable. The Japanese Kongo class DDGs have double the damage control of our Burke class. And for sure, internalize all weapons so that they will survive APAM-size munitions; this means fewer weapons but overtime it will lessen our vulnerability to Moskva-like events. The Chinese don't miss a beat and you can be sure they are emphasizing the use of such tactics from islands in the SCS.
Our esteemed host is shocked I say shocked, that these "lessons learned" appear as they do and I agree. But the money shot is in the "circumstances that lead program-execution efforts away from these guidelines." What circumstances account for recurring program issues followed by the ceremonial reading of these same lessons learned? CRS would provide a service to Navy and the Nation by analyzing and reporting the details of these circumstances, unless Navy developed a sudden interest first.
The leadership learning problem is the single most important issue to fix. The Navy will be reluctant to fix it. To do so USNA needs a gutting and a heavy handed lessons learned organization is needed. As for you Sal, all to often you state “need to learn” this is counterproductive because it implies we can learn. Focus on USNA (cradle of leadership), an axe wielding lessons learned organization and while you are at it the new “plastics” - semisubmersibles. Turn Two sailor.
No harm in reminding people of the guidelines but yes, a bit of blocking and tackling there. Nobody liked FFG-7s but the idea to build them with one of the intentions to allow (to the degree that could be foreseen) future upgrades by using modularity as a design approach wherever possible, is a good goal. Also, if you build fewer ships, make sure they are more survivable. The Japanese Kongo class DDGs have double the damage control of our Burke class. And for sure, internalize all weapons so that they will survive APAM-size munitions; this means fewer weapons but overtime it will lessen our vulnerability to Moskva-like events. The Chinese don't miss a beat and you can be sure they are emphasizing the use of such tactics from islands in the SCS.
Our esteemed host is shocked I say shocked, that these "lessons learned" appear as they do and I agree. But the money shot is in the "circumstances that lead program-execution efforts away from these guidelines." What circumstances account for recurring program issues followed by the ceremonial reading of these same lessons learned? CRS would provide a service to Navy and the Nation by analyzing and reporting the details of these circumstances, unless Navy developed a sudden interest first.
The leadership learning problem is the single most important issue to fix. The Navy will be reluctant to fix it. To do so USNA needs a gutting and a heavy handed lessons learned organization is needed. As for you Sal, all to often you state “need to learn” this is counterproductive because it implies we can learn. Focus on USNA (cradle of leadership), an axe wielding lessons learned organization and while you are at it the new “plastics” - semisubmersibles. Turn Two sailor.