Without a navy to get you and your equipment there, you’ll be feeling it with rest of stateside. Considering for how long we’ve been told to expect the Taiwan Strait to go kinetic, our procurement program has been criminally deficient.
Wha..? wait, we're sinkin? sunk? glub glub glu..........toss me a line you rascal! Honest....I tried to enlist in the Navy first, then Coast Guard.....when they failed me, Marine Corps was just the next office down the street 'n "marine" to me then was just whatever had to do with sea and boats, mermaids 'n stuff... but.....well hell, Semper Fi, damnit!
There is a developing tapatalk naval discussion on a potential off the cuff program for a micro escort and tender to escort ships through the red sea to the straight of Hormuz. I’ll coin it here, Bab El Mandeb class PC.
- Swatting at incoming drones/missiles is helpful.
- Eliminating the reloads being delivered for the Houthis to fire is better
- Eliminating the decision makers and command structure that think firing on U.S. and other merchant ships is the best solution, and micro escorts won't accomplish that.
That class won't be christened as a PC. Someone in the CNO's Flag Writer's shop will come up with the suggestion that those will be called guided missile cruisers, so that nearly instantaneously we can have more cruisers than any other navy.
About 20 years ago, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich testified before Congress and said something like, "The US hasnʻt had a national defense strategy since the Eisenhower Administration. Our strategy documents have replace hard thinking with a series of fluff statements and zero consideration of the barriers to success -- without those barriers, we cannot resource the strategy."
I think that remains the case, and so instead of budgeting to need, we buy to budget.
The president submits a budget to Congress that is proclaimed Dead On Arrival and then Congress diddles with it. President Reagan had a Secretary of the Navy (Senator Webb following John Lehman) resign in protest over the failure of the administration to support budgeting for a 600 ship Navy. Iʻm a big fan of President Reagan, but even presidents have to pick their fights, and the 600 ship Navy wasnʻt the one that President Reagan chose.
"I offer a rather modest recommendation and that is to go back and take a good hard look at what I call the Eisenhower model. Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1997 on the 50th anniversary of the National Security Act observed that when President Kennedy disestablished Eisenhower’s national security structure, he eliminated the U.S. government’s ability to do strategy at the highest levels. Perhaps an overstatement, but certainly don’t want to discount the views of someone who was a National Security Advisor during the Cold War and Brzezinski certainly was that. Second, the importance of the active, persistent involvement of the President. We have reports, we have documents and we need them. President Eisenhower famously said the importance of strategic planning is not the plan, it is the planning. "
Eisenhower was the last President we've had who ever had to "walk the walk" to win a major theater conflict including both the political realities with allies and the logistics of the conflict. Of course, he was the first since Grant, perhaps Sherman to an extent, and Washington prior to that.
Assuming the Navy does good (bad) as or better than the USAF putting a specification on contract for a ship, or aircraft.... no contract baseline (cost schedule spec compliance) withstands the first shot fired in form of a spec change notice (SCN)...... where one of several faults are revealed.
An SCN should begin show cause why the contract should not be terminated....... but!
"We describe this in various ways with differing levels of directness; over-promise, under-deliver; byproduct of layered optimism filters; spawn of happy-talk; culture of untruth; lies."
"Quality has a quantity of its own."
Except no ship = no presence. Something our uniformed leaders seem unable to grasp.
Sunk cost fallacy. Get a ship that originally had to earn a living in the real world like the remaining OUSVs. Man them. Plug and play ways to blow things up.
Except they would end up being three short length 8 cell modules in the bays above the "aviation mission zone" (LCS for Helicopter hangar) on the odd ships. The Good Idea Fairy takes up a lot of volume on those ships.
So before welding new stuff, we burn off the stuff they don't need? I've been retired for 24 years, so a little behind the latest and greatest from the smart folks in the room at NAVSEA
There's a mammoth open area under the flight deck. No good spaces for heavy modules for weapons. I never did figure out where they planned to deploy the VLS from on them.
Geez Louise, even a moron ( or Chinese intel officer) can look at the graphs and easily decipher "Go Day". And we wasted 2 decades and billions on LCS. And taking a perfectly fine frigate and turning it into a USN gold plated toilet. Where is the accountability at the O-10 level?
On the bright side Amazon has some great deals on learning Mandarin Chinese in 10 min a day!
Sal, I wish I could be as optimistic about the SASC as you are but then I look at the membership which includes the war hero Richard Blumenthal. Also, nothing matters while Charles Schumer is majority leader. I spent a lot time in DC.
The only way the Senate can make its voice heard is to hold up flag nominations until something is done. That’s what happened when the Navy passed over Captain Rickover twice. That’s why we got the CVNs and the LA Class of subs.
Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala) got nothing for his efforts in holding up nominations. "Tuberville, R-Ala., did not get any concessions for lifting the holds, and the Pentagon's abortion travel policy remains in place."
Back in 1987 when I got to NAVSEA, we were building five AEGIS ships a year (combo of CGs and DDGs). The limiting factor was LM's capacity to do checkout at Moorestown. Is it still five per year? I assume that the FMS sales take some of that capacity but I'm skeptical that it's three per year.
There has been a completely free contractual for a two drydock submarine overhaul contract that the Pentagon has refused to agree to. The company (Bartlett Marine) has inferred to the Pentagon a two year dry dock contract (with two year Ohio funding) to overhaul two fast attack submarines. Yet the Pentagon big wigs have refused to agree to that contract while the submarine maintenance back log continues to grow. How is that possible?
Dry and/or graving docks are not very sexy. They won’t earn an admiral an LOM or a nice post retirement job. Next you will talk about our lack of salvage capabilities.
Apparently, our subs can't transit the Saint Lawrence Seaway, they're too big. At least that's what I was told here. Part of the Bartlett proposal is for a repair depot. Inland, it's near a railway so components could be overhauled there, freeing up space/workforce for other repairs in port.
Of course, rather than subs, Navy could have the proposed Lorain Shipyard build cargo, tender, and underway replenishment ships to support the fleet we have.....
I would have the naval architects draw up plans for eight nuclear powered battleships complete with four shafts and screws; four 18” guns and lots of missiles to attack and defend.
Then, I would build the shipyard to build those kinds of ships as well as the factories to build all the parts from the keel to the crow’s nest and from the bow to the stern.
Along the way I would scrap every worthless ship. It's time to think big.
The USN sort of proved that concept to be out of date the day we sank the Yamato. After they sank our battleships at Pearl and the Brits ships just out of Singapore. In its place, I would suggest either (a) the PowersThatBe stop screwing around with the Constellation Class and get on with building them, and/or (b) clone the Admiral Gorshkov class. Either way, the biggest threats to the shipbuilding program are (1) a total lack of appreciation for the need for a Navy, and (2) the seemingly incessant urge to add experiment upon experiment in every ship class. In the concept design phase of what became DDG 1000, I calculated that if every new concept had a 90% chance of success, the entire project had only a 9% chance of success as then envisioned. I was right - the ship required a complete re-design to become even as good as it turned out.
Last I knew, they are all in drydock to get their armament without ammo removed and install the launch tubes for a missile that has never been tested. Completely on brand. But as they have never done anything other then sail around and not yet have to have their engines or reduction gearing replaced, I think you are defining 'good' as 'not top candidates for fish habitat'.
That's true only of the Zumwalt class debacle. The other two naval shipbuilding debacles are textbook examples of the Project Management 101 dictum, "If you don't know what you want, bring lots of money to the table, because you will need it."
“But, [CEO of General Dynamics] Novakovic said today the number of out-of-sequence deliveries Electric Boat is receiving is leading to work [on VIRGINIA-class subs] costing as much as eight times more than it would have under normal circumstances.”
How much will these issues drive up the overall cost of each sub. 110%? 125%? 150%?
Even if the House and Senate realign Navy shipbuilding plans with CDR Sal's recommendations (with which I wholeheartedly agree) and increases budgets, it almost matters naught at this point. For example, trade two SSBNs for a single CVN—that's a hull that likely wouldn't be ready until probably 2035 at the earliest given HII's current performance with recent CVN RCOHs and current/past VIRGINIA-class/CVN new construction.
The yards—private and public—are either unable or unwilling to plan and execute new construction and maintenance of the sea-going assets necessary to ensure we are competitive during the upcoming Great Pacific War.
Repeating part of a response I made to yesterday's post, the PRC isn't going to wait untill we get our shipbuilding act together. I suspect that a conflict with them will occur prior to 2030 and that the US Navy will suffer the consequences enabled by OPNAV, NAVSEA, multiple administrations/Congresses (across both major political parties), and, ultimately, an ignorant American electorate.
Great point! Even if you could get individuals to enter the skilled trades at the requisite rate, it's a few years—or more—until they are truly skilled at their crafts.
Thanks again Sal! I write my two Senators ( & cc some others) frequently about the Navy. You have furnished more ammunition (pun intended) to ask their staffs about. The fix may be painful but we can and must fix this!
I'm a Marine.....but I feel your pain, Navy.
Without a navy to get you and your equipment there, you’ll be feeling it with rest of stateside. Considering for how long we’ve been told to expect the Taiwan Strait to go kinetic, our procurement program has been criminally deficient.
Laugh as we all fight for life raft space Jarhead.
Wha..? wait, we're sinkin? sunk? glub glub glu..........toss me a line you rascal! Honest....I tried to enlist in the Navy first, then Coast Guard.....when they failed me, Marine Corps was just the next office down the street 'n "marine" to me then was just whatever had to do with sea and boats, mermaids 'n stuff... but.....well hell, Semper Fi, damnit!
you shouldn't have had a crayon in your mouth while talking to the other recruiters.
:)
Hey man crayons beat MRE's!
Semper Fi LOL
I'm a Marine too and the name MARINE means this, My Ass Rides In Navy Equipment.
Without the Navy ships we are just Army.
There is a developing tapatalk naval discussion on a potential off the cuff program for a micro escort and tender to escort ships through the red sea to the straight of Hormuz. I’ll coin it here, Bab El Mandeb class PC.
Great solution to the wrong problem.
- Swatting at incoming drones/missiles is helpful.
- Eliminating the reloads being delivered for the Houthis to fire is better
- Eliminating the decision makers and command structure that think firing on U.S. and other merchant ships is the best solution, and micro escorts won't accomplish that.
Concentrate on the archers, not the arrows.
JamesM: I have a better idea. Domestic energy independence with zero reliance on the middle east.
It has been a dream since Carter.
That class won't be christened as a PC. Someone in the CNO's Flag Writer's shop will come up with the suggestion that those will be called guided missile cruisers, so that nearly instantaneously we can have more cruisers than any other navy.
We can get Taylor Swift to tell the CO and crew "size doesn't matter"
Yep, Like listing a Marine Rifle company as a Battalion.
I'm thinking they intend to use unmanned warships, maybe only a small crew of Techs to maintain it or a single command ship for 3/c.
About 20 years ago, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich testified before Congress and said something like, "The US hasnʻt had a national defense strategy since the Eisenhower Administration. Our strategy documents have replace hard thinking with a series of fluff statements and zero consideration of the barriers to success -- without those barriers, we cannot resource the strategy."
I think that remains the case, and so instead of budgeting to need, we buy to budget.
I think that’s a bit unfair to Ronald Reagan and Caspar Weinberger.
The president submits a budget to Congress that is proclaimed Dead On Arrival and then Congress diddles with it. President Reagan had a Secretary of the Navy (Senator Webb following John Lehman) resign in protest over the failure of the administration to support budgeting for a 600 ship Navy. Iʻm a big fan of President Reagan, but even presidents have to pick their fights, and the 600 ship Navy wasnʻt the one that President Reagan chose.
I believe that this is the testimony that you are looking for.
https://www.congress.gov/111/chrg/CHRG-111hhrg51105/CHRG-111hhrg51105.pdf
"I offer a rather modest recommendation and that is to go back and take a good hard look at what I call the Eisenhower model. Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1997 on the 50th anniversary of the National Security Act observed that when President Kennedy disestablished Eisenhower’s national security structure, he eliminated the U.S. government’s ability to do strategy at the highest levels. Perhaps an overstatement, but certainly don’t want to discount the views of someone who was a National Security Advisor during the Cold War and Brzezinski certainly was that. Second, the importance of the active, persistent involvement of the President. We have reports, we have documents and we need them. President Eisenhower famously said the importance of strategic planning is not the plan, it is the planning. "
Thatʻs pretty close. Thanks for the research.
Eisenhower was the last President we've had who ever had to "walk the walk" to win a major theater conflict including both the political realities with allies and the logistics of the conflict. Of course, he was the first since Grant, perhaps Sherman to an extent, and Washington prior to that.
Assuming the Navy does good (bad) as or better than the USAF putting a specification on contract for a ship, or aircraft.... no contract baseline (cost schedule spec compliance) withstands the first shot fired in form of a spec change notice (SCN)...... where one of several faults are revealed.
An SCN should begin show cause why the contract should not be terminated....... but!
We get is bad because we allow it so!
So much scrap and rework!
"We describe this in various ways with differing levels of directness; over-promise, under-deliver; byproduct of layered optimism filters; spawn of happy-talk; culture of untruth; lies."
"Quality has a quantity of its own."
Except no ship = no presence. Something our uniformed leaders seem unable to grasp.
Take out the "mission modules" on the Little Crappy Ships and weld on a bunch of VLS cells == then let a Destroyer manage two or three of them ..
Sunk cost fallacy. Get a ship that originally had to earn a living in the real world like the remaining OUSVs. Man them. Plug and play ways to blow things up.
Except they would end up being three short length 8 cell modules in the bays above the "aviation mission zone" (LCS for Helicopter hangar) on the odd ships. The Good Idea Fairy takes up a lot of volume on those ships.
So before welding new stuff, we burn off the stuff they don't need? I've been retired for 24 years, so a little behind the latest and greatest from the smart folks in the room at NAVSEA
There's a mammoth open area under the flight deck. No good spaces for heavy modules for weapons. I never did figure out where they planned to deploy the VLS from on them.
Just now reading this -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom-class_littoral_combat_ship .. looks like Lockheed proposed adding some length and a bunch of stuff they maybe should have had to begin with ..
How many VLS could we put on a decent sized bulk carrier?
Geez Louise, even a moron ( or Chinese intel officer) can look at the graphs and easily decipher "Go Day". And we wasted 2 decades and billions on LCS. And taking a perfectly fine frigate and turning it into a USN gold plated toilet. Where is the accountability at the O-10 level?
On the bright side Amazon has some great deals on learning Mandarin Chinese in 10 min a day!
It's a Category IV language, lot of government incentives if you are in the right career field.
Sal, I wish I could be as optimistic about the SASC as you are but then I look at the membership which includes the war hero Richard Blumenthal. Also, nothing matters while Charles Schumer is majority leader. I spent a lot time in DC.
The only way the Senate can make its voice heard is to hold up flag nominations until something is done. That’s what happened when the Navy passed over Captain Rickover twice. That’s why we got the CVNs and the LA Class of subs.
Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala) got nothing for his efforts in holding up nominations. "Tuberville, R-Ala., did not get any concessions for lifting the holds, and the Pentagon's abortion travel policy remains in place."
You're not trying to Dis' my warrior Senator, Da Nang Dick "Shoot em up to Loot 'em" Blumenthal, are you?
Back in 1987 when I got to NAVSEA, we were building five AEGIS ships a year (combo of CGs and DDGs). The limiting factor was LM's capacity to do checkout at Moorestown. Is it still five per year? I assume that the FMS sales take some of that capacity but I'm skeptical that it's three per year.
There has been a completely free contractual for a two drydock submarine overhaul contract that the Pentagon has refused to agree to. The company (Bartlett Marine) has inferred to the Pentagon a two year dry dock contract (with two year Ohio funding) to overhaul two fast attack submarines. Yet the Pentagon big wigs have refused to agree to that contract while the submarine maintenance back log continues to grow. How is that possible?
Dry and/or graving docks are not very sexy. They won’t earn an admiral an LOM or a nice post retirement job. Next you will talk about our lack of salvage capabilities.
Laughs in Ernest King
Apparently, our subs can't transit the Saint Lawrence Seaway, they're too big. At least that's what I was told here. Part of the Bartlett proposal is for a repair depot. Inland, it's near a railway so components could be overhauled there, freeing up space/workforce for other repairs in port.
Of course, rather than subs, Navy could have the proposed Lorain Shipyard build cargo, tender, and underway replenishment ships to support the fleet we have.....
Recall that Winnie the Flu has stated that he wants to "reunify Taiwan" by 2027. If it isn't built in the next two years it's probably too late
You’re never going to reduce the SSBN demand signal, because there is no winning argument against preventing WW3.
Here is what I would do if I were SECNAV.
I would have the naval architects draw up plans for eight nuclear powered battleships complete with four shafts and screws; four 18” guns and lots of missiles to attack and defend.
Then, I would build the shipyard to build those kinds of ships as well as the factories to build all the parts from the keel to the crow’s nest and from the bow to the stern.
Along the way I would scrap every worthless ship. It's time to think big.
The USN sort of proved that concept to be out of date the day we sank the Yamato. After they sank our battleships at Pearl and the Brits ships just out of Singapore. In its place, I would suggest either (a) the PowersThatBe stop screwing around with the Constellation Class and get on with building them, and/or (b) clone the Admiral Gorshkov class. Either way, the biggest threats to the shipbuilding program are (1) a total lack of appreciation for the need for a Navy, and (2) the seemingly incessant urge to add experiment upon experiment in every ship class. In the concept design phase of what became DDG 1000, I calculated that if every new concept had a 90% chance of success, the entire project had only a 9% chance of success as then envisioned. I was right - the ship required a complete re-design to become even as good as it turned out.
Any ship can be sunk. That why we have fleets.
Last I knew, they are all in drydock to get their armament without ammo removed and install the launch tubes for a missile that has never been tested. Completely on brand. But as they have never done anything other then sail around and not yet have to have their engines or reduction gearing replaced, I think you are defining 'good' as 'not top candidates for fish habitat'.
CONSTELLATION/LCS/ZUMWALT-classes are textbook examples of the saying “perfection is the enemy of good enough.”
That's true only of the Zumwalt class debacle. The other two naval shipbuilding debacles are textbook examples of the Project Management 101 dictum, "If you don't know what you want, bring lots of money to the table, because you will need it."
From a Breaking Defense article dated today (http://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/supply-chain-issues-slowing-down-general-dynamics-sub-construction-ceo-says/):
“But, [CEO of General Dynamics] Novakovic said today the number of out-of-sequence deliveries Electric Boat is receiving is leading to work [on VIRGINIA-class subs] costing as much as eight times more than it would have under normal circumstances.”
How much will these issues drive up the overall cost of each sub. 110%? 125%? 150%?
Even if the House and Senate realign Navy shipbuilding plans with CDR Sal's recommendations (with which I wholeheartedly agree) and increases budgets, it almost matters naught at this point. For example, trade two SSBNs for a single CVN—that's a hull that likely wouldn't be ready until probably 2035 at the earliest given HII's current performance with recent CVN RCOHs and current/past VIRGINIA-class/CVN new construction.
The yards—private and public—are either unable or unwilling to plan and execute new construction and maintenance of the sea-going assets necessary to ensure we are competitive during the upcoming Great Pacific War.
Repeating part of a response I made to yesterday's post, the PRC isn't going to wait untill we get our shipbuilding act together. I suspect that a conflict with them will occur prior to 2030 and that the US Navy will suffer the consequences enabled by OPNAV, NAVSEA, multiple administrations/Congresses (across both major political parties), and, ultimately, an ignorant American electorate.
Five tradesmen retiring for every two entering the workforce. It's not just the ships that are being scrapped without replacement.
Great point! Even if you could get individuals to enter the skilled trades at the requisite rate, it's a few years—or more—until they are truly skilled at their crafts.
The prevailing trends would suggest that the AF is going to get called upon to do a lot ship killing next time around.
The Air Farce is too busy with DIE to worry about fighting wars.
I suspect the "math" on D+1 will produce a visual "clarity" that will be sobering to each service branches.
I think you expect more from them than you will get. They will scream "Orange Man Bad" and call up the PLA and see what deal they can get.
All the service branches are consumed with DIE.
Bill Tate: "The prevailing trends would suggest that the AF is going to get called upon to do a lot of ship killing next time around."
Which is why serious consideration should be given to repurposing the USAF's B-1 fleet to maritime operations as the platform's primary mission.
Thanks again Sal! I write my two Senators ( & cc some others) frequently about the Navy. You have furnished more ammunition (pun intended) to ask their staffs about. The fix may be painful but we can and must fix this!
"I write my two Senators ( & cc some others) frequently about the Navy"
simply, BZ.