NAVSEA & OPNAV's FITREP in a 3x8 Grid

from FITREPs to the Shipyard, a culture of untruth bears fruit

‘My name is OPNAV, king of the 21st Century Navy:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!’

Clark, Mullen, Roughead, Greenert, Richardson, Gilday, and Franchetti.

Where are they on this tablet of woe? Where did they expend their personal and professional capital during their tenure to ensure this well expected trainwreck would not take place?

This is not new. This is not shocking. This is the expected part of The Terrible 20s we have been discussing for 14-years.

LCS.

There was not systemic reform.

DDG-1000.

Congress failed to make a substantive change.

CG(X).

We shrugged, accepted gross failure, and defaulted to building Burkes until the crack of doom.

You know the rest of the story, or lack of story. The lack of a story of accountability. Institutional self-reflection resulting in change towards improvement. A story of building a service transparent, reliable, and setting the standard of meeting the challenge already at our door.

When just papered over the festering rot of systems that are same structures, policies, culture, and in many cases people who brought us here. Why would one expect any difference in outcome?

We lied to each other. We lied to Congress. We lied to the world. From Arkansas to AUKUS, this moment will have impact.

Eventually the music will stop. We are now on the second generation of leaders who have been happy to ignore this systemic failure of performance as if it is a force of nature to endure, and not a creation of man that can be changed.

If you are waiting for the uniformed leadership to speak clearly on this, you simply have not been paying attention.

If you think the Executive Branch leadership will address this, you have not been awake the last 26-months.

The only solution to this wholesale institutional failure will be in Congress. It will need the will, power, and wisdom to do what Alexander did in Gordium, and be content to do it making no friends, and receiving no personal benefit or fame.

From the lazy to the greedy, too many are vested in the inertia of the present system, and the ease of position and profit that comes with it.

It is a fetid, thorny bush we have planted and nurtured, now we must harvest its bitter fruits.

BEHOLD!

Almost exactly two years ago today, the GAO published, Navy Shipbuilding: Increasing Supervisors of Shipbuilding Responsibility Could Help Improve Program Outcomes.

From the highlights;

What GAO Found

Over the past decade, GAO found that the U.S. Navy has faced significant challenges in meeting its shipbuilding goals, experiencing years of construction delays, billions of dollars in cost growth, and frequent quality and performance shortfalls. The Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) serve as the Navy's on-site technical, contractual, and business authority for the construction of Navy vessels at major private shipyards. The SUPSHIPs are responsible for evaluating the construction and business practices of Navy shipbuilders, but face challenges in improving shipbuilding results (see figure).

Factors Limiting the Ability of the Navy's Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) to Help Improve Shipbuilding Program Results

These challenges impede the SUPSHIPs' effectiveness and accountability in a number of ways:

• Variation in quality requirements across Navy shipbuilding contracts hinders the SUPSHIPs' ability to provide consistent oversight of shipbuilding quality.

• Limited input from the SUPSHIPs prior to contract awards does not leverage their expertise to support well-informed decision-making.

• Omission of SUPSHIP reporting from the Navy's process for approving acceptance of ships from the shipbuilders reduces accountability and misses opportunities to ensure that independent SUPSHIP input on ship quality and readiness informs this key decision.

• The SUPSHIPs' position within the Naval Sea Systems Command and their accountability to different technical and acquisition organizations dilutes their ability to be a distinct, authoritative voice in decision-making for Navy shipbuilding programs. Congress passed legislation in December 2021 to establish a Deputy Commander dedicated to the SUPSHIPs, which should help improve their authority and accountability.

Why GAO Did This Study

Despite the efforts of the SUPSHIPs and others to assure construction quality and contract execution, Navy shipbuilding results have regularly fallen short of program expectations. These results have raised questions about the Navy's ability to effectively oversee shipbuilder performance throughout the construction of new ships.

Congress included a provision in a Senate report for GAO to review the SUPSHIPs' oversight efforts. GAO examined, among other objectives, the SUPSHIPs' role in assuring shipbuilding quality and any challenges that limit their ability to help improve shipbuilding program results.

To do this work, GAO reviewed federal regulations as well as policy, guidance, and reporting related to the SUPSHIPs' oversight activities and results. GAO also interviewed DOD and Navy officials about shipbuilding oversight and the SUPSHIPs' role in the execution of shipbuilding programs.

It begs the question, “What if any action was taken in the time period of .54 of a WorldWar?

I can understand ignoring two decades of pounding away on a keyboard by a middling retired USN CDR and his band of merry friends … but the GAO too?

In 2022, their highlights were already old news.

What navalists, the American taxpayer, and more importantly their elected representatives tasked in our Constitution with oversight authority should ask is, “Why?”

The most important question in the English language; “Why?”

Gird your loins, as knowledge of the answer will drive even the best to rage and despair.

h/t Paul McLeary.