As a member of the DDG-1000 design team, I can attest to Bob Work’s statement that the ship was over-burdened with requirements. First was the Navy’s stealth envy. USAF had stealth airplanes; why couldn’t Navy have a stealth ship? This alone made the ship significantly larger than it would have been otherwise. Then, since it was the only ship design game in town, it became the sole magnet for everyone’s new subsystem and pet goat. The ship collected far too many technical risks. Now the Constellation class is the new magnet in town.
I strongly believe that the Navy would be best served by a ship acquisition plan (an actual plan, not a dart throwing contest) that followed a path of smaller, overlapping classes of ships. This would enable us to keep logistics problems in hand while constantly improving the fleet as well as our ability to design, build, train, and maintain.
Has anyone written a book about the Two Ocean Navy expansion that resulted from the panic triggered by the fall of France? I would think there might be some lessons.
If the frigate program actually does go over cost due to over requirements as Work alludes, the entire senior Navy leadership team, including civilians, should be fired. Period. Enough of this nonsense. Navy does know what it needs - go ask the descendants of Wayne Hughes out at NPS for they well know. Now we have to build it!
All the technology risk creates a contracting problem which is quite different from how contracting would work when there is no technology risk. At the time, there were considerable demands for reduced costs, and these were (and are) inconsistent with cost control. The contracting folks can write a contract to contend with the technology risk, but it won't look like the contract they would write if your 'product' is set and the aim is producing at lowest cost. As others have noted, the inability to control the requirements sets up all sorts of troubles later. What was asked for in the three cases under consideration was impossible. Heads should roll if the frigate acquisition process meets the same end......
[former SURFOR Force SUPPO] Don't forget that 70-80% of the cost of a weapon system is realized after commissioning. In order to manage costs and maximize readiness, weapon systems are built in 'blocks' or 'flights' ... with each unit in the 'Block' or 'Flight' having the same configuration. this is true for F/A-18's, Virginia Class Submarines, F-35's, etc. In contrast, the Surface Navy's DDG-51 class is essentially a bunch of individual configurations, with almost no two ships alike. This made sustainment of the surface force impossibly more difficult. One DDG was even built with the capability to do mine hunting via a large compartment that opened to reveal an Unmanned Mine Hunting vehicle. These decisions resulted in a bunch of "one off's" added costs and impacted manning documents and every integrated logistic element.
As a member of the DDG-1000 design team, I can attest to Bob Work’s statement that the ship was over-burdened with requirements. First was the Navy’s stealth envy. USAF had stealth airplanes; why couldn’t Navy have a stealth ship? This alone made the ship significantly larger than it would have been otherwise. Then, since it was the only ship design game in town, it became the sole magnet for everyone’s new subsystem and pet goat. The ship collected far too many technical risks. Now the Constellation class is the new magnet in town.
I strongly believe that the Navy would be best served by a ship acquisition plan (an actual plan, not a dart throwing contest) that followed a path of smaller, overlapping classes of ships. This would enable us to keep logistics problems in hand while constantly improving the fleet as well as our ability to design, build, train, and maintain.
My goodness, if someone thinks the Navy will not over spec and under estimate the cost then they are assuredly wearing Navy blue
Has anyone written a book about the Two Ocean Navy expansion that resulted from the panic triggered by the fall of France? I would think there might be some lessons.
Add a budget value to every requirement?
If the frigate program actually does go over cost due to over requirements as Work alludes, the entire senior Navy leadership team, including civilians, should be fired. Period. Enough of this nonsense. Navy does know what it needs - go ask the descendants of Wayne Hughes out at NPS for they well know. Now we have to build it!
Superb analysis. Thank you!
All the technology risk creates a contracting problem which is quite different from how contracting would work when there is no technology risk. At the time, there were considerable demands for reduced costs, and these were (and are) inconsistent with cost control. The contracting folks can write a contract to contend with the technology risk, but it won't look like the contract they would write if your 'product' is set and the aim is producing at lowest cost. As others have noted, the inability to control the requirements sets up all sorts of troubles later. What was asked for in the three cases under consideration was impossible. Heads should roll if the frigate acquisition process meets the same end......
[former SURFOR Force SUPPO] Don't forget that 70-80% of the cost of a weapon system is realized after commissioning. In order to manage costs and maximize readiness, weapon systems are built in 'blocks' or 'flights' ... with each unit in the 'Block' or 'Flight' having the same configuration. this is true for F/A-18's, Virginia Class Submarines, F-35's, etc. In contrast, the Surface Navy's DDG-51 class is essentially a bunch of individual configurations, with almost no two ships alike. This made sustainment of the surface force impossibly more difficult. One DDG was even built with the capability to do mine hunting via a large compartment that opened to reveal an Unmanned Mine Hunting vehicle. These decisions resulted in a bunch of "one off's" added costs and impacted manning documents and every integrated logistic element.