Pivots, Strategic Persistence, & Rethinking MPS

if we're going to play this role, let's play it right

Building off of Monday’s post, it looks like the US Army’s trans-Atlantic then trans-Mediterranean crossing will proceed at the speed of smell, letting everyone forget about it by the time it shows up off Gaza, if ever.

The great circle route - as the 747 flies - from Norfolk to Gaza is a bit over 5,000 nautical miles, about 1,000 nm less than the distance from San Diego to Taiwan. It’s a distance.

Wouldn’t it be helpful if we kept those items we might need at far distances from home safely stored in our local friend’s backyards in case we need to grab them.

If we are going to be the force of first, middle, and last resort - which everyone including ourselves seems content to be - then shouldn’t we make an effort to at least be smart about it?

If our allies are incapable and yet the Uncle Sam can’t stop saying, “The he11 with it, we’ll do it.” then let’s do what needs to be done.

Europe’s problems are not going to get better, and she can’t and won’t stand without us.

Either come home in full, or accept that we won’t.

Back at the height of the Cold War and soaked in a lot of REFORGER lessons, The Pentagon decided it might be smart to have supplies and logistics capabilities nearby where there might be trouble.

Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSRON) were the answer. As described by our Military Sealift Command:

Afloat prepositioning strategically places military equipment and supplies aboard ships located in key ocean areas to ensure rapid availability during a major theater war, a humanitarian operation or other contingency. MSC's seventeen prepositioning ships support the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Defense Logistics Agency.

After all, like we pointed out yesterday,

The NSS prioritizes Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere.

OK. How do we cover that? We have two active MPSRONs; MPSRON TWO in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; MPSRON THREE in Guam and Saipan in the Pacific Ocean. We can assume CONUS gear can cover the Western Hemisphere.

So, what happened to MPSRON ONE? Who is covering Europe?

Funny you should ask, as we spend the next month watching Army watercraft chugging their flat-hulled, low-freeboard selves across the Atlantic and Mediterranean over the next month…as we enter the third year of the largest war on the European continent since WW2…what once was again shows its need now.

Let’s go back to 2012, you know, the year before the Pacific Pivot.

Military Sealift Command's Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadron One was officially disestablished Sept. 28.

USNS 2ND LT John P. Bobo (T-AK 3008) [pictured in thumb] made a final port visit to Rota, Spain in late September, marking the official disestablishment of the 28-year-old squadron.

The other ships and personnel assigned to MPS Squadron One returned to the United States earlier this year, where they currently maintain a reduced operating status.

MPS Squadron One was one of three squadrons belonging to MSC's Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), established in 1984 by the Department of Defense to carry U.S. Marine Corps equipment and supplies closer to an overseas threat or operation.

As it seems that Europe refuses to let us pivot and, at least from my seat, the coast of West Africa and the North African coast will only get more interesting towards mid-century - is it time to bring back MPSRON ONE? Is it time to expand those things we keep forward deployed?

Regulars here know that for two decades I’ve supported a “move it back CONUS” approach to US forces based in Europe (except for combined logistics and training facilities with our NATO buddies and maybe a few ground units like the 173rd and the odd USAF squadron here and there … maybe), but MPSRON ships are a completely different capability.

Europe and her problems aren’t going anywhere. The Mediterranean will not find peace in my lifetime, and Africa has only begun to be an issue.

It’s time. Back to the future; stand it back up.

SIDEBAR:

The last paragraph of the 2012 article cannot be let go without quoting it. It represents a low of many lows in the high-art of PAOisms and spin drifting in to professionalism.

Just behold!

"Ultimately, these changes are designed to enhance the core of the program: enabling warfighter readiness," said Mike Neuhardt, MPF project officer. "The remaining MPF squadrons will continue to have global reach, and changes in doctrine, ships and squadrons will give them seabasing-enabled capabilities they never had before," he said.

Let me quote a great man: