Quoting Dr. Einstein - "We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them."
The DDG-1000 program was initially launched with over twenty significant technical risks because it was the only ship acquisition program in town, and every subsystem PM understood that without being part of that bandwagon, their funding was up for grabs. Obviously the odds of bringing in that many technical risks on target was vanishingly small. And I *think* every PM of the LSD-17 (and the LCS?) programs was promoted, even with their unforced errors. So, I would add an item #8. No acquisition program manager shall receive a fitness report or promotion until and unless he/she can prove that during his/her tenure the government's financial risk of producing a viable, doctrine-provable, fleet asset was actually reduced, while still meeting all required technical goals on time, and the success or failure of that effort shall be a primary element of the officer's overall evaluation.
A well done rant. I may significantly disagree with you on the cause - Goldwater Nichols, because it is a convenient whipping boy of people who should really know better. But who can disagree with the acquisition debacles - all services, by the way - of the last two decades? One thing overlooked is inventories: the Russo-ukrainian war is screaming at us that sufficient weapons stocks are vital to be able to prosecute a long or long-ish war. This is the same observation made by Depuy and Starry after the Yom Kippur War of '73. Modern war intensely uses up stocks of equipment and ammo. And we do have a big problem supporting long campaigns over long distances. Hence something to replace the C-5M.
Also appreciated is the sense of desperation. We are indeed running out of time before some GPC decides to call our bluff. And finally, there is the severe problem of leadership. This here appears to be mostly a Naval challenge, but I would not judge as I am a retired member of another service. But I must say that I would not want a single serving senior Navy leader in my chain of command; they neither grow trust and loyalty, nor do they appear to be competent stewards of their service.
I just wish I knew who you are. This is the most thoughtful, knowledgeable, prescient item I have ever read about today's horrible situation vis-a vis China. I pray and hope that somebody, somewhere that can do something about it pays attention.
Same logic applies to the Army-all our top-line platforms are pre-Goldwater-Nichols; the "Big 5" (which in reality was more than 5)-Bradley, Abrams, Patriot, MLRS, Blackhawk, Apache. With the exception of the Javelin - - which is a true half-leap ahead - - everything else to include artillery is just an improvement of a current platform (the Stryker doesn't count).
They will NEVER replace the C-5M. They can’t. That expertise no longer exists anywhere. The Air Force has zero interest in that mission too. I’m not sure we can ever replace C-17.
Quoting Dr. Einstein - "We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them."
The DDG-1000 program was initially launched with over twenty significant technical risks because it was the only ship acquisition program in town, and every subsystem PM understood that without being part of that bandwagon, their funding was up for grabs. Obviously the odds of bringing in that many technical risks on target was vanishingly small. And I *think* every PM of the LSD-17 (and the LCS?) programs was promoted, even with their unforced errors. So, I would add an item #8. No acquisition program manager shall receive a fitness report or promotion until and unless he/she can prove that during his/her tenure the government's financial risk of producing a viable, doctrine-provable, fleet asset was actually reduced, while still meeting all required technical goals on time, and the success or failure of that effort shall be a primary element of the officer's overall evaluation.
Yes, I understand the depths of these dreams.....
A well done rant. I may significantly disagree with you on the cause - Goldwater Nichols, because it is a convenient whipping boy of people who should really know better. But who can disagree with the acquisition debacles - all services, by the way - of the last two decades? One thing overlooked is inventories: the Russo-ukrainian war is screaming at us that sufficient weapons stocks are vital to be able to prosecute a long or long-ish war. This is the same observation made by Depuy and Starry after the Yom Kippur War of '73. Modern war intensely uses up stocks of equipment and ammo. And we do have a big problem supporting long campaigns over long distances. Hence something to replace the C-5M.
Also appreciated is the sense of desperation. We are indeed running out of time before some GPC decides to call our bluff. And finally, there is the severe problem of leadership. This here appears to be mostly a Naval challenge, but I would not judge as I am a retired member of another service. But I must say that I would not want a single serving senior Navy leader in my chain of command; they neither grow trust and loyalty, nor do they appear to be competent stewards of their service.
I feel like the problem is that you consistently overestimate America's opponents.
Before the Ukrainian War, you could overestimate both China and Russia and now you are left just being able to overestimate China.
The Ukranian War has taught us two things: (1) we vastly overestimated Russia's military preparedness and (2) drones are the future.
Pretty much every other lesson of the war is undermined by the lack of air power being used.
I just wish I knew who you are. This is the most thoughtful, knowledgeable, prescient item I have ever read about today's horrible situation vis-a vis China. I pray and hope that somebody, somewhere that can do something about it pays attention.
Please just keep on keepin on.
VR - Sid
Awww, shucks. I'm just your standard-issue retired CDR living a life I don't deserve.
You absolutely are NOT just a standard-issue retired CDR. You are a superb example of what we all wish we could be.
VR - Sid
Same logic applies to the Army-all our top-line platforms are pre-Goldwater-Nichols; the "Big 5" (which in reality was more than 5)-Bradley, Abrams, Patriot, MLRS, Blackhawk, Apache. With the exception of the Javelin - - which is a true half-leap ahead - - everything else to include artillery is just an improvement of a current platform (the Stryker doesn't count).
Well said, CDR.
They will NEVER replace the C-5M. They can’t. That expertise no longer exists anywhere. The Air Force has zero interest in that mission too. I’m not sure we can ever replace C-17.