Realism. Pragmatism. The lesser of two evils. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, or at least not my outright enemy... We allied with the Soviet Union in WWII (even though FDR's Administration was riddled with outright Communists and Socialist sympathizers) because it was seen as a lesser evil than Nazi Germany.
Such a mindset should guide our decisions. I'm glad to see that there's a legitimate Nationalist perspective developing among the population. To attempt to deflect those who'd make the claim, a Nationalist perspective does not imply or require a racist or racially skewed perspective. We (as in the United States) need to be the primary consideration in our decision making.
As Mark O. implies, a more rational and balanced approach towards our relations with Russia (realistic/pragmatic) might well have had a significant impact on current events and the lose/lose opportunities that we face in Ukraine. Neither party is without sin and we forgot to consider the Russian response or perception of a hostile regime on a border propped up by Western agencies.
How then does a post-Biden Adminstration bring a realists view and actions to the current conflict in Ukraine, given we don't see The Guns of August in the interim?
Slightly off into the domestic political weeds, but: Ascribing GHWB's 1990 defeat to his administration's realist policies ignores the short and very loud elephant in that room: H. Ross Perot.
Perot merged his deep personal animus to the Bush family with a calculated populist appeal based primarily on domestic concerns regarding trade issues with Mexico to shift the electoral results just slightly enough such that GHWB lost the election to William Jefferson Clinton.
Which means our long subsequent national relationship with Clan Clinton can rightly be laid at Perot's small feet.
If GHWB had applied a bit of that international relations realist philosophy to addressing some of those North American trade issues, minimally enough to at least facially address voter concerns across the US heartland, H.Ross' flip charts would have had not been able to flip that electoral college count, and in that timeline we would all be blissfully unaware of what ever happened to that tall ex-Governor of Arkansas.
I've not seen anything written before the failed coup against Gorby to indicate there was ever serious thought applied to the question of what actually winning the Cold War would look like. Certainly Ronald Reagan's heretical policy directive "We win, They lose" framed the concept (to the horror of the adherents to The Church of Perpetual Accommodation), but how was that actually supposed to work in detail? Occupation troops at key points? Disarmament? Reparations? Mandatory intermarriage?
The argument now, admittedly with 20/20 hindsight, is that it was an error to go along with the "be nice" camp in the DoS and not demand full nuclear disarmament as a precondition for any aid to or economic engagement with Russia (as we in effect did with Ukraine). But how would that have worked? Guarantee Russia against attack by, say, the Chinese with the US nuclear umbrella? Or just say "Too bad you lost, Comrade; You're on your own" likely leading to a bunch (more) work on Russian chemical and biological weapons in secret?
If anyone can provide pointers to any work before 1990ish that attempted any thinking through of how we'd actually do this "Win the Cold War" thing, realist camp or otherwise, I'd be grateful.
Have the full review open. Any good Navy man chooses the "lesser of two weevils."
I think our ideals are an undercounted asset, not captured in many forms of analysis. We can create win-wins by turning enemies into friends and playing a positive sum game.
Realism. Pragmatism. The lesser of two evils. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, or at least not my outright enemy... We allied with the Soviet Union in WWII (even though FDR's Administration was riddled with outright Communists and Socialist sympathizers) because it was seen as a lesser evil than Nazi Germany.
Such a mindset should guide our decisions. I'm glad to see that there's a legitimate Nationalist perspective developing among the population. To attempt to deflect those who'd make the claim, a Nationalist perspective does not imply or require a racist or racially skewed perspective. We (as in the United States) need to be the primary consideration in our decision making.
As Mark O. implies, a more rational and balanced approach towards our relations with Russia (realistic/pragmatic) might well have had a significant impact on current events and the lose/lose opportunities that we face in Ukraine. Neither party is without sin and we forgot to consider the Russian response or perception of a hostile regime on a border propped up by Western agencies.
How then does a post-Biden Adminstration bring a realists view and actions to the current conflict in Ukraine, given we don't see The Guns of August in the interim?
Slightly off into the domestic political weeds, but: Ascribing GHWB's 1990 defeat to his administration's realist policies ignores the short and very loud elephant in that room: H. Ross Perot.
Perot merged his deep personal animus to the Bush family with a calculated populist appeal based primarily on domestic concerns regarding trade issues with Mexico to shift the electoral results just slightly enough such that GHWB lost the election to William Jefferson Clinton.
Which means our long subsequent national relationship with Clan Clinton can rightly be laid at Perot's small feet.
If GHWB had applied a bit of that international relations realist philosophy to addressing some of those North American trade issues, minimally enough to at least facially address voter concerns across the US heartland, H.Ross' flip charts would have had not been able to flip that electoral college count, and in that timeline we would all be blissfully unaware of what ever happened to that tall ex-Governor of Arkansas.
Sal I regret I did not have the opportunity to serve under you as my DH or XO. I think I would have learned a lot.
I've not seen anything written before the failed coup against Gorby to indicate there was ever serious thought applied to the question of what actually winning the Cold War would look like. Certainly Ronald Reagan's heretical policy directive "We win, They lose" framed the concept (to the horror of the adherents to The Church of Perpetual Accommodation), but how was that actually supposed to work in detail? Occupation troops at key points? Disarmament? Reparations? Mandatory intermarriage?
The argument now, admittedly with 20/20 hindsight, is that it was an error to go along with the "be nice" camp in the DoS and not demand full nuclear disarmament as a precondition for any aid to or economic engagement with Russia (as we in effect did with Ukraine). But how would that have worked? Guarantee Russia against attack by, say, the Chinese with the US nuclear umbrella? Or just say "Too bad you lost, Comrade; You're on your own" likely leading to a bunch (more) work on Russian chemical and biological weapons in secret?
If anyone can provide pointers to any work before 1990ish that attempted any thinking through of how we'd actually do this "Win the Cold War" thing, realist camp or otherwise, I'd be grateful.
Fantasy and insanity run with scissors in n both hands
Have the full review open. Any good Navy man chooses the "lesser of two weevils."
I think our ideals are an undercounted asset, not captured in many forms of analysis. We can create win-wins by turning enemies into friends and playing a positive sum game.
https://youtu.be/e4PzpxOj5Cc