Another thought. Companies are expanding factories in fixed locations, not building new ones. What are we doing to provide for the defense of those fixed targets? You figure we have 2 sub builders, 1 CVN builder, and half a dozen(?) missile facilities. What if some of those 25,000 military aged male Chinese who entered illegally last year had nefarious intent? What if they were just going to lase for a SLCM? What is the plan for defending our defense plants? (Hint, none). So, in one fell swoop, we could have zero industrial base to resupply our Navy at sea.
There are a finite number of CVN capable drydocks. What happens if a 20000 TEU merchant hits one of those dock gates instead of a bridge? That doesn't take 25k males.
I just talked elsewhere about this... The potential level of sabotage is insane, and not somthing we really can defend against. Military bases and MIC targets, even govt offices need not even be on the list if the lights go out. The power grid and internet hubs going off will bring the country to a screeching halt. When theres no electricity, no banking, gas pumps, stores...whos going to be going to their day job building ships or missiles? With the potential for a couple hundred saboteurs in every state, and the fact that anyone with a 7th grade education and a couple hundred bucks to spend at Home Depot can do major damage, we could all see our lives turned upside down. Its what Id do if I was runnin the red team...
Dig with a shovel in the right spot on our farm, you take out an interstate gas pipeline AND a transcontinental emergency backup phone line the DOD pays the telecom companies to maintain..
I see the output of Bonneville Dam every day on the way to work. Was a lil curious (we were talking about this here at the time) and took a closer look last year. Anyone could put a big chunk of the PNW in the dark for at least a week or two without much effort and things I have in the shop... Its low hanging fruit. No big plots, training, or funding like a terrorist cell might use are needed. Its just a matter of "lets do this today". And the grid distribution stations here, thatd cause much longer term outages, (because transformers and similar items arent stocked with spares in any quantity, and take a long time to build) arent much harder. And Im sure its just as easy everywhere else!
Get a African-grade hunting rifle (doesn't have to be a .50 or anything futuristic)...drive along I-15 and I-40 in the California desert and take out transformers.
There are no spares
There are no standard designs
And guess where they are made these days? With a 2-year lead time?
Germany and the US. There are more US transformer factories than you might think. And there are mutual aid type arrangements, plus some people who commercially support this. So it isn't as easy as people think, but the depth of the pool isn't really that deep. And the total lack of standardization is absurd.
Is there a port or Naval Base we utilize either in CONUS or OCONUS that isn’t constricted? I shudder every time I’m stuck in traffic on the HRBT that it is a potential choke point that could bottle up all maritime traffic in Norfolk and Newport News….and as Baltimore exhibited early this morning, an overnight Maersk vessel without power can easily be described as an uncontrolled nautical vessel.
Least? Puget Sound. Only bridge across a Naval transit route is Kitsap Point Floating.
Guam, maybe. The Navy basin looks pretty easily obstructed. Mayport is pretty unconstrained getting to sea, as is Pearl. Still a channel to clear in both spots. Yokuska is wide open and difficult to block, as is Rota. Sasebo is well in from the sea, but the channel is broad.
Our adversaries now do this. The folks in Yemen turn stocks of SAM's into anti-ship weapons with new guidence kits? The PAC-3 I expect is in such short supply it cannot be spared. As another comment notes we have little real undustrial base left. I see no mobilization of technical skilled folks for example either...
PAC3 MSE has a trivial warhead, it's really a hit-to-kill missile. It will put a 10" hole in a ship, probably all the way though it, but it's not a ship killer.
Not a lot of damage, but a lot of frigates and on down will be limping out of the engagement area with that damage, though. I would prefer more -6s, but we might end up being able to crank out more PAC-3s.
SM-6 is 4mil a pop and the PAC-3 is about the same. How many of each of these have been built? Is there a possibility the cost could go down with volume purchases? Items like these with long term usage should be lower in cost the longer they are in production.
Should also be engineered for rapid easy inexpensive refurbishment, like the batteries, propellant, coolant, whatever fluids or soft parts need replacement should not involve, erm, rocket surgery.
So you can build a huge surplus and let them sit for 20 years of peace and THEN when you need them they can be swiftly freshened up and deployed.
They could have their ROI and lower the cost... I understand the desire of the MIC to maintain maximum profitability but is some sort of individual corporate restraint to much to dream about?
I went thought it and posted that here months ago, but I have no idea when it was. It is not nearly as many as you might hope. I suspect Ukraine has expended at least 10% of the total procured.
1. "For a decade now, the Navy has been paying Raytheon to build 125 of the missiles per year at a cost of slightly more than $4 million per missile; the fleet has around 600 in stock. The production rate should increase slightly in the coming years."
The math would seem like we expended half our annual production over 10 years?
2. the PAC3 has a shorter range, but seemingly 1 big edge for the Navy. Learn to shoot them and Army stocks become a deep reserve.
we had a gravity bomb shortage during Vietnam. rationing. Digging deep into WW2 stocks and putting some really degraded crap into the pipeline. (see Forrestal fire). Given the Dem Congress abdication of our promises to South Vietnam in 72-75, I doubt they were splurging to restock...
I'm wondering what the self-life is for the SM-2 Mk70 booster motor. I know many of the older Mk12's were aged out and were used as boosters for sounding rockets.
I think it's more that they're in love with having a VDS to get below the thermocline. Hull mounted sonar is not much good for deep water operations - maybe? ok for self defence, but not for ASW escort of HVT / MFU or convoy ops. The subs can go below the layer and come back from another angle, HMS can't penetrate and so poof the sub is gone. Until MK48 equivalent breaks your back. Or the CVN's.
1. This is confusing without a breakout of army and navy missiles, cost, dimensions, performance, target sets, stock, production rates current and achievable.
2. Whatever answers those are, they need a RMA in cheaper missiles. Take a zero off the prices. Two zeroes if you want to deal with swarms. Cheaper may also mean smaller and thus more magazine capacity. Maybe it won't be as fancy but for a drone you don't need fancy. At a sufficient price point they have added value as multirole weapons ie for surface and shore attack. Stick a JDAM/APKWS/DAGR like kit on a Grad class rocket.
RAM seems to have a very short range. The various 5" guided projectiles might be a better option for drones but still expensive. Are they cheaper than RAM?
As a certain saying goes "quantity has a quality all its own." Our growing number of abversaries understand this very well. We are already begging our foreign users for Patriots to refill Ukraines dwindling number of Patriot systems. Hypersonic Kinzhals destroy hideously expensive Patriots regularly. Patriots kills of the vastly more capable Kinzhal not in evidence except Ukranian propoganda. With the horrific loss rate in Ukraine how many rounds would the USN actually get in the end?
Nah, Kinzals were shot down by Patriots, IIRC they got 6 in a few minutes over Kiev. The recent increase in Russian ISR behind the lines linked to a vastly improved and sped-up targeting process by the Russians seems to have gotten a couple of Patriot TELs and some HIMARS, hit by SS-26s.
If thats the case, then perhaps the USN should think about reconfiguring its AAW suite towards the weapons best suited for the reality of the air threats we are actually facing.
And reconfigure the ships with much greater number of these shorter ranged missiles...and perhaps per more effective DP guns.
SM-2's came along to counter the AS-4 threat in the 80's.
A good analog would be the quick evolution of the the AAW suites on USN ships from 1942-'45. It went from the few 5' open mounts and 1.1 inch quads, to the 5"38 DP, along with the big numbers of 40mm and 20mm mounts.
(and ...to be fair...the VT fuse was a giant game changer then)
Why is it that the USN is listening to Lockheed deciding what they can best build, instead of the USN defining the requirements in the first place?
If we want to shoot the archer, we need to be able to hit the archer in the air when we are up against a real country rather than some terrorists in a failed state.
I posit we need a much greater number of "not so golden" rounds and configuration for the war we are actually fighting.
Furthermore, is our thinking about what to expect in a peer to peer conflict really up to snuff? Will we only confront the very highest end weapons we think we will?
Or are we drafting on decades old presumptions, and not looking beyond what the Primes want to sell?
Heh. Save the missiles for long-range engagements. Use 127, 76, or even 155 mm for closer engagements. Much cheaper, much deeper magazines, variety of ammunition for different missions, including the ever-popular naval gunfire support. OTO already has its 76 mm Vulcano ammunition which has terminal guidance and anti aircraft/missile capability. It shouldn't be too difficult to develop a 127 mm. round, maybe even 155 mm, for anti aircraft/missile use. And there would still be plenty of deck space left for VLS systems.
Relatedly, if we're faced with significant attack, do we EVER decide to not try and shoot it down with a longer-ranged and more expensive missile?
As best I understand it, if we detect an incoming missile in SM-2/6 range, we aren't going to just sit on the SM-2/6 and wait for it to get close enough to engage with ESSM or RAM. And we shouldn't... because the closer it gets, the more likely we take a hit.
But I'd think that in practice, this means we're likely to use our more expensive and less plentiful missiles first, right?
"Relatedly, if we're faced with significant attack, do we EVER decide to not try and shoot it down with a longer-ranged and more expensive missile?"
Of course not....And certainly not in the limited surface to air engagements since WWII (the part the Admiral got sorta right). When through Korea, Vietnam, Libya, the Forever Wars, did the number of targets exceed one or two, if ever even more than that, then just a handful?
I will surmise that more than a few of these engagements are happening at detection and target acquisition ranges well inside the theoretical maximums we usually hear about...
Wouldn't surprise me that some cases the detection to targeting to shoot have been within the minimum range of the SM-2....
"But I'd think that in practice, this means we're likely to use our more expensive and less plentiful missiles first, right?"
Not necessarily...
Go winchester with your SM-6's on the airbreathing shaheds ...and then along comes a flurry of ballistic shots up high...
Now what?
Kinda like at Midway for the Japanese when the ineffectual Vindicators brought the Zeros down to the deck and out of play to engage the SBD's...
I don't know that we do. In fact, that's what I'm trying to get at with this line of thought. There's a trade-off of which of our missiles can respond to various incoming missiles/drones/aircraft.
At one end, we have our high capability, expensive, long-range missiles. Those give us the best odds of a successful intercept, but they're expensive. We can save those and decide to use shorter range, less capable missiles or guns and we'll save money, but we reduce the chance that we successfully intercept.
Like you say, we don't need to (and shouldn't) waste SM-6s on Shaheds. But what happens when the case isn't so obvious?
In the Red Sea, we know the capabilities of the incoming pretty well, and they're very low. And they're being used in low enough numbers that they don't provide much of a threat. We can classify and respond economically because the enemy is few in number, slow, and inaccurate.
Against China, it won't always be max range against DF-21s, but we should expect that the numbers and capabilities of the missiles being fired at us are going to be significantly higher across the board.
In that scenario, what kind of capability do we have to identify and prioritize the incoming and intercept it with the theoretical "least expensive" response?
To take your Midway example, the Japanese couldn't know that the Torpedos our TBDs carried were practically useless. So they sic'd the Zeros on them and shot them all down.
Against China, they've got a lot of missiles and drones of various ranges and capabilities. Do we or can we know which ones are the modern-day TBD Devastators that we can safely ignore or prosecute with a cheaper option?
"Those give us the best odds of a successful intercept, but they're expensive. "
Best odds? You make it sound like expensive, exquisite weapons are immutably the most effective. The history of warfare has proven otherwise over and over again.
"We can save those and decide to use shorter range, less capable missiles or guns and we'll save money, but we reduce the chance that we successfully intercept."
Again, too broad a brush. I've spent some quality time in the southern Red Sea (on a previous generation DDG), and will submit that terrain, atmospherics (to include heat and dust degradation to equipment) makes this a fallacious presumption.
"Shorter range" does -not- directly equate to "less capable".
"In the Red Sea, we know the capabilities of the incoming pretty well"
Do we? Are you sure? When you think you have clarity that pierces the fog of war...especially against an enemy you consider "inferior"...You've set yourself up for a nasty surprise.
"...we should expect that the numbers and capabilities of the missiles being fired at us are going to be significantly higher across the board. "
Why? Swarm attacks with numerous cheap weapons have worked at least since archers took the field.
"In that scenario, what kind of capability do we have to identify and prioritize the incoming and intercept it with the theoretical "least expensive" response?"
Indeed. Just like we don't know what the Houthis -backed by the Iranians, and most likely the Chinese - have up their sleeve.
"Against China, they've got a lot of missiles and drones of various ranges and capabilities. "
On this we agree, and thats why simply focusing on the highest end... which also equates directly to the most expensive, but not necessarily most effective... missiles is the wrong tack.
We won't have the numbers, nor in many scenarios, actually the most effective weapons to bring to bear.
And the military simply must stop letting industry define Requirements...
PAC3 is a small anti-missile round with limited range. It is not ideal for fleet defense. It's fine as a 2nd tier to get leakers, but you should try to kill incoming missiles (and especially aircraft) further out. PAC2 is the long range round. I think they may still be made for export, but the US hasn't bought any in years.
PAC3 does not exist in enough numbers to fight a major war. I suspect Ukraine has fired well over 10% of the US inventory, possibly over 20%. PAC2 numbers bought as far back as you can easily track though on-line procurement numbers are not great either, but PAC2 procurement started before 1990. I suspect the majority of the various versions of PAC2 rounds in storage need the same sort of certification as the older Standards need.
This is regretably just Ukranian propoganda. No evidence has been presented that any Kinzals were shot down...anywhere. We DO know after firing a whole launchers worth the Patriot system was scrape metal. The Patriot just does not have the capability to deal with Hypersonic weapons...
Another thought. Companies are expanding factories in fixed locations, not building new ones. What are we doing to provide for the defense of those fixed targets? You figure we have 2 sub builders, 1 CVN builder, and half a dozen(?) missile facilities. What if some of those 25,000 military aged male Chinese who entered illegally last year had nefarious intent? What if they were just going to lase for a SLCM? What is the plan for defending our defense plants? (Hint, none). So, in one fell swoop, we could have zero industrial base to resupply our Navy at sea.
Gee, they would NEVER do that, would they?
There are a finite number of CVN capable drydocks. What happens if a 20000 TEU merchant hits one of those dock gates instead of a bridge? That doesn't take 25k males.
For decades, the USN fought successfully kept the Coronado bridge from being built across San Diego Bay...
Hope the decision to let it happen doesn't bite us in the butt one day.
I just talked elsewhere about this... The potential level of sabotage is insane, and not somthing we really can defend against. Military bases and MIC targets, even govt offices need not even be on the list if the lights go out. The power grid and internet hubs going off will bring the country to a screeching halt. When theres no electricity, no banking, gas pumps, stores...whos going to be going to their day job building ships or missiles? With the potential for a couple hundred saboteurs in every state, and the fact that anyone with a 7th grade education and a couple hundred bucks to spend at Home Depot can do major damage, we could all see our lives turned upside down. Its what Id do if I was runnin the red team...
Dig with a shovel in the right spot on our farm, you take out an interstate gas pipeline AND a transcontinental emergency backup phone line the DOD pays the telecom companies to maintain..
I see the output of Bonneville Dam every day on the way to work. Was a lil curious (we were talking about this here at the time) and took a closer look last year. Anyone could put a big chunk of the PNW in the dark for at least a week or two without much effort and things I have in the shop... Its low hanging fruit. No big plots, training, or funding like a terrorist cell might use are needed. Its just a matter of "lets do this today". And the grid distribution stations here, thatd cause much longer term outages, (because transformers and similar items arent stocked with spares in any quantity, and take a long time to build) arent much harder. And Im sure its just as easy everywhere else!
Get a African-grade hunting rifle (doesn't have to be a .50 or anything futuristic)...drive along I-15 and I-40 in the California desert and take out transformers.
There are no spares
There are no standard designs
And guess where they are made these days? With a 2-year lead time?
Germany and the US. There are more US transformer factories than you might think. And there are mutual aid type arrangements, plus some people who commercially support this. So it isn't as easy as people think, but the depth of the pool isn't really that deep. And the total lack of standardization is absurd.
Where does the (specialty) iron for the core come from? The copper for the windings?
And how many of those EHV transformers are in the spares pool? There are probably close to 2-dozen on the routes I specified.
Someone recently opened an electrical steel plant in the US. Google say US Steel in Arkansas.
If you don't use electrical steel the transformer still apparently works, it just is going to get noticeably hotter and more inefficient.
Is there a port or Naval Base we utilize either in CONUS or OCONUS that isn’t constricted? I shudder every time I’m stuck in traffic on the HRBT that it is a potential choke point that could bottle up all maritime traffic in Norfolk and Newport News….and as Baltimore exhibited early this morning, an overnight Maersk vessel without power can easily be described as an uncontrolled nautical vessel.
Least? Puget Sound. Only bridge across a Naval transit route is Kitsap Point Floating.
Guam, maybe. The Navy basin looks pretty easily obstructed. Mayport is pretty unconstrained getting to sea, as is Pearl. Still a channel to clear in both spots. Yokuska is wide open and difficult to block, as is Rota. Sasebo is well in from the sea, but the channel is broad.
Now upgrade PAC-3 with a surface attack option....
Our adversaries now do this. The folks in Yemen turn stocks of SAM's into anti-ship weapons with new guidence kits? The PAC-3 I expect is in such short supply it cannot be spared. As another comment notes we have little real undustrial base left. I see no mobilization of technical skilled folks for example either...
It's slow, but we are adding to the industrial base. Arguably a bigger problem is how much of the new plant is dependent on Chinese sub-components.
PAC3 MSE has a trivial warhead, it's really a hit-to-kill missile. It will put a 10" hole in a ship, probably all the way though it, but it's not a ship killer.
Not a lot of damage, but a lot of frigates and on down will be limping out of the engagement area with that damage, though. I would prefer more -6s, but we might end up being able to crank out more PAC-3s.
Ideally, both…
SM-6 is 4mil a pop and the PAC-3 is about the same. How many of each of these have been built? Is there a possibility the cost could go down with volume purchases? Items like these with long term usage should be lower in cost the longer they are in production.
Should also be engineered for rapid easy inexpensive refurbishment, like the batteries, propellant, coolant, whatever fluids or soft parts need replacement should not involve, erm, rocket surgery.
So you can build a huge surplus and let them sit for 20 years of peace and THEN when you need them they can be swiftly freshened up and deployed.
Hear, hear. That might be doable on several systems.
Impossible.
That would mess up the ROI of the Defense Primes.
They could have their ROI and lower the cost... I understand the desire of the MIC to maintain maximum profitability but is some sort of individual corporate restraint to much to dream about?
Sad to say... It is...
Some believe the current setup of the Defense Industry is as perfect as it can be.
Agree... I do.
I went thought it and posted that here months ago, but I have no idea when it was. It is not nearly as many as you might hope. I suspect Ukraine has expended at least 10% of the total procured.
a couple of comments:
1. "For a decade now, the Navy has been paying Raytheon to build 125 of the missiles per year at a cost of slightly more than $4 million per missile; the fleet has around 600 in stock. The production rate should increase slightly in the coming years."
The math would seem like we expended half our annual production over 10 years?
2. the PAC3 has a shorter range, but seemingly 1 big edge for the Navy. Learn to shoot them and Army stocks become a deep reserve.
How does everyone not understand that we need to be dealing in thousands, not hundreds?
Question: since WWII we've assumed unlimited stocks of dumb bombs, gravity bombs eg Mk 82. How true is this?
we had a gravity bomb shortage during Vietnam. rationing. Digging deep into WW2 stocks and putting some really degraded crap into the pipeline. (see Forrestal fire). Given the Dem Congress abdication of our promises to South Vietnam in 72-75, I doubt they were splurging to restock...
I'm wondering what the self-life is for the SM-2 Mk70 booster motor. I know many of the older Mk12's were aged out and were used as boosters for sounding rockets.
The sun comes up in the West - Right?
Everyone seems to be in love with those automated anti-sub warfare systems, as shown in the video.
I think it's more that they're in love with having a VDS to get below the thermocline. Hull mounted sonar is not much good for deep water operations - maybe? ok for self defence, but not for ASW escort of HVT / MFU or convoy ops. The subs can go below the layer and come back from another angle, HMS can't penetrate and so poof the sub is gone. Until MK48 equivalent breaks your back. Or the CVN's.
1. This is confusing without a breakout of army and navy missiles, cost, dimensions, performance, target sets, stock, production rates current and achievable.
2. Whatever answers those are, they need a RMA in cheaper missiles. Take a zero off the prices. Two zeroes if you want to deal with swarms. Cheaper may also mean smaller and thus more magazine capacity. Maybe it won't be as fancy but for a drone you don't need fancy. At a sufficient price point they have added value as multirole weapons ie for surface and shore attack. Stick a JDAM/APKWS/DAGR like kit on a Grad class rocket.
aren't rolling airframe missiles the weap of choice for a drone? Why not?
I thought it should be ESSM. Turns out they are half about $2 mil each, so only a somewhat savings. Quicker to produce, though.
and perhaps reloadable at sea
RAM yes. ESSM o carrier and amphibs, yes. In VLS no.
RAM seems to have a very short range. The various 5" guided projectiles might be a better option for drones but still expensive. Are they cheaper than RAM?
And then there is the (lack of) convenient, quick turn-around VLS re-load capability which Sal has hilighted previously. Lots here to lose sleep over.
Related: https://strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/20240326.aspx
Nice to see a fellow strategy page reader here
As a certain saying goes "quantity has a quality all its own." Our growing number of abversaries understand this very well. We are already begging our foreign users for Patriots to refill Ukraines dwindling number of Patriot systems. Hypersonic Kinzhals destroy hideously expensive Patriots regularly. Patriots kills of the vastly more capable Kinzhal not in evidence except Ukranian propoganda. With the horrific loss rate in Ukraine how many rounds would the USN actually get in the end?
Nah, Kinzals were shot down by Patriots, IIRC they got 6 in a few minutes over Kiev. The recent increase in Russian ISR behind the lines linked to a vastly improved and sped-up targeting process by the Russians seems to have gotten a couple of Patriot TELs and some HIMARS, hit by SS-26s.
Kill the archer, kill his factory.
Not expecting an answer, but how many of the Red Sea intercepts have occurred within ESSM or NASAMS range?
Well, the Germans supposedly tried to use a RAM to take down the one missile they tagged, without success.
My understanding is that quite a few have been taken down with 5" and 76mm guns.
great. cheap and ammo friendly
now do the counterfire part
That is getting close. That we already had on taken down by a CIWS is not good. Nothing is 100% reliable, if you give them enough shots...
Another not going to get answered here question...
What have been the nominal detection ranges in these engagements?
How about effective target acquisition ranges?
If thats the case, then perhaps the USN should think about reconfiguring its AAW suite towards the weapons best suited for the reality of the air threats we are actually facing.
And reconfigure the ships with much greater number of these shorter ranged missiles...and perhaps per more effective DP guns.
SM-2's came along to counter the AS-4 threat in the 80's.
A good analog would be the quick evolution of the the AAW suites on USN ships from 1942-'45. It went from the few 5' open mounts and 1.1 inch quads, to the 5"38 DP, along with the big numbers of 40mm and 20mm mounts.
(and ...to be fair...the VT fuse was a giant game changer then)
Why is it that the USN is listening to Lockheed deciding what they can best build, instead of the USN defining the requirements in the first place?
Because thinking is hard.
87,000+ NAVSEA employees.....
If we want to shoot the archer, we need to be able to hit the archer in the air when we are up against a real country rather than some terrorists in a failed state.
(Being an old DDG guy) I understand that, and thats the missiles we currently carry.
I am old enough to remember this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7pHxouLlw8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pru2kkBl_8o
I posit we need a much greater number of "not so golden" rounds and configuration for the war we are actually fighting.
Furthermore, is our thinking about what to expect in a peer to peer conflict really up to snuff? Will we only confront the very highest end weapons we think we will?
Or are we drafting on decades old presumptions, and not looking beyond what the Primes want to sell?
TAMIR is one answer. $50,000. Wonder if they can be integrated with AGIS ?
IDF does not want to share source code.
Heh. Save the missiles for long-range engagements. Use 127, 76, or even 155 mm for closer engagements. Much cheaper, much deeper magazines, variety of ammunition for different missions, including the ever-popular naval gunfire support. OTO already has its 76 mm Vulcano ammunition which has terminal guidance and anti aircraft/missile capability. It shouldn't be too difficult to develop a 127 mm. round, maybe even 155 mm, for anti aircraft/missile use. And there would still be plenty of deck space left for VLS systems.
Relatedly, if we're faced with significant attack, do we EVER decide to not try and shoot it down with a longer-ranged and more expensive missile?
As best I understand it, if we detect an incoming missile in SM-2/6 range, we aren't going to just sit on the SM-2/6 and wait for it to get close enough to engage with ESSM or RAM. And we shouldn't... because the closer it gets, the more likely we take a hit.
But I'd think that in practice, this means we're likely to use our more expensive and less plentiful missiles first, right?
"Relatedly, if we're faced with significant attack, do we EVER decide to not try and shoot it down with a longer-ranged and more expensive missile?"
Of course not....And certainly not in the limited surface to air engagements since WWII (the part the Admiral got sorta right). When through Korea, Vietnam, Libya, the Forever Wars, did the number of targets exceed one or two, if ever even more than that, then just a handful?
I will surmise that more than a few of these engagements are happening at detection and target acquisition ranges well inside the theoretical maximums we usually hear about...
Wouldn't surprise me that some cases the detection to targeting to shoot have been within the minimum range of the SM-2....
"But I'd think that in practice, this means we're likely to use our more expensive and less plentiful missiles first, right?"
Not necessarily...
Go winchester with your SM-6's on the airbreathing shaheds ...and then along comes a flurry of ballistic shots up high...
Now what?
Kinda like at Midway for the Japanese when the ineffectual Vindicators brought the Zeros down to the deck and out of play to engage the SBD's...
What are the implications of these conclusions for what happens when we're going up against more than a piecemeal attack by low quality opponents?
Again...
Why do we presuppose that every engagement with China will be at max range against DF-21s?
I don't know that we do. In fact, that's what I'm trying to get at with this line of thought. There's a trade-off of which of our missiles can respond to various incoming missiles/drones/aircraft.
At one end, we have our high capability, expensive, long-range missiles. Those give us the best odds of a successful intercept, but they're expensive. We can save those and decide to use shorter range, less capable missiles or guns and we'll save money, but we reduce the chance that we successfully intercept.
Like you say, we don't need to (and shouldn't) waste SM-6s on Shaheds. But what happens when the case isn't so obvious?
In the Red Sea, we know the capabilities of the incoming pretty well, and they're very low. And they're being used in low enough numbers that they don't provide much of a threat. We can classify and respond economically because the enemy is few in number, slow, and inaccurate.
Against China, it won't always be max range against DF-21s, but we should expect that the numbers and capabilities of the missiles being fired at us are going to be significantly higher across the board.
In that scenario, what kind of capability do we have to identify and prioritize the incoming and intercept it with the theoretical "least expensive" response?
To take your Midway example, the Japanese couldn't know that the Torpedos our TBDs carried were practically useless. So they sic'd the Zeros on them and shot them all down.
Against China, they've got a lot of missiles and drones of various ranges and capabilities. Do we or can we know which ones are the modern-day TBD Devastators that we can safely ignore or prosecute with a cheaper option?
"Those give us the best odds of a successful intercept, but they're expensive. "
Best odds? You make it sound like expensive, exquisite weapons are immutably the most effective. The history of warfare has proven otherwise over and over again.
"We can save those and decide to use shorter range, less capable missiles or guns and we'll save money, but we reduce the chance that we successfully intercept."
Again, too broad a brush. I've spent some quality time in the southern Red Sea (on a previous generation DDG), and will submit that terrain, atmospherics (to include heat and dust degradation to equipment) makes this a fallacious presumption.
"Shorter range" does -not- directly equate to "less capable".
"In the Red Sea, we know the capabilities of the incoming pretty well"
Do we? Are you sure? When you think you have clarity that pierces the fog of war...especially against an enemy you consider "inferior"...You've set yourself up for a nasty surprise.
"...we should expect that the numbers and capabilities of the missiles being fired at us are going to be significantly higher across the board. "
Why? Swarm attacks with numerous cheap weapons have worked at least since archers took the field.
"In that scenario, what kind of capability do we have to identify and prioritize the incoming and intercept it with the theoretical "least expensive" response?"
Indeed. Just like we don't know what the Houthis -backed by the Iranians, and most likely the Chinese - have up their sleeve.
"Against China, they've got a lot of missiles and drones of various ranges and capabilities. "
On this we agree, and thats why simply focusing on the highest end... which also equates directly to the most expensive, but not necessarily most effective... missiles is the wrong tack.
We won't have the numbers, nor in many scenarios, actually the most effective weapons to bring to bear.
And the military simply must stop letting industry define Requirements...
Based what they wish to sell.
don’t worry, fat lloyd is on the job!
Great, but can they be reloaded at sea?
PAC3 is a small anti-missile round with limited range. It is not ideal for fleet defense. It's fine as a 2nd tier to get leakers, but you should try to kill incoming missiles (and especially aircraft) further out. PAC2 is the long range round. I think they may still be made for export, but the US hasn't bought any in years.
PAC3 does not exist in enough numbers to fight a major war. I suspect Ukraine has fired well over 10% of the US inventory, possibly over 20%. PAC2 numbers bought as far back as you can easily track though on-line procurement numbers are not great either, but PAC2 procurement started before 1990. I suspect the majority of the various versions of PAC2 rounds in storage need the same sort of certification as the older Standards need.
This is regretably just Ukranian propoganda. No evidence has been presented that any Kinzals were shot down...anywhere. We DO know after firing a whole launchers worth the Patriot system was scrape metal. The Patriot just does not have the capability to deal with Hypersonic weapons...
And you judge that on what, Russian propaganda?