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Seawriter's avatar

I wrote a book, US Navy Pacific Fleet in 1941 (https://www.amazon.com/Navy-Pacific-Fleet-1941-battleship/dp/1472859502/ for those interested.)

One of the thing that struck me while researching the book was the emphasis the US Navy placed on its fleet train: tenders, supply ships, and floating drydocks, even before entry into WWII. These ships allowed the Navy to set up a fully functional port in an advanced base in an island lacking anything but a good harbor. (Ulithi is probably the apogee of that capability.)

The pieces were in place before Pearl Harbor, and over the next four years the fleet train allowed what became the Big Blue Fleet to move ever closer to the Japanese Home Islands and victory. A navy ignores tenders at its peril.

M. Thompson's avatar

Two things come to mind:

First, we're going to need some kind of SHORAD/EW self defense aboard these ships. It's going to be a UAS magnet, and I expect them to be early targets. Considering how the Ukrainians are hitting Sevastopol regularly, this is a prudent decision. At the very least, fitted for but not with, or space for multiple Phalanx.

Second, the repair department does not have to be fully manned at all times short of war. Currently, the Submarine Force has Reserve Expeditionary Maintenance units that support the remaining tenders as well as other forward locations. It would be possible to have a manpower assignment based on the expected maintenance levels. One would be a voyage repair/forward reload manning level, and the other a major battle damage repair manning level.

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