One of the thing that struck me while researching the book was the emphasis the US Navy placed on its fleet train: tenders, supply ships, and floating drydocks, even before entry into WWII. These ships allowed the Navy to set up a fully functional port in an advanced base in an island lacking anything but a good harbor. (Ulithi is probably the apogee of that capability.)
The pieces were in place before Pearl Harbor, and over the next four years the fleet train allowed what became the Big Blue Fleet to move ever closer to the Japanese Home Islands and victory. A navy ignores tenders at its peril.
Concur. I'm just an interested amateur, but I have the Kindle edition of Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (and I remember an episode in the Victory at Sea DVD that devoted a lot of airtime to Ulithi). Stupendous (and underappreciated now) achievement.
I put your book in my 'Zon shopping list. I happened to read Ryan Wadle's excellent master's thesis on the evolving (and increasingly important) use of carriers in the Navy's Fleet Problems of 1929-33. I look forward to buying and reading later this year.
First, we're going to need some kind of SHORAD/EW self defense aboard these ships. It's going to be a UAS magnet, and I expect them to be early targets. Considering how the Ukrainians are hitting Sevastopol regularly, this is a prudent decision. At the very least, fitted for but not with, or space for multiple Phalanx.
Second, the repair department does not have to be fully manned at all times short of war. Currently, the Submarine Force has Reserve Expeditionary Maintenance units that support the remaining tenders as well as other forward locations. It would be possible to have a manpower assignment based on the expected maintenance levels. One would be a voyage repair/forward reload manning level, and the other a major battle damage repair manning level.
Reserve Rapair Forces (Units) is a good idea, but the once WORKING MODEL of maintaining a 600-ship Navy should be influencing this equation BIG TIME. IT IS NOT because the MIC has a lock on Congress, the Navy, and must change how they do business. There is HUGE RESISTANCE against this change . . . now that all the $$$ is flowing into their coffers.
I SAY AGAIN . . . Mk38 Mod 4 with AHEAD (Advanced Hit Efficiency And Destruction) ammunition should become the new U.S. Navy STANDARD replacing Mk15 CIWS. Multiple manufacturers must be qualified with supporting supply chains.
Concerning sensors . . . an inexpensive 3D AESA non-rotating sensor should go through a similar qualification exercise and be installed as a STANDARD for self-defense. There are USCG FRC's that have a RADA RPS-42 like system under test. Proliferation of this system is very possible. Aegis for logistics ships results.
Forward base the ships with skelton crews in Australia/ Japan protected ports, than fly in the reserve repair ccrews.Sortie as needed tovfirward bases. Economical and practical
That's a given. Any fleet operating location is going to be a missile target. Just adding in the final layer of defense at an anchorage helps those ships undergoing repair.
Given the current size of our Fleet, and the apparent shortcomings that our near peer competition likely has analyzed and gamed, IF I was an enemy submarine commodore, I'd send some of my subs after the Fleet's logistics tail, to include tenders, oilers, MSC hulls, etc.....but the folks wearing the green eyeshades and fighting the Capitol Hill budget wars don't seem to give a rat's ass about the pointy end of the spear so IF MOAR Tenders are built, probably delivered late and overbudget, they'll likely have traded some requirements for cost (the Cost, Schedule, Performance triangle remains the law of the land in the five-sided wind tunnel - and you get to pick two).....rumor has it that the defense acquisition system has been reformed - anyone seeing any evidence?
I've argued on these pages that I'd the Chicoms went hard they'd try to bottle up Guam with a strategically sunk ship or two in the harbor. Heck of you did it at just the right time you could catch a major portion of the deployed fleet including a CVN there. It would with minimal or possibly no casualties take a bunch of major commandants out of action at a crucial time and cause a humanitarian crisis with food running out on the island. Given our worthless political class this would almost certainly delay and posdibly cripple a vigorous response to Chinese argression.
There are two bottlenecks in Apra Harbor, Guam: the entrance to Outer Apra Harbor and the entrance to Inner Apra Harbor.
The former is very deep and wide (easy for a CVN without tugs to transit en route to Kilo Pier) with a major drop-off just outside the breakwall. Blocking that entrance would require something carrier sized. Not very likely.
The latter is kinda narrow, and only dredged deep enough for anything with a draft of a sub tender at most (USS EMORY S LAND ties up on the north side of Inner Apra if memory serves). Navy & CG assets in the inner harbor are the sub tender, whichever subs are in port, three CG patrol boats, and a CG buoy tender. Blocking the inner harbor is doable, but you'd have to loiter while watching the channel, then launch your weapons in time to catch your target in the right spot. How you'd loiter without being intercepted is beyond me.
Apra Harbor currently hasn't got the infrastructure to host a fleet. It would be strained to host an amphibious ready group.
The AD I was deployed on serviced ships underway closing in close enough to use small boats. Or sending repair crews and equipment to civilian airports where the deployed CODs would pick them up and take them to the carrier. There was work done for fast attacks too. During a contingency operation we would close in on surface ships and use small boats to transport back and forth. Not only for repairs but for dental appointments. For major items the ships were met in ports by flyaway teams. Sometimes the AD would have to be there too.
In any new war anyone pulling into a port has targeted their ship for instant destruction! With today's technology and breath of geographical capability, any war in the western Pacific will be totally fought and won at-sea! This is NOT WW2.
I think one issue is these may be more ships that will be coming too late. Could we build a big deck module and slap it on one of the new T-ATS? Then if things go well and we get the big ships, maybe we pawn the little guys off to an ally.
We’ve had decades of bandaid “fixes” all with the intent of sustaining material readiness. Most of those failed to deliver. Yes to ADs and AS’s. Yes to a robust SIMA. Our aging Fleet makes this imperative.
I would argue that a LCS tender flotilla, built and made ready when the LCS hulls were floated, would have fixed a number of issues with those ships. An LCS tender would have allowed LCS ship deployment in every low-rent hot spot we needed to cover. Somali piracy is one obvious example. Proper tender support would have allowed us to wring out the full value of the LCS (okay, okay, stop snickering).
The inter-war period made it clear: tenders extend the value of ALL small ships. They should be an integral part of every small ship program we have.
We ran MULEPATS out of Guam with a buoy tender and a patrol boat.
Both would steam up to the northern reaches of the Northern Marianas, near Maug. The tender would stay in a box of ~20nm x 20nm, and the patrol boat (with an embarked NMFS agent) would reach out into the EEZ to intercept long liners poaching fish. When the PB ran low on fuel or food, it would zip back to the buoy tender to top off, then go back out.
HC-130 detachments from USCG AirSta Barbers Point would fly out of Andersen AFB to act as spotters.
It took some coordination, but it greatly expanded our reach. The model works.
Great idea, and it won’t happen because it all makes too much sense. I love the VLS reload capable part.
Agree on 4 and locations with the notion that the one based in Pearl be occasionally deployed to someplace like Midway in support of West PAC workups. Doing that would teach a lot of lessons that might get glossed over growing barnacles next to PHNSY.
So the good Cdr Sal has forced me into a rabbit hole this morning -- instead of doing my usual job (trying to understand what the heck the Cleveland Browns are doing) I'm reading about destroyer tenders. A recent example is USS Shenandoah (AD-44), which swam but 13 years and served in the Persian Gulf. What struck me about the ship was the crewing: 87 officers and 1508 enlisted.
Really? That many men? Today's Navy isn't going to afford crewing like that across a tender flotilla. While we talk about the need for tenders (full agreement) and what their capabilities might be, thought should be given as to the crews needed and how we'll manage that.
I think figuring out the Browns is the harder job...and I've been a (long suffering) fan for 50+ years - with some high points along the way just to give enough hope to keep hanging on.
The enlisted probably had a lot of specialists like machinists, tool and die makers, sheet metal, HVAC, boilermakers, etc. plus a healthy contingent of SK's and HS's. Seems a bit heavy on officers at less than 1:20 though
Tenders today will need some machining, but using CNC machines which are more efficient and faster. I'd definitely look into additive manufacture/2D printing. If SpaceX can print rocket motor parts, no reason you can't print just about anything for a ship.
We seem to have found a way to get tankers on the cheap, but we should try and build new if only to get standardized logistics. Also 4 and 4 and hope for more once you know you hit the first goal. We have a high degree of risk in that once we get a ship type commitment, we will strangle funds for the next type we are trying to get.
A most timely and well focused topic. I spent 2.5 years aboard USS Piedmont (AD-17) from 1978 to 1980. Commissioned 1944 and in Tokyo Bay for the WWII Japanese surrender. Most people have no idea what the capabilities of an AD are. We were certified for nuclear maintenance capability. Our wardroom and chief's mess contained mostly specialist warrant and prior enlisted mature officers that had unique and immensely advanced skills (optics specialists for periscope repair for example). An AD did not just repair surface ships. During my time onboard our Repair Department white board was always filled to overflowing with scheduled jobs. What happened when the ADs were retired? Those scheduled jobs reverted to private shipyards and the few overworked Navy yards. No wonder our maintenance backlog grew immensely over the years. Yes, bring back the ADs! r/Karl
It is very hard to argue with CDR Sal when he discusses the need for ships, shipyards and bases and anything else needed for America to be the premier naval power.
The only problem is that the American people are not really supportive of shifting the needed resources to the maritime world.
Those of us in the maritime world - military and commercial - were aware of the problems for decades before they became national news. The amount that our elected representatives are willing to spend is barely enough for us to maintain what we have.
To quote the convicted felon and former Congressman Michael Ozzie Myers - in DC Money talks and BS Walks.
The MIC has a vested interest in the Tenders going away. Then the submarine force is as dependent on the shipyards as are surface vessels. We have come to the place where CONGRESS is going to have to DIRECT the NAVY to build Tenders of all types along with their associated Drydocks. Congress just shrunk from the task of requiring sailor repairable equipment be in all future military contracts.
NOTHING CHANGES . . . by DESIGN! Patriotic? How about just RESPONSIBLE? NOTHING CHANGES!
There will be minor changes between the T-AS, and T-AD. Drydocks are the same argument for need, and if we had any spares in anything this is the THING . . . THAT MUST CHANGE!
Concerning Drydocks . . . the Heavy Lift ships can perform this function, and do so many other things too. Mother ship for smaller vessels, VLS reload and provisions on-load, Drydock lift for major combatants up to DDG-51.
All of this lethargy on the MIC’s part . . . IS BY DESIGN. Our defense suffers for it.
Industry responds to what Congress and the USN ask for. While they ain't clean by a longshot, the lethargy of which you speak comes from many sources. A significant number of which originate from their end customer and Congress.
You are correct, and the U.S. Navy is derelct in this regard. THIS need has existed for decades, but only HIGH $$$ solutions are suggested, developed, and tested. They have not even been demonstrated to my knowledge though Wallops could have conducted one.
As an additional backstop, can the two existing tenders be put in the reserve fleet in case of war? Like we used to? I don't know their condition, but they aren't going run into a brick wall and sink at the date their service life is slated to end.
Build more MOAR? Could that be the watchword?
Re the comment about SHORAD/EW, they need to design the superstructure and weather deck on every ship to fit CONEX with air defense VLS cells for ship defense, especially integrated with TF/Fleet ops. Also if they can fit some RAMS on there, that would be prudent.
Absolutely agree. I read this this morning--only I would disagree with building the AD WITHOUT shielding for a NSF (Nuclear Support Facility) onboard. For the added expense, it makes the AD fully capable to support nuclear powered ships wherever they may be. The big problem will be reconstituting all of the ratings/skills that went the way of the dinosaur when we decommissioned the AS/AD/ARs in the early-mid 1990's.
If I may add, regardless of shipbuilding initiative we are currently pursuing (I wouldn't say we have arrived at success yet) having more fully mission capable ships currently in our inventory would bring more immediate national security. Tenders of all stripes are force multipliers.
The complete Annihilation of the Navy's Combat Logistics Force is either through complete FO ignorance, or stupidity. Reading history would highlight the need for tenders, along with oilers, stores ships, and ammunition ships, to be even considered an expeditionary Navy. USS CANOPUS tended submarines at the end of the Bataan Pinsinula from the first Japanese attack until she was scuttled as Bataan surrendered. The closest maintenance was at Pearl Harbor or limited capability in Australia. ADs, ARs, and countless smaller tenders like ARLs repaired battle damaged ships close to the front lines either to return them to action, or enable them to limp back to a Navy shipyard thousands of miles away. Do the current gaggle of FOs actually believe a war in the Pacific in this century would involve no battle damage, or a lesser need for ammo, food, & fuel? Or are they using the famous Army technique of just assuming challenges away in the spirit of supporting the flawed Joint approach to everything? If they do ignore history and obvious shortfalls, it's a beacon for a badly needed DOGE moment!
Great idea! But more than 3 or 4. As you say, attrition is a thing.
And does that notional AD(X) have the capability to perform VLS reloads in anything but protected waters? Does the receiving ship have to be tied up to a dock (making the AD a very expensive crane)?
And what about more VLS reload capability - absent a full blown AD? Why not buy a geared freighter or six for the job? Buy them on the market, paint them gray and install mil-spec electronics.
What about tankers? Refuelers? And of course, big-wing aerial tankers so the Navy can refuel their own aircraft?
I foresee the T-ATS ocean tugs getting lots of module mission gear so they can support reloads or even act as mini tenders. They have the crane. EPF's crane and everything else wouldn't cut it.
How are these T-ATS equipped? The information I've found online is pretty sparse - 15 knots, 6000 nm range (is that with a tow on?), no mention of any defensive capability.
I wrote a book, US Navy Pacific Fleet in 1941 (https://www.amazon.com/Navy-Pacific-Fleet-1941-battleship/dp/1472859502/ for those interested.)
One of the thing that struck me while researching the book was the emphasis the US Navy placed on its fleet train: tenders, supply ships, and floating drydocks, even before entry into WWII. These ships allowed the Navy to set up a fully functional port in an advanced base in an island lacking anything but a good harbor. (Ulithi is probably the apogee of that capability.)
The pieces were in place before Pearl Harbor, and over the next four years the fleet train allowed what became the Big Blue Fleet to move ever closer to the Japanese Home Islands and victory. A navy ignores tenders at its peril.
AMEN!!!!......history is lost to those who don't study it or just don't care....the lessons written with blood have been tragically lost to time.....
The Pacific Atolls that can provide the protected harbor are being developed. THE NAVY IS SHRINGING FROM THE TASK OF BUILDING WHAT WILL OCCUPY THEM.
Concur. I'm just an interested amateur, but I have the Kindle edition of Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (and I remember an episode in the Victory at Sea DVD that devoted a lot of airtime to Ulithi). Stupendous (and underappreciated now) achievement.
I put your book in my 'Zon shopping list. I happened to read Ryan Wadle's excellent master's thesis on the evolving (and increasingly important) use of carriers in the Navy's Fleet Problems of 1929-33. I look forward to buying and reading later this year.
Two things come to mind:
First, we're going to need some kind of SHORAD/EW self defense aboard these ships. It's going to be a UAS magnet, and I expect them to be early targets. Considering how the Ukrainians are hitting Sevastopol regularly, this is a prudent decision. At the very least, fitted for but not with, or space for multiple Phalanx.
Second, the repair department does not have to be fully manned at all times short of war. Currently, the Submarine Force has Reserve Expeditionary Maintenance units that support the remaining tenders as well as other forward locations. It would be possible to have a manpower assignment based on the expected maintenance levels. One would be a voyage repair/forward reload manning level, and the other a major battle damage repair manning level.
Anti-UAS magnet . . . Mk38 Mod4 with AHEAD ammo.
Reserve Rapair Forces (Units) is a good idea, but the once WORKING MODEL of maintaining a 600-ship Navy should be influencing this equation BIG TIME. IT IS NOT because the MIC has a lock on Congress, the Navy, and must change how they do business. There is HUGE RESISTANCE against this change . . . now that all the $$$ is flowing into their coffers.
The current style seems to be putting just one or two such weapons on a 'non-combatant' ship.
That strikes me as totally inadequate.
Although I do like the coax .50.
For UAS we probably need something that'll throw clouds of pellets to protect against AP drones.
Or microwave.
Huh! Pellets. Like a really big shotgun! I like it! Would be cost-effective.
I SAY AGAIN . . . Mk38 Mod 4 with AHEAD (Advanced Hit Efficiency And Destruction) ammunition should become the new U.S. Navy STANDARD replacing Mk15 CIWS. Multiple manufacturers must be qualified with supporting supply chains.
Concerning sensors . . . an inexpensive 3D AESA non-rotating sensor should go through a similar qualification exercise and be installed as a STANDARD for self-defense. There are USCG FRC's that have a RADA RPS-42 like system under test. Proliferation of this system is very possible. Aegis for logistics ships results.
Forward base the ships with skelton crews in Australia/ Japan protected ports, than fly in the reserve repair ccrews.Sortie as needed tovfirward bases. Economical and practical
SHORAD is not adequate. Repair ships will be ICBM targets.
Going to need THAAD, Patriot or SM-3 and associated radars and associated C3 assets.
That's a given. Any fleet operating location is going to be a missile target. Just adding in the final layer of defense at an anchorage helps those ships undergoing repair.
Given the current size of our Fleet, and the apparent shortcomings that our near peer competition likely has analyzed and gamed, IF I was an enemy submarine commodore, I'd send some of my subs after the Fleet's logistics tail, to include tenders, oilers, MSC hulls, etc.....but the folks wearing the green eyeshades and fighting the Capitol Hill budget wars don't seem to give a rat's ass about the pointy end of the spear so IF MOAR Tenders are built, probably delivered late and overbudget, they'll likely have traded some requirements for cost (the Cost, Schedule, Performance triangle remains the law of the land in the five-sided wind tunnel - and you get to pick two).....rumor has it that the defense acquisition system has been reformed - anyone seeing any evidence?
I've argued on these pages that I'd the Chicoms went hard they'd try to bottle up Guam with a strategically sunk ship or two in the harbor. Heck of you did it at just the right time you could catch a major portion of the deployed fleet including a CVN there. It would with minimal or possibly no casualties take a bunch of major commandants out of action at a crucial time and cause a humanitarian crisis with food running out on the island. Given our worthless political class this would almost certainly delay and posdibly cripple a vigorous response to Chinese argression.
There are two bottlenecks in Apra Harbor, Guam: the entrance to Outer Apra Harbor and the entrance to Inner Apra Harbor.
The former is very deep and wide (easy for a CVN without tugs to transit en route to Kilo Pier) with a major drop-off just outside the breakwall. Blocking that entrance would require something carrier sized. Not very likely.
The latter is kinda narrow, and only dredged deep enough for anything with a draft of a sub tender at most (USS EMORY S LAND ties up on the north side of Inner Apra if memory serves). Navy & CG assets in the inner harbor are the sub tender, whichever subs are in port, three CG patrol boats, and a CG buoy tender. Blocking the inner harbor is doable, but you'd have to loiter while watching the channel, then launch your weapons in time to catch your target in the right spot. How you'd loiter without being intercepted is beyond me.
Apra Harbor currently hasn't got the infrastructure to host a fleet. It would be strained to host an amphibious ready group.
The AD I was deployed on serviced ships underway closing in close enough to use small boats. Or sending repair crews and equipment to civilian airports where the deployed CODs would pick them up and take them to the carrier. There was work done for fast attacks too. During a contingency operation we would close in on surface ships and use small boats to transport back and forth. Not only for repairs but for dental appointments. For major items the ships were met in ports by flyaway teams. Sometimes the AD would have to be there too.
In any new war anyone pulling into a port has targeted their ship for instant destruction! With today's technology and breath of geographical capability, any war in the western Pacific will be totally fought and won at-sea! This is NOT WW2.
I think one issue is these may be more ships that will be coming too late. Could we build a big deck module and slap it on one of the new T-ATS? Then if things go well and we get the big ships, maybe we pawn the little guys off to an ally.
We’ve had decades of bandaid “fixes” all with the intent of sustaining material readiness. Most of those failed to deliver. Yes to ADs and AS’s. Yes to a robust SIMA. Our aging Fleet makes this imperative.
I would argue that a LCS tender flotilla, built and made ready when the LCS hulls were floated, would have fixed a number of issues with those ships. An LCS tender would have allowed LCS ship deployment in every low-rent hot spot we needed to cover. Somali piracy is one obvious example. Proper tender support would have allowed us to wring out the full value of the LCS (okay, okay, stop snickering).
The inter-war period made it clear: tenders extend the value of ALL small ships. They should be an integral part of every small ship program we have.
We ran MULEPATS out of Guam with a buoy tender and a patrol boat.
Both would steam up to the northern reaches of the Northern Marianas, near Maug. The tender would stay in a box of ~20nm x 20nm, and the patrol boat (with an embarked NMFS agent) would reach out into the EEZ to intercept long liners poaching fish. When the PB ran low on fuel or food, it would zip back to the buoy tender to top off, then go back out.
HC-130 detachments from USCG AirSta Barbers Point would fly out of Andersen AFB to act as spotters.
It took some coordination, but it greatly expanded our reach. The model works.
Nice improvisation. Hope whoever came up with the idea at least got an "atta boy".
Great idea, and it won’t happen because it all makes too much sense. I love the VLS reload capable part.
Agree on 4 and locations with the notion that the one based in Pearl be occasionally deployed to someplace like Midway in support of West PAC workups. Doing that would teach a lot of lessons that might get glossed over growing barnacles next to PHNSY.
So the good Cdr Sal has forced me into a rabbit hole this morning -- instead of doing my usual job (trying to understand what the heck the Cleveland Browns are doing) I'm reading about destroyer tenders. A recent example is USS Shenandoah (AD-44), which swam but 13 years and served in the Persian Gulf. What struck me about the ship was the crewing: 87 officers and 1508 enlisted.
Really? That many men? Today's Navy isn't going to afford crewing like that across a tender flotilla. While we talk about the need for tenders (full agreement) and what their capabilities might be, thought should be given as to the crews needed and how we'll manage that.
The Browns..... will end up without a solid playoff run no matter what happens. Just accept it.:(
I think figuring out the Browns is the harder job...and I've been a (long suffering) fan for 50+ years - with some high points along the way just to give enough hope to keep hanging on.
The enlisted probably had a lot of specialists like machinists, tool and die makers, sheet metal, HVAC, boilermakers, etc. plus a healthy contingent of SK's and HS's. Seems a bit heavy on officers at less than 1:20 though
Tenders today will need some machining, but using CNC machines which are more efficient and faster. I'd definitely look into additive manufacture/2D printing. If SpaceX can print rocket motor parts, no reason you can't print just about anything for a ship.
6 and 8, that way we should have a spare or two ahead of time in case of a big war and our forward bases are hit.
And start buying at least 2 medium tankers from a US shipyard per year. The Other Sal estimates we would need 100 in case of a big naval war.
We seem to have found a way to get tankers on the cheap, but we should try and build new if only to get standardized logistics. Also 4 and 4 and hope for more once you know you hit the first goal. We have a high degree of risk in that once we get a ship type commitment, we will strangle funds for the next type we are trying to get.
A most timely and well focused topic. I spent 2.5 years aboard USS Piedmont (AD-17) from 1978 to 1980. Commissioned 1944 and in Tokyo Bay for the WWII Japanese surrender. Most people have no idea what the capabilities of an AD are. We were certified for nuclear maintenance capability. Our wardroom and chief's mess contained mostly specialist warrant and prior enlisted mature officers that had unique and immensely advanced skills (optics specialists for periscope repair for example). An AD did not just repair surface ships. During my time onboard our Repair Department white board was always filled to overflowing with scheduled jobs. What happened when the ADs were retired? Those scheduled jobs reverted to private shipyards and the few overworked Navy yards. No wonder our maintenance backlog grew immensely over the years. Yes, bring back the ADs! r/Karl
It is very hard to argue with CDR Sal when he discusses the need for ships, shipyards and bases and anything else needed for America to be the premier naval power.
The only problem is that the American people are not really supportive of shifting the needed resources to the maritime world.
Those of us in the maritime world - military and commercial - were aware of the problems for decades before they became national news. The amount that our elected representatives are willing to spend is barely enough for us to maintain what we have.
To quote the convicted felon and former Congressman Michael Ozzie Myers - in DC Money talks and BS Walks.
The MIC has a vested interest in the Tenders going away. Then the submarine force is as dependent on the shipyards as are surface vessels. We have come to the place where CONGRESS is going to have to DIRECT the NAVY to build Tenders of all types along with their associated Drydocks. Congress just shrunk from the task of requiring sailor repairable equipment be in all future military contracts.
NOTHING CHANGES . . . by DESIGN! Patriotic? How about just RESPONSIBLE? NOTHING CHANGES!
There will be minor changes between the T-AS, and T-AD. Drydocks are the same argument for need, and if we had any spares in anything this is the THING . . . THAT MUST CHANGE!
Concerning Drydocks . . . the Heavy Lift ships can perform this function, and do so many other things too. Mother ship for smaller vessels, VLS reload and provisions on-load, Drydock lift for major combatants up to DDG-51.
All of this lethargy on the MIC’s part . . . IS BY DESIGN. Our defense suffers for it.
Industry responds to what Congress and the USN ask for. While they ain't clean by a longshot, the lethargy of which you speak comes from many sources. A significant number of which originate from their end customer and Congress.
You are correct, and the U.S. Navy is derelct in this regard. THIS need has existed for decades, but only HIGH $$$ solutions are suggested, developed, and tested. They have not even been demonstrated to my knowledge though Wallops could have conducted one.
It would be good to keep Hanwa Philly out of the sub and destroyer game to get them into the tender game. Or spin off NASSCO.
How about Hanwha needs to be making Frigates as well as Logistics Support Ships.
As an additional backstop, can the two existing tenders be put in the reserve fleet in case of war? Like we used to? I don't know their condition, but they aren't going run into a brick wall and sink at the date their service life is slated to end.
Build more MOAR? Could that be the watchword?
Re the comment about SHORAD/EW, they need to design the superstructure and weather deck on every ship to fit CONEX with air defense VLS cells for ship defense, especially integrated with TF/Fleet ops. Also if they can fit some RAMS on there, that would be prudent.
Absolutely agree. I read this this morning--only I would disagree with building the AD WITHOUT shielding for a NSF (Nuclear Support Facility) onboard. For the added expense, it makes the AD fully capable to support nuclear powered ships wherever they may be. The big problem will be reconstituting all of the ratings/skills that went the way of the dinosaur when we decommissioned the AS/AD/ARs in the early-mid 1990's.
If I may add, regardless of shipbuilding initiative we are currently pursuing (I wouldn't say we have arrived at success yet) having more fully mission capable ships currently in our inventory would bring more immediate national security. Tenders of all stripes are force multipliers.
The complete Annihilation of the Navy's Combat Logistics Force is either through complete FO ignorance, or stupidity. Reading history would highlight the need for tenders, along with oilers, stores ships, and ammunition ships, to be even considered an expeditionary Navy. USS CANOPUS tended submarines at the end of the Bataan Pinsinula from the first Japanese attack until she was scuttled as Bataan surrendered. The closest maintenance was at Pearl Harbor or limited capability in Australia. ADs, ARs, and countless smaller tenders like ARLs repaired battle damaged ships close to the front lines either to return them to action, or enable them to limp back to a Navy shipyard thousands of miles away. Do the current gaggle of FOs actually believe a war in the Pacific in this century would involve no battle damage, or a lesser need for ammo, food, & fuel? Or are they using the famous Army technique of just assuming challenges away in the spirit of supporting the flawed Joint approach to everything? If they do ignore history and obvious shortfalls, it's a beacon for a badly needed DOGE moment!
Great idea! But more than 3 or 4. As you say, attrition is a thing.
And does that notional AD(X) have the capability to perform VLS reloads in anything but protected waters? Does the receiving ship have to be tied up to a dock (making the AD a very expensive crane)?
And what about more VLS reload capability - absent a full blown AD? Why not buy a geared freighter or six for the job? Buy them on the market, paint them gray and install mil-spec electronics.
What about tankers? Refuelers? And of course, big-wing aerial tankers so the Navy can refuel their own aircraft?
I foresee the T-ATS ocean tugs getting lots of module mission gear so they can support reloads or even act as mini tenders. They have the crane. EPF's crane and everything else wouldn't cut it.
How are these T-ATS equipped? The information I've found online is pretty sparse - 15 knots, 6000 nm range (is that with a tow on?), no mention of any defensive capability.