CDR Sal, you have been espousing religious doctrine to the church singers for a long time. Listened to a prominent military commentator on a business channel this AM. For the first time, I heard someone say "we're not looking at victory, but imposing sufficient costs to deter China." Deterrence instead of victory. That changes the decision calculus for both sides. A lot. Have to wonder if we are capable of calculus, or find ourselves taking our boots off because we have run out of fingers and thumbs as we "count" trying to solve our problems.
Yes, this is part of the "Deterrence by Denial" vs. "Deterrence by Punishment" argument.
What you are describing is the defeatist "Deterrence by Punishment" school of thought that, at its core, is just a coping mechanism for not playing to wind. Search for the terms on my Substack. I've written about it before.
Deterrence by denial is death by inflation. We can lie to ourselves about this but, make no mistake, we will be balancing our budget. We can do it willingly or when it all falls apart economically. If you believe we will do it willingly... Well I've got a bridge to sell you. Pain is coming for us. War will just speed it up.
Deterrence by punishment is death of the CCP and possibly millions of its citizens by starvation. They import most of the food or fertilizer needed to eat. They plan on a short war. We can starve them for years.
Sadly, any country China goes to war with will more than likely resemble Ukraine. Blown to bits. The closer they are to China the worse it is.
One does not need to be Sun Tzu to understand why China is going to war. Their growth has ended. They will use war to try and hold it together. We might try and do the same. Both cannot win. But both could lose.
"Deterrence instead of victory. That changes the decision calculus for both sides. A lot."
Their Admirals are looking for weaknesses and opportunities that are readily exploitable. Ours are looking at interior decorating options for their K Street offices and the list of hor d'ourves at the next D.C. cocktail party.
I have to ask - Was the person making this stupid statement a “journalist” whom we have no expectation of intelligence, or someone in a position of responsibility?
How capable are the ship Captains of the rapidly expanding PRC navy? When the Dreadnaught race kicked off finding enough capable officers became a problem for the Royal Navy. Too many weak chinned Nigels and not enough Jacky Fishers
Same question for all the technical staff. Competent commanders and technical support staff need to run high tech warships face a similar gauntlet as ours do with DEI box ticking, just as loyalty to Xi. Add in corruption. This isn’t to diminish the threat, we are deeply fornicated if something kicks off. Just curious how the human factors that are harming our navy play out for the PRC.
Qualities as combatant captains we won't know until the balloon goes up. Broad qualities of seamanship? I have no problem giving the PLAN the edge. They have the largest merchant and fishing fleets in the world to pull talent from.
Seems to me that it's the Sub Skippers that matter most because of the isolation and independence, and fishing fleet or container ship driving isn't a great fit
2/3 of the PLAN 60+ submarine fleet are SSKs. I suspect that they will be focused on operating inside the first island chain and largely under friendly air cover which will limit our own agressive prosecution of contacts. Somewhat isolated but not quite the same as our own SSNs operating inside the chain.
I know it's fiction, but fiction with a solid ring of truth...
A scene from Das Boot:
The skipper is bringing the boat inshore to sneak into Spain (Portugal?). Just the sail is broached and everyone is stressed while the skipper is content and humming. He is having a good time!
He then regales his jo's about his early days going to sea aboard a cargo schooner.
Point being, it's that familiarity with ...and affinity for... with the sea that really does matter.
Their huge cable layers, too. These ships don't get much attention, but they've come a long way since Lord Kelvin used the Great Eastern to connect Europe and America. These ships are where the cyber domain meets the maritime world.
Jacky Fisher had ten years to rebuild the Royal Navy. HE figured war would not occur until the Keil Canal was operational, and he was correct. We don't have that time.
They don't have to be capable. They only need surprise, more ships, and more VLS for the first 30 minutes. Toss in a few tactical nukes in places like Guam and Okinawa?
And still, opening paragraph of the Fact Sheet. " The CMPR illustrates why the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the PRC and its increasingly capable military as the Department’s top pacing challenge."
Who wants to tell SECDEF Austin that China has done caught up and has the numbers for superiority in their backyard, west of Wake, where any agression is likely to take place.
Haven't heard those terms since I taught coercion theory at the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting. And you are right, deterrence by punishment is a losing proposition. Anyone up for a re-do of Rolling Thunder? Bueller?
The first place that US leadership and influencers must look is in the mirror. Because for all the glaring, intimidating statistics of ship hulls, weapons, and "thunder out of China" (to borrow a phrase), the problem is internal, not external.
Thirty years ago, in an era of post-Cold War hubris and triumphalism, USA consciously -- cheerfully, even -- began a massive program to deactivate its World War II legacy industrial base, along with the educational/worker training pipeline. Numerous great old companies went out of business or merged operations into large, inefficient, financialized, corporatized business concerns. From the Beltway grifting-class, BRAC gave away immensely valuable, irreplaceable real estate and fixtures to well-connected speculators and developers. All to the end of (ha!) "saving money," which of course the country never really saved.
Meanwhile, what passes for US military culture --civilian and uniformed -- bought into a bullying sense of might-makes-right supremacy (e.g., cruise missile diplomacy) and "full spectrum dominance" based on a historically temporary mis-correlation of global forces and power. Recall SecState Albright's 1993 question about "Why do we have this great military if we don't use it?" [words to that effect.] Truly, an ignorant comment from a generally foolish person.
Along the foregoing lines, and in terms of supplying a fundamental rationale for power and its use, just try to find a decent undergrad/grad program in ANY US university, incl so-called "service academies," on military history or true "military science." Not "Government" majors; not "Poly Sci" majors; not what passes for a "History" major anymore. USA unis crank out hundreds of thousands of JDs & MBAs; but who are the strategic thinkers w Masters of Military Science or PhD/MilSci? -- and don't say "JPME."
Over those same three decades, China methodically, purposefully, with deeply strategic focus aforethought, built itself into the world's largest industrial and energy power, by any & every metric: oil use, coal, electric power, mines/minerals, metals, machine-building at every point of the production spectrum, finished goods. Early on, and thinking faaaaar ahead, China scoured the globe for resources and channels of movement/transport, to extract valuable things and bring 'em home to the Motherland. (More recently, Belt & Road speaks for itself.) And the West not only watched it happen, the West funded most of it and educated entire generations of Chinese scientists and engineers who made it possible.
Now... We (well, US policymakers) somehow awaken to this China problem that has been evolving for two generations, staring us right in the face. And somehow, it's an issue that must find a solution fast; like by 2027 or some other date on the calendar when all hell is supposedly going to break loose.
No, I don't have an answer, let alone an easy answer... But whatever happens must begin with admitting the problem, if not scope of long-term disastrous thinking. The US has made way too many mistakes. The collective American policy brain just has not worked right, in terms of creating our own future. At the personal level, look in the mirror. Looking ahead, read more, learn more, vow to change and get better.
PS -- forgive the length of this post. As Mark Twain once remarked, "I'd have written a shorter note if I had more time."
Byron King is absolutely correct (except it should be "thunder outer China" per Kipling) in his lengthy but must-read post.
Our problems are 30+ years in the making and began when Bush, Sr. proclaimed a "New World Order" following Desert Strom. Remember the book "The End of History and the Last Man" by Francis Fukuyama? Liberal democracy and free trade capitalism had triumphed forever.
Too bad Osama bin Laden, Xi and Putin didn't read the book.
Scary stuff. And all the interest the US paid on China’s vast holdings of Treasury bonds pretty much paid for this entire build up. I read somewhere once that China’s interest income from Treasuries was bigger than its defence budget.
"... Now do the same math..." It's Christmas. So why go and serve up a heaping portion of "bah humbug." While Santa may pack on the groceries, he's still pretty agile in keeping his naughty and nice lists current.
Many thanks for the assessment. Honestly, nothing new here....USG has been asleep at the wheel since 2010 on this subject. However, I do agree on the report regarding fthem inally calling the RENHAI a cruiser. About time and common sense. xie xie.
Meanwhile at the ranch...speaking of cruisers. Attached. A dismal GAO report on the USN refurbishing efforts on the Tico's. Accountable management.....anyone?
To be real...the "modernization" effort was nothing but a way for the Navy to sidestep that pesky Congress. They never intended to modernize or keep the cruisers. Once idled, the Navy never intended to bring them back. It was nothing but a shell game. A criminal plan to thwart Congress' annoying interest in keeping the CGs around.
Those missile boats would be laughable... if the Chinese were trying to use them in the North Atlantic. Inside the First Island Chain they can definitely be a problem for forces trying to get inside. Same reason we need a couple squadrons of similar vessels in the Philippines and other islands we don't want the Chinese in.
1. As the saying goes (attributed to various sources): "Quantity has a quality of its own."
2. "Ask a few simple questions: to defend against these missiles, how many SM-3 and SM-6 are we producing each year?
"To attack the launching, basing, and production facilities, how many TLAM are we producing each year?
"How many could we have west of the International Date Line with 90-days notice?"
Along with those questions, another issue to ponder is the viability of moving those resources west after production. There are already logistics constraints in delivering sufficient spares and replacement items to INDOPAC-based units (e.g., Guam, Yoko, Sasebo) with no resistance from our peer competitor. Now, imagine attempting to do so during a shooting war. Could the US get sufficient quantities of the items referenced by CDR Sal to remote bases? Or, would ships and subs be forced to come back to Pearl--or even West Coast bases--to reload?
And this doesn't even begin to consider the need to perform depot-level repairs to subs and ships that are damaged in the fight. For example, where are the sectionalized floating dry docks used in locations such as Ulithi during WW2? Oh, that's right, they don't exist currently, and the Navy may not even have a plan in place for their build and relocation.
What's more important, quantity or quality? Why quality of course -- as long as you have enough of it. A Marine Corps adage stated at the Naval War College
Describe the victory conditions for war with PRC and discuss how you would achieve victory over PRC using any means at all. Is some sort of invasion on the table? Regime Change?, air and naval bombardment of cities?, blockade? You know, just talk me through how you are going to win any war with China. Then we'll look at investment strategies.
Ah yes, victory conditions. Seem to recall a bunch of VERY senior folks coming to universal disagreement of what we were actually trying to accomplish during a reasonably recent (last five years) discussion of this topic.
The left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing was intended to direct people in the proper care of their fellow human beings, not as a plan for national defense. Ask where the operational, construction, and maintenance plans converge under a single decision maker. Fire that person, all his/her direct reportees, and all those at the third level below them. Then pass a law that prohibits all GOFO from being hired in any capacity by any company with even an indirect connection to national security. That MIGHT get the attention of any potential replacements.
Buried in the report... "...LHA by early 2024, which is expected to be fitted with an electromagnetic catapult for UAVs..." Interesting... electromagnetic catapult and UAV in the same sentence. Hmm... an LHA launching --> UAVs (?????) <-- that necessitated a catapult... not just any catapult... an --> electromagnetic <-- catapult. Huh...begins tugging at beard...
The design demanded severe weight reduction, which resulted in vulnerable unprotected uptakes (a problem that could have precipitated the loss of the Monterey during the typhoon with her hangar fire as well...in both cases the engineering spaces became uninhabitable immediately), and a wholly unprotected torpedo magazine just aft of the hangar which contained 400 100 lb bombs...
The latter a factor because the Independences simply didn't have the adequate bomb stowage that was required of their employment as fleet carriers.
If you are gonna go "austere" ...or in the current burgeoning lexicon inexpensive... make sure you buy enough to lose.
I'm simply noting they are not in "taking baby steps" mode but close to being able to "play ball." And a catapult certainly hints that they're not talking about toys for UAVs but something of a size that requires a catapult to be launched. Anyone think the PRC couldn't spit UAVs out like gumballs? Yeah I'm thinking "the hits keep coming."
I am just bringing up the inevitable that our neo CVL's will come with a significant cost to think about.
The LHA's were built to the legacy Level II Survivability standard...
Less protection, compartmentalization, redundancy, etc., are built into those designs.
Take a look again at how the Bonnie Dick met her end.
Employing them as full on carriers?
The less informed will see them as full on carriers.
Prepare for some nasty surprises.
In WWII we had the depth of units in theater, the ability to rapidly replenish losses, and could conduct heavy repair forward (like the Monterey after the typhoon).
Not today.
And don't think for a second the Chinese are not planning to exploit all this
Well to be clear I was only referring to the fact that the PLAN is the one coming out with the LHA I'm referring to above. As to whether the navy should adopt a similar operational concept for their LHAs? That I can't answer and mindful that many are questioning the survivability of these large deck amphibs in a peer conflict.
Agree totally... with the exception that I have to believe that BH would be around today if that fire had started while at sea. It was more being in the yard, and all the weaknesses in DC that come with it that killed her.
"Which PLA and naval commanders have combat experience? Significant combat experience?
When was the last time China was engaged in a theatre-level contest with a peer adversary? How did it turn out? "
When has anybody?
The last time a US aircraft carrier was -admittedly- fired upon was the summer of 1945. Because its been so long, a widespread myth is they are "Invulnerable".
Five were sunk from Oct. 44 to Aug. 45. Two fleet carriers were so damaged they were out of the war permanently (Tico made it back late summer 1945).
The list of carriers damaged, but were repaired forward, is lengthy, around 20.
Its been widely circulated that the Ike and Lincoln both took fire from the Houthis.
A reminder...browsing the stats above...what kills a US carrier is the involvement of her own ordnance. Ditto for the fires on the Forrestal and Enterprise.
1. Few PLA officers in command positions have significant combat experience. General Zhang Youxia, the current CMC Vice Chairman, is one exception, having gained combat experience during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. General Liu Zhenli, Chief of the Joint Staff Department, also combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese War. Many PLA commanders, particularly at the operational level, lack preparation for modern warfare.
2. The last time PRC was engaged in a theatre-level contest with a peer adversary was the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. The conflict - brief, bloody and inconclusive. Though PRC claimed victory, both sides suffered heavy casualties, and that war then exposed weaknesses in the PLA's operational capabilities.
I think we could ask the same questions about the USN, and get similar answers. With a couple DDGs off Yemen MAYBE being exceptions...our Navy has no real experience doing anything. Our scripted wargames and pierside REFTRAs arent exactly confidence inspiring... In fact, I'd go on a limb and guess that the PLAN is training harder and more realistically than we are. Sure, maybe we have a lil institutional knowledge and long standing doctrine...but placed in the hands of folks who run into large cargo ships, or onto reefs called out plainly on charts...I'm not convinced it matters...
Let's ask the same questions of the USN as of December 8, 1941:
1. Which USN and naval commanders had combat experience? Significant combat experience?
Answer: none.
2. When was the last time the US was engaged in a theatre-level contest with a peer adversary? How did it turn out?
Answer: 1815 from a naval perspective. WW1 or Spanish American War were not against peer naval adversaries.
3. Describe the depth of USN combat-experienced NCO base.
Answer: essentially none.
4. Describe USN / naval operational experience with force projection, and especially intermediate-term logistical support.
Answer: the USN had been studying, exercising, and experimenting with force projection and logistical support but had little operational experience.
5. Describe USN air assets and their air superiority combat experience.
Answer: the USN had a significant quantity of air assets but many of them were obsolete or obsolescent, and had zero air superiority combat experience.
Yet despite this weak experience, the USN emerged victorious, not least due to its powerful industrial base - a realm in which China has the clear advantage today.
CDR Sal, you have been espousing religious doctrine to the church singers for a long time. Listened to a prominent military commentator on a business channel this AM. For the first time, I heard someone say "we're not looking at victory, but imposing sufficient costs to deter China." Deterrence instead of victory. That changes the decision calculus for both sides. A lot. Have to wonder if we are capable of calculus, or find ourselves taking our boots off because we have run out of fingers and thumbs as we "count" trying to solve our problems.
Yes, this is part of the "Deterrence by Denial" vs. "Deterrence by Punishment" argument.
What you are describing is the defeatist "Deterrence by Punishment" school of thought that, at its core, is just a coping mechanism for not playing to wind. Search for the terms on my Substack. I've written about it before.
One may know how to win yet be unable to do so.
Deterrence by denial is death by inflation. We can lie to ourselves about this but, make no mistake, we will be balancing our budget. We can do it willingly or when it all falls apart economically. If you believe we will do it willingly... Well I've got a bridge to sell you. Pain is coming for us. War will just speed it up.
Deterrence by punishment is death of the CCP and possibly millions of its citizens by starvation. They import most of the food or fertilizer needed to eat. They plan on a short war. We can starve them for years.
Sadly, any country China goes to war with will more than likely resemble Ukraine. Blown to bits. The closer they are to China the worse it is.
One does not need to be Sun Tzu to understand why China is going to war. Their growth has ended. They will use war to try and hold it together. We might try and do the same. Both cannot win. But both could lose.
"Deterrence instead of victory. That changes the decision calculus for both sides. A lot."
Their Admirals are looking for weaknesses and opportunities that are readily exploitable. Ours are looking at interior decorating options for their K Street offices and the list of hor d'ourves at the next D.C. cocktail party.
I have to ask - Was the person making this stupid statement a “journalist” whom we have no expectation of intelligence, or someone in a position of responsibility?
How capable are the ship Captains of the rapidly expanding PRC navy? When the Dreadnaught race kicked off finding enough capable officers became a problem for the Royal Navy. Too many weak chinned Nigels and not enough Jacky Fishers
Same question for all the technical staff. Competent commanders and technical support staff need to run high tech warships face a similar gauntlet as ours do with DEI box ticking, just as loyalty to Xi. Add in corruption. This isn’t to diminish the threat, we are deeply fornicated if something kicks off. Just curious how the human factors that are harming our navy play out for the PRC.
Qualities as combatant captains we won't know until the balloon goes up. Broad qualities of seamanship? I have no problem giving the PLAN the edge. They have the largest merchant and fishing fleets in the world to pull talent from.
USN playing bumper cars in San Diego Bay...
https://youtu.be/onol7M_qtwk?si=NmicBHGMkWnaiUin
At least one of them "chickened" out. That could have been embarrassing.
There's a longer video that includes the radio chatter
That is so bad it's almost beyond belief. Visibility was clearly not an issue. I'm at a loss for any other comment.
Seems to me that it's the Sub Skippers that matter most because of the isolation and independence, and fishing fleet or container ship driving isn't a great fit
It is never a good idea to underestimate our enemy.
2/3 of the PLAN 60+ submarine fleet are SSKs. I suspect that they will be focused on operating inside the first island chain and largely under friendly air cover which will limit our own agressive prosecution of contacts. Somewhat isolated but not quite the same as our own SSNs operating inside the chain.
Don't agree with that.
I know it's fiction, but fiction with a solid ring of truth...
A scene from Das Boot:
The skipper is bringing the boat inshore to sneak into Spain (Portugal?). Just the sail is broached and everyone is stressed while the skipper is content and humming. He is having a good time!
He then regales his jo's about his early days going to sea aboard a cargo schooner.
Point being, it's that familiarity with ...and affinity for... with the sea that really does matter.
Here is the last part of that scene...
https://youtu.be/Ey2351KM1cU?si=U8CUYfYWlpEAIeOV
Helps to greatly reduce the odds of this kind of thing...
https://www.reddit.com/r/CatastrophicFailure/comments/kiiwpb/in_2005_the_nuclear_attack_submarine_uss_san/
Their huge cable layers, too. These ships don't get much attention, but they've come a long way since Lord Kelvin used the Great Eastern to connect Europe and America. These ships are where the cyber domain meets the maritime world.
Safe to say that the US captains have the edge in DEI training and joint staff position filling.
I suspect they will pull the triggers when directed first. Then the question becomes “what kind of captains do we have?”
Jacky Fisher had ten years to rebuild the Royal Navy. HE figured war would not occur until the Keil Canal was operational, and he was correct. We don't have that time.
They don't have to be capable. They only need surprise, more ships, and more VLS for the first 30 minutes. Toss in a few tactical nukes in places like Guam and Okinawa?
And still, opening paragraph of the Fact Sheet. " The CMPR illustrates why the 2022 National Defense Strategy identified the PRC and its increasingly capable military as the Department’s top pacing challenge."
Who wants to tell SECDEF Austin that China has done caught up and has the numbers for superiority in their backyard, west of Wake, where any agression is likely to take place.
Haven't heard those terms since I taught coercion theory at the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting. And you are right, deterrence by punishment is a losing proposition. Anyone up for a re-do of Rolling Thunder? Bueller?
The first place that US leadership and influencers must look is in the mirror. Because for all the glaring, intimidating statistics of ship hulls, weapons, and "thunder out of China" (to borrow a phrase), the problem is internal, not external.
Thirty years ago, in an era of post-Cold War hubris and triumphalism, USA consciously -- cheerfully, even -- began a massive program to deactivate its World War II legacy industrial base, along with the educational/worker training pipeline. Numerous great old companies went out of business or merged operations into large, inefficient, financialized, corporatized business concerns. From the Beltway grifting-class, BRAC gave away immensely valuable, irreplaceable real estate and fixtures to well-connected speculators and developers. All to the end of (ha!) "saving money," which of course the country never really saved.
Meanwhile, what passes for US military culture --civilian and uniformed -- bought into a bullying sense of might-makes-right supremacy (e.g., cruise missile diplomacy) and "full spectrum dominance" based on a historically temporary mis-correlation of global forces and power. Recall SecState Albright's 1993 question about "Why do we have this great military if we don't use it?" [words to that effect.] Truly, an ignorant comment from a generally foolish person.
Along the foregoing lines, and in terms of supplying a fundamental rationale for power and its use, just try to find a decent undergrad/grad program in ANY US university, incl so-called "service academies," on military history or true "military science." Not "Government" majors; not "Poly Sci" majors; not what passes for a "History" major anymore. USA unis crank out hundreds of thousands of JDs & MBAs; but who are the strategic thinkers w Masters of Military Science or PhD/MilSci? -- and don't say "JPME."
Over those same three decades, China methodically, purposefully, with deeply strategic focus aforethought, built itself into the world's largest industrial and energy power, by any & every metric: oil use, coal, electric power, mines/minerals, metals, machine-building at every point of the production spectrum, finished goods. Early on, and thinking faaaaar ahead, China scoured the globe for resources and channels of movement/transport, to extract valuable things and bring 'em home to the Motherland. (More recently, Belt & Road speaks for itself.) And the West not only watched it happen, the West funded most of it and educated entire generations of Chinese scientists and engineers who made it possible.
Now... We (well, US policymakers) somehow awaken to this China problem that has been evolving for two generations, staring us right in the face. And somehow, it's an issue that must find a solution fast; like by 2027 or some other date on the calendar when all hell is supposedly going to break loose.
No, I don't have an answer, let alone an easy answer... But whatever happens must begin with admitting the problem, if not scope of long-term disastrous thinking. The US has made way too many mistakes. The collective American policy brain just has not worked right, in terms of creating our own future. At the personal level, look in the mirror. Looking ahead, read more, learn more, vow to change and get better.
PS -- forgive the length of this post. As Mark Twain once remarked, "I'd have written a shorter note if I had more time."
Byron King is absolutely correct (except it should be "thunder outer China" per Kipling) in his lengthy but must-read post.
Our problems are 30+ years in the making and began when Bush, Sr. proclaimed a "New World Order" following Desert Strom. Remember the book "The End of History and the Last Man" by Francis Fukuyama? Liberal democracy and free trade capitalism had triumphed forever.
Too bad Osama bin Laden, Xi and Putin didn't read the book.
What should be done?
Rebuild our industrial base and military.
Separate Russia from China.
End all the endless wars that are sucking us dry.
What have we been doing?
Sacrificing our industrial base in the name of free trade.
Imposing DEI on our military.
Antagonizing Putin and driving Russia into the arms of China.
Promoting Pride Week in Kabul.
Let’s hope things change 1 20 25.
Scary stuff. And all the interest the US paid on China’s vast holdings of Treasury bonds pretty much paid for this entire build up. I read somewhere once that China’s interest income from Treasuries was bigger than its defence budget.
Sounds reasonable. After all, the interest we pay on our national debt is more than our defense budget.
Clearly even one percent of the current flag officers can see Chinese intent. Stevie Wonder can see Chinese intent. Force composition = Intent.
Now do that same math for the United States.
"... Now do the same math..." It's Christmas. So why go and serve up a heaping portion of "bah humbug." While Santa may pack on the groceries, he's still pretty agile in keeping his naughty and nice lists current.
CDR Sal,
Many thanks for the assessment. Honestly, nothing new here....USG has been asleep at the wheel since 2010 on this subject. However, I do agree on the report regarding fthem inally calling the RENHAI a cruiser. About time and common sense. xie xie.
Meanwhile at the ranch...speaking of cruisers. Attached. A dismal GAO report on the USN refurbishing efforts on the Tico's. Accountable management.....anyone?
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-106749.pdf
To be real...the "modernization" effort was nothing but a way for the Navy to sidestep that pesky Congress. They never intended to modernize or keep the cruisers. Once idled, the Navy never intended to bring them back. It was nothing but a shell game. A criminal plan to thwart Congress' annoying interest in keeping the CGs around.
Those missile boats would be laughable... if the Chinese were trying to use them in the North Atlantic. Inside the First Island Chain they can definitely be a problem for forces trying to get inside. Same reason we need a couple squadrons of similar vessels in the Philippines and other islands we don't want the Chinese in.
1. As the saying goes (attributed to various sources): "Quantity has a quality of its own."
2. "Ask a few simple questions: to defend against these missiles, how many SM-3 and SM-6 are we producing each year?
"To attack the launching, basing, and production facilities, how many TLAM are we producing each year?
"How many could we have west of the International Date Line with 90-days notice?"
Along with those questions, another issue to ponder is the viability of moving those resources west after production. There are already logistics constraints in delivering sufficient spares and replacement items to INDOPAC-based units (e.g., Guam, Yoko, Sasebo) with no resistance from our peer competitor. Now, imagine attempting to do so during a shooting war. Could the US get sufficient quantities of the items referenced by CDR Sal to remote bases? Or, would ships and subs be forced to come back to Pearl--or even West Coast bases--to reload?
And this doesn't even begin to consider the need to perform depot-level repairs to subs and ships that are damaged in the fight. For example, where are the sectionalized floating dry docks used in locations such as Ulithi during WW2? Oh, that's right, they don't exist currently, and the Navy may not even have a plan in place for their build and relocation.
What's more important, quantity or quality? Why quality of course -- as long as you have enough of it. A Marine Corps adage stated at the Naval War College
Agreed , but the US Navy at present has neither the requisite quality nor quantity.
I think our TLAM production this year was...zero!!!
But I think we converted 25 to the antiship variant...
Describe the victory conditions for war with PRC and discuss how you would achieve victory over PRC using any means at all. Is some sort of invasion on the table? Regime Change?, air and naval bombardment of cities?, blockade? You know, just talk me through how you are going to win any war with China. Then we'll look at investment strategies.
Ah yes, victory conditions. Seem to recall a bunch of VERY senior folks coming to universal disagreement of what we were actually trying to accomplish during a reasonably recent (last five years) discussion of this topic.
Yes - all cause for concern, serious concern... and yet, symptomatic of where we are:
https://news.usni.org/2024/12/17/gao-navy-wasted-1-84-billion-in-repairs-to-cruisers-cut-from-the-fleet?mc_cid=c8e6cc0b03&mc_eid=5b25e465a1
The left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing was intended to direct people in the proper care of their fellow human beings, not as a plan for national defense. Ask where the operational, construction, and maintenance plans converge under a single decision maker. Fire that person, all his/her direct reportees, and all those at the third level below them. Then pass a law that prohibits all GOFO from being hired in any capacity by any company with even an indirect connection to national security. That MIGHT get the attention of any potential replacements.
Great ideas. Unfortunately, that bill wouldn't stand a chance of passing since the military industrial complex and Congress are a miasma of incest.
Can we agree that the 'near peer' label has reached it's expiration date?
Buried in the report... "...LHA by early 2024, which is expected to be fitted with an electromagnetic catapult for UAVs..." Interesting... electromagnetic catapult and UAV in the same sentence. Hmm... an LHA launching --> UAVs (?????) <-- that necessitated a catapult... not just any catapult... an --> electromagnetic <-- catapult. Huh...begins tugging at beard...
Remember the USS Princeton ...
https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/ships/wardamagereportno62/cvl2317.jpg
whole report...
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/w/war-damage-reports/uss-princeton-cvl23-war-damage-report-no-62.html
The design demanded severe weight reduction, which resulted in vulnerable unprotected uptakes (a problem that could have precipitated the loss of the Monterey during the typhoon with her hangar fire as well...in both cases the engineering spaces became uninhabitable immediately), and a wholly unprotected torpedo magazine just aft of the hangar which contained 400 100 lb bombs...
The latter a factor because the Independences simply didn't have the adequate bomb stowage that was required of their employment as fleet carriers.
If you are gonna go "austere" ...or in the current burgeoning lexicon inexpensive... make sure you buy enough to lose.
I'm simply noting they are not in "taking baby steps" mode but close to being able to "play ball." And a catapult certainly hints that they're not talking about toys for UAVs but something of a size that requires a catapult to be launched. Anyone think the PRC couldn't spit UAVs out like gumballs? Yeah I'm thinking "the hits keep coming."
I am just bringing up the inevitable that our neo CVL's will come with a significant cost to think about.
The LHA's were built to the legacy Level II Survivability standard...
Less protection, compartmentalization, redundancy, etc., are built into those designs.
Take a look again at how the Bonnie Dick met her end.
Employing them as full on carriers?
The less informed will see them as full on carriers.
Prepare for some nasty surprises.
In WWII we had the depth of units in theater, the ability to rapidly replenish losses, and could conduct heavy repair forward (like the Monterey after the typhoon).
Not today.
And don't think for a second the Chinese are not planning to exploit all this
Well to be clear I was only referring to the fact that the PLAN is the one coming out with the LHA I'm referring to above. As to whether the navy should adopt a similar operational concept for their LHAs? That I can't answer and mindful that many are questioning the survivability of these large deck amphibs in a peer conflict.
We have been for years now. Thats what the Bonnie Dick was in the yard for...To take aboard F-35's.
https://www.dvidshub.net/video/935468/f-35b-flight-operations-aboard-uss-america-lha-6
Seen the write ups in the past... very expensive hardware for that deck.
Agree totally... with the exception that I have to believe that BH would be around today if that fire had started while at sea. It was more being in the yard, and all the weaknesses in DC that come with it that killed her.
Questions (not trolling, seriously; while not meaning to diminish China's obvious Pacific ambitions, and her committment to them):
1. Which PLA and naval commanders have combat experience? Significant combat experience?
2. When was the last time China was engaged in a theatre-level contest with a peer adversary? How did it turn out?
3. Describe the depth of PLA's combat-experienced NCO base.
4. Describe PLA / naval operational experience with force projection, and especially intermediate-term logistical support.
5. Describe PLA air assets and their air superiority combat experience.
"Which PLA and naval commanders have combat experience? Significant combat experience?
When was the last time China was engaged in a theatre-level contest with a peer adversary? How did it turn out? "
When has anybody?
The last time a US aircraft carrier was -admittedly- fired upon was the summer of 1945. Because its been so long, a widespread myth is they are "Invulnerable".
Five were sunk from Oct. 44 to Aug. 45. Two fleet carriers were so damaged they were out of the war permanently (Tico made it back late summer 1945).
The list of carriers damaged, but were repaired forward, is lengthy, around 20.
Its been widely circulated that the Ike and Lincoln both took fire from the Houthis.
A reminder...browsing the stats above...what kills a US carrier is the involvement of her own ordnance. Ditto for the fires on the Forrestal and Enterprise.
Why are bomb farms still tolerated?
https://nara.getarchive.net/media/a-us-navy-usn-aviation-ordnanceman-ao-checks-over-racks-loaded-with-gbu-12-fc8c54
How many carriers do we have today? Replacement aircraft and pilots?
"Describe the depth of PLA's combat-experienced NCO base."
Betting no Chinese NCO would think they could get away from this...
https://maritime-executive.com/article/chief-s-mess-on-u-s-navy-warship-broke-rules-and-lied-to-get-starlink
An Entire Chief's Mess Broke the Law and Lied In Order to Get Starlink
IYH
1. Few PLA officers in command positions have significant combat experience. General Zhang Youxia, the current CMC Vice Chairman, is one exception, having gained combat experience during the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. General Liu Zhenli, Chief of the Joint Staff Department, also combat experience from the Sino-Vietnamese War. Many PLA commanders, particularly at the operational level, lack preparation for modern warfare.
2. The last time PRC was engaged in a theatre-level contest with a peer adversary was the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. The conflict - brief, bloody and inconclusive. Though PRC claimed victory, both sides suffered heavy casualties, and that war then exposed weaknesses in the PLA's operational capabilities.
I think we could ask the same questions about the USN, and get similar answers. With a couple DDGs off Yemen MAYBE being exceptions...our Navy has no real experience doing anything. Our scripted wargames and pierside REFTRAs arent exactly confidence inspiring... In fact, I'd go on a limb and guess that the PLAN is training harder and more realistically than we are. Sure, maybe we have a lil institutional knowledge and long standing doctrine...but placed in the hands of folks who run into large cargo ships, or onto reefs called out plainly on charts...I'm not convinced it matters...
Let's ask the same questions of the USN as of December 8, 1941:
1. Which USN and naval commanders had combat experience? Significant combat experience?
Answer: none.
2. When was the last time the US was engaged in a theatre-level contest with a peer adversary? How did it turn out?
Answer: 1815 from a naval perspective. WW1 or Spanish American War were not against peer naval adversaries.
3. Describe the depth of USN combat-experienced NCO base.
Answer: essentially none.
4. Describe USN / naval operational experience with force projection, and especially intermediate-term logistical support.
Answer: the USN had been studying, exercising, and experimenting with force projection and logistical support but had little operational experience.
5. Describe USN air assets and their air superiority combat experience.
Answer: the USN had a significant quantity of air assets but many of them were obsolete or obsolescent, and had zero air superiority combat experience.
Yet despite this weak experience, the USN emerged victorious, not least due to its powerful industrial base - a realm in which China has the clear advantage today.