The 2024 China Military Power Report

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The 2024 China Military Power Report is out. You can find the two pager fact sheet here, or the full report.

The initial conversations I saw on Wednesday when it came out were about the expected rise in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) strategic nuclear forces (pg. 111).

• Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces. The PLA seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields to provide it options at every rung of the escalation ladder.

• Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion. DoD estimates the PRC has surpassed 600 operational nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of 2024.

• DoD estimates that the PRC will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels, and will continue growing its force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that year, an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military by 2049.

The ‘shocking’ news would have been if the PRC had not grown its strategic nuclear force. For decades, they took risks in this area to focus on building their conventional military power, so catching up was overdue.

That is an interesting topic, but that isn’t what keeps me up at night as that isn’t the threat we really need to be focused on.

I am much more interested in the aspects of the PRC’s military that the United States is more likely to have to deal with in any conflict west of the International Date Line, their naval (pg. 48) and rocket forces (pg. 63). The latter is, frankly the crocodile closest to our canoe, but let’s look at the other croc right behind it first, the naval threat.

The USN would be lucky to be able to report something like this coming from our industrial base. It really is a disgrace. The ‘peace dividend’ that began in the Clinton Administration was a dividend, a divided to the global ambitions of the PRC.

Where the PRC is today should not be a shock to anyone. It has been clear to see for thirty years, and could not be ignored by the time we invaded Iraq in 2003, but The Smartest People in the Room™ did because it suited their short-term needs.

…but here we are.

BEHOLD!

Numerically, the PRC has the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including over 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. As of mid-2024, the PLAN is outfitting the 9th and 10th RENHAI CG units. As many as 10 LUYANG III MOD DDGs are in various stages of construction, outfitting, or sea trials. The first two JIANGKAI III FFGs will conduct sea trials during summer 2024. The PRC will build more of these units as well as the smaller and less capable JIANGKAI II MOD FFG, at least two of which are under construction as of mid-2024. The PLAN is outfitting a fourth YUSHEN LHA which launched in late 2023 and will likely begin sea trials in the second half of 2024. The PLAN began construction on the new YULAN class (Type 076)

49 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

LHA by early 2024, which is expected to be fitted with an electromagnetic catapult for UAVs. The PLAN’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian, began its sea trials in the first half of 2024 and remains on track for a 2025 operational capability.

Did you catch that at the top? At last, people are listening to Salamander. We are finally calling the Type 055 destroyer (RENHAI Class) what it is, a cruiser. I like that more and more are calling them ‘RENHAI Class cruisers’ which I think the Salamander Style Council will require from here on out.

They’ve built 8, are building 4 and plan on 16.

They are a land power building a navy of a naval power. The report emphasizes that by repeating the introduction at the end, with a few juicy details for emphasis.

The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants. The PLAN’s force structure consists of theater navies with subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation units, and naval bases. The PLAN’s Northern Theater Navy is subordinate to the NTC, the Eastern Theater Navy is subordinate to the ETC, and the Southern Theater Navy is subordinate to the STC.

One of the coping mechanisms by those who continue to think the PLAN of today is the PLAN of 1995 is to sniff at the HOUBEI…they don’t count in that 370 number does not include the HOUBEI. If you do, we are looking at 430.

That 370 number are ~modern warships.

We, rightfully, like to state our comparative advantage, especially in quality and capability, of our submarine force. How long can we maintain that lead with the experience the PRC submarine builders are getting?

PRC shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 1990s.

Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear-powered submarines—two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (3,900 nm) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400 nm), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM. The Type 096 will likely begin construction soon. Considering the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms, the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.”

The PRC launched four SHANG III class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational by 2025. This new SHANG class variant enhances the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with LACMs. The PLAN is improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft but continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.

Now to the developments in the area that the PRC has a comparative advantage in and should keep everyone feeling insecure: conventional ballistic missiles.

This little bit should get you pondering:

The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would enable the PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in CONUS, Hawaii, and Alaska.

That ‘may be’ problem isn’t as sobering as the ‘do have’ problem:

The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched, short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). The PLARF’s ground-based missile forces complement the air- and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces includes the CSS-6 (DF-15) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725 km–850 km), the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 km), the CSS-11 (DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km), land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km), the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) capable CSS-22 (DF-17) MRBM, the CSS-18 (DF-26) IRBM (3,000 km–4,000 km), and the CJ-10 (DH-10) and CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 1,500 km–2, 000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally-armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific from mainland China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle, and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field.

The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. As the PLARF expands its DF-26 inventory, it is phasing out DF-21 equipment. The PLA no longer fields any dedicated BDEs of the dual nuclear-conventional capable DF-21Cs. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS from mainland China. In 2020, the PRC fired ASBMs against a moving target in the SCS.

The PLARF is developing and testing new variants of theater-range missiles and developing capabilities and methods to counter adversary BMD systems. The DF-17 passed several tests and is deployed operationally. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific. The PLARF continues to expand its DF-17 inventory and this weapon’s HGV payload is designed to evade adversary radars and BMDs.

Everyone sees this, yes? Let me put this in pictures.

Overlay this with our western Pacific bases, bunkers, airfield, repair facilities, etc.

How do you defend against these numbers?

Extra credit: I’d encourage you to also check out page 159 for the special report on corruption.

Ask a few simple questions: to defend against these missiles, how many SM-3 and SM-6 are we producing each year?

To attack the launching, basing, and production facilities, how many TLAM are we producing each year?

How many could we have west of the International Date Line with 90-days notice?