The Case for a 600 Ship Navy: Now More than Ever with LT Joseph Sims, USN
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When was the last time the US Navy made the case for a significantly larger navy to defend its interests on the high seas?
Yep, back when Ole Sal was a Midshipman and EagleOne was as close to his service in Vietnam than Sal was to his service in Afghanistan - the 1980s.
What lessons can we take from that relatively successful intellectual, political, and personal struggle to grow our Navy?
Using his recent article in Naval History Magazine, Lessons from the 600-Ship Navy, as a starting point for our conversation, our guest for the full hour this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern will be Lieutenant Joseph Sims, USN.
Lieutenant Sims is a Surface Warfare Officer and 2018 graduate of the US Naval Academy where he majored in history and competed four years on the varsity tennis team. He completed his first division officer tour on USS LASSEN (DDG-82), where he served as the gunnery officer and electronic warfare officer and completed deployment to 5th Fleet with the Truman Strike Group in 2019-2020 as well as deployment to 4th Fleet in 2020. Following completion of the Advanced Division Officer Course and Prospective Engineering Officer Course in Newport, RI, he reported to USS ANTIETAM (CG-54) in August of 2021 as the Main Propulsion Assistant.Â
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Cdr S. Let me offer some history from the Army experience post-VN which might have applicability. Full disclosure, I am a retired Army O-6, former armor battalion/brigade commander, worked for the Chief of Staff in the early 90s, and was Chief of the Strategy Division in J-5.
1. Focusing on the number, any number, is cart before horse (told you I was Army)
2. At the end of the VN war, the Army was faced with the same issue at the end of every war -- what was the institution for, how was it relevant, what would the future hold?
3. Army CSA at the time, GEN Abrams, put together a study group. They started with the question, what will warfare in the near to mid term look like -- who's the adversary, where will the confrontation most likely occur and how can we win? They produced a report, the unclassified version became known as the Astiride report after the O-6 that ran the group. Group included thinkers like Harry Summers. Abrams also had a gentleman's agreement with SecDef Schlesinger about Active and Reserve force structure.
4. The report didn't talk about equipment, numbers, divisions, etc. It said, USSR is the adversary, critical theater is Europe, and warfare will require armored formations working in close coordination with USAF assets to defeat the enemy in the close and deep battle. That report was briefed scores of times around DC -- think tanks, Congressional staff, DoD, other Services, etc. Simultaneously and hand in glove, Army thinkers at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle were working on the doctrine that would work in such an environment. That doctrine became AirLand Battle.
5. The Army got head nods from the poobahs in DC for the brief, which was the concept of warfare, and how we could succeed in the engagements, battles, and campaigns expected in Europe.
6. The Army followed up with authorization and appropriation requests that resulted in the Big Five -- Abrams, Bradley, UH-60, AH-64 and Patriot/MLRS (really six, but we've never been good at math). They also scoped the 18 divisions and associated Corps and separate units that would be needed.
7. The Army went back around to the aforementioned poobahs and got them to admit -- if you agreed with the concept, then it follows that you ought to support the implementing authorization/appropriation. Fleshed it out with training in the dirt, from Soldier to Brigade, oriented on the National Training Center, and Division and Corps simulations using the Battle Command Training Program and unit Command Post Exercises.
I'd argue that the Army and other services, and DoD/JS would be well served to conduct a repeat of such a study and the implementing steps to gain support in Congress. I realize that fighting the Chinese will be primarily a naval campaign. We have to get there and the Navy is indispensable in such an effort. We also have to think about the next steps. After we "save" Taiwan and defeat the CCP anti-access/area denial capabilities, then what?
tough to find enough competent sailors to staff 600 ships
maybe impossible