US Govt will not fund 600 ships. Which as Cdr S is required and even amateurs like myself know is required. The idea is not to fight a war, but to intimidate adversaries into NOT fighting. For example 18 CBGs and two training carrier groups. Send 6 CBGs into the Taiwan Strait for a show of force, and let us how feisty the PLAN remains. The people and US Govt have other priorities, none of which have much to do with the military. As you can see with the army reactivating HQ 11 Abn Division and leaving 7 Div as a peacetime HQ and some army divisions short of 3 brigades, we all are for meaningless show.
Cdr S. Let me offer some history from the Army experience post-VN which might have applicability. Full disclosure, I am a retired Army O-6, former armor battalion/brigade commander, worked for the Chief of Staff in the early 90s, and was Chief of the Strategy Division in J-5.
1. Focusing on the number, any number, is cart before horse (told you I was Army)
2. At the end of the VN war, the Army was faced with the same issue at the end of every war -- what was the institution for, how was it relevant, what would the future hold?
3. Army CSA at the time, GEN Abrams, put together a study group. They started with the question, what will warfare in the near to mid term look like -- who's the adversary, where will the confrontation most likely occur and how can we win? They produced a report, the unclassified version became known as the Astiride report after the O-6 that ran the group. Group included thinkers like Harry Summers. Abrams also had a gentleman's agreement with SecDef Schlesinger about Active and Reserve force structure.
4. The report didn't talk about equipment, numbers, divisions, etc. It said, USSR is the adversary, critical theater is Europe, and warfare will require armored formations working in close coordination with USAF assets to defeat the enemy in the close and deep battle. That report was briefed scores of times around DC -- think tanks, Congressional staff, DoD, other Services, etc. Simultaneously and hand in glove, Army thinkers at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle were working on the doctrine that would work in such an environment. That doctrine became AirLand Battle.
5. The Army got head nods from the poobahs in DC for the brief, which was the concept of warfare, and how we could succeed in the engagements, battles, and campaigns expected in Europe.
6. The Army followed up with authorization and appropriation requests that resulted in the Big Five -- Abrams, Bradley, UH-60, AH-64 and Patriot/MLRS (really six, but we've never been good at math). They also scoped the 18 divisions and associated Corps and separate units that would be needed.
7. The Army went back around to the aforementioned poobahs and got them to admit -- if you agreed with the concept, then it follows that you ought to support the implementing authorization/appropriation. Fleshed it out with training in the dirt, from Soldier to Brigade, oriented on the National Training Center, and Division and Corps simulations using the Battle Command Training Program and unit Command Post Exercises.
I'd argue that the Army and other services, and DoD/JS would be well served to conduct a repeat of such a study and the implementing steps to gain support in Congress. I realize that fighting the Chinese will be primarily a naval campaign. We have to get there and the Navy is indispensable in such an effort. We also have to think about the next steps. After we "save" Taiwan and defeat the CCP anti-access/area denial capabilities, then what?
US Govt will not fund 600 ships. Which as Cdr S is required and even amateurs like myself know is required. The idea is not to fight a war, but to intimidate adversaries into NOT fighting. For example 18 CBGs and two training carrier groups. Send 6 CBGs into the Taiwan Strait for a show of force, and let us how feisty the PLAN remains. The people and US Govt have other priorities, none of which have much to do with the military. As you can see with the army reactivating HQ 11 Abn Division and leaving 7 Div as a peacetime HQ and some army divisions short of 3 brigades, we all are for meaningless show.
So, what you're telling me is that you didn't listen to the show.
I'm hearing impaired, sorry
tough to find enough competent sailors to staff 600 ships
maybe impossible
We need the biggest navy we can get so that institutional knowledge is not lost. Same for building ships and ammunition. If we forget, we are doomed.
Cdr S. Let me offer some history from the Army experience post-VN which might have applicability. Full disclosure, I am a retired Army O-6, former armor battalion/brigade commander, worked for the Chief of Staff in the early 90s, and was Chief of the Strategy Division in J-5.
1. Focusing on the number, any number, is cart before horse (told you I was Army)
2. At the end of the VN war, the Army was faced with the same issue at the end of every war -- what was the institution for, how was it relevant, what would the future hold?
3. Army CSA at the time, GEN Abrams, put together a study group. They started with the question, what will warfare in the near to mid term look like -- who's the adversary, where will the confrontation most likely occur and how can we win? They produced a report, the unclassified version became known as the Astiride report after the O-6 that ran the group. Group included thinkers like Harry Summers. Abrams also had a gentleman's agreement with SecDef Schlesinger about Active and Reserve force structure.
4. The report didn't talk about equipment, numbers, divisions, etc. It said, USSR is the adversary, critical theater is Europe, and warfare will require armored formations working in close coordination with USAF assets to defeat the enemy in the close and deep battle. That report was briefed scores of times around DC -- think tanks, Congressional staff, DoD, other Services, etc. Simultaneously and hand in glove, Army thinkers at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle were working on the doctrine that would work in such an environment. That doctrine became AirLand Battle.
5. The Army got head nods from the poobahs in DC for the brief, which was the concept of warfare, and how we could succeed in the engagements, battles, and campaigns expected in Europe.
6. The Army followed up with authorization and appropriation requests that resulted in the Big Five -- Abrams, Bradley, UH-60, AH-64 and Patriot/MLRS (really six, but we've never been good at math). They also scoped the 18 divisions and associated Corps and separate units that would be needed.
7. The Army went back around to the aforementioned poobahs and got them to admit -- if you agreed with the concept, then it follows that you ought to support the implementing authorization/appropriation. Fleshed it out with training in the dirt, from Soldier to Brigade, oriented on the National Training Center, and Division and Corps simulations using the Battle Command Training Program and unit Command Post Exercises.
I'd argue that the Army and other services, and DoD/JS would be well served to conduct a repeat of such a study and the implementing steps to gain support in Congress. I realize that fighting the Chinese will be primarily a naval campaign. We have to get there and the Navy is indispensable in such an effort. We also have to think about the next steps. After we "save" Taiwan and defeat the CCP anti-access/area denial capabilities, then what?