For the last Monday of 2020, we are bringing in one of our favorite regulars guests, Bryan McGrath. Bryan offers one of the better situation reports of where our Navy finds itself in the first year of what will be an incredibly challenging decade. Get a fresh cup of coffee and dig in. He doesn't just provide the solid analysis of where we are, he offers a way forward.
I am not sure that the Navy's "second" nuclear shipyard Electric Boat in Connecticut could easily be converted to build even a smaller nuclear carrier. EB which was actually the "first" nuclear shipyard where the Nautilus was built is primarily for building submarines. The other nuclear shipyards in Portsmouth, Bremerton, and Hawaii I don't believe have built a "new" ship in decades of any sort.
As an "old school" Naval Officer (1988-2008 tacair aviator) I've long railed at the acquisition strategy that procures systems that rely on technological advances that have not even been invented yet (JSF, FORD) or objectively ridiculous ideas like LCS or DDG 1000.
I think the biggest challenge to the above would be the cancerous political relationships between DoD, DC, and industry. Unfortunately, a cadre of Navy/Marine professionals who are totally committed to their oath, their mission, and future if their DoN would likely be quickly eliminated in favor of "team players". Cynical, yes. But I'm not seeing any trends to indicate that otherwise.
Sal: Thanks for providing Bryan the venue for this excellent article. For reference I have added it to my students required reading list ICW the upcoming discussion we will be having re. the new Tri-Service MARSTRAT.
Bryan: Cogent and direct as always :) There is an issue here that is kind of the 500lb elephant in the room and it is of two faces; the one side the actual threat and the other how to deal with the rapidly proliferating environment of special access programs/systems.
> The first is "easier" and consists of gaining a healthy and rationally-based understanding of the scope and pace of the current and near-term (0-5 years out) threat presented by advanced sea denial (ASD) systems and their supporting counter-intervention forces. There is much mythology out there regarding real vs imagined capabilities, but there are also some very serious gaps that can only be managed, not mitigated in that same near term. This is due in no small part to the dithering and misplaced emphasis for the better part of the last decade+ as these threats were conceived, developed and deployed with lots of blame to share from uniformed leadership to civilian, including the IC. I swear there have been (and still are in some cases) days where I feel I am watching the disaster that befell the Far East and the Asiatic Fleet/ABDA unwinding from a reel of some awful retrospective film. That strategic communication you advocate for needs to be brutally honest about that threat and undertake an education of the American public as part of the narrative about the need for *and* challenges to seapower. Post Cold War there was a degree of smug deprecation re. the DoD's annual "Soviet Military Power" (as there tends to be from some quarters about the current PLA one) but at the time it served a real educational purpose. There will likewise need to be a lifting of the veils of secrecy, to some degree, to aid in that understanding and to remove the mythology of inevitability/invincibility the other side is blatantly promulgating. That needs to happen *now*.
> The second is much more difficult and discussion, per se, requires some delicate footwork. There are assertions in the new strategy that are going to be problematic in the face of the realities of protecting capabilities, present and planned, from exploitation by determined, capable and guileless adversaries. To wit - 'delivering integrated all domain naval forces' calls for "Expand(ing) capabilities and concepts to expose, disrupt, and deny malign activities in day-to-day competition" while "Generate(ing) sufficient readiness and capacity to conduct and logistically sustain forward operations, support experimentation, and preserve combat-ready surge forces" and "Operate with allies and partners in day-to-day competition, crisis and conflict"; this immediately generates a tension in the area of highly classified programs. These (and other) assertions in the new strategy beget a degree of necessary access and openness in a traditionally tightly controlled venue that has implications from design and procurement to operations and training. Going forward the maritime forces that emerge from this concept need to be of a nature that retain, let's call it a "Wartime Reserve Mode" resident and protected in systems that operators already trained and proficient in the day-to-day use can seamlessly shift to and while maintaining proficiency and capability in the use of those same systems in combat. This is an area that the Integrated Naval Power Capability and Resources branch, headed by the Engineering, Design and Acquisition Command you call for would have a central role (and if necessary, club) in directing and guiding the SYSCOMs. In turn, this would hopefully avoid the brittleness of exquisite systems noted in the strategy and favor the development and procurement of integrated, networked systems that can grow and adapt to the rapidly changing ASD threat environment.
1. Subscribed. 2. Let me know what the fee is, and I will pay immediately.
This is dope!
I am not sure that the Navy's "second" nuclear shipyard Electric Boat in Connecticut could easily be converted to build even a smaller nuclear carrier. EB which was actually the "first" nuclear shipyard where the Nautilus was built is primarily for building submarines. The other nuclear shipyards in Portsmouth, Bremerton, and Hawaii I don't believe have built a "new" ship in decades of any sort.
Good morning, Front Porch! Where's the coffee urn and my damned mug?
As an "old school" Naval Officer (1988-2008 tacair aviator) I've long railed at the acquisition strategy that procures systems that rely on technological advances that have not even been invented yet (JSF, FORD) or objectively ridiculous ideas like LCS or DDG 1000.
I think the biggest challenge to the above would be the cancerous political relationships between DoD, DC, and industry. Unfortunately, a cadre of Navy/Marine professionals who are totally committed to their oath, their mission, and future if their DoN would likely be quickly eliminated in favor of "team players". Cynical, yes. But I'm not seeing any trends to indicate that otherwise.
Cajun cafe au lait in hand, proceed!
Sal: Thanks for providing Bryan the venue for this excellent article. For reference I have added it to my students required reading list ICW the upcoming discussion we will be having re. the new Tri-Service MARSTRAT.
Bryan: Cogent and direct as always :) There is an issue here that is kind of the 500lb elephant in the room and it is of two faces; the one side the actual threat and the other how to deal with the rapidly proliferating environment of special access programs/systems.
> The first is "easier" and consists of gaining a healthy and rationally-based understanding of the scope and pace of the current and near-term (0-5 years out) threat presented by advanced sea denial (ASD) systems and their supporting counter-intervention forces. There is much mythology out there regarding real vs imagined capabilities, but there are also some very serious gaps that can only be managed, not mitigated in that same near term. This is due in no small part to the dithering and misplaced emphasis for the better part of the last decade+ as these threats were conceived, developed and deployed with lots of blame to share from uniformed leadership to civilian, including the IC. I swear there have been (and still are in some cases) days where I feel I am watching the disaster that befell the Far East and the Asiatic Fleet/ABDA unwinding from a reel of some awful retrospective film. That strategic communication you advocate for needs to be brutally honest about that threat and undertake an education of the American public as part of the narrative about the need for *and* challenges to seapower. Post Cold War there was a degree of smug deprecation re. the DoD's annual "Soviet Military Power" (as there tends to be from some quarters about the current PLA one) but at the time it served a real educational purpose. There will likewise need to be a lifting of the veils of secrecy, to some degree, to aid in that understanding and to remove the mythology of inevitability/invincibility the other side is blatantly promulgating. That needs to happen *now*.
> The second is much more difficult and discussion, per se, requires some delicate footwork. There are assertions in the new strategy that are going to be problematic in the face of the realities of protecting capabilities, present and planned, from exploitation by determined, capable and guileless adversaries. To wit - 'delivering integrated all domain naval forces' calls for "Expand(ing) capabilities and concepts to expose, disrupt, and deny malign activities in day-to-day competition" while "Generate(ing) sufficient readiness and capacity to conduct and logistically sustain forward operations, support experimentation, and preserve combat-ready surge forces" and "Operate with allies and partners in day-to-day competition, crisis and conflict"; this immediately generates a tension in the area of highly classified programs. These (and other) assertions in the new strategy beget a degree of necessary access and openness in a traditionally tightly controlled venue that has implications from design and procurement to operations and training. Going forward the maritime forces that emerge from this concept need to be of a nature that retain, let's call it a "Wartime Reserve Mode" resident and protected in systems that operators already trained and proficient in the day-to-day use can seamlessly shift to and while maintaining proficiency and capability in the use of those same systems in combat. This is an area that the Integrated Naval Power Capability and Resources branch, headed by the Engineering, Design and Acquisition Command you call for would have a central role (and if necessary, club) in directing and guiding the SYSCOMs. In turn, this would hopefully avoid the brittleness of exquisite systems noted in the strategy and favor the development and procurement of integrated, networked systems that can grow and adapt to the rapidly changing ASD threat environment.
Just a few things to chew on ;)
w/r, SJS
https://www.facebook.com/RTnews/posts/10160565883339411
russia today making fun of zumwalt rust