I proudly served in USS Niagara Falls (AFS-3). Our winches were our main battery. During one combined VERTREP/CONREP event, we transferred 600 pallets of food and aviation and general stores in a 10 hour period. Good day.
Lets do a FleetEx, and declare one of the supply ships (pick one) a casualty. Doesn't even have to be enemy action - a prop gets bent, a bearing spun....Takes it out of action in the middle of catching up to the fleet.
CLF tends to be low priority except for Mine Warfare. Even with the possibility of using US owned ships to augment, we are still woefully short, and nothing active can run with the carriers. I commanded two CLF ships and was XO of one--as I told my crews:"Nobody goes very far, stays very long, or does very much without us.". Or, as WSC put it in The River War :" Victory is the bright flower, supply is the stem without which it would never had bloomed".
Given the realistic timeline (call it 2-3 years, optimistically), I’m curious what the Porch thinks the best COA available to a truly clear-eyed DOD / USG even is re: materially improving the state of our maritime logistics. Fund an aggressive build program (slow)? Buy up existing stock and retrofit (as needed) to our requirements? Some sort of technology solution that can move the needle?
Genuinely curious and starting to feel like too much of the discourse (broadly, not singling out CDR S or the Porch) is focused on hand-wringing rather than what we might feasibly do about it in time to make a difference vis-a-vis China
"I would concentrate the bulk of my efforts on interdicting U.S. and allied resupply lines, on the logic that naval combat forces wither on the vine if deprived of ammunition, fuel, and stores for long. "
If the Japanese had done this from Dec. 41 into '42, then Guadalcanal would have been an impossible proposition for the USN.
As it was, the loss of the Neosho at Coral Sea -which the Japanese mistook for a Cruiser- spooked Fletcher enough at the Guadalcanal landings that he bailed leaving the landing in jeopardy.
There were just a few AO's to bag, and the war would've been very different.
The SL-7's can keep up with carriers if someone is willing to foot the fuel bill. Like many of our sealift ships they're steam powered antiques, but they'll hustle when goosed.
I feel as though the state of the Sealift Command is the elephant in the room. Our Sealift fleet has an average age of just under 50 years. No mention of the horribly-failed activation exercise last year, when we were unable to put sealift ships to sea and some suffered total plant failure when attempting to sail for the first time in decades. No mention so far of the slave-labor complaints that have caused the massive manpower shortfall in the sealift fleet (13 months on, 2-3 weeks off? Gee, why can't we find people? The rampant criminality on board, prostitution complaints aboard... how many people realize that our sealift ships' unlicensed crews are now frequently recruited out of criminal diversion programs, rehabs and the like? Or that our maritime administrators overseeing the fleet are a sectrans that has never worked in logistics and a MARAD admin who is not viewed as having enough related experience by mariners under her administration? Show of hands, who notices that the logistics fleet is 90% civilian crewed?
I feel as though the focus on MSC might benefit from speaking with people who have, in fact, worked for MSC.
Sal Mercogliano and RADM Mark Busby would be a valuable addition to this discussion.
The navy really does not have a maritime strategy that would suggest how its distributed maritime operations (DMO) scheme would be used, and therefore has no idea of how many more CLF ships it needs. It of course does not help that all current CLF ships are USNS vessels manned by CIVMARS who may or may not go into battle if called.
It would be helpful for the navy to provide some idea of what objectives its DMO concept is designed to produce at the operational level of war to support strategy goals. That's what a maritime strategy would state. Right now there are lots of tactical concepts out there but no one concept connecting them. Yes, Prof Holmes is right in saying more are needed, but what types and how many? Present gator ships are not set up to do CLF at all. They are too slow and big targets themselves.
"Do our budgets and plans match realistic requirements?"
I’m losing my confidence, and I’m sad.
I proudly served in USS Niagara Falls (AFS-3). Our winches were our main battery. During one combined VERTREP/CONREP event, we transferred 600 pallets of food and aviation and general stores in a 10 hour period. Good day.
Lets do a FleetEx, and declare one of the supply ships (pick one) a casualty. Doesn't even have to be enemy action - a prop gets bent, a bearing spun....Takes it out of action in the middle of catching up to the fleet.
Now what?
CLF tends to be low priority except for Mine Warfare. Even with the possibility of using US owned ships to augment, we are still woefully short, and nothing active can run with the carriers. I commanded two CLF ships and was XO of one--as I told my crews:"Nobody goes very far, stays very long, or does very much without us.". Or, as WSC put it in The River War :" Victory is the bright flower, supply is the stem without which it would never had bloomed".
America. Has. No. Money.
All we have is debt.
It should be no mystery why we haven't got the fleet we need for the missions we intend to accomplish.
Given the realistic timeline (call it 2-3 years, optimistically), I’m curious what the Porch thinks the best COA available to a truly clear-eyed DOD / USG even is re: materially improving the state of our maritime logistics. Fund an aggressive build program (slow)? Buy up existing stock and retrofit (as needed) to our requirements? Some sort of technology solution that can move the needle?
Genuinely curious and starting to feel like too much of the discourse (broadly, not singling out CDR S or the Porch) is focused on hand-wringing rather than what we might feasibly do about it in time to make a difference vis-a-vis China
The unstated assumption is that our Political representatives actually want us to Win the next conflict.
That seems foolish given all the evidence to the contrary.
"I would concentrate the bulk of my efforts on interdicting U.S. and allied resupply lines, on the logic that naval combat forces wither on the vine if deprived of ammunition, fuel, and stores for long. "
If the Japanese had done this from Dec. 41 into '42, then Guadalcanal would have been an impossible proposition for the USN.
As it was, the loss of the Neosho at Coral Sea -which the Japanese mistook for a Cruiser- spooked Fletcher enough at the Guadalcanal landings that he bailed leaving the landing in jeopardy.
There were just a few AO's to bag, and the war would've been very different.
Recommend this, from the 'other' Sal...
https://youtu.be/gv6lfke6lEY?si=bmIijwuPydvirhc-
The SL-7's can keep up with carriers if someone is willing to foot the fuel bill. Like many of our sealift ships they're steam powered antiques, but they'll hustle when goosed.
I feel as though the state of the Sealift Command is the elephant in the room. Our Sealift fleet has an average age of just under 50 years. No mention of the horribly-failed activation exercise last year, when we were unable to put sealift ships to sea and some suffered total plant failure when attempting to sail for the first time in decades. No mention so far of the slave-labor complaints that have caused the massive manpower shortfall in the sealift fleet (13 months on, 2-3 weeks off? Gee, why can't we find people? The rampant criminality on board, prostitution complaints aboard... how many people realize that our sealift ships' unlicensed crews are now frequently recruited out of criminal diversion programs, rehabs and the like? Or that our maritime administrators overseeing the fleet are a sectrans that has never worked in logistics and a MARAD admin who is not viewed as having enough related experience by mariners under her administration? Show of hands, who notices that the logistics fleet is 90% civilian crewed?
I feel as though the focus on MSC might benefit from speaking with people who have, in fact, worked for MSC.
Sal Mercogliano and RADM Mark Busby would be a valuable addition to this discussion.
The navy really does not have a maritime strategy that would suggest how its distributed maritime operations (DMO) scheme would be used, and therefore has no idea of how many more CLF ships it needs. It of course does not help that all current CLF ships are USNS vessels manned by CIVMARS who may or may not go into battle if called.
It would be helpful for the navy to provide some idea of what objectives its DMO concept is designed to produce at the operational level of war to support strategy goals. That's what a maritime strategy would state. Right now there are lots of tactical concepts out there but no one concept connecting them. Yes, Prof Holmes is right in saying more are needed, but what types and how many? Present gator ships are not set up to do CLF at all. They are too slow and big targets themselves.
"Logistics is the ball and chain of Armored warfare" Guderian.
It is also the ball and chain of Naval and Infantry warfare.