In 1943, Admiral Nimitz formed the Service Squadrons, under Commodore Worral Carter, to ensure that the Pacific Fleet would be maintained, and equipped to carry out it's combat operations. He saw to it that there were sufficient repair ships and personnel and a functioning Fleet Train to see that that would be accomplished.
I could get really going on this, especially with training, supply, and maintenance. Fixing it is not going to be easy, they need to go back to the old mantra of the 80’s ‘Pride and Professionalism’ and begin from there. Readiness squadrons are a good thing, but they’ll need someone like Boorda who as CCDG 8 walked the piers, and occasionally visited the ships. The navy needs to get ships company to take ownership as well. Lastly, if they are not painting ships, God only knows what’s going on inside the skin of the ship. The haze gray epoxy is still available in the supply system and isn’t JITS, yet.
The obvious bloat is the installations command. they didn't exist in the 20th century and was a product of the idea that the installations could be bill payers. the goal of the installations command was to create alignment of 'levels of effort' across submarine, air, amphibious, and naval bases. That was accomplished within 5 years. then, the installations command became a layer on top of Naval Facilities Engineering Command, or they competed with Naval Supply Systems Command for operations of mission areas that were traditionally theirs.
Also, you need to include FLEET LOGISTICS CENTER PEARL HARBOR in this discussion about the culture of the past 23 (ish) years.
in 1999, the Red Hill fuel division operated with 50 employees, including 21 veteran operators. it had its own environmental and engineering teams, as well as trained chemists, a fleet of barges, and a fleet focus that was unmatched.
By the time that the "spill" took place, it had less than 30 employeers, only 1 veteran operator, and it's barges, engineering and environmental teams had been transferred to the 'regional command', it had been merged with the Hickam Field fuels facilities, and the divisions knowledge of their facilities was lacking.
those decisions didn't happen in Hawaii. They happened in the Pentagon, made by people who never pumped a barrel of fuel in their lives.
thanks for the 'like'. How bad can it get? the DoD decided to charter the M/T MAERSK PERRY and moor it in Pearl Harbor as a stop gap in case they need to drain red hill quickly. this costs the services (my estimate) $100K per day or $3M per month.
Further, the Navy has no way to deliver JP-5 to the fleet in Pearl Harbor.
and the things that were major contributions to the spill (1) putting a fuel recovery system in the Hill that is made of PVC pipe" or (2) using a water well in the fuel farm that was put there for the contruction of the Hill (to make water for cement) and subsequently for the production of steam to head Navy Special Fuel Oil (NSFO) pipes... and then deciding to repurpose that water well in the FUEL FARM for residential water???
A like is not strong enough for this. I entered the Navy in the mid 80's, and have been involved in various levels of this since then. I've screamed to the high heavens since the 90's when you could see it start falling off the cliff. But the voice of reason is rarely ever listened to. Could it be turned around, yes. But will it? No. The "leadership" is not up to the task, and the pipeline is dry. And the politicians controlling it all are unworthy of their positions. Quite depressing.
I can remember INSURV inspections aboard several ships. At the worker bee and supervisory level my best recollection wasn't the actual inspection but the blood, sweat & tears that went into the preps for it. If anything, that alone improved our material readiness, or it seemed so. At the time, the whip hand of Rear Admiral Bulkeley alone was sufficient motivation to show your best side if you were one of those lacking the inate gumption yourself. We had a list of hits from previous INSURV's as a guidepost. How do you address items like "Overhead in the galley is too low"? Anecdotally, I had heard that was a hit on Knox Class Frigates by the good Admiral himself. Well, we sure didn't put much time into worrying about that but put time into tidying, titivation and making sure everything was to spec. In regard to material readiness that was our job anyway. It never hurt to have an inspection with teeth looming on the horizon, the results from which might well determine your future career path. And I think the Broken Window Theory applies to our Navy ships as much as it applies to neighborhoods and cities. I see a rust streaked ship and worry. Hygiene is fundamental to good health.
I never met Admiral Bulkeley when he came aboard in the 80s. Shipmates said he was a hunched over old man in coveralls and not very communicative...not that many dared to engage him in conversation. But that man was deck crawling and nosing around everywhere. How's that for oversight, scrutiny and leading from the front? Before the Admiral arrived onboard we were told he liked chocolate chip cookies. I suggested to the XO that we lay in a supply of the Famous Amos variety. I still like to believe that made that INSURV a tad bit more bearable.
(Finally, was this a clever play on words? "As there is a lot of ruin in a nation..." ruin in a nation ---> ruination? Nice.)
We have a major problem in the Naval Shipyards and in the private shipyards (that actually do most of the maintenance on the fleet.)
When "Zone managers" don't know things like "you can't have those guys painting when I have the SSTGs open" and it's kicked up to one of the 5 (Yes, 5) Assistant Project Superintendents, to determine which job has priority...
When guys with twenty plus years of experience are retiring as soon as it is legal to do so, just to get out of the toxic cesspool that has become "the waterfront."
When people that have never worked in the shop are made the training manager for that shop on waterfront...
This might just be effecting your readiness numbers.
When sailors that just got back from a 9 month westpac are short cycled to the carrier leaving on westpac, because there's only three guys in the Pacific northwest that have this NEC required to be on the carrier to deploy... Especially when the NEC is for a system no longer in use, but the hide bound bastards in that funny five sided building don't want to hear that, MANNING SAYS YOU GOTTA HAVE A xxx TECH, DAMN IT.
When "Command at Sea" is just a ticket to be punched on the way to doing something important... When you have through two consecutive cycles robbed a shipyard of their CO early, to put them in charge of another shipyard who's CO either failed massively or who has said "fuck this shit, I'm out."... When promotions are based on DEI instead of competency...
You just might have a manning problem.
Steel is important, and we don't have enough of it, but flesh and blood is just as important, and we are actively driving it away. If you can't put flesh and blood on the steel, you're in Australia's boat, where they have more submarines than crews to man them.
Sad to see the Cold War Fleet that I served in (and bitched about and eventually left) was so much better than what billions (trillions?) of dollars and a generation of time have wrought.
It is not just the officers that should be taking the heat for this, where was the Senior enlisted leadership sounding the alarm? There were no senior enlisted leaders willing to put their "careers" on the line to defend their Navy and its personnel. You don't think of some Command Master Chiefs put on the line before congress instead of telling them what they want to hear woudl not have carried some weight? Instead they were complicit and we end up with a shore Command Master Chiefs with assistant Master Chief on his/her "staff" while the fleet is 5k short of seagoing personnel. They to are part of the problem.
In 1943, Admiral Nimitz formed the Service Squadrons, under Commodore Worral Carter, to ensure that the Pacific Fleet would be maintained, and equipped to carry out it's combat operations. He saw to it that there were sufficient repair ships and personnel and a functioning Fleet Train to see that that would be accomplished.
Carter must be spinning in his grave.
Our reflexive antipathy to resurrecting proven Cold War practices...whatever they may be...is baffling.
Stop buying shiny new things and fix the stuff that works that you already have
I could get really going on this, especially with training, supply, and maintenance. Fixing it is not going to be easy, they need to go back to the old mantra of the 80’s ‘Pride and Professionalism’ and begin from there. Readiness squadrons are a good thing, but they’ll need someone like Boorda who as CCDG 8 walked the piers, and occasionally visited the ships. The navy needs to get ships company to take ownership as well. Lastly, if they are not painting ships, God only knows what’s going on inside the skin of the ship. The haze gray epoxy is still available in the supply system and isn’t JITS, yet.
Damn
The obvious bloat is the installations command. they didn't exist in the 20th century and was a product of the idea that the installations could be bill payers. the goal of the installations command was to create alignment of 'levels of effort' across submarine, air, amphibious, and naval bases. That was accomplished within 5 years. then, the installations command became a layer on top of Naval Facilities Engineering Command, or they competed with Naval Supply Systems Command for operations of mission areas that were traditionally theirs.
Also, you need to include FLEET LOGISTICS CENTER PEARL HARBOR in this discussion about the culture of the past 23 (ish) years.
in 1999, the Red Hill fuel division operated with 50 employees, including 21 veteran operators. it had its own environmental and engineering teams, as well as trained chemists, a fleet of barges, and a fleet focus that was unmatched.
By the time that the "spill" took place, it had less than 30 employeers, only 1 veteran operator, and it's barges, engineering and environmental teams had been transferred to the 'regional command', it had been merged with the Hickam Field fuels facilities, and the divisions knowledge of their facilities was lacking.
those decisions didn't happen in Hawaii. They happened in the Pentagon, made by people who never pumped a barrel of fuel in their lives.
thanks for the 'like'. How bad can it get? the DoD decided to charter the M/T MAERSK PERRY and moor it in Pearl Harbor as a stop gap in case they need to drain red hill quickly. this costs the services (my estimate) $100K per day or $3M per month.
Further, the Navy has no way to deliver JP-5 to the fleet in Pearl Harbor.
and the things that were major contributions to the spill (1) putting a fuel recovery system in the Hill that is made of PVC pipe" or (2) using a water well in the fuel farm that was put there for the contruction of the Hill (to make water for cement) and subsequently for the production of steam to head Navy Special Fuel Oil (NSFO) pipes... and then deciding to repurpose that water well in the FUEL FARM for residential water???
I can go on and on! what a bunch of ....
A like is not strong enough for this. I entered the Navy in the mid 80's, and have been involved in various levels of this since then. I've screamed to the high heavens since the 90's when you could see it start falling off the cliff. But the voice of reason is rarely ever listened to. Could it be turned around, yes. But will it? No. The "leadership" is not up to the task, and the pipeline is dry. And the politicians controlling it all are unworthy of their positions. Quite depressing.
I can remember INSURV inspections aboard several ships. At the worker bee and supervisory level my best recollection wasn't the actual inspection but the blood, sweat & tears that went into the preps for it. If anything, that alone improved our material readiness, or it seemed so. At the time, the whip hand of Rear Admiral Bulkeley alone was sufficient motivation to show your best side if you were one of those lacking the inate gumption yourself. We had a list of hits from previous INSURV's as a guidepost. How do you address items like "Overhead in the galley is too low"? Anecdotally, I had heard that was a hit on Knox Class Frigates by the good Admiral himself. Well, we sure didn't put much time into worrying about that but put time into tidying, titivation and making sure everything was to spec. In regard to material readiness that was our job anyway. It never hurt to have an inspection with teeth looming on the horizon, the results from which might well determine your future career path. And I think the Broken Window Theory applies to our Navy ships as much as it applies to neighborhoods and cities. I see a rust streaked ship and worry. Hygiene is fundamental to good health.
I never met Admiral Bulkeley when he came aboard in the 80s. Shipmates said he was a hunched over old man in coveralls and not very communicative...not that many dared to engage him in conversation. But that man was deck crawling and nosing around everywhere. How's that for oversight, scrutiny and leading from the front? Before the Admiral arrived onboard we were told he liked chocolate chip cookies. I suggested to the XO that we lay in a supply of the Famous Amos variety. I still like to believe that made that INSURV a tad bit more bearable.
(Finally, was this a clever play on words? "As there is a lot of ruin in a nation..." ruin in a nation ---> ruination? Nice.)
The army also gutted maintenance, don’t feel bad. Actually the army did that 80s / 90s to get more teeth to tail. Those worthless loggies!
Well actually not more teeth, more staff and TDA (don’t deploy) and HR EO and support the Warfighter lol.
Don’t worry, Help is coming.
War is coming
The fatal flaw is not the number of hulls or maintenance, it is was clearly decision making and remains decision making. Reset the officer corps
The fatal flaw is not the number of hulls or maintenance, it is was clearly decision making and remains decision making. Reset the officer corps
We have a major problem in the Naval Shipyards and in the private shipyards (that actually do most of the maintenance on the fleet.)
When "Zone managers" don't know things like "you can't have those guys painting when I have the SSTGs open" and it's kicked up to one of the 5 (Yes, 5) Assistant Project Superintendents, to determine which job has priority...
When guys with twenty plus years of experience are retiring as soon as it is legal to do so, just to get out of the toxic cesspool that has become "the waterfront."
When people that have never worked in the shop are made the training manager for that shop on waterfront...
This might just be effecting your readiness numbers.
When sailors that just got back from a 9 month westpac are short cycled to the carrier leaving on westpac, because there's only three guys in the Pacific northwest that have this NEC required to be on the carrier to deploy... Especially when the NEC is for a system no longer in use, but the hide bound bastards in that funny five sided building don't want to hear that, MANNING SAYS YOU GOTTA HAVE A xxx TECH, DAMN IT.
When "Command at Sea" is just a ticket to be punched on the way to doing something important... When you have through two consecutive cycles robbed a shipyard of their CO early, to put them in charge of another shipyard who's CO either failed massively or who has said "fuck this shit, I'm out."... When promotions are based on DEI instead of competency...
You just might have a manning problem.
Steel is important, and we don't have enough of it, but flesh and blood is just as important, and we are actively driving it away. If you can't put flesh and blood on the steel, you're in Australia's boat, where they have more submarines than crews to man them.
Sad to see the Cold War Fleet that I served in (and bitched about and eventually left) was so much better than what billions (trillions?) of dollars and a generation of time have wrought.
It is not just the officers that should be taking the heat for this, where was the Senior enlisted leadership sounding the alarm? There were no senior enlisted leaders willing to put their "careers" on the line to defend their Navy and its personnel. You don't think of some Command Master Chiefs put on the line before congress instead of telling them what they want to hear woudl not have carried some weight? Instead they were complicit and we end up with a shore Command Master Chiefs with assistant Master Chief on his/her "staff" while the fleet is 5k short of seagoing personnel. They to are part of the problem.