I can barely understand this article because there’s a lot of military double speak maybe? Oh, and maybe also that I don’t know a damn thing about the ships and the Navy. However, I could imagine something like this: the Navy is building some ships of one kind or another (lots of money for the shipbuilders and God knows who else) and then the navy kind of letting them fall apart over time and deciding that the ships need to be retired and, “what? Maybe we need some more ships?” . And, my god, there’s more money for the ship builders and god knows who. Another trough
As always, well said and accurate. I do think though, there is another half to this problem and that belongs to those for whom the amphibious ships should matter. Years ago, when we got the large deck sans a well deck, a very senior Marine wondered if that was right or wrong, but the real conclusion was too late in the decision process to alter the course. Although there is a general who has ships and shipbuilding in a portfolio, there is not a general who wakes up every day thinking and worrying about ships. The N-7 is a Navy staff position, and CMC's have left it unfilled. Not necessarily representing USMC interests, it represents an aspect of seriousness. Just a few years ago the Marine Corps backed off the requirement for 38 amphibs- the commitment kind of on paper always floated in degrees of seriousness with which the Marines held that number, but now at 31. And the bar always settles lower and lower. Confusion was added in the aftermath of that with small, slow and vulnerable amphibious ships being a new requirement. It does not matter what kind or size, the idea the Navy would put together any kind of mix that looked something like over 60 amphibs was never realistic, and of course the danger of the smaller non-existent ships became a risk to the existing ships- it simply math. A story today about Marines ready to "fight tonight" over amphibious ships. That should have been last night, last week, last year, actually, last decade. The greatest raw power resides in the CVBG of course, but the greatest flexibility for the NCA resides in the afloat amphibious force- whether Task Force-58 (it is all about the bulldozers) or afloat attack helicopters that self-deployed from the ocean to combat in Afghanistan in 3 days. We are kind of out of that business now, and that is not to America's advantage.
The Amphib Navy was never seen a fertile place for a sailor or Surface Warfare Officer to grow his career. Managed to avoid amphibs in my 19½ years at sea out of my 26. As a new CWO and LDO amphibs were a common first assignment as Assistant CICO or Assistant COMMO for us, but I got good-dealed by friendly detailers to an FFG and an Aegis CG. Far easier to get bridge time and to SWO qualify on a Frigate than on an amphib or carrier. I am sure my self-serving thought processes mirrored many in Washington even though I was a lower-level minion most of my career. Amphibs? Ugh! I doubt anyone in the top of his class at Annapolis or in OCS asks for an LPD or LHA. Neither did anyone I ever knew in an "A" School ever did. But I did do a NAVEDTRA training manual course in Amphibious Warfare when I was an RD2 and called it good enough.
If it’s not sexy, it is probably important. I spend a lot of windshield time these days and have been listening to Dan Carlin’s “Hardcore History.” Most recently, his 6 part series on the war in the Pacific. Logistics - not sexy, but essential. Repair/maintenance facilities - not sexy, but essential. Landing craft and troop ships - not sexy, but essential.
Possibly, the Navy might be right on the Gator Navy for the wrong reasons. If China is the 'pacing' threat it is more likely that a deterrent force for blockade would be seagoing not land based. Also given the lack of an AAV that isn't a sitting duck in a contested landing, where would Marines be able to fight their way ashore at this point? And, I'm saying this as former Marine CH-53 pilot.
The same "prestige" issue hits our smaller ships like the Cyclone Class. Wouldn't up gunned/missiled
versions of the Cyclone be handy around the rocks and shoals of the South China sea and the Strait of Malacca? The old Pegasus-class hydrofoils would also be useful I would think.
Maybe just forcing every officer in the Navy above the rank of 0-6 or has a degree from Harvard, Yale , Columbia etc. in political science or sociology to retire would be a good start.
We used 2 large decks as "Harrier carriers" in OIF to great effect. Those were condition driven by circumstance. The absence of well decks in the new LHA makes those operations more permanent than condition driven. The absence of a well deck, in the notional BLT-MEU would then drive to a 4 ship ARG, an LPD and 2xLSDs to make up for the loss, though change of force structure and less ground systems to get ashore may mean a third well deck may not be needed. The old LPH MAU-BLT "of my youth" were generally 5 ships- 3x well decks and an LKA along with the LHP. Obviously long gone, but a construct from which we can evaluate. I also struggle with "second land army". We fought ashore in France in WWI because USMC leadership realized if the Marine Corps did not show to the fight that was a declared war, it would become genuinely marginal. The rush to Pusan was ashore. After the remarkable landing in Inchon- "kick the door in", 1st MarDiv remained and fought as a land army. Kuwait, OIF and OEF. In fact the departure from Iraq as stability was achieved and shift to Afghanistan was to "march to the sound of the guns", where the nation was in a fight and recognition the Marine Corps ended to be present and participate in the fight. The sea offers great strategic and operational mobility, it requires specialized equipment and skill, but the fight ends up being on land. That is an observation of history, but seems to be a fact. To try to discount that or walk way from that may not simply be hard, but again may end up marginalizing the Marine Corps. A question today is could the Marine Corps repeat DS/DS, or OIF? What would the consequences be if the Marine Corps is either not able to show up, or critically dependent upon others for critical capabilities (not to speak of doctrine and training) that enable it to fully function, in a military response that attracts all of our Armed Forces? There are few examples, even in WWII, where Marines landed and passed operations to the army. Guadalcanal was a long time in the making, much more than "door kicking". It was far more common to be "shoulder to shoulder" in the Pacific, and of course not present in the Atlantic.
The nice privilege of war is if , IF you even see this time they back down with a stare.
As to why we want to take and hold vast territories in the Pacific? That question too should be asked. We are already in possession, and to proceed forward with such leadership is an immoral choice. Also recipe for Doom.
The Maritime Preposition Ships are being taken out of service. Namely the John P Bobo class.
I can barely understand this article because there’s a lot of military double speak maybe? Oh, and maybe also that I don’t know a damn thing about the ships and the Navy. However, I could imagine something like this: the Navy is building some ships of one kind or another (lots of money for the shipbuilders and God knows who else) and then the navy kind of letting them fall apart over time and deciding that the ships need to be retired and, “what? Maybe we need some more ships?” . And, my god, there’s more money for the ship builders and god knows who. Another trough
on the mark!
As always, well said and accurate. I do think though, there is another half to this problem and that belongs to those for whom the amphibious ships should matter. Years ago, when we got the large deck sans a well deck, a very senior Marine wondered if that was right or wrong, but the real conclusion was too late in the decision process to alter the course. Although there is a general who has ships and shipbuilding in a portfolio, there is not a general who wakes up every day thinking and worrying about ships. The N-7 is a Navy staff position, and CMC's have left it unfilled. Not necessarily representing USMC interests, it represents an aspect of seriousness. Just a few years ago the Marine Corps backed off the requirement for 38 amphibs- the commitment kind of on paper always floated in degrees of seriousness with which the Marines held that number, but now at 31. And the bar always settles lower and lower. Confusion was added in the aftermath of that with small, slow and vulnerable amphibious ships being a new requirement. It does not matter what kind or size, the idea the Navy would put together any kind of mix that looked something like over 60 amphibs was never realistic, and of course the danger of the smaller non-existent ships became a risk to the existing ships- it simply math. A story today about Marines ready to "fight tonight" over amphibious ships. That should have been last night, last week, last year, actually, last decade. The greatest raw power resides in the CVBG of course, but the greatest flexibility for the NCA resides in the afloat amphibious force- whether Task Force-58 (it is all about the bulldozers) or afloat attack helicopters that self-deployed from the ocean to combat in Afghanistan in 3 days. We are kind of out of that business now, and that is not to America's advantage.
The Amphib Navy was never seen a fertile place for a sailor or Surface Warfare Officer to grow his career. Managed to avoid amphibs in my 19½ years at sea out of my 26. As a new CWO and LDO amphibs were a common first assignment as Assistant CICO or Assistant COMMO for us, but I got good-dealed by friendly detailers to an FFG and an Aegis CG. Far easier to get bridge time and to SWO qualify on a Frigate than on an amphib or carrier. I am sure my self-serving thought processes mirrored many in Washington even though I was a lower-level minion most of my career. Amphibs? Ugh! I doubt anyone in the top of his class at Annapolis or in OCS asks for an LPD or LHA. Neither did anyone I ever knew in an "A" School ever did. But I did do a NAVEDTRA training manual course in Amphibious Warfare when I was an RD2 and called it good enough.
Good article, a voice in the wilderness.
If it’s not sexy, it is probably important. I spend a lot of windshield time these days and have been listening to Dan Carlin’s “Hardcore History.” Most recently, his 6 part series on the war in the Pacific. Logistics - not sexy, but essential. Repair/maintenance facilities - not sexy, but essential. Landing craft and troop ships - not sexy, but essential.
Possibly, the Navy might be right on the Gator Navy for the wrong reasons. If China is the 'pacing' threat it is more likely that a deterrent force for blockade would be seagoing not land based. Also given the lack of an AAV that isn't a sitting duck in a contested landing, where would Marines be able to fight their way ashore at this point? And, I'm saying this as former Marine CH-53 pilot.
The same "prestige" issue hits our smaller ships like the Cyclone Class. Wouldn't up gunned/missiled
versions of the Cyclone be handy around the rocks and shoals of the South China sea and the Strait of Malacca? The old Pegasus-class hydrofoils would also be useful I would think.
Maybe just forcing every officer in the Navy above the rank of 0-6 or has a degree from Harvard, Yale , Columbia etc. in political science or sociology to retire would be a good start.
We used 2 large decks as "Harrier carriers" in OIF to great effect. Those were condition driven by circumstance. The absence of well decks in the new LHA makes those operations more permanent than condition driven. The absence of a well deck, in the notional BLT-MEU would then drive to a 4 ship ARG, an LPD and 2xLSDs to make up for the loss, though change of force structure and less ground systems to get ashore may mean a third well deck may not be needed. The old LPH MAU-BLT "of my youth" were generally 5 ships- 3x well decks and an LKA along with the LHP. Obviously long gone, but a construct from which we can evaluate. I also struggle with "second land army". We fought ashore in France in WWI because USMC leadership realized if the Marine Corps did not show to the fight that was a declared war, it would become genuinely marginal. The rush to Pusan was ashore. After the remarkable landing in Inchon- "kick the door in", 1st MarDiv remained and fought as a land army. Kuwait, OIF and OEF. In fact the departure from Iraq as stability was achieved and shift to Afghanistan was to "march to the sound of the guns", where the nation was in a fight and recognition the Marine Corps ended to be present and participate in the fight. The sea offers great strategic and operational mobility, it requires specialized equipment and skill, but the fight ends up being on land. That is an observation of history, but seems to be a fact. To try to discount that or walk way from that may not simply be hard, but again may end up marginalizing the Marine Corps. A question today is could the Marine Corps repeat DS/DS, or OIF? What would the consequences be if the Marine Corps is either not able to show up, or critically dependent upon others for critical capabilities (not to speak of doctrine and training) that enable it to fully function, in a military response that attracts all of our Armed Forces? There are few examples, even in WWII, where Marines landed and passed operations to the army. Guadalcanal was a long time in the making, much more than "door kicking". It was far more common to be "shoulder to shoulder" in the Pacific, and of course not present in the Atlantic.
Moral rot, and flat Greed.
Sorry.
I’m sure your service was Honorable.
This is a problem in the Army too.
The nice privilege of war is if , IF you even see this time they back down with a stare.
As to why we want to take and hold vast territories in the Pacific? That question too should be asked. We are already in possession, and to proceed forward with such leadership is an immoral choice. Also recipe for Doom.
Maintenance isn’t it appears a big money maker for any service, except perhaps the Air Force.