When it comes to unmanned systems, I have one question.
How much PERSONAL experience do these people have with them? Especially the heavy iron - MQ-9 at a minimum, RQ-4/MQ-4 even better. There are a handful of BAMS-D veterans out there...THESE are the people who need to be calling the shots! One of the biggest problems with our acquisition system is that it treats acquiring as agenic...no experience with the system required (or desired). The biggest headache with the MQ-4 Triton program has been the disregard for the hard-learned lessons of the Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration, combined with the failure to use BAMS-D as a training ground. Of course, BAMS-D worked....and the tale of how a handful of testers turned a sow's ear into a dazzlingly capable maritime surveillance platform would make a hell of a book.
Deep-six Goldwater-Nichols, yes...and I've laid out my own thoughts on that subject. Put the Joint Chiefs back in charge, let them have the priority fights for resources...preferably in public.
And as Laz and others have pointed out, we need a SECNAV who will push publicly for the Navy...and privately for a serious warfighting strategy. Pro tip: Study Jellicoe's strategy for dealing with the High Seas Fleet.
1. Are we ready to commit our national defense to unmanned platforms without a robust Electronic Warfare assessment? After all, we're touting their success right now, without every using one in hostitilities, nor in an intense EW environment.
2. At what point do all these unmanned programs become "too big to fail". After all, we've been sold "optimum manning", the LCS, (in two failed versions) the Firescout C (just one failed version there that failed OPEVAL and was declared operational 3 wks later), the DDX, and tons of programs that are virtually unaffordable when viewed with combat losses (the Seawolf, DDX, Ford class CVN, F35 A, B, and C). All "too big to fail" and all virtually failed programs. Granted, the Seawolf and DDX were 3 platforms each, and the F35 continues to stumble along, although spare parts are rare, and we will go to combat with a lot less platforms than we were told we "had" to have.
3. How do all these "great ideas" fit into our latest "War Plan Orange?" (OK, that was the WWII plan, talking about a major theater war vs China/Russia/North Korea). Especially good to know that since we've built generations of warships that cannot be reloaded at sea (VLS equipped).
Inquiring minds (and this old retired Captain) want to know.
OK, color me auto-slathered. But let's agree that the NYT has done their due diligence in laying in a supply of CYA''s and told-ya-so's for articles a few years from now. And: "- has had to figure out how to do more with less." A no-brainer, just do less. Learn Mandarin too.
The question is, do we have shipyards and repair facilities we can still reactivate? If not, we don't have time to build them. If we don't have them, we have to get close with SK, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and access their yards and/or build out capacity.
Also, can we use secondary shipyards to build something like the National Security Cutters in numbers with containerized missiles on them? They could operate in squadrons in the SCS...good luck finding them among the shipping traffic. With containerized MK-41 launch tubes, they could punch above their weight if they were datalinked.
even though it might have hurt, CDR, I had anticipated/allowed/wished for you to take that somewhat longer holiday break.
in any case, nice for us that you did not. our thanx for the dedication.
I had read the article, and noted the emphasis given to future unmanned systems. thought, meh, perhaps. unlikely. too much "tech" today is too vulnerable tomorrow.
From a cursory search, Eric Lipton has barely any experience in national defense, let alone the workings and purpose of the many apparatus' within, he's a neophyte in the world of defense. His writings read of someone who's easily led astray with bright, new and flashy things, not understanding the principals of redundancy and simplicity as it pertains to warfare. In short, too many movies and dinner parties, and not enough ground truth.
As for RADM Selby, he's got no room to talk or, criticize.
Since I didn’t bother breaching the paywall, did the endless praise for the small and unmanned happen to mention how the Iranians had one of the new technological marvels under involuntary tow on the way back to an Iranian port when one of those big, old style, cumbersome “ships” (shudder) had to chase them down and launch an old style manned “helicopter” (double shudder) to get the Iranians to drop the tow line and skedaddle?
It misses that the Navy needs a maritime strategy that says what missions the fleet will undertake in peace and war. That strategy should in turn inform the size and force structure of the fleet. That needs to happen so that we don't repeat mistakes like LCS and DDG 1000. Every part of the Navy is working unmanned systems (surface, subsurface and air,) so its unfair to suggest its a 20th century navy. That's a cheap throwaway line. Aircraft carriers, destroyers to escort them and SSN's are still needed for global naval operations.
The article is also an unfair hit piece on HII shipbuilding. That company builds what the govt asks it too, and has been the victim of an uneven demand signal for decades. Uneven demand for ships causes highly trained shipyard workers to leave in order to put food on the table. If there was an even demand signal then the shipyards would not have to constantly hire and train large numbers of new workers.
The article should have made a renewed pitch for the Commission on the Future of the navy but did not.
Always worth the time to read, thanks CDR S. I'm curious, have you ever written down your thoughts on the shortcomings of Goldwater-Nichols or (even better) what needs changed/overhauled/scrapped in order to fix it? I'd love to read that
I tire so of this Nonsense from the smart people who have never pissed an ounce of salt water. We can all do more real navy stuff with a 60 year old frigate, manned by a watch team of 60 year old sailors, and just a lucky break (or two), than any unmanned system today. The UUV and USV platforms I walked away from 16 years ago were really nothing more than NUWC science projects, and to this day are not even close (through all their iterations) to being “warfighters”.
If these guys can’t even figure out how to better spin/sell what we lost 20 years of development chasing, I mean come on, it isn’t even PowerPoint deep at this point, it’s a naked shot at one more try to do everything we proved DOESNT WORK.
Same old story. I used the 2018 report because it was readily available.
Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress Updated August 25, 2023, page 5
"The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missile."
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Updated October 22, 2018, page 5.
"LCS mission packages have been under development since the early days of the LCS program. The Navy’s plan is to develop and deploy initial versions of these packages, followed by development and procurement of more capable versions."
Reading the mission statement for the LCS and the large unmanned vessel, they read almost identical.
“low sea-state float toys”. Will anyone in the Potomac Fleet ever be brave enough to demand a serious “Let’s press the limits and be sneaky” war game where the results are not pre-ordained? Let all of the acquisition PM’s prove they actually have something that should be continued for reasons other than being jobs programs in the right congressional districts. A well-understood joke inside the Zumwalt program was that everyone knew the program wasn’t going to get cancelled because there were contracts in 46 states.
When it comes to unmanned systems, I have one question.
How much PERSONAL experience do these people have with them? Especially the heavy iron - MQ-9 at a minimum, RQ-4/MQ-4 even better. There are a handful of BAMS-D veterans out there...THESE are the people who need to be calling the shots! One of the biggest problems with our acquisition system is that it treats acquiring as agenic...no experience with the system required (or desired). The biggest headache with the MQ-4 Triton program has been the disregard for the hard-learned lessons of the Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration, combined with the failure to use BAMS-D as a training ground. Of course, BAMS-D worked....and the tale of how a handful of testers turned a sow's ear into a dazzlingly capable maritime surveillance platform would make a hell of a book.
Deep-six Goldwater-Nichols, yes...and I've laid out my own thoughts on that subject. Put the Joint Chiefs back in charge, let them have the priority fights for resources...preferably in public.
And as Laz and others have pointed out, we need a SECNAV who will push publicly for the Navy...and privately for a serious warfighting strategy. Pro tip: Study Jellicoe's strategy for dealing with the High Seas Fleet.
your new production brook?
May I suggest: Ephemeral stream. One that only flows in direct reaction to rainfall, and whose channel is always above the water table.
This is really excellent. Thanks for pulling this together.
1. Are we ready to commit our national defense to unmanned platforms without a robust Electronic Warfare assessment? After all, we're touting their success right now, without every using one in hostitilities, nor in an intense EW environment.
2. At what point do all these unmanned programs become "too big to fail". After all, we've been sold "optimum manning", the LCS, (in two failed versions) the Firescout C (just one failed version there that failed OPEVAL and was declared operational 3 wks later), the DDX, and tons of programs that are virtually unaffordable when viewed with combat losses (the Seawolf, DDX, Ford class CVN, F35 A, B, and C). All "too big to fail" and all virtually failed programs. Granted, the Seawolf and DDX were 3 platforms each, and the F35 continues to stumble along, although spare parts are rare, and we will go to combat with a lot less platforms than we were told we "had" to have.
3. How do all these "great ideas" fit into our latest "War Plan Orange?" (OK, that was the WWII plan, talking about a major theater war vs China/Russia/North Korea). Especially good to know that since we've built generations of warships that cannot be reloaded at sea (VLS equipped).
Inquiring minds (and this old retired Captain) want to know.
OK, color me auto-slathered. But let's agree that the NYT has done their due diligence in laying in a supply of CYA''s and told-ya-so's for articles a few years from now. And: "- has had to figure out how to do more with less." A no-brainer, just do less. Learn Mandarin too.
The question is, do we have shipyards and repair facilities we can still reactivate? If not, we don't have time to build them. If we don't have them, we have to get close with SK, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia and access their yards and/or build out capacity.
Also, can we use secondary shipyards to build something like the National Security Cutters in numbers with containerized missiles on them? They could operate in squadrons in the SCS...good luck finding them among the shipping traffic. With containerized MK-41 launch tubes, they could punch above their weight if they were datalinked.
Game, set, match, Salamander
even though it might have hurt, CDR, I had anticipated/allowed/wished for you to take that somewhat longer holiday break.
in any case, nice for us that you did not. our thanx for the dedication.
I had read the article, and noted the emphasis given to future unmanned systems. thought, meh, perhaps. unlikely. too much "tech" today is too vulnerable tomorrow.
From a cursory search, Eric Lipton has barely any experience in national defense, let alone the workings and purpose of the many apparatus' within, he's a neophyte in the world of defense. His writings read of someone who's easily led astray with bright, new and flashy things, not understanding the principals of redundancy and simplicity as it pertains to warfare. In short, too many movies and dinner parties, and not enough ground truth.
As for RADM Selby, he's got no room to talk or, criticize.
Well written, sir.
Since I didn’t bother breaching the paywall, did the endless praise for the small and unmanned happen to mention how the Iranians had one of the new technological marvels under involuntary tow on the way back to an Iranian port when one of those big, old style, cumbersome “ships” (shudder) had to chase them down and launch an old style manned “helicopter” (double shudder) to get the Iranians to drop the tow line and skedaddle?
It misses that the Navy needs a maritime strategy that says what missions the fleet will undertake in peace and war. That strategy should in turn inform the size and force structure of the fleet. That needs to happen so that we don't repeat mistakes like LCS and DDG 1000. Every part of the Navy is working unmanned systems (surface, subsurface and air,) so its unfair to suggest its a 20th century navy. That's a cheap throwaway line. Aircraft carriers, destroyers to escort them and SSN's are still needed for global naval operations.
The article is also an unfair hit piece on HII shipbuilding. That company builds what the govt asks it too, and has been the victim of an uneven demand signal for decades. Uneven demand for ships causes highly trained shipyard workers to leave in order to put food on the table. If there was an even demand signal then the shipyards would not have to constantly hire and train large numbers of new workers.
The article should have made a renewed pitch for the Commission on the Future of the navy but did not.
Always worth the time to read, thanks CDR S. I'm curious, have you ever written down your thoughts on the shortcomings of Goldwater-Nichols or (even better) what needs changed/overhauled/scrapped in order to fix it? I'd love to read that
I tire so of this Nonsense from the smart people who have never pissed an ounce of salt water. We can all do more real navy stuff with a 60 year old frigate, manned by a watch team of 60 year old sailors, and just a lucky break (or two), than any unmanned system today. The UUV and USV platforms I walked away from 16 years ago were really nothing more than NUWC science projects, and to this day are not even close (through all their iterations) to being “warfighters”.
If these guys can’t even figure out how to better spin/sell what we lost 20 years of development chasing, I mean come on, it isn’t even PowerPoint deep at this point, it’s a naked shot at one more try to do everything we proved DOESNT WORK.
Same old story. I used the 2018 report because it was readily available.
Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress Updated August 25, 2023, page 5
"The Navy wants LUSVs to be low-cost, high-endurance, reconfigurable ships with ample capacity for carrying various modular payloads—particularly anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and strike payloads, meaning principally anti-ship and land-attack missile."
Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Updated October 22, 2018, page 5.
"LCS mission packages have been under development since the early days of the LCS program. The Navy’s plan is to develop and deploy initial versions of these packages, followed by development and procurement of more capable versions."
Reading the mission statement for the LCS and the large unmanned vessel, they read almost identical.
Imma be simple today.
🤬
“low sea-state float toys”. Will anyone in the Potomac Fleet ever be brave enough to demand a serious “Let’s press the limits and be sneaky” war game where the results are not pre-ordained? Let all of the acquisition PM’s prove they actually have something that should be continued for reasons other than being jobs programs in the right congressional districts. A well-understood joke inside the Zumwalt program was that everyone knew the program wasn’t going to get cancelled because there were contracts in 46 states.