I retired nearly 40 years ago. Before desktop/laptops, mobile phones, internet, social media, & detachable storage. Back then information transfer had to be done by couriers and dead-drops and face-to-face.
These days, the idea that a breach can be contained is hubris; it will be to its users before it’s discovered.
I retired nearly 40 years ago. Before desktop/laptops, mobile phones, internet, social media, & detachable storage. Back then information transfer had to be done by couriers and dead-drops and face-to-face.
These days, the idea that a breach can be contained is hubris; it will be to its users before it’s discovered.
Security will have to start at the front end and limiting access is the most basic defense.
I look at that flow chart and it seems already too complex with too many inputs.
Even back in the day, the Pentagon / Syscom product was the process. No change today it seems..Death by PowerPoint.
I retired nearly 40 years ago. Before desktop/laptops, mobile phones, internet, social media, & detachable storage. Back then information transfer had to be done by couriers and dead-drops and face-to-face.
These days, the idea that a breach can be contained is hubris; it will be to its users before it’s discovered.
Security will have to start at the front end and limiting access is the most basic defense.
I look at that flow chart and it seems already too complex with too many inputs.
Even back in the day, the Pentagon / Syscom product was the process. No change today it seems..Death by PowerPoint.
Truth: Still NO new lessons learned from prior After-Action Report’s (AAR).
Dx: Institutional failure to adapt OODA Loop feedback into new systems design efforts.
See diagram embedded here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_C._Richardson_(admiral)?wprov=sfti1