All part and parcel of the same...lack of funds. They want to get rid of the Riverine fleet to reduce costs and get the manpower back for the rest of the fleet at the expense of that specific capability. Just like the Air Force wanting to get rid of the A-10s and using ridiculous arguments about its survivability over a battlefield.
The answer is to increase the correct capabilities - and all of them that you can - for the money you have. The Navy should get more money for more hulls and more missile and more capabilities. As it looks now, though, they would be hurting for people to put on the platforms.
This has nothing to do with funding. It is another example of the Navy wanting new, flashy, shiny toys (that also have a post-retirement benefit to the Flags) at the expense of solid, proven warfighting platforms. Same goes for the USAF & the A-10.
I'm advocating for good shore duty for Petty Officers so they can have families. What a perfect spot for a machinist's mate. Eighteen months of engine room watchstanding on a blue-water destroyer; three years in a Riverine unit; and back to sea as a CPO. Meanwhile, my hypothetical machinist's wife and kids have had six years in a leafy, attractive base housing complex with top-notch schools. We demand so much of our sailors when on sea duty, and we should reward them with cushy, but, meaningful, shored duty.
I loved my "shore duty." In at 1500, still there to greet day shift at 0745. Two weeks home, two weeks TDY. Long stretches with no days off for weeks at a time. And that was peak Reagan when we had funding.
Late edit: And never once saw anyone from the wardroom after 15:30 unless they were exiting a cockpit.
Really? 6 years ashore? That would be poor personnel management. Why join the Navy if not expecting to go out sea? Could the Air force afford to take a pilot off of flight status for six years? Join the Marines an expect not to go out to the field for six years? Part and parcel of a military career is good duty assignments and bad ones. You ask for Hawaii and you get Lejuene. The problem is current recruiting is it sells the service as 9-5 job like working for Google or IBM, as a family friendly experience. I have been a military brat and served both before as during the introduction of a "family friendly" Which was attempted at great detriment the single service member. As an example the Marine's recognized they screwed the pooch and had to introduce a Single Marine Program , like the Ft Hood People First, is an open admission of leadership failure. Family Friendly is an impossibility because the best thing you can do for that family is to make sure the service member is trained and equipment to accomplish the mission enhancing's his ability to come back alive. That means, as countless military families survived before "family friendly", missed birthdays, anniversaries, Christmases.- many deployments It means somebody else has to get the kids from childcare because their is no liberty call or 9 to 5 until the crew passes damage control drills (Hello USS Bonhomme Richard) for example.
Recruiting/retention is the same be honest and you get the people you want, it has worked in the past. Of course it also means fixing the leadership failures.
Comparing the Air Force to a military operation like the USN is not a fair comparison. Even the USA is different. There is nothing like sea duty. With so few ships doing so much our ships are underway constantly. To keep skilled sailors we have to give them good shore duty to make up for the suffering they endure while at sea.
Even so you can't take key skilled experienced personnel out of the pipeline for six years at a shot. What sea going skills do they lose over that amount of time? What good is retaining them if you can't send them were needed? do the math. If they stay in for 20 years it is over 1/4 their career, 20% of a 30 year career. It is like the argument about pregnancy limited duty /maternity leave. It may help retention but what to end if that service member is on limited duty/unavailable for deployment up 25% of a 4 year enlistment for a single pregnancy?
Yes USAF is not like seas duty and I can't speak for out it is now but ask anybody who was in SAC during the cold war what that duty was like.
I'm not advocating for 6 years ashore. 1.5 years at sea; followed by 3 years ashore followed by another 1.5 at sea. However, the family would live in San Diego, Mayport, or Norfolk for the full 6 years.
In the Marines they can run kids through a four-year enlistment then cut them loose and replace them with new kids. Riflemen, as valuable as they are, don't have the technical skills that a Second Class has. We can replace a 4 year Marine with a boot and not lose much in combat effectiveness. Sailors are different.
I am all for keeping families stable, My average time at a duty station was about 2 years. But you have to look at the rating. Do you have enough shore billets for MMs with a nuclear rating (for example) to maintain their proficiency/qualifications to make that happen? I doubt it. Not much call for that rating outside of sea duty or at the school itself. Even the Marine Corps which has traditionally done a great job at recruiting but not paid much attention to retention is changing that approach. One of the reason for the recruiting vs, retention approach was that being a grunt was/is a young mans game, it is hard on the body. Knee braces were not that uncommon among the senior ranks. I remember being station at Lejeune in the 80s, you figured 9 months of the year in the field training or deployed.
Not arguing the Navy should not have a riverine capability, but I think of all the Navy billets tied up in Romania & Poland doing Air Defense Artillery and I think that maybe the Army should have this capability to support their own operations.
Side note on the A-10: It's too expensive to use for counter insurgencies (drones, light attack or rotary will do) and despite it's ruggedness, the war in Ukraine has shown that it would not last long against a near peer.
I agree the Navy should have a Riverine force and maintain it...but whether they WANT flashy new toys, they have to PAY for them and MAN them, thus the Riverene force is seen as a supply of both money and men.
Not really on the A-10s. Russia's Frogfoots are still flying CAS and the A-10 is much more durable and maneuverable...and was made for interdiction and destruction of massed formations, transportation columns, artillery sites, etc. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses is a thing and, if the zoomies are there, they will have suppressed any S-300, S-400 etc. batteries already. The Russians are taking it in the chops because they HAVEN'T completed their SEAD and don't have air dominance.
So, you are either talking MANPADS or anti-aircraft guns (the same ones that were around when the A-10 was born). MANPADS may be a threat, but they are a threat to any CAS platform...from helicopters to prop planes (and drones don't carry enough ordnance).
Nobody said it was...but it is more survivable than helicopters and other platforms for the same mission set. It is certainly better than risking an F-35 or even F-15 or F-16s for the same mission. Again, it is part of a system. Conduct SEAD, eliminate threats, and produce a less threatening environment...certainly much less threatening than that faced by the Russians in Ukraine at the moment. In a peer-to-peer conflict you are sure going to lose some equipment...the question is how many, at what cost, and what you can do with it before you lose it.
Find me a plane that would not have a concern in a peer on peer fight. SAMS suck for aircraft, but you have to fight in the air. It is what it is. The platform is better than a fast mover for CAS.
As other have pointed a lot of the lack of people is poor personnel management ie. Navy people running shore based air defense systems. Why should a Master Chief have another Master Chief has an assistant? Why should a Master Chief even have an assistant (other than to create a cushy sore duty assignment for somebody nearing retirement)? How many people are assigned DEI billets while you have a 9,000 person shortfall in people for sea duty? Take everybody assigned to whatever department responsible for the Navy working uniform fiasco and assign them to sea duty while the CNO grows a pair an says "see the Coast Guard Working Uniform, that is what we will be adopting". Of course you have to fix leadership. What do you imagine the retention rate is for the USS George Washington? Find out how the gross incompetents' that were in command of that ship (both officer and enlisted) managed to rise those positions and how do we prevent it from happening again. Part of the money issue is also a management issue. DOD wide. The Air Force does not need 5 fight demonstration teams, Space Force can get by with a version of the Air Force Uniform not a complete new costly, ugly design (Like the Navy should have adopted the USCG work uniform). As for recruiting try honesty, realistic view of military life instead of trying to sell a job like 9-5 IBM but with uniforms.
The only reason there are Senior & Master Chiefs is a pay chart. Not sure what value the MCPON still brings, but we should start by sundowning the FLT CMDs and reverting all CMDs to their previous rate and assigning them accordingly.
" our Navy is once again committing the professional malpractice of decommissioning most of the US Navy’s riverine fleet."
Wait, we have a riverine fleet now?
"We will be at war again, perhaps soon, where we will once more need to recreate a riverine force from scratch because we knowingly let it die at peace."
I am having trouble imaging what a US Navy riverine fleet would do in a war with China.
Fight for the river mouths. Keep Chinese small boats from landing troops upriver. Sink Naval Militia units. A fair amount, when you really think about it.
Vietnam, Philippines, anywhere in Asia that ain't China. Also, China isn't the only area we have problems. Maybe help the Nigerians hang a couple pirates?
We don't have the money to do everything. We must make choices. I question the importance of riverine forces that are fundamentally irrelevant for deterring or fighting China.
Pretty effing deep as soon as you leave the island. Subs dive as they leave the harbor. You are correct, Guam is not the best place for small boat ops. Now, down in the islands of Micronesia, etc., that may be better as they patrol between the land masses.
Yeah, many an atoll in Micronesia has loads of islands with small channels betwixt 'em (if any). That's a great place for patrol boats and RIBs along with drones, airships, and helos.
I think it gets back to riverine, littoral, and near shore can all compliment each other with the right platform selection. Marines wants to sit on shore and wait for something to come by and get shot at. The island has been and remains an unsinkable aircraft carrier, not a Gibraltar or Singapore. Sortie from the island by sea and air.
They may not being going up the Yangtze (just like the Army is not going to be making Thunder Runs into Peking) but imagine what up gunned/missile ships like the Cyclone class and riverine boats could do among the rocks, shoals reefs tens of thousands of small islands of the South China Sea. Extend it further out to the Solomon Islands which are now effectively in Chinese hands. PT boats came in amongst those islands in WWII. And while on the subject the Infantry part of the Riverine force should be Marines not a Navy master at arms rating.
Like any of the other concepts for small distributed forces operating inside the enemy threat ring, one wonders how they get replenished with gas and bullets. Sure, they can be a nuisance for a while, but is this form of warfare decisive? Doubtful. Not to mention, China has plenty of maritime militia type forces to chase down these boats.
Seems to me that that a Cyclone class is exactly the type of ship you want to deal with China's Maritime Militia instead of sending an Ardleigh Burke to deal with troublesome fishing trawlers. -Remember how were stuck sending large major warships to deal with pirates. These upgraded patrol craft could have sufficient range /endurance that they could stage from a tender (USS Whidbey Island LSD-41?) sufficient distance distance from the treat ring. IF running like a behind the lines special ops resupply could be by sub or air.
The same Navy that won't have Missile Patrol Boats for Blue/Green water isn't going to invest in a Brown water fleet. Too many chances for young officers to screw up.
Yes not only does the Navy NOT have any rqmt for a Patrol Ship nor FAC-M, it confuses or conflates those needs with a FIAC for littoral waters. The need is obvious to those who have operated in the past Green/Brown waters. But maybe not so to the Marines?
The curse of the unknowing is made worse by the huge dreadnoughts they so like
Big Navy has never supported riverine capability. Such units were red headed step children in Vietnam, and have been so ever since. I recall, as a young Ensign, trying to volunteer for riverine duty in Vietnam, my Destroyer CO at the time scotched the effort. He told me that it was a career killer. I believe he was speaking truth.
Too true, Captain Mongo. Post-Vietnam, I served with a few Riverine sailors. Aside from their amazing (and dark) sea stories some were burnt out Signalmen, Gunners Mates, Enginemen, Radiomen and Radarmen deep in the bottle. The success stories were LCDR Godbehere, another was CDR Chestnutt (LDO), men I was stationed with once and three times respectively. Both promoted up from the ranks after Riverine duty. Never knew of a line officer whose career was enhanced by Riverine service, except Admiral Zumwalt who was CNFV (Brown Water Navy) before jumping to CNO. Back in 1968 as an RD2 I was stationed with ADM Zumwalt's son, a J.O. aboard our DDG. Poor guy always went horizontal when we were underway, horribly afflicted with sea sickness. He was a decent guy but like any line officer "not cutting the mustard" he transferred to a get-well tour in Vietnam in the Riverine forces. His exposure to Agent Orange killed him at age 42. Let's not forget LTjg John Kerry, a man with a sealed service record and possibly three versions of his DD-214, who got short-toured off a DLG to Vietnam Riverine duty, got short-toured from there because of 3 Purple Hearts and subsequently got an early discharge. In my short 10 year career as a Zero I saw more than a few J.O.'s sent to get-well tours (such as ANGLICO, Riverine, NROTC, a training command...etc) after a less than stellar first sea tour (<---That a judgment the CO makes. I have no opinions.) As an EWCS(SW) I got shoehorned into an O-4 line officer billet as (A)EWO at CincPacFlt because the billet had been empty for years because it wasn't "career enhancing" for a line officer. Go figure. What a wonderful tour that was. Was stationed at two training commands too and my observation was that it was heaven for Enlisted, CWO's and LDO's but a going-nowhere assignment for line officers. Sadly, any assignment to Riverine forces might just be a dead end career move for a line officer. How could it be otherwise in that dog-eat-dog community? So few slots for Command at Sea and only one slot for CNO...who'd want to get sidetracked? Well, maybe a patriot would.
(Small world: ADM Zumwalt was XO of USS Zellars (DD-777) in 1948, the year I was born. My older brother was an RD2 aboard Zellars in 1966-1968.)
LCDR Godbehere yelled at me once in a misunderstanding wholly my fault. It was the only time we conversed. So thankful for that. I have the greatest respect for this man.
At a past Gamewardens of Vietnam, I meet Godbehere, truly a good man. But there are so many riverine vets who were. As an officer of PBR-FVA we were fortunate enough to been established with Bosn John C. Williams (MOH, SS, BS, etc.) the most decorated enlisted sailor of the modern era. His famous line is: "There is NO way to do the Wrong thing Right"
My thoughts exactly. Save for VADM Bulkeley, I can't think of any prominent admiral who spent time in small boats. And he was explicitly told to go to a destroyer to continue his career.
Yes. It has long been my thought that "Swift Boat" consciously attempted to emulate Kennedy to further his political career. I would also really like to see his real service record.
There were Three naval forces on Vietnamese waters. The Mobile Riverine Force was the Task Force 117 which lifted and supported Army troops around the inland rivers; Operation Gamewardens Task Force 116 the riverine force; and Operation Market Time Task force 115 the coastal patrol and interdiction force. All had their unique boats and operations and crewing.
Our people in charge are determined to gut our national defense and I don’t think they should be called leadership because they don’t appear to leading at all. We should always have small boat units because they are useful for so many different missions. This is just one more example of what not to do with a Navy.
Not only is it a strategic loss at the power projection level, it is an even greater loss at the sailor/officer development level. Lost opportunities to develop small, cohesive units. Lost opportunities to develop JOs early in their careers. Lost opportunities to build deck plate leaders.
Ca. 1995 at Ft. Ord, there was a huge lot with acre upon acre of river boats left over from the 7th ID. For all I know they are still there, or maybe they are in Ukraine. So I know we had this capability, once.
I know That the Navy decommissioned its CRF and gave the UKR Navy most of those riverine craft to include Mk VI PBs, RPBs, RCBs, SURCs, and some other boats I may not have noticed. The USN decided to sell the UKR Navy some of the new being built 40 ft. PBs The UKR also got some modified USCG cutters or patrol boats.
The US Navy has built up a riverine force multiple times, only to turn its head and dissolve that force a few years later. That has been said in many books and articles.
What that means is the officers in the OPNAV rqmts code I believe N95, have No operational experience and cant explain the need to their higher ups. Ergo no funding.
And we are NOT talking a lot of money. Probably less than some big programs like the ridiculous ORCA ULLUV. That is not an either or choice, its a do the right thing and stay the course.
An official USN Naval History and Heritage Command Riverine War book:
Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992. [Online edition without all of the images of the hardcopy edition.].
just before I retired as one of the few remaining 9279 NOBC's The Nav decided to build the CRF. I tried to volunteer for ANY of the billets; told to pound sand. The commissioning CO was a blue-water blackshoe with zero experience IIRC.
All part and parcel of the same...lack of funds. They want to get rid of the Riverine fleet to reduce costs and get the manpower back for the rest of the fleet at the expense of that specific capability. Just like the Air Force wanting to get rid of the A-10s and using ridiculous arguments about its survivability over a battlefield.
The answer is to increase the correct capabilities - and all of them that you can - for the money you have. The Navy should get more money for more hulls and more missile and more capabilities. As it looks now, though, they would be hurting for people to put on the platforms.
This has nothing to do with funding. It is another example of the Navy wanting new, flashy, shiny toys (that also have a post-retirement benefit to the Flags) at the expense of solid, proven warfighting platforms. Same goes for the USAF & the A-10.
BIG Ships, open waters three miles deep and way out of range of land to run into.
I'm advocating for good shore duty for Petty Officers so they can have families. What a perfect spot for a machinist's mate. Eighteen months of engine room watchstanding on a blue-water destroyer; three years in a Riverine unit; and back to sea as a CPO. Meanwhile, my hypothetical machinist's wife and kids have had six years in a leafy, attractive base housing complex with top-notch schools. We demand so much of our sailors when on sea duty, and we should reward them with cushy, but, meaningful, shored duty.
I loved my "shore duty." In at 1500, still there to greet day shift at 0745. Two weeks home, two weeks TDY. Long stretches with no days off for weeks at a time. And that was peak Reagan when we had funding.
Late edit: And never once saw anyone from the wardroom after 15:30 unless they were exiting a cockpit.
Really? 6 years ashore? That would be poor personnel management. Why join the Navy if not expecting to go out sea? Could the Air force afford to take a pilot off of flight status for six years? Join the Marines an expect not to go out to the field for six years? Part and parcel of a military career is good duty assignments and bad ones. You ask for Hawaii and you get Lejuene. The problem is current recruiting is it sells the service as 9-5 job like working for Google or IBM, as a family friendly experience. I have been a military brat and served both before as during the introduction of a "family friendly" Which was attempted at great detriment the single service member. As an example the Marine's recognized they screwed the pooch and had to introduce a Single Marine Program , like the Ft Hood People First, is an open admission of leadership failure. Family Friendly is an impossibility because the best thing you can do for that family is to make sure the service member is trained and equipment to accomplish the mission enhancing's his ability to come back alive. That means, as countless military families survived before "family friendly", missed birthdays, anniversaries, Christmases.- many deployments It means somebody else has to get the kids from childcare because their is no liberty call or 9 to 5 until the crew passes damage control drills (Hello USS Bonhomme Richard) for example.
Recruiting/retention is the same be honest and you get the people you want, it has worked in the past. Of course it also means fixing the leadership failures.
https://youtu.be/6eTsf2yD880
Comparing the Air Force to a military operation like the USN is not a fair comparison. Even the USA is different. There is nothing like sea duty. With so few ships doing so much our ships are underway constantly. To keep skilled sailors we have to give them good shore duty to make up for the suffering they endure while at sea.
Even so you can't take key skilled experienced personnel out of the pipeline for six years at a shot. What sea going skills do they lose over that amount of time? What good is retaining them if you can't send them were needed? do the math. If they stay in for 20 years it is over 1/4 their career, 20% of a 30 year career. It is like the argument about pregnancy limited duty /maternity leave. It may help retention but what to end if that service member is on limited duty/unavailable for deployment up 25% of a 4 year enlistment for a single pregnancy?
Yes USAF is not like seas duty and I can't speak for out it is now but ask anybody who was in SAC during the cold war what that duty was like.
I'm not advocating for 6 years ashore. 1.5 years at sea; followed by 3 years ashore followed by another 1.5 at sea. However, the family would live in San Diego, Mayport, or Norfolk for the full 6 years.
In the Marines they can run kids through a four-year enlistment then cut them loose and replace them with new kids. Riflemen, as valuable as they are, don't have the technical skills that a Second Class has. We can replace a 4 year Marine with a boot and not lose much in combat effectiveness. Sailors are different.
I am all for keeping families stable, My average time at a duty station was about 2 years. But you have to look at the rating. Do you have enough shore billets for MMs with a nuclear rating (for example) to maintain their proficiency/qualifications to make that happen? I doubt it. Not much call for that rating outside of sea duty or at the school itself. Even the Marine Corps which has traditionally done a great job at recruiting but not paid much attention to retention is changing that approach. One of the reason for the recruiting vs, retention approach was that being a grunt was/is a young mans game, it is hard on the body. Knee braces were not that uncommon among the senior ranks. I remember being station at Lejeune in the 80s, you figured 9 months of the year in the field training or deployed.
Meh.. .the USN is uber for the jarheads......*
*(The US Air Force is Lyft for the Army).
Not arguing the Navy should not have a riverine capability, but I think of all the Navy billets tied up in Romania & Poland doing Air Defense Artillery and I think that maybe the Army should have this capability to support their own operations.
Side note on the A-10: It's too expensive to use for counter insurgencies (drones, light attack or rotary will do) and despite it's ruggedness, the war in Ukraine has shown that it would not last long against a near peer.
I agree the Navy should have a Riverine force and maintain it...but whether they WANT flashy new toys, they have to PAY for them and MAN them, thus the Riverene force is seen as a supply of both money and men.
Not really on the A-10s. Russia's Frogfoots are still flying CAS and the A-10 is much more durable and maneuverable...and was made for interdiction and destruction of massed formations, transportation columns, artillery sites, etc. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses is a thing and, if the zoomies are there, they will have suppressed any S-300, S-400 etc. batteries already. The Russians are taking it in the chops because they HAVEN'T completed their SEAD and don't have air dominance.
So, you are either talking MANPADS or anti-aircraft guns (the same ones that were around when the A-10 was born). MANPADS may be a threat, but they are a threat to any CAS platform...from helicopters to prop planes (and drones don't carry enough ordnance).
"Russia's Frogfoots are still flying CAS ... Russians are taking it on the chops."
The A-10 would be suffering similarly under these conditions. It's not invincible.
Nobody said it was...but it is more survivable than helicopters and other platforms for the same mission set. It is certainly better than risking an F-35 or even F-15 or F-16s for the same mission. Again, it is part of a system. Conduct SEAD, eliminate threats, and produce a less threatening environment...certainly much less threatening than that faced by the Russians in Ukraine at the moment. In a peer-to-peer conflict you are sure going to lose some equipment...the question is how many, at what cost, and what you can do with it before you lose it.
Find me a plane that would not have a concern in a peer on peer fight. SAMS suck for aircraft, but you have to fight in the air. It is what it is. The platform is better than a fast mover for CAS.
As other have pointed a lot of the lack of people is poor personnel management ie. Navy people running shore based air defense systems. Why should a Master Chief have another Master Chief has an assistant? Why should a Master Chief even have an assistant (other than to create a cushy sore duty assignment for somebody nearing retirement)? How many people are assigned DEI billets while you have a 9,000 person shortfall in people for sea duty? Take everybody assigned to whatever department responsible for the Navy working uniform fiasco and assign them to sea duty while the CNO grows a pair an says "see the Coast Guard Working Uniform, that is what we will be adopting". Of course you have to fix leadership. What do you imagine the retention rate is for the USS George Washington? Find out how the gross incompetents' that were in command of that ship (both officer and enlisted) managed to rise those positions and how do we prevent it from happening again. Part of the money issue is also a management issue. DOD wide. The Air Force does not need 5 fight demonstration teams, Space Force can get by with a version of the Air Force Uniform not a complete new costly, ugly design (Like the Navy should have adopted the USCG work uniform). As for recruiting try honesty, realistic view of military life instead of trying to sell a job like 9-5 IBM but with uniforms.
https://youtu.be/6eTsf2yD880
The only reason there are Senior & Master Chiefs is a pay chart. Not sure what value the MCPON still brings, but we should start by sundowning the FLT CMDs and reverting all CMDs to their previous rate and assigning them accordingly.
The last war we actually won (the one that ended Sept 2, 1945) we managed to top out with E7 (equivalents).
" our Navy is once again committing the professional malpractice of decommissioning most of the US Navy’s riverine fleet."
Wait, we have a riverine fleet now?
"We will be at war again, perhaps soon, where we will once more need to recreate a riverine force from scratch because we knowingly let it die at peace."
I am having trouble imaging what a US Navy riverine fleet would do in a war with China.
Fight for the river mouths. Keep Chinese small boats from landing troops upriver. Sink Naval Militia units. A fair amount, when you really think about it.
Where are these rivers? Taiwan? If so, this sounds like a job for Taiwan not the USN.
I agree but money needs to be spent becoming a Nuclear weapons power. That is the only way out.
This amount of funding involved in riverine warfare is minuscule. That is NOT an either or choice
Vietnam, Philippines, anywhere in Asia that ain't China. Also, China isn't the only area we have problems. Maybe help the Nigerians hang a couple pirates?
In case you didn't notice rivers are in all the areas the US is concerned with~
Take the blinders off
We don't have the money to do everything. We must make choices. I question the importance of riverine forces that are fundamentally irrelevant for deterring or fighting China.
There are more places than China to fight, Think the entire western Pacific, Islands and coasts Guam, for one example.
Guam has no navigable rivers. It has small creeks.
All that water around those islands is called littoral and exactly where the Marines plan to operate against China. See Bret Baker's comment.
Does the CG check all the rivers leading off islands?
Pretty effing deep as soon as you leave the island. Subs dive as they leave the harbor. You are correct, Guam is not the best place for small boat ops. Now, down in the islands of Micronesia, etc., that may be better as they patrol between the land masses.
Yeah, many an atoll in Micronesia has loads of islands with small channels betwixt 'em (if any). That's a great place for patrol boats and RIBs along with drones, airships, and helos.
Sometimes I effectively ponder warfare, other times, I spout sarcasm and cynicism, I am at my best when I combine the two!! :-)
Navigable rivers map from Marine Vessel Traffic.
https://www.marinevesseltraffic.com/Images/Wiki-Pictures/Navigable%20Rivers%20Worldwide.png
That is amazing!
The area is comparable to the Blue water oceans as far as military usage is concerned.
There is a need for a unit trained to operate in them.
I think it gets back to riverine, littoral, and near shore can all compliment each other with the right platform selection. Marines wants to sit on shore and wait for something to come by and get shot at. The island has been and remains an unsinkable aircraft carrier, not a Gibraltar or Singapore. Sortie from the island by sea and air.
Yes but without those mission stated in Navy Strategy, there will be NO rqmt for manning or platforms
They may not being going up the Yangtze (just like the Army is not going to be making Thunder Runs into Peking) but imagine what up gunned/missile ships like the Cyclone class and riverine boats could do among the rocks, shoals reefs tens of thousands of small islands of the South China Sea. Extend it further out to the Solomon Islands which are now effectively in Chinese hands. PT boats came in amongst those islands in WWII. And while on the subject the Infantry part of the Riverine force should be Marines not a Navy master at arms rating.
Most of what MAs do should be done by Marines.
Like any of the other concepts for small distributed forces operating inside the enemy threat ring, one wonders how they get replenished with gas and bullets. Sure, they can be a nuisance for a while, but is this form of warfare decisive? Doubtful. Not to mention, China has plenty of maritime militia type forces to chase down these boats.
Seems to me that that a Cyclone class is exactly the type of ship you want to deal with China's Maritime Militia instead of sending an Ardleigh Burke to deal with troublesome fishing trawlers. -Remember how were stuck sending large major warships to deal with pirates. These upgraded patrol craft could have sufficient range /endurance that they could stage from a tender (USS Whidbey Island LSD-41?) sufficient distance distance from the treat ring. IF running like a behind the lines special ops resupply could be by sub or air.
“ raft of options “
The same Navy that won't have Missile Patrol Boats for Blue/Green water isn't going to invest in a Brown water fleet. Too many chances for young officers to screw up.
Or worse, show up their superiors.
Yes not only does the Navy NOT have any rqmt for a Patrol Ship nor FAC-M, it confuses or conflates those needs with a FIAC for littoral waters. The need is obvious to those who have operated in the past Green/Brown waters. But maybe not so to the Marines?
The curse of the unknowing is made worse by the huge dreadnoughts they so like
Big Navy has never supported riverine capability. Such units were red headed step children in Vietnam, and have been so ever since. I recall, as a young Ensign, trying to volunteer for riverine duty in Vietnam, my Destroyer CO at the time scotched the effort. He told me that it was a career killer. I believe he was speaking truth.
Too true, Captain Mongo. Post-Vietnam, I served with a few Riverine sailors. Aside from their amazing (and dark) sea stories some were burnt out Signalmen, Gunners Mates, Enginemen, Radiomen and Radarmen deep in the bottle. The success stories were LCDR Godbehere, another was CDR Chestnutt (LDO), men I was stationed with once and three times respectively. Both promoted up from the ranks after Riverine duty. Never knew of a line officer whose career was enhanced by Riverine service, except Admiral Zumwalt who was CNFV (Brown Water Navy) before jumping to CNO. Back in 1968 as an RD2 I was stationed with ADM Zumwalt's son, a J.O. aboard our DDG. Poor guy always went horizontal when we were underway, horribly afflicted with sea sickness. He was a decent guy but like any line officer "not cutting the mustard" he transferred to a get-well tour in Vietnam in the Riverine forces. His exposure to Agent Orange killed him at age 42. Let's not forget LTjg John Kerry, a man with a sealed service record and possibly three versions of his DD-214, who got short-toured off a DLG to Vietnam Riverine duty, got short-toured from there because of 3 Purple Hearts and subsequently got an early discharge. In my short 10 year career as a Zero I saw more than a few J.O.'s sent to get-well tours (such as ANGLICO, Riverine, NROTC, a training command...etc) after a less than stellar first sea tour (<---That a judgment the CO makes. I have no opinions.) As an EWCS(SW) I got shoehorned into an O-4 line officer billet as (A)EWO at CincPacFlt because the billet had been empty for years because it wasn't "career enhancing" for a line officer. Go figure. What a wonderful tour that was. Was stationed at two training commands too and my observation was that it was heaven for Enlisted, CWO's and LDO's but a going-nowhere assignment for line officers. Sadly, any assignment to Riverine forces might just be a dead end career move for a line officer. How could it be otherwise in that dog-eat-dog community? So few slots for Command at Sea and only one slot for CNO...who'd want to get sidetracked? Well, maybe a patriot would.
(Small world: ADM Zumwalt was XO of USS Zellars (DD-777) in 1948, the year I was born. My older brother was an RD2 aboard Zellars in 1966-1968.)
LCDR Godbehere yelled at me once in a misunderstanding wholly my fault. It was the only time we conversed. So thankful for that. I have the greatest respect for this man.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988/april/vietnam-two-views-god-be-here
At a past Gamewardens of Vietnam, I meet Godbehere, truly a good man. But there are so many riverine vets who were. As an officer of PBR-FVA we were fortunate enough to been established with Bosn John C. Williams (MOH, SS, BS, etc.) the most decorated enlisted sailor of the modern era. His famous line is: "There is NO way to do the Wrong thing Right"
"At a past Gamewardens of Vietnam, I meet Godbehere, truly a good man. But there are so many riverine vets who were."
Our host here and Eagle-1 were just talking about one such on Midrats this weekend - Captain Paul Rinn.
Sadly an oft told tale
My thoughts exactly. Save for VADM Bulkeley, I can't think of any prominent admiral who spent time in small boats. And he was explicitly told to go to a destroyer to continue his career.
Look what it did for Lurch, and Kennedy
Yes. It has long been my thought that "Swift Boat" consciously attempted to emulate Kennedy to further his political career. I would also really like to see his real service record.
If it hasn't already happened, it will be a damned shame about that fire that destroyed those old service records....
Riverine warfare is an often neglected and shunned warfare tactic, By both Navy and Marines.
Navy wants Blue water, Marines just need a beach.
But it is a very needed warfare tactic.
Good article here on MRF in Vietnam: https://cimsec.org/mobile-riverine-force-example-riverine-ops-21st-century/
There were Three naval forces on Vietnamese waters. The Mobile Riverine Force was the Task Force 117 which lifted and supported Army troops around the inland rivers; Operation Gamewardens Task Force 116 the riverine force; and Operation Market Time Task force 115 the coastal patrol and interdiction force. All had their unique boats and operations and crewing.
See Tom Cutler's "Brown Water, Black Berets" ; the definitive tome on Brown Water Ops in Vietnam. Required reading at my SBU.
Our people in charge are determined to gut our national defense and I don’t think they should be called leadership because they don’t appear to leading at all. We should always have small boat units because they are useful for so many different missions. This is just one more example of what not to do with a Navy.
Not only is it a strategic loss at the power projection level, it is an even greater loss at the sailor/officer development level. Lost opportunities to develop small, cohesive units. Lost opportunities to develop JOs early in their careers. Lost opportunities to build deck plate leaders.
Ca. 1995 at Ft. Ord, there was a huge lot with acre upon acre of river boats left over from the 7th ID. For all I know they are still there, or maybe they are in Ukraine. So I know we had this capability, once.
Be willing to bet those were Army bridging boats. Interesting jet boat.
How much are we spending for riverine capability?
How much are we spending for diversity, inclusion and equity?
How much are we spending to care for people who cannot figure out which head to use?
How much of our existing riverine capability has been given away to UKR? Is any of it being replaced for OUR future use?
Great video. Wonder if USNI would dare show it. Nah.
I know That the Navy decommissioned its CRF and gave the UKR Navy most of those riverine craft to include Mk VI PBs, RPBs, RCBs, SURCs, and some other boats I may not have noticed. The USN decided to sell the UKR Navy some of the new being built 40 ft. PBs The UKR also got some modified USCG cutters or patrol boats.
The US Navy has built up a riverine force multiple times, only to turn its head and dissolve that force a few years later. That has been said in many books and articles.
What that means is the officers in the OPNAV rqmts code I believe N95, have No operational experience and cant explain the need to their higher ups. Ergo no funding.
And we are NOT talking a lot of money. Probably less than some big programs like the ridiculous ORCA ULLUV. That is not an either or choice, its a do the right thing and stay the course.
An official USN Naval History and Heritage Command Riverine War book:
Marolda, Edward J. By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia. Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1992. [Online edition without all of the images of the hardcopy edition.].
This is Bosn Williams MOH citation:
https://www.nsw.navy.mil/MEDAL-OF-HONOR/Petty-Officer-1st-Class-James-E-Williams/
It's simple. We won't have it until we need it. Once we get it, the learning curve will be Darwinian.
Rinse, repeat.
just before I retired as one of the few remaining 9279 NOBC's The Nav decided to build the CRF. I tried to volunteer for ANY of the billets; told to pound sand. The commissioning CO was a blue-water blackshoe with zero experience IIRC.