One of the issues surely is the sheer number of steps between a section asking for a spare part, receiving one in hand, and then getting that replaced at the depot level from the machine shop in Oklahoma that makes the part in the first place. Too many people with no skin in the game have too important roles to play in making that happen.
If you don't procure spares on a regular basis, the knowledge of how to produce them will inevitably evaporate, as the people who possess the knowledge find profitable ways to use their capital investments.
As George C Scott (Patton) said to the Emir "They are pretty, but can they fight?". If our Navy is "pretty" because of jury-rigged repairs, the answer to the question will trend toward "no". Not through any lack of will, but from lack of needed logistics.
2018 NDS made readiness for war the top departmental priority. That we are now four years on and readiness is in the UNFUNDED priority list is a friggin crime.
But here's the deeper story. And it's not a happy one.
CNO Gilday has laid out his four budget priorities. In order, they are the Columbia SSBN; readiness; lethality; and capacity (to the extent the remaining budget can support). That his NUMBER TWO priority finds itself on the UPL signals the unrelenting budget pressure the Navy is under.
So perhaps OSD will divert funds to the Navy. Sorry, sports fans. The 355-ship Navy isn't even among the top five DoD budget priorities. As near as I can tell, these are: triad recap; space (particularly missile warning and tracking); the Pacific Deterrence initiative, focused on near-term lethality for the China fight; the European Deterrence Initiative, aka Ukraine supplemental; advanced tech (RDT&E); and overall force readiness. Overlaid on all of this is making up for lost buying power due to higher than expected inflation.
So the deeper story is the Navy needs to quit screwing around and come up with a plan. Decomming ships is a sad but necessary step. But just look at the demands that remain within the SCN account alone: Columbia; 12 CVNs; FFGX; DDG-DDGX; SSN-SSNX; 31 L-class and 18-35 LAWs. Then you add in the need to recap the strategic sealift fleet and buy a shit ton of unmanned vehicles and vessels.
We can all light candles and chant for more money from Congress. But in my view, we've reached the culminating point. The Navy has no choice other than reimagining the future battle force along the lines of the Commandant's FD 2030. Which necessarily means goring some sacred cows.
That might mean rejecting the opportunity cost for 12 CVNs and choosing a smaller carrier fleet; converting all destroyer yards to build FFGXs to build numbers in the near term while we design DDGX; and foregoing trying to move to 3 SSNs per year. Bryan, Jerry, take deep breaths. If the Marines can shed tanks and cannons, the Navy can take similar steps. All of the choices now facing us suck. But they'll suck a lot worse the longer we stand around doing nothing.
Hoping and waiting for dollars to come our way IS NOT A STRATEGY.
I don't really have a problem with the way the CNO did the unfunded list. He's just throwing the ball back into the face of congress and let them own the problem of lack of funding. Fundamentally, there is a disconnect between the demands and expectations put on the Navy and the funding it receives. I think the 'Brass' see these unfunded priorities as something to game to get more funding than they would otherwise get.
Our Navy’s inability to learn is so common place that it is expected, the norm, and no longer irritates as it should. No accountability, just careers. Where have USNA grads been for the last 30 years?
One of the issues surely is the sheer number of steps between a section asking for a spare part, receiving one in hand, and then getting that replaced at the depot level from the machine shop in Oklahoma that makes the part in the first place. Too many people with no skin in the game have too important roles to play in making that happen.
If you don't procure spares on a regular basis, the knowledge of how to produce them will inevitably evaporate, as the people who possess the knowledge find profitable ways to use their capital investments.
Accurate observations by you both.
As George C Scott (Patton) said to the Emir "They are pretty, but can they fight?". If our Navy is "pretty" because of jury-rigged repairs, the answer to the question will trend toward "no". Not through any lack of will, but from lack of needed logistics.
Yes, there is indeed a deeper story.
2018 NDS made readiness for war the top departmental priority. That we are now four years on and readiness is in the UNFUNDED priority list is a friggin crime.
But here's the deeper story. And it's not a happy one.
CNO Gilday has laid out his four budget priorities. In order, they are the Columbia SSBN; readiness; lethality; and capacity (to the extent the remaining budget can support). That his NUMBER TWO priority finds itself on the UPL signals the unrelenting budget pressure the Navy is under.
So perhaps OSD will divert funds to the Navy. Sorry, sports fans. The 355-ship Navy isn't even among the top five DoD budget priorities. As near as I can tell, these are: triad recap; space (particularly missile warning and tracking); the Pacific Deterrence initiative, focused on near-term lethality for the China fight; the European Deterrence Initiative, aka Ukraine supplemental; advanced tech (RDT&E); and overall force readiness. Overlaid on all of this is making up for lost buying power due to higher than expected inflation.
So the deeper story is the Navy needs to quit screwing around and come up with a plan. Decomming ships is a sad but necessary step. But just look at the demands that remain within the SCN account alone: Columbia; 12 CVNs; FFGX; DDG-DDGX; SSN-SSNX; 31 L-class and 18-35 LAWs. Then you add in the need to recap the strategic sealift fleet and buy a shit ton of unmanned vehicles and vessels.
We can all light candles and chant for more money from Congress. But in my view, we've reached the culminating point. The Navy has no choice other than reimagining the future battle force along the lines of the Commandant's FD 2030. Which necessarily means goring some sacred cows.
That might mean rejecting the opportunity cost for 12 CVNs and choosing a smaller carrier fleet; converting all destroyer yards to build FFGXs to build numbers in the near term while we design DDGX; and foregoing trying to move to 3 SSNs per year. Bryan, Jerry, take deep breaths. If the Marines can shed tanks and cannons, the Navy can take similar steps. All of the choices now facing us suck. But they'll suck a lot worse the longer we stand around doing nothing.
Hoping and waiting for dollars to come our way IS NOT A STRATEGY.
And yet we continue to fund Diversity and Woke training…. CNO should resign. He is not up to the task.
I don't really have a problem with the way the CNO did the unfunded list. He's just throwing the ball back into the face of congress and let them own the problem of lack of funding. Fundamentally, there is a disconnect between the demands and expectations put on the Navy and the funding it receives. I think the 'Brass' see these unfunded priorities as something to game to get more funding than they would otherwise get.
Our Navy’s inability to learn is so common place that it is expected, the norm, and no longer irritates as it should. No accountability, just careers. Where have USNA grads been for the last 30 years?