I think it would be something along the lines of "you can't control what isn't under your guns (or missiles, these days)"...so hulls make a difference. You have to BE THERE to affect events and being spread too thin to cover strategic areas of operations matters a great deal. You can't be operating on a shoe string and be prepared - your capabilities must be robust (personnel, ammunition, logistics, repairs, replacement) and up to date.
As far as retreat goes, I think our doctrine across the board always looks at retreat as an opportunity for counter-attack. In the case of Ukraine, if they have the resources, our doctrine might LET the Russians break through at Bahkmut. Let them pour west toward Dnipro on the E-50 and keep them on one axis of advance with blocking forces N/S of the E-50 and keeping the advance south of the Samara River. Then put your HIMARs/artillery north of the Samara River, pinch off the salient around Pokrovsk with armor. Then you hit them with anti-tank weapons/infantry all along the line from the south, and artillery from north to roll them up with a culminating battle in the flat fields in front of the Dnipro River at Dnipro. Destroy them in detail. Then you reconstitute and counter attack back towards Donetsk and south to the Azov from Pokrovsk. The Russians couldn't replace the logistical train or combat power from that kind of loss and the war would be over very quickly.
Fwd maint is a good one. How about the detailed systems knowledge and physics of the wwii aviators and sailors that were able to "hack" their systems ( esp the non working ones) to maje them more effective. How do we replicate that?
And what do we do about cost/complexity of shipbuilding. We arent cranking out a Gearing a weak any more. The original CV Ranger cost $260M in Fy23 $$$$. Vs 17B$ and counting for 78.
Forgive the predictable Coastie response: America needs long range combat search and rescue capability for downed pilots and for lifeboats full of sailors.
If we're planning for retreats/defeats in naval battles with a peer west of Wake Island, then our CSAR platforms need fantastic sensor suites for finding people in the vast Pacific, loooooooooooong legs, significant passenger capacity, critical medical gear, and either:
(1) high speed to get in and out with no prior notice; or
(2) the ability to loiter stealthily on lifeguard station beforehand.
Helos on current cutters won't meet the CSAR need because their range is far too short and because current cutters aren't exactly survivable in front line combat … but we need not reinvent the wheel. WWII offers lots of lessons if we bother to study our own military history.
Perhaps we can <i>evolve</i> the wheel with a mix of platforms:
(3) a fast and semi-stealthy patrol boat (a hydrofoil?) that can operate in a "Combat SAR <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1098418/mulepat-refueling-sea">MULEPAT</a>" configuration, using a low profile mother ship that loiters way back over the horizon for refueling and replenishment.
Depending on the level of analysis, it's very possible that concentration of resources in another sector might mean that not only is retrograde warranted for economy of force, but there won't be any possibility of counterattack (for your brigade or division, for example).
In a very similar vein, I have been very interested for many years in the transition from defense to capitulation. At some point, you don't have to kill the enemy any more because they start surrendering to you and deserting their positions. Indeed, the point of maneuver warfare is to get to that collapse and, on the other side, to avoid being placed in that position.
Damage control. Our last few marriages with cargo ships didn't show that we are particularly good on that front, as well as many others. The USS Fitzgerald was almost lost to flooding. The USS McCain apparently did better (they certainly gave out lots of medals, but that can mean very different things.)
My biggest worry is that our Navy is brittle. Our Navy's actions show that they run on the assumption that we can be glass cannons pummeling the enemy at standoff range. That's never been the case, and it isn't now.
The BB retirements and conversion to museum ships show this better than anything. The most vital characteristic of a battleship is "gets hit and keeps fighting." Do we have anything in our fleet now that can get hit and keep fighting?
I'd be interested in hearing some thoughts on the future of surface navies in a world where major powers possess highly effective ship-killer missiles, hypersonic and otherwise.
My last duty assignment was in the Joint/Army Concepts Division at ARCIC, and as I was departing to retirement, the topic of "The Role of the Army Component Command in a Maritime Theater: WWII in the Central Pacific as a Case Study" was suggested as a MA thesis or potentially PhD dissertation topic.
The omission of retreat as a topic in Army manuals is even more puzzling, since for the 40+ years of the Cold War, a fighting retreat, making the Red Horde bleed heavily for every yard, was the main strategic plan for a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
"[Aleksyev] had achieved a textbook breakthrough, only to find that NATO had their own textbook for containing and smashing it." -Tom Clancy, "Red Dawn" (Not an exact quote, but close enough)
Forward logistics and supply is great, but in an era where our military industries are concentrated, and therefore vulnerable, what near peer adversary is going to let us spin up manufacturing to crank out war material? How many hull losses before 7th fleet is mission inoperable? How many hulls is the US willing to lose to prosecute a war when it takes billions in money and months of time to replace just one sunk DDG?
Any future near peer war of the future is going to be fought with what is on hand and in the area when the war breaks out, and this war will be over in weeks. Resupply won't be coming, it will be weeks before anything makes it out of the chaos that our adversaries will cause in CONUS.
The Navy should have never been cut as much as it was post cold war.
Why does a military history have this tedious nonsense in its preface? “The Reconstruction policy between the Federal Government and the former rebellious states saw an increased effort to control the narrative of how and why the war was fought, which led to an enduring perpetuation of Lost Cause rhetoric. The Lost Cause promotes an interpretation of the Civil War era that legitimates and excuses the secessionist agenda. This narrative has been wholly rejected by academic scholars who rely on rigorous research and an honest interpretation of primary source materials. To rely on bad faith interpretations of history like the Lost Cause in this day and age would be insufficient, inaccurate, and an acknowledgment that the Confederate States of America was a legitimate nation. The fact is that Abraham Lincoln and the United States Congress were very careful not to recognize the government of the states in rebellion as a legitimate government. Nonetheless, those states that formed a political and social alliance, even though not recognized by the Lincoln government, called iv themselves the “Confederacy” or the “Confederate States of America.” In our works, the Army University Press acknowledges that political alliance, albeit an alliance in rebellion, by allowing the use of the terms “Confederate,” “Confederacy,” “Confederate Army,” for ease of reference and flow of the narrative, in addition to the variations of the term “rebel.””
I think it would be something along the lines of "you can't control what isn't under your guns (or missiles, these days)"...so hulls make a difference. You have to BE THERE to affect events and being spread too thin to cover strategic areas of operations matters a great deal. You can't be operating on a shoe string and be prepared - your capabilities must be robust (personnel, ammunition, logistics, repairs, replacement) and up to date.
As far as retreat goes, I think our doctrine across the board always looks at retreat as an opportunity for counter-attack. In the case of Ukraine, if they have the resources, our doctrine might LET the Russians break through at Bahkmut. Let them pour west toward Dnipro on the E-50 and keep them on one axis of advance with blocking forces N/S of the E-50 and keeping the advance south of the Samara River. Then put your HIMARs/artillery north of the Samara River, pinch off the salient around Pokrovsk with armor. Then you hit them with anti-tank weapons/infantry all along the line from the south, and artillery from north to roll them up with a culminating battle in the flat fields in front of the Dnipro River at Dnipro. Destroy them in detail. Then you reconstitute and counter attack back towards Donetsk and south to the Azov from Pokrovsk. The Russians couldn't replace the logistical train or combat power from that kind of loss and the war would be over very quickly.
Fwd maint is a good one. How about the detailed systems knowledge and physics of the wwii aviators and sailors that were able to "hack" their systems ( esp the non working ones) to maje them more effective. How do we replicate that?
And what do we do about cost/complexity of shipbuilding. We arent cranking out a Gearing a weak any more. The original CV Ranger cost $260M in Fy23 $$$$. Vs 17B$ and counting for 78.
Forgive the predictable Coastie response: America needs long range combat search and rescue capability for downed pilots and for lifeboats full of sailors.
I presume we don't want a more horrifying replay of the <a href="https://www.history.com/news/uss-indianapolis-sinking-survivor-stories-sharks">USS INDIANAPOLIS disaster</a>.
https://youtu.be/HehdiuXzOUY
If we're planning for retreats/defeats in naval battles with a peer west of Wake Island, then our CSAR platforms need fantastic sensor suites for finding people in the vast Pacific, loooooooooooong legs, significant passenger capacity, critical medical gear, and either:
(1) high speed to get in and out with no prior notice; or
(2) the ability to loiter stealthily on lifeguard station beforehand.
Helos on current cutters won't meet the CSAR need because their range is far too short and because current cutters aren't exactly survivable in front line combat … but we need not reinvent the wheel. WWII offers lots of lessons if we bother to study our own military history.
Perhaps we can <i>evolve</i> the wheel with a mix of platforms:
(1) a seaplane(ish) hybrid of the <a href="https://www.boeing.com/defense/v-22-osprey/">V-22 Osprey</a> tilt-rotor aircraft and the <a href="https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nnam/explore/collections/aircraft/s/sh-3a-sea-king.html">H-3 Sea King</a> helo;
(2) a quiet yet inexpensive diesel submarine designed for <a href="https://www.archives.gov/files/publications/prologue/2014/fall/lifeguard.pdf">lifeguard</a>/intel duty; and
(3) a fast and semi-stealthy patrol boat (a hydrofoil?) that can operate in a "Combat SAR <a href="https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1098418/mulepat-refueling-sea">MULEPAT</a>" configuration, using a low profile mother ship that loiters way back over the horizon for refueling and replenishment.
Depending on the level of analysis, it's very possible that concentration of resources in another sector might mean that not only is retrograde warranted for economy of force, but there won't be any possibility of counterattack (for your brigade or division, for example).
In a very similar vein, I have been very interested for many years in the transition from defense to capitulation. At some point, you don't have to kill the enemy any more because they start surrendering to you and deserting their positions. Indeed, the point of maneuver warfare is to get to that collapse and, on the other side, to avoid being placed in that position.
Damage control. Our last few marriages with cargo ships didn't show that we are particularly good on that front, as well as many others. The USS Fitzgerald was almost lost to flooding. The USS McCain apparently did better (they certainly gave out lots of medals, but that can mean very different things.)
My biggest worry is that our Navy is brittle. Our Navy's actions show that they run on the assumption that we can be glass cannons pummeling the enemy at standoff range. That's never been the case, and it isn't now.
The BB retirements and conversion to museum ships show this better than anything. The most vital characteristic of a battleship is "gets hit and keeps fighting." Do we have anything in our fleet now that can get hit and keep fighting?
I'd be interested in hearing some thoughts on the future of surface navies in a world where major powers possess highly effective ship-killer missiles, hypersonic and otherwise.
My last duty assignment was in the Joint/Army Concepts Division at ARCIC, and as I was departing to retirement, the topic of "The Role of the Army Component Command in a Maritime Theater: WWII in the Central Pacific as a Case Study" was suggested as a MA thesis or potentially PhD dissertation topic.
The omission of retreat as a topic in Army manuals is even more puzzling, since for the 40+ years of the Cold War, a fighting retreat, making the Red Horde bleed heavily for every yard, was the main strategic plan for a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
"[Aleksyev] had achieved a textbook breakthrough, only to find that NATO had their own textbook for containing and smashing it." -Tom Clancy, "Red Dawn" (Not an exact quote, but close enough)
Forward logistics and supply is great, but in an era where our military industries are concentrated, and therefore vulnerable, what near peer adversary is going to let us spin up manufacturing to crank out war material? How many hull losses before 7th fleet is mission inoperable? How many hulls is the US willing to lose to prosecute a war when it takes billions in money and months of time to replace just one sunk DDG?
Any future near peer war of the future is going to be fought with what is on hand and in the area when the war breaks out, and this war will be over in weeks. Resupply won't be coming, it will be weeks before anything makes it out of the chaos that our adversaries will cause in CONUS.
The Navy should have never been cut as much as it was post cold war.
Why does a military history have this tedious nonsense in its preface? “The Reconstruction policy between the Federal Government and the former rebellious states saw an increased effort to control the narrative of how and why the war was fought, which led to an enduring perpetuation of Lost Cause rhetoric. The Lost Cause promotes an interpretation of the Civil War era that legitimates and excuses the secessionist agenda. This narrative has been wholly rejected by academic scholars who rely on rigorous research and an honest interpretation of primary source materials. To rely on bad faith interpretations of history like the Lost Cause in this day and age would be insufficient, inaccurate, and an acknowledgment that the Confederate States of America was a legitimate nation. The fact is that Abraham Lincoln and the United States Congress were very careful not to recognize the government of the states in rebellion as a legitimate government. Nonetheless, those states that formed a political and social alliance, even though not recognized by the Lincoln government, called iv themselves the “Confederacy” or the “Confederate States of America.” In our works, the Army University Press acknowledges that political alliance, albeit an alliance in rebellion, by allowing the use of the terms “Confederate,” “Confederacy,” “Confederate Army,” for ease of reference and flow of the narrative, in addition to the variations of the term “rebel.””