Usually things flow from here to twitter, but now and then I pop something off that - knowing that not everyone who reads CDRSalamander is on twitter - deserves to flow the other way.
As a Navy guy who spent almost half a decade doing an Army guy's job as an operational planner, a few ideas popped in to my head this AM about "what next" in Ukraine.
Generally I'm not a fan of winter offensives, but when they work - they work. I am even more not a fan of wasting momentum when your larger enemy is on the back foot.
So, three Courses of Action for you to consider ... with absolutely no Commander's Intent or Higher Direction and Guidance ... but when has that ever stopped a core Joint Operational Planning Group's Core Planning Team from sketching some ideas out?
We all need plans to deviate from:
Winter offensives work. The Battles of Trenton 1&2 and Princeton (Dec 1776-Jan 1777)
COA-D Converging columns/axes at a single objective, either Azov, Armianski or Mauripol
Regarding the Dnipro river, there are two bridges across that river that apply - one at Antonivka (E97) and the bridge over the dam at Nova Kakhovka (P47). Washington crossed the Delaware in a wooden boat but he wasn't bringing tanks or trucks. Seems to me that those Russian fellas are going to oppose that crossing and they can resupply from Crimea or from the territory they hold in the east. Releasing water from the dam would make the downriver crossing ugly. Can the ice on Kakhovka above the dam support heavy equipment in the winter?