Regarding the Dnipro river, there are two bridges across that river that apply - one at Antonivka (E97) and the bridge over the dam at Nova Kakhovka (P47). Washington crossed the Delaware in a wooden boat but he wasn't bringing tanks or trucks. Seems to me that those Russian fellas are going to oppose that crossing and they can resupply from Crimea or from the territory they hold in the east. Releasing water from the dam would make the downriver crossing ugly. Can the ice on Kakhovka above the dam support heavy equipment in the winter?
I was thinking on this and the possible drive on Nova Kakhovka along the TO403 to try to get behind the Russians and possibly save the bridge before the Russians can blow it (as they try to keep it open to get their troops out). If they do blow it, though, the river levels will go down upstream and provide a lot of areas for putting pontoon bridges across. Then the Russians have to defend multiple crossing points and bridgeheads vs just one - no matter how much better the bridge is. So they shift upriver and get behind the Russians, perhaps in concert with the drive through center Sal describes.
Pontoons, ferrying to establish multiple bridgeheads, use rivercraft and small boats to ferry over javelin teams w/light vehicles to raise hell in the Russian rear LOCs while the bridgeheads get established. Can't use the established bridges initially as they are already targeted, probably already rigged ready to blow. There is enough of a road network running to and parallel and to the river at multiple locations to make this possible , if they have the equipment. Russian can't defend the whole river length.
Well, and this is for immediate localized attacks. Everyone keeps talking about "getting across the Dnipro" but, of course, the Ukrainians are already across the Dnipro to the East. They just need to drive through the Russian center toward the Sea of Azov to interrupt Russian resupply by land and split the Russian front to prevent transfer of personnel from front to front. Then they can hold the Russians East of this line and drive West on Kherson and the Crimea behind the Dnipro (no reason for an opposed crossing).
I said the same thing the other day. While the Russians can leave blocking forces to prevent crossing the Dnipro at Kherson, so can the Ukrainians - and the Russians don't have the logistics and troops to cross back over in an opposed river crossing. So move the troops from there and strike South from Zaporizhia along the E105 toward Vasylivka and the N08 toward Orikhiv pushing South toward Tokmak and the N30. Using the roads will be important in bad weather as nobody will be able to get off road. This would split the Russian front and, if they can get Melitipol in the bargain, they can "eat their way out from the belly".
I don't know if any faints will work as the Russian can't really logistically moves things around and I'm not sure they would even try until the "faint" developed into this kind of attack. So unless you go all in on splitting the front, they'll probably try to use local forces. If they DO react and send forces from the Kherson or Kharkiv fronts, that will provide opportunities as well.
Right now, if I were planning that, I would put emphasis on the fight for the R-66 in East Ukraine. If they get that N/S road before the winter, they can threaten - or carry out - clearing attacks to the north and east while still holding a line against the Russians in Donetsk. This will cut Russian GLOCs and keep them from sending troops to the thrust southward.
IF the Ukrainian army has the reserves to do all of this. They had 40M people, we were training something like 100K in a reserve force - but who know how many they have and how many tanks.
If they have limited resources, I would say their best bet is to hit Kherson NOW. As we know, the most difficult thing to do is disengage from an active enemy and retreat in good order. Based on what we've seen from the Russians, I don't think they'll retreat any better than they attacked. So, when they start to withdraw, hit them while they are on the move with their backs to the River. Chances are you can bag a lot of troops and equipment when they panic and leave their stuff to run for the ferries.
After all, they'll think, who wants to be the last to die for a place you are abandoning?
I'd say COA-A but kick it off with a convincing try at taking the dam at Nova Kakhovka, with plans for pushing reinforcements across that dam crossing to heading east and cause trouble if it falls easily and intact Remagen-style.
I've been thinking for a while that the eastern end of the reservoir SE of Zaporizhzhia (so many z's!) would make a nice starting point for a push down through Vasylivka and partisan country along M-18 to Melitopol and then onward to the seaside to cut all those rail lines supplying Crimea. Adding another supporting thrust down to mind ones left flank along H-30 to Berdiansk might also be attractive depending on what forces are available - one can only push so much down one road, and spreading out and putting some skeer on behind the lines worked up north.
Of course the Rooskies can read a map too - I note recent OSINT sat images showing the digging of defensive trench works (!) north of Melitopol, from which it seems Russian trench doctrine does not go in for communication trenches.
But that Zaporizhzhia Oblast front has been awfully quiet for a long time as far as Ukrainian activity goes. Maybe some lulling action going on there?
And any of these make more sense that the media's idea of what happens next - I'm just not sure why the Ukrainians would decide to stick their... hand... into the woodchipper down at Kherson when that's clearly what the Russians really, really want them to do.
Winter offensives work. The Battles of Trenton 1&2 and Princeton (Dec 1776-Jan 1777)
COA-D Converging columns/axes at a single objective, either Azov, Armianski or Mauripol
Regarding the Dnipro river, there are two bridges across that river that apply - one at Antonivka (E97) and the bridge over the dam at Nova Kakhovka (P47). Washington crossed the Delaware in a wooden boat but he wasn't bringing tanks or trucks. Seems to me that those Russian fellas are going to oppose that crossing and they can resupply from Crimea or from the territory they hold in the east. Releasing water from the dam would make the downriver crossing ugly. Can the ice on Kakhovka above the dam support heavy equipment in the winter?
I was thinking on this and the possible drive on Nova Kakhovka along the TO403 to try to get behind the Russians and possibly save the bridge before the Russians can blow it (as they try to keep it open to get their troops out). If they do blow it, though, the river levels will go down upstream and provide a lot of areas for putting pontoon bridges across. Then the Russians have to defend multiple crossing points and bridgeheads vs just one - no matter how much better the bridge is. So they shift upriver and get behind the Russians, perhaps in concert with the drive through center Sal describes.
Pontoons, ferrying to establish multiple bridgeheads, use rivercraft and small boats to ferry over javelin teams w/light vehicles to raise hell in the Russian rear LOCs while the bridgeheads get established. Can't use the established bridges initially as they are already targeted, probably already rigged ready to blow. There is enough of a road network running to and parallel and to the river at multiple locations to make this possible , if they have the equipment. Russian can't defend the whole river length.
Well, and this is for immediate localized attacks. Everyone keeps talking about "getting across the Dnipro" but, of course, the Ukrainians are already across the Dnipro to the East. They just need to drive through the Russian center toward the Sea of Azov to interrupt Russian resupply by land and split the Russian front to prevent transfer of personnel from front to front. Then they can hold the Russians East of this line and drive West on Kherson and the Crimea behind the Dnipro (no reason for an opposed crossing).
I said the same thing the other day. While the Russians can leave blocking forces to prevent crossing the Dnipro at Kherson, so can the Ukrainians - and the Russians don't have the logistics and troops to cross back over in an opposed river crossing. So move the troops from there and strike South from Zaporizhia along the E105 toward Vasylivka and the N08 toward Orikhiv pushing South toward Tokmak and the N30. Using the roads will be important in bad weather as nobody will be able to get off road. This would split the Russian front and, if they can get Melitipol in the bargain, they can "eat their way out from the belly".
I don't know if any faints will work as the Russian can't really logistically moves things around and I'm not sure they would even try until the "faint" developed into this kind of attack. So unless you go all in on splitting the front, they'll probably try to use local forces. If they DO react and send forces from the Kherson or Kharkiv fronts, that will provide opportunities as well.
Right now, if I were planning that, I would put emphasis on the fight for the R-66 in East Ukraine. If they get that N/S road before the winter, they can threaten - or carry out - clearing attacks to the north and east while still holding a line against the Russians in Donetsk. This will cut Russian GLOCs and keep them from sending troops to the thrust southward.
IF the Ukrainian army has the reserves to do all of this. They had 40M people, we were training something like 100K in a reserve force - but who know how many they have and how many tanks.
If they have limited resources, I would say their best bet is to hit Kherson NOW. As we know, the most difficult thing to do is disengage from an active enemy and retreat in good order. Based on what we've seen from the Russians, I don't think they'll retreat any better than they attacked. So, when they start to withdraw, hit them while they are on the move with their backs to the River. Chances are you can bag a lot of troops and equipment when they panic and leave their stuff to run for the ferries.
After all, they'll think, who wants to be the last to die for a place you are abandoning?
Recommend Washington's Crossing by David Hackett Fischer
I'd say COA-A but kick it off with a convincing try at taking the dam at Nova Kakhovka, with plans for pushing reinforcements across that dam crossing to heading east and cause trouble if it falls easily and intact Remagen-style.
I've been thinking for a while that the eastern end of the reservoir SE of Zaporizhzhia (so many z's!) would make a nice starting point for a push down through Vasylivka and partisan country along M-18 to Melitopol and then onward to the seaside to cut all those rail lines supplying Crimea. Adding another supporting thrust down to mind ones left flank along H-30 to Berdiansk might also be attractive depending on what forces are available - one can only push so much down one road, and spreading out and putting some skeer on behind the lines worked up north.
Of course the Rooskies can read a map too - I note recent OSINT sat images showing the digging of defensive trench works (!) north of Melitopol, from which it seems Russian trench doctrine does not go in for communication trenches.
But that Zaporizhzhia Oblast front has been awfully quiet for a long time as far as Ukrainian activity goes. Maybe some lulling action going on there?
And any of these make more sense that the media's idea of what happens next - I'm just not sure why the Ukrainians would decide to stick their... hand... into the woodchipper down at Kherson when that's clearly what the Russians really, really want them to do.