What LCS Says About our Culture of Untruth
no, we haven't talked about it enough
As promised yesterday, time to drag LCS out of the gimp box again, because it fits in well with last week’s 3x8 Grid of Shame, flavored in no small part with the Navy’s decision to pull its head inside its shell and cancel its ship briefings.
To solve the many problems we have created for ourselves, we must have a foundational change in our culture. Expecting a different result without changing that, I’m not sure how we get any headway.
From our FITREPs to our shipbuilding plans to the testimony by our leadership to Congress. We spin, mindlessly drone talking points and carefully scripted PAOisms, and from our FITREP to awards system, we willfully share untruths, obscure, hope things just blow up on someone else’s PCS cycle.
I want you to think about all the things we were told about LCS for the last two decades, and let’s compare her to those other ships in her company.
Commissioned 2021 (NB: built by HII in South Korea)
Displacement: 2,600 tons
Length: 107m
Main gun: 76mm
ASCM: at least 4
ASW torpedoes: 2 x triple 324mm
AAW: 4 Mistral; fitted for but not with 8 additional VLS cells and CIWS.
Air assets: 1
Commissioned 2001
Displacement: 3,810 tons
Length: 118m
Main gun: 5”
ASCM: 8
ASW torpedoes: 2 x triple 324mm
AAW: 8 MK-41 VLS holding 32 ESSM and 1 CIWS; and fitted for but not with 8 additional MK-41 VLS cells and an additional CIWS.
Air assets: 1
Commissioned 2002
Displacement: 6,200 tons
Length: 151m
Main gun: 76mm
ASCM: 8
ASW torpedoes: 2 x triple 324mm
AAW: 16 ESSM in MK-48 VLS cells, 16 additional MK-41 VLS cells, and 2 CIWS
Air assets: 1
Commissioned 2021
Displacement: 2,307 tons
Length: 127m
Main gun: 57mm
ASCM: from this pic from last month, looks like 4-8. Perhaps up to 24 Hellfire, unknown if installed.
ASW torpedoes: none
AAW: Single 11-cell SeaRAM.
Air assets: 1
Now, let’s take a look at this second pic. On its face it demonstrates that LCS is a direct byproduct of an institutional habit of not being honest with the American people, their elected representatives, and hell … even ourselves.
Besides both this pic and the first one showing the USN ship being the most out of formation, what catches you eye?
The ship furthest away in formation should look the smallest,,,but there is nothing “small” about an LCS in the visual spectrum.
In an age where satellites with multi-spectral surveillance capability matched with artificial intelligence, look at that first pic. Is there any way to hide that wake?
Of course not.
Then look at the LCS’s weapons capability compared to the other ships. Is she ready for combat in the littorals against an enemy that will bring modern air, surface, and subsurface threats to her?
Should people only realizing this in the third decade of the 21st Century be taken seriously?
No. I don’t buy any of what they are selling. Either they are lying to my/our face, or they lack the critical thinking skills to see what this kludge was/is/will be.
Let’s go back to what everyone was sold 18-yrs ago. This is just one of many, but a good example. It is from the NPS Thesis, Evaluation of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Potential for the Turkish Navy, by Aykut Kertmen.
What did he think LCS would be at the time? What was he told? Let’s see what his view was 17.58 years ago. It took us 3.67 years to defeat Imperial Japan (a measure of time known as a WorldWar around these here parts), so that was 4.8 WorldWars ago.
Seems like just yesterday…
As a transformation platform, the LCS will be critical in implementing new operational concepts and in providing a focused, littoral mission platform for joint forces. Its superior speed and maneuverability; low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures; and ability to lay distributed sensor fields are all fundamental to mission success. It will also carry a “squadron” of unmanned vehicles (air, surface, and undersea) that will considerably extend its sensor and weapon coverage and provide substantial Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities.
…
Ships intended to fight in the relatively cluttered environment of the littorals should be small, nimble, lightly manned, and expendable. The intent is to swarm over an adversary.
Good news for the author, though quite kind - he figured out in 2006 what any honest review of what the USN was doing was … wrong;
…the U.S. Navy’s analysis of one area of littoral operations—the surface threats facing U.S. forces in littoral waters—did not include consideration of the potential impact of all threats the LCS is likely to face. For example, while the requirements for the LCS are focused on combating small boats, the LCS could face larger threats in littoral waters, including missile-armed warships. Though the LCS is to rely on support from other nearby U.S. forces, the U.S. Navy also intends for the LCS to operate independently of those forces. The U.S. Navy has not analyzed how operating independently could pose additional risks to LCS.
The survivability of the LCS in dangerous littoral waters is open to question. Speed, stealth, and battlespace awareness may not be sufficient to avoid being targeted and attacked by modern sensors and weapons, particularly in waters close to an enemy’s shore. Also the LCS’s modest self-defense weapons may not be adequate to counter incoming missiles and torpedoes.
The requirements the U.S. Navy decided upon for the LCS’s surface warfare capabilities were focused on small boats as the adversary, and this did not include an analysis of the impact of larger surface threats in the littorals. The U.S. Navy focused their analysis of the surface threat on swarms of small boats that are capable of operating at high speeds and employing shoulder-mounted or crew-served weapons, such as light machine guns. From or near shorelines, these boats can conduct short-range attacks that are simultaneous and have the element of surprise. The U.S. Navy measured its current and programmed capabilities against defeating swarms of small boats in high numbers. For example, to determine the capability problems and measures of effectiveness for escorting ships through choke points, the U.S. Navy measured its force structure against defeating large numbers of small boats. However, larger threats, such as missile-armed patrol boats and frigates, are also identified in the U.S. Navy’s LCS concept of operations and threat studies as threats that the LCS may face in the littorals. Such vessels may be armed with medium caliber guns, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles. These threats could present additional risks to LCS operations.
U.S. Navy officials stated that if a larger surface threat were encountered, an LCS would be able to call upon the assistance of other U.S. forces in the area, such as tactical aviation or larger surface warships. In a major combat operation, it is true that LCS squadrons would be able to draw upon the assistance of those nearby navy or joint forces in the face of a larger surface threat in the area. However, according to the LCS concept of operations, in addition to operating with other U.S. forces on a regular basis, the LCS is intended to operate independently of those forces, depending on the types and circumstances of the missions. When operating independently, such as during routine deployments to littoral waters, the LCS may not be able to call upon assistance from larger U.S. forces. This may impede LCS operations and may force the LCS to withdraw from an operating area. This situation would be contrary to the U.S. Navy’s goals. Since the U.S. Navy did not analyze the impact of larger surface threats on LCS operations, the extent of the risk and the impact on littoral operations is not known.
Here we are - how many WorldWars since LCS-1 was commissioned? Is it almost four - and yet people are still saying, “Give it to the fleet and let them figure it out…”
No, I’m sorry, that ship sailed a long time ago. We know what she is. We bought a few dozen ships from wish.com and will just have to deal with it. We will have to find something for them to do, but expecting something magic to come in FY24?
No.
Let’s be honest with each other.
LCS is a fourth-rate class of ship. Nothing more. In any significant conflict, she will be relegated what the Omaha Class cruisers were in WWII…which gives me an idea for another post…
"Let’s be honest with each other."
Or...
We can hide in Army cammo, spout corporate platitudes, congratulate each other for being Really Smart Guys"...
While hiding from the press which wants to probe our repeated failures, get webcams removed to hide our lack of seamanship skills, tell Congress to f*k off, choose which Commander in Chief we will be loyal to....
All because, since we are so smart, we are secure in our superior knowledge that the NatSec system is the most perfect it can be and beyond rebuke.
I recall those long-ago 1990s. I was "there" -- as much as any one person can be anywhere in our Big Navy. I recall discussing this newfangled LCS thingy w NAVSEA reps. Two of the major, driving ideas (from the Top!, no less, betraying the ignorant strategic culture of the era) -- were... USA "won the Cold War" and nobody anywhere could/would ever mess with us again, so we could afford to think small and even minimal. Meanwhile, people are expensive, so eliminate as many warm bodies as possible, down to the mess cranks cuz everybody can boil a bag of nutritious gruel, yes?
.
All this while USNavy was BRAC-ing away 200 yrs of institutional knowledge of how to design and build ships. Willy-nilly, govt closed facilities and laid off countless skillsets necessary to think-design-engineer-oversee difficult naval tasks. Oh, and what remained of the contractor base, post-Last-Supper, assured its govt "partners" that absolutely, no-kidding, private industry could pick up every bit of slack and deliver the goods.