The 3D computer-aided design/engineering tools have been available for years. They're able to draw a 3-dimensional model and analyze it kinematically and dynamically simulate how a crew would operate it in a static state as well as underway (feel free to pick your sea state with a simulated 98% level accuracy before you pick up a screwdriver. With that data, you prototype build and test, test, etc. THEN, you will know what you need to build/assemble, how much it will cost, and how long it will take to build, and you will understand how it works under the intended operating parameters you set.
Former Army here so big ignorant about this. I accept that this is a problem and that a solution must be found. Why is this difficult? Is the bird itself delicate? Are tolerances small? Suppose both, suppose that each missile ships in a container to protect it and to align it with the tube that it fires from - something like what the Russians do. Too slow? Or, is this the wrong place to discuss the details?
Details are always a good thing to discuss, because that’s where you find the real problems. When the Navy decided that VLS was better than twin-arm missile launchers, the system that evolved was to install a very, very large chunk of structure and electronics in our combatants. That structure/magazine is sized to expect bare missiles, not missiles in protective boxes. We could have done something different back then….but we didn’t. So we have what we have. For anyone thinking of replacing our current magazines plus bare birds system, I can think of any number of physical and logistical reasons not to - ship refits are a BEAR. Trust me on that score. I had the task/“opportunity” of executing the New Threat Upgrade mods to USS Worden (CG 18), which included the complete gutting of her CIC1 and CIC2 spaces, and all radar and fire control equipment. One year just to plan the overhaul. “Open and inspect” becomes the most depressing phrase in the English language because of all the surprises you find.
I don't think I have the right answer, I'm not confused about my level of expertise. On the other hand, If we can't change the ship and we can't change the missile then we can't fix the problem - full stop. My idea was not to change the magazine, it was to have a rigid transport sleeve to protect the missile. clamp it to the deck over the magazine. Using the sleeve as a guide lower the missile into the magazine. You don't have to calm seas to get the sleeve attached and you reduce the risk of missile damage. Again, I'm not proud of the idea - it probably isn't workable - but we have to think outside the box and we have to accept difficult solutions or we have years of proof that the problem is unsolvable.
I often wonder whether the failure to advance on the VLS reloading problem is simply a matter of professional conservatism. No one once to risk their career and potential retirement gig on the off chance they bend a fin on a multi-million dollar missile with their name being the signature that authorized such a misadventure. The safer alternative being to push papers and studies for two years, punch their ticket, and move on to their next command.
Nothing in our current acquisition process supports solving this in less than a decade. And that's ONLY if there is a war-time level of commitment to doing so. Which the vested interests of the Iron Triangle (DoD, Congress, Military Industrial Complex (TM)) will fight every step of the way. Why? Easy (and not necessarily root) answer is money. The people in those acquisition positions gain present and future largesse and influence by keeping the current way of doing business in place. Other, larger, global strategic influences are in play, but "beyond the scope" of this conversation. Short term, tactical answer is make it "unprofitable" to continue business as usual. Harsh measures called for to make that happen. Vested interests will fight it every step of the way, because they feel it is in their personal interest to do so. We do live in interesting times.
Start by firing a few Admirals. Rinse and repeat, and it will astound you how quickly a solution to the problem is found. It is not magic. The Navy's lack of accountability or transparency is the root cause of many of our current challenges.
Does anyone doubt the results if Elon Musk were responsible for solving this problem? None of our Admirals are Elon, but they could ask for his input.
Active duty flags being fired for cause is what is known as "a good start" and is within the power of the chief executive. Check. Firing senior executive service types and other bureaucrats with many years of awful service is where the real "money" in improving acquisition must be made. That is also where the congress and Military Industrial Complex (TM) will weigh in to protect the system. The donor / donated to relationship is literally in the DNA of the current system, and will not go "quietly into the night". And all we want to do is come up with a way of replenishing VLS cells at sea? Another "good start" if it succeeds, so much more to do. The world does indeed wonder.
I believe that Trump will fire many Flags and SES. Elon and Vivek are addressing the revolving door from the military to the MIC. Trump is in a take-no-prisoners mood, rightfully so.
I moved from honest work in USAF operations/logistics to USAF acquisition after about a dozen years.
USAF has officer career tracks in PMO specialties, unlike the Army and Navy who throw officers in to PMO from commands that use the weapons in acquisition, supposedly to bring real world perspective. The result usually is the contractors sway them. While the USAF suffers similarly, but the officers think they know….
Yes fire the flags! But the system is more deeply flawed!
First kill a dog system, like F-35. Rooting out flags may feel good but empty slots over dog systems won’t save much.
My first reserve unit was with the combat stevedores at NAVELSG just when they were getting their QUALCERT and standing up reload capabilities. Folks took too long to recognize that NOSSA civvies do not work in comat zones. And where do we expect to conduct actual reloads during a war?
Anything that is deliberately ignored because it’s just too hard to deal with is a “something” you’d better figure out either (a) how to do, or (b) how to compensate for. And that is a truism for all of life.
...and the taste of Kirin beer. I saw Sid's link to CLG-5 UNREP-ing Talos at sea. Served aboard her 1970-72 as an RD1. My UNREP station was in CIC, we were never encouraged to be outside the skin of the ship during UNREP's. Different Navy, indeed, particularly so for "station ships". How wonderful it was to have a rewarding and fun career.
That wasn't just a port visit cruise deployment either and those were warshots and not exercise rounds being transferred.
A few weeks later that DDG was all wrapped up at the center of the Beirut dustup as she escorted Yassir Arafat's ship when he left Beirut to Athens.
And the Israelis were making no bones about the fact that if they got a chance they would sink that ship. Hadnt been all that long since the USS Liberty.
I recently found this slide show from a photographer who was aboard with Arafat and his entourage (good for looking back at a serious Rogue's Gallery). You can see that DDG close aboard at the 2:35 mark to foil Israeli targeting. And you can see her again at the 4:58 and 5:45 marks.
So, point is, the capability was available when -really- needed.
We've gotten too comfortable fighting non-peer enemies and not winning a war against non-peer enemies. We've settled for cheap sports trophies instead.
I would think if SpaceX can figure out how to recapture a returning Starship Super Heavy booster with launch tower "chop sticks", then somebody out there should be able to figure out how to do reloading at sea safely and effectively.
Just saw an email from Mooch Ward showing the number of USNA Academy grads this year and there are 229 naval aviators but only 187 SWOs. I'm just an ignorant retired USAF officer but these stats make me wonder if we have a 2nd Air Force who happens to have a navy or navy that has an air arm? Might this account for some of the Navy's issues? <dons asbestos suit>
“If conflict were to erupt, or if something were to happen, being able to go to various different locations around the Indo-Pacific, it makes it much faster for us to reload,” said Cmdr. Nicholas Maruca, the Dewey’s captain.”
This presumes we have a very deep and robust bunker for depot of the missiles in the numbers and locations that will be needed. We don’t have enough MUSV capability or MSC capability to conduct unreps now. What will a war look like? At least we are trying to restart unrep from civilian (non MSC) vessels again.
To take it one step further, the T-AKE design (then ADC(X) was funded on the crumbs falling off the table of the DD21 acquisition program. Auxiliary ship programs are not popular in the Pentagon as they do not foster flag promotions nor are sexy in selling to the hill. T-AKE was looked upon as an unnecessary UNREP capability whose time had passed. I was told the ship would never be built. A very misguided acquisition community at NAVSEA has resulted in the loss of time, effort and engineering capabilities we desperately need now. And no one is held accountable.
In 1997 the UNREP department at NSWC Hueneme, the surface navy ISEA and exactly the folks to do it, using out of hide resources built a full scale working EDM for underway unrep that would handle everything including Tomahawk. When demonstrated on site for ADM Mullen his response was “over my dead body Will this proceed any further. I don’t need anything that raises questions about the number of empty VLS cells we already have at sea”.
Of course the septuagenarian Department Head, Marv Miller, who was used to lively exchanges with The FOA Wayne Meyer, responded
“ well admiral, I guess the first thing in my daily routine after this is checking the WP obituaries”
Marv has passed but we need a hundred more of engineers like him.
"In 1997 the UNREP department at NSWC Hueneme, the surface navy ISEA . . . using out of hide resources built a full scale working EDM for underway unrep that would handle everything including Tomahawk." This, folks, is why we should have naval shipyards building naval ships. Humans have inventive faculties, letting them apply those faculties to naval problems can work wonders.
Sid, it is the act of building ships that allows one to know how to build ships. Of course private yards should build warships too, but when we closed our yards we castrated ourselves. Only by building your own ships can you have the experienced workers needed to supervise civilian construction.
Again, "the act of building ships" has never been primarily done in US Government owned yards Tom.
Now, what the Navy gave up to its continuing decline was the process of defining Fleet Architecture, and then defining ship design requirements based on that framework.
Now, all of that is left to the marketing departments at the Defense Primes.
Along with abdicating that prime responsibility, the USN has willy nilly dismantled the Administrative culture, bureaucracy (it needn't be a dirty word), and knowledge to coherently design ships and associated functions.
Echoing jetcal, just exactly what do those ~87,000 people at NASEA do for the money We. The People pay them??
System and systemic have become "bad" words in the modern lexicon. But that is where the institutional memory is embodied. It is easy to "lose" decades of experience and takes decades to rebuild it. The infrastructure of a navy yard is but one component and is worthless without leadership that is committed to the years necessary to build the brain trust that can acquire and utilize the tools, resources, and infrastructure. This is a reason why Chinese shipbuilding capacity to should give one pause. Mission killing a ships in the SCS in any confrontation with the PLAN, but not sinking them, leaves them essentially in their own backyard and readily repairable by a skilled and numerous workforce with lots of resources and infrastructure. (Re)Building a handful of U.S. Navy Shipyards doesn't shift the balance nearly enough or quickly enough. To do this right, the U.S. needs a revitalized and expanding private shipbuilding renaissance. I do not see and obvious path to get there but I am confident that and entitled 100k NAVSEA workforce would be more of a barrier than a boon.
It is a great story, and not just a turgid engineering compendium about STREAM rigs and such. Although there is alot of detail about such things, because the author Marvin Owen Miller and his little rag tag band of castoffs and buried geniuses based at Point Hueneme are the ones who designed and built the UNREP system the Navy has in place today.
The historical thread through the book really is entertaining. Written in 1996, the last pages actually bring up the the nascent (and sadly optimistic) efforts then beginning to rearm VLS ships. Exactly what is seen being unearthed and posited as "new" efforts today...
This capability is clever myth. Chosin had some deck modifications to support this gear, and it's not something that can be easily taken down in an emergency breakaway. It's slow, complicated and dangerous and at best can reload less than 10 weapons in 2 hours or more alongside. Better to follow the dutch model and give each ship 2-3 sidekick, minimum manned ships with 8-32 VLS cells. When those unmanned ships are empty they just return to port for reload.
For my sins, I was an AE XO. We used to routinely conrep SMs and ASROCs to small boys using a wheeled dolly which could then be positioned to load via the launcher. I get it that VLS is a slightly more complex issue, but can't be that hard. Maybe padeyes on the receiving ship that attach a loader crane that goes over on the first load? Anyway, I do remember that VERTREP was scary, because the missile tended to weathercock as it was being carried.
I do question the need for a super high tech radar to ascertain the sea state.
10 cells in 2 hrs? Once cell every 12 minutes? OK. A, 8-hr work day, two shifts of 4-hrs a load team, to reload a DDG? Beats the hell our of a month back to port and back. Sounds like a bargain.
The Pacific is awash (no pun intended with calm harbors suitable for coaling 125 yrs ago, and reloading VLS today.
The "Dutch model" hasn't even become a proven capability in local waters, much less across that Pacific. Sidekick/unmanned ships leak electrons like a carnival show...and again, are vaporware.
Falling in love with PPT programs, MIC oversell, hand-waving technology risk, and assumptions about dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum is how we got in the mess we are in here at the end of 2024.
This is how you were sold the lie that was LCS, Laz. You are repeating your last mistakes.
I fully like the idea of doing this operation in port. No opposition from me on that account. I think its foolish to do this at sea, underway, making way. Hooked up alongside for two hours plus to get just 10 missiles (maybe.) That's maybe one engagement against 3 inbound weapons. Your ship is very vulnerable during UNREP too, would not want to do emergency breakaway with weapons hanging over the focsl and all that crap out there on deck.
Unmanned ships have gone to sea and have fired weapons. I like the idea, but it needs testing and refinement before adoption for sure. The Dutch variant assumes 8-10 people on board the sidekick ships so not totally unmanned. The Dutch also do not buy ppt as gospel. If they actually buy the sidekick ships then I would have some faith that they work. Dutch gear tends to work, unlike the Danish Iver Huitfeldt that went to the Red Sea to fight Houthi missiles only to find out that combat systems integration had never been accomplished. Apparently that was off the budget to save $$$.
There was a time in the not too distant past that UNREP of missiles was not a dicey affair.
Turns out that the abandonment of the rail launch systems was not fully thought through.
So your suggestion is to go back to a rigid port system like during the coaling days for logistics (which worked so well for the Russian Baltic Fleet back in the day).
Let's look at the real world today.
Can we really count on Yanbu?
Unfettered access to the Suez?
How vulnerable is Djibouti to missile threats?
Think that it's a solid fact that we will still have access to Diego Garcia 5 years from now?
Access to Bahrain and Qatar will continue in perpetuity?
For those locations, how will your Winchester DDG's manage to get to those places anyway?
The Omani Ports the US uses now will get this treatment...
That's because the issue has been ignored for 3 decades.
The prospects of the all too few missile shooters going Winchester at a critical time -perhaps with theirs paths to resupply blocked - is much more tactically and Operationally relevant.
If one wants to know the way the political wind is blowing just listen to Admiral Stavridis...he is the master in joining up on the side that he sees as the winning one at the moment...without regard for truth or facts.
I really appreciate the articles here. The information and topics you discuss, very often I never see anywhere else or I hear about it here first. When I bring up information (usually problems/Deficiencies) to my friends in discussions, often their jaws drop and they cannot believe the lack of strategic planning or DEI or munition shortages, ship design failures etc that now seem commonplace in our Navy & Military. So thank you CDR, and thank you to all who post here. I'm just a regular guy who loves his country and spends too much time worrying about it.
Apparently it was easier to design, build, test, and deploy an SSBN in less than five years than to develop a VLS reload system in forty years.
Can someone please give the VLS reload at sea the same priority and attention?
At this point even if takes four or five hours to reload a single cell with an interim system it's still an improvement and a starting baseline to improve future development.
The 3D computer-aided design/engineering tools have been available for years. They're able to draw a 3-dimensional model and analyze it kinematically and dynamically simulate how a crew would operate it in a static state as well as underway (feel free to pick your sea state with a simulated 98% level accuracy before you pick up a screwdriver. With that data, you prototype build and test, test, etc. THEN, you will know what you need to build/assemble, how much it will cost, and how long it will take to build, and you will understand how it works under the intended operating parameters you set.
Former Army here so big ignorant about this. I accept that this is a problem and that a solution must be found. Why is this difficult? Is the bird itself delicate? Are tolerances small? Suppose both, suppose that each missile ships in a container to protect it and to align it with the tube that it fires from - something like what the Russians do. Too slow? Or, is this the wrong place to discuss the details?
Details are always a good thing to discuss, because that’s where you find the real problems. When the Navy decided that VLS was better than twin-arm missile launchers, the system that evolved was to install a very, very large chunk of structure and electronics in our combatants. That structure/magazine is sized to expect bare missiles, not missiles in protective boxes. We could have done something different back then….but we didn’t. So we have what we have. For anyone thinking of replacing our current magazines plus bare birds system, I can think of any number of physical and logistical reasons not to - ship refits are a BEAR. Trust me on that score. I had the task/“opportunity” of executing the New Threat Upgrade mods to USS Worden (CG 18), which included the complete gutting of her CIC1 and CIC2 spaces, and all radar and fire control equipment. One year just to plan the overhaul. “Open and inspect” becomes the most depressing phrase in the English language because of all the surprises you find.
"“Open and inspect” becomes the most depressing phrase in the English language because of all the surprises you find."
And yet, it is exactly those surprises that need to be revealed.
Absolutely no argument.
I don't think I have the right answer, I'm not confused about my level of expertise. On the other hand, If we can't change the ship and we can't change the missile then we can't fix the problem - full stop. My idea was not to change the magazine, it was to have a rigid transport sleeve to protect the missile. clamp it to the deck over the magazine. Using the sleeve as a guide lower the missile into the magazine. You don't have to calm seas to get the sleeve attached and you reduce the risk of missile damage. Again, I'm not proud of the idea - it probably isn't workable - but we have to think outside the box and we have to accept difficult solutions or we have years of proof that the problem is unsolvable.
I often wonder whether the failure to advance on the VLS reloading problem is simply a matter of professional conservatism. No one once to risk their career and potential retirement gig on the off chance they bend a fin on a multi-million dollar missile with their name being the signature that authorized such a misadventure. The safer alternative being to push papers and studies for two years, punch their ticket, and move on to their next command.
Nothing in our current acquisition process supports solving this in less than a decade. And that's ONLY if there is a war-time level of commitment to doing so. Which the vested interests of the Iron Triangle (DoD, Congress, Military Industrial Complex (TM)) will fight every step of the way. Why? Easy (and not necessarily root) answer is money. The people in those acquisition positions gain present and future largesse and influence by keeping the current way of doing business in place. Other, larger, global strategic influences are in play, but "beyond the scope" of this conversation. Short term, tactical answer is make it "unprofitable" to continue business as usual. Harsh measures called for to make that happen. Vested interests will fight it every step of the way, because they feel it is in their personal interest to do so. We do live in interesting times.
Start by firing a few Admirals. Rinse and repeat, and it will astound you how quickly a solution to the problem is found. It is not magic. The Navy's lack of accountability or transparency is the root cause of many of our current challenges.
Does anyone doubt the results if Elon Musk were responsible for solving this problem? None of our Admirals are Elon, but they could ask for his input.
Active duty flags being fired for cause is what is known as "a good start" and is within the power of the chief executive. Check. Firing senior executive service types and other bureaucrats with many years of awful service is where the real "money" in improving acquisition must be made. That is also where the congress and Military Industrial Complex (TM) will weigh in to protect the system. The donor / donated to relationship is literally in the DNA of the current system, and will not go "quietly into the night". And all we want to do is come up with a way of replenishing VLS cells at sea? Another "good start" if it succeeds, so much more to do. The world does indeed wonder.
I believe that Trump will fire many Flags and SES. Elon and Vivek are addressing the revolving door from the military to the MIC. Trump is in a take-no-prisoners mood, rightfully so.
I’ve thought for a few years now that the SES as an entity is one of the root causes of our malaise as a nation.
I moved from honest work in USAF operations/logistics to USAF acquisition after about a dozen years.
USAF has officer career tracks in PMO specialties, unlike the Army and Navy who throw officers in to PMO from commands that use the weapons in acquisition, supposedly to bring real world perspective. The result usually is the contractors sway them. While the USAF suffers similarly, but the officers think they know….
Yes fire the flags! But the system is more deeply flawed!
First kill a dog system, like F-35. Rooting out flags may feel good but empty slots over dog systems won’t save much.
My first reserve unit was with the combat stevedores at NAVELSG just when they were getting their QUALCERT and standing up reload capabilities. Folks took too long to recognize that NOSSA civvies do not work in comat zones. And where do we expect to conduct actual reloads during a war?
A reminder...
Reloading missiles via UNREP was a focus starting in the 1950's, and then deliberately ignored when VLS became the launch system of choice.
Then it just became too hard to deal with, so nobody has bothered to take it seriously until its suddenly now an acute problem.
https://www.okieboat.com/Copyright%20images/123%20UNREPS%20Refuel,%20rearm%20and%20resupply%204%201024%20C.jpg
(find the rust in that c. 1968 pic of the then 20+ y.o. Oklahoma City...)
Why do you think the sliding padeye exists?
See, "Designing The US Navy's Underway Replenishment System"
You can read the whole thing here:
https://g.co/kgs/xHN3dBA
Anything that is deliberately ignored because it’s just too hard to deal with is a “something” you’d better figure out either (a) how to do, or (b) how to compensate for. And that is a truism for all of life.
Also, if anybody wants to try and use the excuse that in previous eras when missiles were UNREP'd, that the evolutions were rare tests....
That would be a load of ...
Here is a DDG in the 80's loading SM1 ER's aft and ASROCs forward in the Med the day before the Marines went ashore in Beirut...
https://www.flickr.com/photos/67307569@N00/2594694067
https://www.flickr.com/photos/67307569@N00/50379422566
That was a different navy in a far away galaxy (ocean). I can smell the beef yakisoba from the photo’s!
...and the taste of Kirin beer. I saw Sid's link to CLG-5 UNREP-ing Talos at sea. Served aboard her 1970-72 as an RD1. My UNREP station was in CIC, we were never encouraged to be outside the skin of the ship during UNREP's. Different Navy, indeed, particularly so for "station ships". How wonderful it was to have a rewarding and fun career.
One thing is the same...
Harpoon aboard in those days was a rushed bandaid affair, and note that the containerized Harpoons could not be reloaded at sea...
A half century (nearly) later, entirely exposed, containerized missiles still can't be reloaded at sea...
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/hju9m1/2048_x_1480_a_closeup_of_the_foredeck_of_an/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=mweb3x&utm_name=mweb3xcss&utm_term=1&utm_content=share_button
That wasn't just a port visit cruise deployment either and those were warshots and not exercise rounds being transferred.
A few weeks later that DDG was all wrapped up at the center of the Beirut dustup as she escorted Yassir Arafat's ship when he left Beirut to Athens.
And the Israelis were making no bones about the fact that if they got a chance they would sink that ship. Hadnt been all that long since the USS Liberty.
https://www.fouadelkoury.com/installrespon.php?id=25
I recently found this slide show from a photographer who was aboard with Arafat and his entourage (good for looking back at a serious Rogue's Gallery). You can see that DDG close aboard at the 2:35 mark to foil Israeli targeting. And you can see her again at the 4:58 and 5:45 marks.
So, point is, the capability was available when -really- needed.
So, this new system requires radiating a radar...
Guess EMCON isn't in the plan.
How long will it take to equip the T-AKE's ...and all 2 T-AOE's...with the capability?
Anytime before 2035?
Who is going to escort these ships forward?
Or will they, "Hide in Plain Sight"?
Like these ships were attempting to do...
https://safety4sea.com/centcom-defeats-houthi-attacks-on-u-s-cargo-vessels/
It's like the Navy doesn't plan to fight a real war.
We’ve gotten far too comfortable lobbing missiles into uncontested targets, which led to sloppy thinking.
We've gotten too comfortable fighting non-peer enemies and not winning a war against non-peer enemies. We've settled for cheap sports trophies instead.
...or is simply trying to keep up 'appearances'????
I would think if SpaceX can figure out how to recapture a returning Starship Super Heavy booster with launch tower "chop sticks", then somebody out there should be able to figure out how to do reloading at sea safely and effectively.
Just saw an email from Mooch Ward showing the number of USNA Academy grads this year and there are 229 naval aviators but only 187 SWOs. I'm just an ignorant retired USAF officer but these stats make me wonder if we have a 2nd Air Force who happens to have a navy or navy that has an air arm? Might this account for some of the Navy's issues? <dons asbestos suit>
Aviators wash out and go to the surface fleet? They make NROTC drive their airfields around? ducks behind guy in suit
You have the essence.
“If conflict were to erupt, or if something were to happen, being able to go to various different locations around the Indo-Pacific, it makes it much faster for us to reload,” said Cmdr. Nicholas Maruca, the Dewey’s captain.”
This presumes we have a very deep and robust bunker for depot of the missiles in the numbers and locations that will be needed. We don’t have enough MUSV capability or MSC capability to conduct unreps now. What will a war look like? At least we are trying to restart unrep from civilian (non MSC) vessels again.
To take it one step further, the T-AKE design (then ADC(X) was funded on the crumbs falling off the table of the DD21 acquisition program. Auxiliary ship programs are not popular in the Pentagon as they do not foster flag promotions nor are sexy in selling to the hill. T-AKE was looked upon as an unnecessary UNREP capability whose time had passed. I was told the ship would never be built. A very misguided acquisition community at NAVSEA has resulted in the loss of time, effort and engineering capabilities we desperately need now. And no one is held accountable.
In 1997 the UNREP department at NSWC Hueneme, the surface navy ISEA and exactly the folks to do it, using out of hide resources built a full scale working EDM for underway unrep that would handle everything including Tomahawk. When demonstrated on site for ADM Mullen his response was “over my dead body Will this proceed any further. I don’t need anything that raises questions about the number of empty VLS cells we already have at sea”.
Of course the septuagenarian Department Head, Marv Miller, who was used to lively exchanges with The FOA Wayne Meyer, responded
“ well admiral, I guess the first thing in my daily routine after this is checking the WP obituaries”
Marv has passed but we need a hundred more of engineers like him.
Truth.
"In 1997 the UNREP department at NSWC Hueneme, the surface navy ISEA . . . using out of hide resources built a full scale working EDM for underway unrep that would handle everything including Tomahawk." This, folks, is why we should have naval shipyards building naval ships. Humans have inventive faculties, letting them apply those faculties to naval problems can work wonders.
In the entire history of the USN, Naval Shipyards have always built the minority of ships Tom.
Don't understand why or how this would help. Especially now, considering what the focus is in those yards these days...
https://youtu.be/HLahadFN_Hs?si=of4Vkj2PZe2jDpGF
Sid, it is the act of building ships that allows one to know how to build ships. Of course private yards should build warships too, but when we closed our yards we castrated ourselves. Only by building your own ships can you have the experienced workers needed to supervise civilian construction.
Again, "the act of building ships" has never been primarily done in US Government owned yards Tom.
Now, what the Navy gave up to its continuing decline was the process of defining Fleet Architecture, and then defining ship design requirements based on that framework.
Now, all of that is left to the marketing departments at the Defense Primes.
Along with abdicating that prime responsibility, the USN has willy nilly dismantled the Administrative culture, bureaucracy (it needn't be a dirty word), and knowledge to coherently design ships and associated functions.
Echoing jetcal, just exactly what do those ~87,000 people at NASEA do for the money We. The People pay them??
System and systemic have become "bad" words in the modern lexicon. But that is where the institutional memory is embodied. It is easy to "lose" decades of experience and takes decades to rebuild it. The infrastructure of a navy yard is but one component and is worthless without leadership that is committed to the years necessary to build the brain trust that can acquire and utilize the tools, resources, and infrastructure. This is a reason why Chinese shipbuilding capacity to should give one pause. Mission killing a ships in the SCS in any confrontation with the PLAN, but not sinking them, leaves them essentially in their own backyard and readily repairable by a skilled and numerous workforce with lots of resources and infrastructure. (Re)Building a handful of U.S. Navy Shipyards doesn't shift the balance nearly enough or quickly enough. To do this right, the U.S. needs a revitalized and expanding private shipbuilding renaissance. I do not see and obvious path to get there but I am confident that and entitled 100k NAVSEA workforce would be more of a barrier than a boon.
Invest in coastal and river shipping. Sell it as getting trucks off the road.
Follow their facebook page and you will wonder even more.
I see what you mean...
Good place to start house cleaning.
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1AjkekvpkL/
+1000
Rebumping the link to the book:
Designing the U.S. Navy's Underway Replenishment System"
https://g.co/kgs/xHN3dBA
It was penned by Marv Miller.
It is a great story, and not just a turgid engineering compendium about STREAM rigs and such. Although there is alot of detail about such things, because the author Marvin Owen Miller and his little rag tag band of castoffs and buried geniuses based at Point Hueneme are the ones who designed and built the UNREP system the Navy has in place today.
The historical thread through the book really is entertaining. Written in 1996, the last pages actually bring up the the nascent (and sadly optimistic) efforts then beginning to rearm VLS ships. Exactly what is seen being unearthed and posited as "new" efforts today...
https://news.usni.org/2024/10/15/navy-conducts-first-successful-tests-reloading-missiles-and-rearming-warships-at-sea
(do 'Journalists' ever think of browsing historical references these days?)
Where are the Marv Millers today?
That link is gold Sid. 15-20 VLS cells an hour to the ship to be loaded later at 3/hr. That was in 1991. 33 years ago.
thanks!
But to be fair, another Porch member (don't remember who) first linked it some months back...
This capability is clever myth. Chosin had some deck modifications to support this gear, and it's not something that can be easily taken down in an emergency breakaway. It's slow, complicated and dangerous and at best can reload less than 10 weapons in 2 hours or more alongside. Better to follow the dutch model and give each ship 2-3 sidekick, minimum manned ships with 8-32 VLS cells. When those unmanned ships are empty they just return to port for reload.
For my sins, I was an AE XO. We used to routinely conrep SMs and ASROCs to small boys using a wheeled dolly which could then be positioned to load via the launcher. I get it that VLS is a slightly more complex issue, but can't be that hard. Maybe padeyes on the receiving ship that attach a loader crane that goes over on the first load? Anyway, I do remember that VERTREP was scary, because the missile tended to weathercock as it was being carried.
I do question the need for a super high tech radar to ascertain the sea state.
Still find it ironic that the containers were stenciled with:
DELICATE INSTRUMENT DO NOT DROP
How does all that work in a contested EW environment?
10 cells in 2 hrs? Once cell every 12 minutes? OK. A, 8-hr work day, two shifts of 4-hrs a load team, to reload a DDG? Beats the hell our of a month back to port and back. Sounds like a bargain.
The Pacific is awash (no pun intended with calm harbors suitable for coaling 125 yrs ago, and reloading VLS today.
The "Dutch model" hasn't even become a proven capability in local waters, much less across that Pacific. Sidekick/unmanned ships leak electrons like a carnival show...and again, are vaporware.
Falling in love with PPT programs, MIC oversell, hand-waving technology risk, and assumptions about dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum is how we got in the mess we are in here at the end of 2024.
This is how you were sold the lie that was LCS, Laz. You are repeating your last mistakes.
267,000 miles (hopefully nautical miles) with 70 autonomous isn't vaporware. Really, the point being driven in the article is to get the navy working on what they have and quit screwing around with the actual vapor ship, LUSV. https://breakingdefense.com/2024/12/exclusive-top-2-senators-urge-navy-to-change-course-on-large-usv-program/
Again, how does this work in a contested EW environment?
Musical interlude.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QDtYo2IPTsw
I think Autonomous combined with LOS is going to handle many of those contingencies. Again, there is no perfect.
Plus there is no reason these ships can't also be manned for some or all of the time.
I fully like the idea of doing this operation in port. No opposition from me on that account. I think its foolish to do this at sea, underway, making way. Hooked up alongside for two hours plus to get just 10 missiles (maybe.) That's maybe one engagement against 3 inbound weapons. Your ship is very vulnerable during UNREP too, would not want to do emergency breakaway with weapons hanging over the focsl and all that crap out there on deck.
Unmanned ships have gone to sea and have fired weapons. I like the idea, but it needs testing and refinement before adoption for sure. The Dutch variant assumes 8-10 people on board the sidekick ships so not totally unmanned. The Dutch also do not buy ppt as gospel. If they actually buy the sidekick ships then I would have some faith that they work. Dutch gear tends to work, unlike the Danish Iver Huitfeldt that went to the Red Sea to fight Houthi missiles only to find out that combat systems integration had never been accomplished. Apparently that was off the budget to save $$$.
Did you read the link to the book Laz?
Doesn't look like it
There was a time in the not too distant past that UNREP of missiles was not a dicey affair.
Turns out that the abandonment of the rail launch systems was not fully thought through.
So your suggestion is to go back to a rigid port system like during the coaling days for logistics (which worked so well for the Russian Baltic Fleet back in the day).
Let's look at the real world today.
Can we really count on Yanbu?
Unfettered access to the Suez?
How vulnerable is Djibouti to missile threats?
Think that it's a solid fact that we will still have access to Diego Garcia 5 years from now?
Access to Bahrain and Qatar will continue in perpetuity?
For those locations, how will your Winchester DDG's manage to get to those places anyway?
The Omani Ports the US uses now will get this treatment...
https://youtube.com/shorts/mEMshX5cSfk?si=NUcIwl2CUk3gMPj_
The one huge advantage the USN has had since WWII was it's UNREP system.
Now people are waking up to the travesty of it being pissed away
UNREP is indeed a great advantage. No argument from me. The rate of missile transfer just seems slow and not tactically relevant.
That's because the issue has been ignored for 3 decades.
The prospects of the all too few missile shooters going Winchester at a critical time -perhaps with theirs paths to resupply blocked - is much more tactically and Operationally relevant.
If one wants to know the way the political wind is blowing just listen to Admiral Stavridis...he is the master in joining up on the side that he sees as the winning one at the moment...without regard for truth or facts.
He is no Arleigh Burke.
I really appreciate the articles here. The information and topics you discuss, very often I never see anywhere else or I hear about it here first. When I bring up information (usually problems/Deficiencies) to my friends in discussions, often their jaws drop and they cannot believe the lack of strategic planning or DEI or munition shortages, ship design failures etc that now seem commonplace in our Navy & Military. So thank you CDR, and thank you to all who post here. I'm just a regular guy who loves his country and spends too much time worrying about it.
Apparently it was easier to design, build, test, and deploy an SSBN in less than five years than to develop a VLS reload system in forty years.
Can someone please give the VLS reload at sea the same priority and attention?
At this point even if takes four or five hours to reload a single cell with an interim system it's still an improvement and a starting baseline to improve future development.