Flawed or not, one can argue both, we have always had a Naval strategy that holds for the dual foci of being ready for today's challenges while preparing for those yet to come. We have also had multiple studies over the years that identify requirements as the hardest part of moving from strategy to effective force development, both in readiness and in future systems. (Along with coordination between Requirements and PPBE.)
In the early 2000's, DoD/DON moved to improve requirements generation by creating formal Requirements Analyst positions and instituting the JCIDS processes. However, for many organizations, including JROC and OPNAV, there is no pipeline or career path for developing a professional Requirements Analyst cadre.
Almost all folks currently working requirements, at any level you may choose to examine, have only the minimal DAU two or three courses necessary for certification at their current level. They are not Acquisition Professionals and their positions are not coded as within the Acquisition Community. Thus, there is no continuity of expertise at turnover and no consistency of expertise across any given organization, much less across DoD or DON.
The primary reason that these folks were not placed in the AC was that leadership wanted them to represent the user, not the PEO/PM. That was and is a good reason. But the resulting open source nature of the manpower fill process also means almost everyone in a requirements development position has never done it before. They must obtain an often considerable amount of OJT before they can be productive. Uniform Requirements Analysts are often just completing their OJT when it is time to rotate out to their next tour. Civilians often elect to move on after a significant period of OJT because a good part of their experience has included frustration and set backs as the bureaucracy slowly grinds them down. And, again, because they are not part of the AC, there is nothing of promise as to career path or promotional opportunities to entice them to stay.
Lehman had the sequence correct. But DON cannot plot that course with any degree of confidence or certainty until this weak link is fixed.
"The Navy has to work out its strategy-tactics confusion; until then, it will continue to put the budgetary cart before the strategic horse.There is a strategy problem in the Navy. Take as primary evidence that only three and a half years after completing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, its primary author is now in favor of crafting a new strategy.1 That strategy was published only four years after its predecessor, Seapower 21. And that one came eight years after Forward . . . from the Sea, which itself was a two-year tune-up of From the Sea, which replaced the 1986 Maritime Strategy. In other words, the Navy has changed its strategy five times in 25 years—while its mission has remained unchanged for more than five decades."
“Prepare? What are you always preparing for?! JUST GO!” — Dark Helmet
Flawed or not, one can argue both, we have always had a Naval strategy that holds for the dual foci of being ready for today's challenges while preparing for those yet to come. We have also had multiple studies over the years that identify requirements as the hardest part of moving from strategy to effective force development, both in readiness and in future systems. (Along with coordination between Requirements and PPBE.)
In the early 2000's, DoD/DON moved to improve requirements generation by creating formal Requirements Analyst positions and instituting the JCIDS processes. However, for many organizations, including JROC and OPNAV, there is no pipeline or career path for developing a professional Requirements Analyst cadre.
Almost all folks currently working requirements, at any level you may choose to examine, have only the minimal DAU two or three courses necessary for certification at their current level. They are not Acquisition Professionals and their positions are not coded as within the Acquisition Community. Thus, there is no continuity of expertise at turnover and no consistency of expertise across any given organization, much less across DoD or DON.
The primary reason that these folks were not placed in the AC was that leadership wanted them to represent the user, not the PEO/PM. That was and is a good reason. But the resulting open source nature of the manpower fill process also means almost everyone in a requirements development position has never done it before. They must obtain an often considerable amount of OJT before they can be productive. Uniform Requirements Analysts are often just completing their OJT when it is time to rotate out to their next tour. Civilians often elect to move on after a significant period of OJT because a good part of their experience has included frustration and set backs as the bureaucracy slowly grinds them down. And, again, because they are not part of the AC, there is nothing of promise as to career path or promotional opportunities to entice them to stay.
Lehman had the sequence correct. But DON cannot plot that course with any degree of confidence or certainty until this weak link is fixed.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012/february/so-much-strategy-so-little-strategic-direction
"The Navy has to work out its strategy-tactics confusion; until then, it will continue to put the budgetary cart before the strategic horse.There is a strategy problem in the Navy. Take as primary evidence that only three and a half years after completing A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, its primary author is now in favor of crafting a new strategy.1 That strategy was published only four years after its predecessor, Seapower 21. And that one came eight years after Forward . . . from the Sea, which itself was a two-year tune-up of From the Sea, which replaced the 1986 Maritime Strategy. In other words, the Navy has changed its strategy five times in 25 years—while its mission has remained unchanged for more than five decades."