In all the stories and movies about the D-Day landings in WWII, one thing that simply is not covered all that much - and as such is mostly missing from the popular memory of that campaign - was the importance of the Cherbourg to the northwest of the beaches.
The WWII museum puts the issue together clearly;
The Utah Beach landings and accompanying parachute drops on June 6, 1944, by the 4th Infantry Division and the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions had one primary objective: to set the stage for the capture of the Cotentin Peninsula and, above all, the port city of Cherbourg. Capturing Cherbourg and its harbor installations was considered vital for the long-term viability of the Normandy landings, for no matter how many supplies were brought ashore on the artificial Mulberry harbors, they could not compete with the capacity of modern port facilities.
Kicking in the door is one thing - being able to hold it and then expand out from there is a whole other problem.
That story came to mind over the weekend when our friend Mark Vandroff asked a little question over on X about the usefulness of the below in logistical support of a Taiwan invasion.
Read the whole thing.
Yes, you read that correctly; 60. Six-Zero.
That had me thinking a bit, and that is when Cherbourg came to mind.
Amphibious landings are one if not the most difficult military operations of any era. It is not a “come as you are” party and unquestionably isn’t a figure it out when you get there thing.
Likewise, from loading to unloading, to pulling up to the pier - modern auto carriers are not an easy ship to get around in.
So, are these dual use ships? Tom Shugart has done some of the best thinking on the topic of dual use possiblities, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) seems to have a habit of thinking this way. Looking at the very civilian construction of these ships and all the limitations that come with that, let’s assume they could be useful in bringing vehicles ashore in a Taiwan invasion scenario - but how?
If these were going to be used for a Taiwan invasion, again I’d bet it would be for a follow-on force unless they get real inventive.
If they need a proper port - like the allies in WWII needed Cherbourg - the question is, where are Taiwan's Cherbourg's that they would use?
If you know they would need one, where are they and how do you make sure Taiwan can hold them longer than the month it took the US to take Cherbourg?
To narrow things down, of course the first thing to do; we look at the chart.
I am sure there are may be other options, but the above seem to be the major west coast ferry terminals. Put the ones near Taipei aside for obvious reasons, and that leaves us with Budai, Anping, Yanpu, and Dongliu.
For reference purposes the distances from Budai to Guangzhou's ferry terminal is ~120nm (NB: the distance from Portsmouth to the landing beaches in Normandy is ~85nm).
One of those four ports it very urban environments will need to be taken intact & appropriate security inland achieved. Once you do that, then yes...I can see how useful those car ferries could be. Though you still need to get them across the Taiwan Strait intact.
The long pole in the tent for the PRC is how they can ensure the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in that 120+nm route are secure.
Taiwan’s job is to make that too hard. So, there is your challenge, what needs to be done to ensure that Taiwan and “friends" can keep those four, and other, ports out of PRC hands for the time it takes for reinforces to come from the east, south, and in a fun timeline the northeast.
On the other side of the coin, what needs to be done to ensure blue-SLOC coming from those three directions remain open to make sure none of those critical ports they need to bring reinforcements ashore are degraded or in some way made unusable by the PRC?
Will the PRC be able to conduct ASW zone defense in those waters long enough to win the war in their favor? ASW isn’t an easy task, and all it will take for a change in nerves could be the ROC getting lucky a few times. Loose one or two car carriers, and that’s a serious impact on operational plans.
Please let me add a perhaps quixotic, perhaps practical, variable to the mix of potential defensive solutions. Recently I came across reports from several news agencies on the training of civilians in small arms and small infantry unit tactics. A professional, well trained, well equipped force? No. For safety’s sake they were drilling with airsoft rifles. But that in itself is OK. Let’s not get good people killed in training if we can help it. My thought is that if they can be trained to that level, there may be some way to give them hands-on experience with SAMs and anti-armor weapons. Just this morning’s nickel (my 0.02 w/ inflation).