Will the PRC be able to conduct ASW zone defense in those waters long enough to win the war in their favor? ASW isn’t an easy task, and all it will take for a change in nerves could be the ROC getting lucky a few times. Loose one or two car carriers, and that’s a serious impact on operational plans.
Taiwan straits are VERY shallow. Too shallow for our SSN's to operate during a war. We will be restricted to operating from the north and south of the island.
There is a very good question as to whether our SSN's will be able to get close enough to fire torps into the straits. This has been a major issue of discussion and debate in a number of the war games run by outside groups trying to get a handle on this issue.
They will definitely have a role, but the question is capability in a heavy EW environment. Ukrainian USV's have had some big success, but the Black Sea is big, and they have mostly taken advantage of Russian incompetence. Isolated ships without support, not running EW.
I'd be looking at things like the Hellfire missiles we use on Apache's, and focusing on optical guidance packages with heavy EW shielding, so they can lock and fire and forget, and be immune to any EW.
I'd also be willing to bet that Javelins will do really wonderful things to mid-size landing craft. We've proven they can work out to 3 miles in Ukraine.
Over water? With no terrain to block them? In top-attack mode? (how they strike tanks, fly overhead and warhead fires downward into roof of tank)
In top attack mode, a Javelin would punch a nice 12" hole through the hull of that boat.
My fear is the whole thing boils down to the missile/air blockade. I think if the blockade is successful, Taiwan will surrender before the first Chinese boot hit's the sand, and the landing will be unopposed.
That presuming the Taiwanese are aware of the initial attack. China plans to send in several RORO in a non kinetic fashion to take the ports first. Then and only after that does it go kinetic.
More to that point, they have active ferry contracts with Taiwan even now. It wouldn’t be hard to unload several brigades from these vessels. It’s in their war planning.
You really need a smiley face emoji or something in there so the few on here who don't understand the debacle that is the LCS can keep themselves from getting excited.
Why use sub-launched torpedoes? Drop 'em from helos. You can lay out a SOSUS style of system of passive sensors in the strait, if one isn't there already, and fixed wing sub hunters (with fighter escorts) can scatter sonobuoys anywhere they're needed.
While I have no doubt we will be shooting down a lot of Chinese aircraft over the straits, I seriously doubt any US aircraft other than F-35 or F-22 will actually be able to fly through that airspace.
China is a peer competitor. Their gear may not be quite as good as ours, but it is very much better than the Russians and they have a lot of it.
Our helo's will be even further from the straits than our subs.
And we don't have competent air-delivered offensive naval mining anymore. And the Chinese would blow our B-52's out of the sky before they got within 100 miles of the straits.
B-52's will have a role. Volley firing LRASM and other missiles from standoff distance.
Zero chance the Air Force risks B-52's within range of any Chinese air-defense missiles. Same for any kind of US helo's.
Now, if we had bothered to build non-nuclear subs, smaller boats that could operate in the straits, things would be different. The Japanese have some excellent AIP diesel boats that we could license build to do this.
As it stands, the only substantive way we have to stop Chinese surface vessels from transiting the straits is with missiles, either fired from ships, submarines, aircraft or land.
B-2 can fly low. Let it lay the mines, if it doesn't have a higher priority mission at the time. Reality is they have the nuke mission and we have seen over time that they seem to only turn them loose in 3s for conventional missions. Plus, we will have to distribute the fleet to remote fields in time of war just to avoid Chinese surveillance being able to say when we take off.
I'm an idiot. I just re-read your comment for the 3rd time and only just realized you said B-2, not B-52
Now it makes more sense, but I still think it's too high a risk mission.
Do we even have air-droppable offensive mines?
But like the B-52, B-1 and B-2 can carry a crap ton of missiles.
Also, B-2 stealth is predicated on high altitude operation. And those are strategic assets until we get enough B-21's built. They won't risk them like that.
A while back this came up, and Ill re-propose my thoughts. We see subs and their torps as potentially the best way to derail an invasion. But we know the strait is NOT a good playspace for subs. Missile defences seem like the answer, but very likely, the airspace over Taiwan will be solidly under Chinese control, and above ground missile facilities probably will have a life span measured in hours if not minutes. So how to stop the invasion fleet? I always remember the saying "bombs (missiles) let in air, torpedoes let in water"... I think the answer comes from the past- ala the Oscarborg Fortress. Id suggest all the potential landing spots get shoreline underground torpedo armed bunkers. Yes, lots of ugly reinforced concrete and steel, but theyd have to be fairly survivable against an air onslaught. Arm them with submerged torpedo tubes, and warehoused with as many Mark 48s as they can afford. Or maybe skip the bunkers, and seafloor placed VLS-style containers full of torps, launched by remote control, is the answer. Fat spreads of torps sent out when the invasion fleet nears or crosses the horizon would be devastating to the troop ships and escorts alike, and compared to missiles, would be hard to defend against. I know this is a napkin-doodle level idea, but I also feel that inside the box thinking and relying on things that fly thru Chinese owned airspace isnt the best recipe for success.
The Ukrainians have used British Brimstone missiles mounted on flat-bed trucks, with standard cargo covers.
That's about 100 times cheaper and easier to distribute and move around.
Static assets that can be pre-sighted will be dead at zero+10 minutes, long before any landing craft approach the shore.
The Chinese won't be able, however, to destroy all road mobile assets, and since you can buy dozens of road mobile for every hardened bunker, road mobile wins.
Im not convinced thats accurate. And Taiwan is nothing at all like Ukraine. At all. I keep hearing road mobile being used like its magically immune. China will have absolute air dominance over Taiwan very quickly. After that, I would NOT want to be attatched to any above ground military unit, especially anything like a missile battery, on a truck or otherwise. And assuming that underground/underwater installations are easilly destroyed...well i dont see that being the case either. Making a statement doesnt make it fact...
So how many ships do you think will comprise an invasion fleet and escorts?? The thing being, anti-ship missiles arent going to stop or sink large cargo carriers like torpedoes will. Sure...maybe if you get 3+ hits in each one. But how many missiles do you need to launch to get three hits?? Six?? Nine?? More?? What if the invasion fleet is 100 ships, or more?? Good luck having the better part of a thousand antiship missiles still in existence when the fleet comes over the horizon. A great dream, but I wouldnt hold my breath.
Mostly the missiles from shore conversation is focused on Taiwan's ability to defeat the landing force.
Not shooting at car carriers - shooting at Type-05 landing craft. The Chinese equivalent to our AAV (actually to the EFV that we cancelled and never built, but they did)
Also, I've seen video of the Ukrainians launching Brimstone like that at Russian naval targets. Brimstone is basically a limey Hellfire on steroids. Can easily be quad or 8 packed in side-facing racks on a flat bed with a protective screen so it looks like a normal heavy cargo truck until it stops.
Now, the truck isn't a magic tank, it has zero targeting capability. It has to be plugged into a larger network that is getting target designation from somewhere else.
Also, respectfully disagree with your assessment on Air control.
I think Taiwan airspace will be heavily contested and unsafe for BOTH sides.
That will make it hard for friendly aviation, but will also make it hard for enemy aviation.
If China thought they had a reasonable chance of obtaining Air Supremacy quickly, they would have ZERO need for an Amphibious invasion force.
They'd just fly the troops in on helo's.
They won't be able to do that until they take some ground and clear the area of local air defense. That's why they need the invasion force.
As for fleet size, why is everyone so obsessed with D-Day numbers?
That was the Invasion of France. The Entire Normandy peninsula is larger than Taiwan.
Will they have 100 ships? Sure, in that general area, but not part of a landing fleet.
They will not be landing masses of heavy armor. It's a little island, and 90% of the terrain is Urban or mountain.
It's an infantry fight, and both China and Taiwan know the population and politico's will capitulate rather than fight it out and destroy the cities.
That means BOTH sides are planning that the battle is 90% over once the Chinese get a sizeable landing force ashore and able to push into the cities.
So the Taiwanese need to PREVENT that landing force from getting ashore and the Chinese need to ASSURE that landing force can get ashore.
If the Chinese think the Taiwanese can be successful at preventing the landing force from reaching shore (and we are talking combat effective here, sure a few units may get ashore, but they need enough ashore to form cohesive units under fire and prosecute the mission) Then they Chinese won't risk the invasion.
Conversely, if the Taiwanese don't think they can hold back enough of the landing force, they will probably capitulate before the invasion fleet sights shore.
Agreed. Plus lots of other easy things no one seems to be trying. Why not a mine launched by MLRS or 155mm artillery. That way the obstacle is already there in case they try and wipe out the shooters.
yeah, that would need to be a new development, but I like the idea.
Yet another for the rapid prototype list.
But using DPICM cluster munitions from concealed artillery batteries that are pre-sighted to fire on landing beaches would be effective.
Simple spotter system with pre-ranged tube artillery positioned 15km+ back from the beach.
DPICM fired 500m off-shore, maybe more.
Pre ranging would allow batteries to fire a line of shells. Using modern auto-loaders on SP 155mm allows for MRSI, (multiple round, simultaneous impact) from same gun, (time on target- on steroids)
Doesn't have to be catastrophic damage. What might only cause minor damage to an IFV or tank on land would probably be nearly instantly fatal to a swimming IFV or tank, with likely 100% fatality for all embarked personnel as well. even if the water is only 20 feet deep.
The Strait is shallow, but according to marineinsight.com, half of the major ports are on the eastern side of the island. I see the ferry ports in Sal's illustration, but it looks like all of those ports are pretty close to the 100 m line. We've put subs in the Gulf in waters shallower than that. I think the key question of subs in the area is who owns the air space.
In war time, water that shallow gives the sub NOWHERE to run if it is detected.
Subs don't run left and right. They run DOWN.
In water that shallow, subs can be seen from aircraft even when submerged due to contrast.
It's a death sentence. Our subs are fantastic, but their survival is based on stealth that they cannot maintain under heavy wartime sonar environment in a space like that.
In other words, No admiral will ever order a US sub anywhere near those shallower waters, because no admiral wants to be the first admiral to lose a US nuclear submarine to an attack they could have survived had they been in deeper water.
So, combine the risk to the subs, with the fact that there will still be PLENTY of targets for them to prosecute outside the straits, and you will not be using US subs to close the straits.
They will be hunting down Chinese surface vessels outside the Straits, as well as hunting/defending against Chinese subs that are hunting our fleet.
They have a better chance of remaining undetected, just based on size, but again, if your talking about water that is 200' deep...
Let's look at a good example. Japanese Soryu class Diesel AIP. Several good Navalists have proposed that the US should buy or license build these
Virginia SSN (Block IV): 10,200 tons disp, 460' length, 34' beam, 54' depth (keel to top of sail).
Soryu SS: 4,200 tons disp, 275' length, 30' beam, 50' depth (keel to top of sail).
Even small subs are still tall.
Assuming you need at least 20' of water over the sail to stay hidden (and probably more) that means your keel is already at 70'.
Assuming you want to keep at least 50' under your keel for safety, because the bottom of the deep blue ain't a super-highway, that means the skipper has exactly 80' of leeway in depth. That's like being tied up in chains. No room to maneuver.
It's not that they CAN'T stay hidden. It's iffy. And unlike in deep water, IF they are detected, they are DEAD. Period. End of Question.
Please let me add a perhaps quixotic, perhaps practical, variable to the mix of potential defensive solutions. Recently I came across reports from several news agencies on the training of civilians in small arms and small infantry unit tactics. A professional, well trained, well equipped force? No. For safety’s sake they were drilling with airsoft rifles. But that in itself is OK. Let’s not get good people killed in training if we can help it. My thought is that if they can be trained to that level, there may be some way to give them hands-on experience with SAMs and anti-armor weapons. Just this morning’s nickel (my 0.02 w/ inflation).
I live in a very 2A-friendly state, but you are starting to make me drool. Well, some members of the HOA community might have something to say about the mines. OTOH, the president is a retired woman Marine, the VP s a former Ranger, …. You get the idea.
So, you know anyone who has a whole bunch of spare javelins they want to give to Taiwan? I thought just about every one in NATO inventory had already been sent to UKR and that resupply is a very long term problem.
not even close to all in inventory. For sure, a lot, and yes, we need more, but that would have been true regardless.
Also, the British made NLAW might also be effective in this scenario, as it has greater range than AT-4 and packs a bigger punch. Not sure on tracking moving target, as I've never had my hands on one.
I like how you think. Play the away game as long as you can. Thinking in terms of short, limited training opportunities, how does the learning curve for Javelin compare to that of the LAW?
well, it is obviously longer, but since no one can hit a moving target at 500m with a LAW, it doesn't matter.
LAW's disable amphibious assault craft on the beach, after they have disembarked their troops. ie.. LAW's (and AT-4's which is our more modern equivalent to the LAW) are not going to make a substantive difference in stopping them at the waters edge.
AT-4's do the same thing at slightly greater range, but again, mostly useless against a moving target unless you are Davy freakin' Crockett with a missile.
Javelins and TOW's can track moving targets. TOW has more punch and range, but is wire guided and therefore susceptible to operator error or flinch from return fire. Javelin is fire and forget.
And we COULD be deploying lots of Javelin.
I'll freely admit I've supported sending Javelin to Ukraine on the theory that it was not a weapon we needed in Taiwan.
I only just came to the realization that it would make an effective stand-off weapon for amphibious assault fighting vehicles.
So we open a new freaking assembly line, or license the Ukrainians to build their own and keep ours from here out.
Type-05 in the surf is going to have a target area from the front of about 2-3 ft in height and 8 ft in width
Imagine ripping a sheet of plywood in half lengthwise. Then paint that piece camo, and float it in the surf.
Then try hitting it with an unguided rocket fired with plastic sights measured in 50m increments, while it's bobbing in the surf coming toward you - and shooting at you.
Those Type-05's have thermal sights like the Bradley. Any exposed infantry on the beach are going to get ripped to shreds.
Javelin has thermal and can lock and fire and forget from 3,000m, so the shooter can be hundreds of yards off the beach in cover and still engage the type-05's when they are more than 2k out to sea.
Max range on the LAW is about 250m
I'm not even certain a LAW can penetrate the frontal armor on a Type-05
Javelin would use top attack and so would be coming down onto a much larger target - 8'x20' give or take.
LAW was created to give infantry a point blank option against enemy armor and IFV/APC when those units are penetrating your position, so they can be fired from the side or rear. It was never intended to hit armor at range, or from the front, or while it is moving.
And the "light anti-tank weapon" designation was based on when it was first deployed - 1963
Now days it is primarily a bunker ( or goat raping terrorist hut) buster
It's simply not suited to use against modern armor or IFV in this scenario.
Maybe stock them up so the Taiwanese could ostensibly continue to threaten Chinese forces once they get into the cities, but honestly, there are better weapons for that as well.
But the point of using AT missiles to engage the Type-05 is to do it before they reach land. Troops in body armor with weapons aboard an enclosed IFV will all die when it takes a hard hit in water deeper than 10 ft.
Hitting them with weapons after they land means the embarked troops are still on the ground
But the point of all these mental exercises is to DETER China from acting.
China knows once they have a decent toe-hold, the odds of capitulation are pretty good, to avoid massive civilian casualties and destruction of the cities.
So Taiwan needs to arm with weapons that create a credible threat to China's capacity to get that toe-hold.
Javelin (in sufficient numbers) does that. LAW/AT-4/RPG etc does not.
France, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, Israel and India all make their own comparable fire-and-forget ATGM with top attack that would also be equally appropriate to the requirement.
Taiwan should stock up on any and all of these it can get it's hands on.
10,000 would be ideal.
Even 1,000 creates a credible threat to any initial landing force.
I used to think that the Taiwanese military was organized like the ROK military until I watched an interview with the former Taiwanese CoS. The reality is that the Taiwanese military is very small and their reserves are not adequately organized or equipped. They need to get on the ball immediately! The answer to your question is probably land based Harpoon missiles. I would have a mix of fixed and mounted ones for survivability.
Remember, we pack 4 ESSM into the same VLS cell that holds a single LRASM or SM-2/3/6
LRASM is awesome but expensive.
NSM can terrain maneuver over land to strike a target in the water.
That means the Taiwanese could use my magazine ship idea and slap hundreds of NSM on the crew-boat decks that stay in open water off the east coast, able to fire at targets painted on the west coast.
I seem to remember us putting a Turkish frigate out of action after a screwup during maneuvers with an ESSM. Half a dozen slamming into a troop ship would be better than nothing. At the very least, eat up enemy missile defense so bigger stuff can get them.
unfortunately, I think that is the more likely scenario, but it depends heavily on how the missile campaign bears out. If we and our allies can stop enough of the inbound missiles, and sink enough of the potential amphibious assault wave before it departs, it could give the Taiwanese reason to hang in there.
Which is why I'm really worried at the moment. Worried they Chinese might make a play before the election, and we get sucked into a half-assed response that just gets a bunch of sailors and Marines killed while still ceding Taiwan to China, and we won't even have the balls to destroy the microchip industry to deny it to the Chinese.
I don’t think they will make a play for Taiwan. Perhaps a feint. They plan to knock the US Navy out. Even if they half succeed, Taiwan will likely vote to “reunify” after seeing the worlds “most powerful navy” punched in the face.
Kind of irritating that they were relying on the US the whole time and weren't very serious about their military preparedness. I should have realized something was up when I read an article about them retiring the M-47 tank fleet a couple years ago.
Its the left-over mentality that re-unification was always possible, the KMT was always holding-out hope, and infected a great deal of the population that reunification and resolution were the paths forward. Meanwhile, mainland China ran-over Tibet, ignored the statues of reunification with HK and just walked right into Macau.
Taiwan should be building Kamakazi drones by the millions, and housing them underground and mines built into Harpoon like cruise missiles so they can mine every Chinese port that can be used against them. Any war is going to be a "come as you are" affair with little spin up or production time.
I agree, and was looking at the same map in some detail recently asking myself the same questions.
There are some important distinctions though that give me pause.
Our need for Cherbourg was based on the need to push forward an armor and mechanized army, fighting in mostly open terrain, for a maneuver centric style of warfare, and the logistical tail to feed it.
I think everybody on our side needs to step back and ask "How does China plan to defeat Taiwan"?
I don't see that as a war based on lot's of thirsty vehicles maneuvering around. There is no space for it.
Furthermore, a war by China to conquer Taiwan will not be a genocidal war of elimination, as the Chinese see the Taiwanese as their wayward little brothers who need to be brought back into the fold.
What I'm getting at is this: The PEOPLE of Taiwan are the strategic terrain. China's plan will be based on isolating and holding the major population centers (Taiwan is highly urbanized and the vast majority of the population are concentrated on the western (China facing) shore.
You don't need nearly as large a logistical tail to support Infantry, light vehicles, and light artillery, when you have air and sea power.
While I have no doubt the PLAN will plan to capture western ports, I suspect there may be far less use for those car carriers, as the PLA and PLAN Marines will not need that many vehicles.
I think their focus will be on carving out a defensible and reliable sea and air lane to the western beaches.
If they can put enough infantry ashore via landing craft or helo, Taiwan will surrender.
The population are NOT die hard willing to fight to the death. political pressure to end the fight and prevent more civilian casualties will be significant.
I expect the Chinese plan is to force that decision as fast as possible by swamping the Western populated side of the island with massive missile attacks against both military and civilian infrastructure, as well as just enough well placed attacks on purely civilian targets to create widespread fear and panic.
And as soon as they can clear the air and waters enough, they will land upwards of 30 divisions of Infantry and seize the urban centers on the west coast and apply pressure until the government surrenders.
Probably an unbreakable Air, Sea and land blockade would bring Taiwan down fast, the US will not try to break that blockade with a weak government and weaker recruit pool of men and women who refuse to be drafted.
Right now, today, there is a very realistic question as to how effectively China could implement such a blockade.
Setting aside our militaries issues (on which we no doubt agree), we are not toothless.
And China still has major issues with some of their tech, and especially missiles.
The Chinese are also not 'cowboys' or gamblers, willing to risk it all on a 'maybe'.
Right now, today, China's odds at succeeding on that blockade are in the 50/50 range
Multiple war game scenarios have been played out tending to support that 'Any Given Sunday' current status. Not saying it wouldn't be bloody and painful for us, but I tend to think we could pull it out, but it's close right now.
So China is working hard to tilt those odds. More missiles, more ships, more aircraft.
We and the Taiwanese need to be countering the things China is building to upset the odds.
Adding capabilities that are NOT directly balanced against Chinese new capabilities will not change the math enough.
Taiwan needs more air defense, most specifically an Aegis ashore type setup with thousands of ESSM interceptor missiles.
And they need anti-ship missiles in many varieties. NSM, Harpoon, and even smaller systems that could be used LoS from shore to strike landing craft.
If the people of Taiwan aren't on board with their defense in the face of the PLA, likely outcome is for them to destroy the high end chip making factories and submit. The rest of the neighborhood will take notice, adjust their opinions of the "winners" and "losers" and carry on as they always have.
Why would the Taiwanese destroy the heart of their economy? They won't do it (We on the other hand, SHOULD if it looks like China will win)
The people of Taiwan are as divided on this as Americans are on Trump.
Not many really want to be ruled by China.
But Chinese propaganda on reunification is strong. 2 of the 3 major political parties in Taiwan want 'less antagonism' toward China, and improved relations. Fortunately, the one that just won the election for President is the one that prefers independence (without saying it).
So many people would fight.
If China does win, the message to the neighborhood will be "Your going to lose anyway, so why fight in the first place. Just concede to our demands and it won't have to come to a fight."
And we will see alliances dry up, and more and more China will become the dominant global economic force, until we are nothing but an impoverished client state with a ton of military hardware, and a perpetual debt to China. They will leverage that to control our internal politics so that we CAN'T bring back manufacturing, or do anything other than be the junkie buying their dope.
Quote: If China does win, the message to the neighborhood will be "Your going to lose anyway, so why fight in the first place. Just concede to our demands and it won't have to come to a fight." And we will see alliances dry up, and more and more China will become the dominant global economic force, until we are nothing but an impoverished client state with a ton of military hardware, and a perpetual debt to China. They will leverage that to control our internal politics so that we CAN'T bring back manufacturing, or do anything other than be the junkie buying their dope. End Quote
Will the Taiwanese fight? There is an object lesson in recent history...Hong Kong. Destruction of the chip factories is a threat, and in theory a deterrent to invasion only if the mainland leadership views those factories as critical to bringing Taiwan to heel. Logic says they do, that's the western, enlightened way of thinking. Getting into the mind of a seventy year old autocrat obsessed with his legacy gives me pause...what if he has a different critical path calculus?
And it's not just Xi. It's the entire CCP mindset and structure.
Our diplomats and foreign policy geniuses cannot understand the idea of going to war and killing tens of thousands over 'national pride', but the Chinese can.
IMHO, the CCP would absolutely be willing to risk the impoverishment of the Island in order to resolve an issue they see as a stain on their honor.
The chip factories are NOT a deterrent. They ARE a strategic asset that we MUST ensure the Chinese to not obtain.
Ergo, the Chinese are willing to risk their destruction. We CANNOT risk their capture intact.
Now? Laid this out several...some time ago to higher, wasn't popular line of thinking, dismissed out of hand. Ownership of chip production requires potentially "unwestern" thinking. I'll leave it at that.
This is why we (the US) continually perform so poorly with such a capable military. Our 'decision makers' are so in love with themselves they cannot imagine that anyone else with power and intellect would NOT see the world though the same 'enlightened' manner that they do.
A well reasoned POA, I do not disagree. However, success is implied by simply pushing numbers ashore? I would think it also predicated on breaking out of those beachheads and successfully engaging in continual MOUT. Any given Sunday if Taiwan has the collective will to resist.
to be certain. What I'm suggesting is that the proximity of the population centers to the west coast will make the task of investing those population centers much easier.
I don't think the Taiwanese will fight in the streets, and I suspect the Chinese have similar expectations.
Once you have a large enough force ashore on those beachheads, they don't have to break out very far
Cherbourg is 24 miles from Utah beach.
Every single urban center on the west coast of Taiwan has multiple beaches either within the city proper, or within 1 or 2 miles.
If they can get combat effective forces ashore they are already in the cities.
Now, maybe the Taiwanese can throw them back, but that's a hell of a gamble.
My sense is that the Taiwanese have to hold them at the water's edge, or the gig is up.
That means creating the capability to hold-at-risk the Chinese capacity to reach the beach
I understand and agree. They must beat them at the waterline, control the airspace, weather the missile barrage, and do so decisively or it's over quickly. Urban combat is a losing proposition for Taiwan. I also agree with your suggestion that "Western" thinking interferes with conceiving potential outcomes. They simply do not think like us.
Interesting. My opinion is there is no way an invasion of Taiwan doesn't immediately devolve into urban combat. The entire island has an area of ~36k km2 and a population of 23M (slightly more area than the state of Delaware - pop. 1M). A light pollution map shows the western half of island as heavily populated and the eastern half essentially rural. So let's say half of the island's area (18k km2) is urban. For perspective the New York–Newark–Jersey City, NY-NJ metropolitan statistical area in the US has a population of 20M and an area of 12k km2. I can't imaging planning a half dozen landing site along the that portion of the east coast and not immediately engaging in street-by-street urban warfare. Once you get the eastern half Taiwan you are in the mountainous sticks. Imagine West Virginia butting up against NY-Newark. Uggh! <shudder>
What we are saying is that the Taiwanese government and people probably lack the will-power to continue the fight once it gets off the beach and into the citites.
Now, that doesn't mean there won't be some urban combat.
The Chinese won't land on 1 beach, or even 5. They'll land on 15 small beaches, each getting the equivalent of what we (in the Marines) would call a Battalion Landing Team.
And the idea is that if the Taiwanese can present a credible threat, that those landings will be effectively opposed and a majority of the landing craft destroyed BEFORE they hit the beach, then that alone may be enough to prevent China from undertaking the risk in the first place.
The CCP are not going to gamble on a bunch of Omaha beach outcomes. They want a bunch of Sword and Utah beach landings.
Discussions on the topic of Taiwan always end up with logistics and supportability if the fight goes past a short period of time. Both for Red and Blue. Beans, bullets, fuel and people; get them to the fight and support them when they get there. China seems to be playing the role of the U.S. in WWII; large quantities of perhaps dubious quality (Shermans vs Leopards? At some point quantity becomes a quality as someone said...). We seem to have limited amounts of aging but reasonable quality stuff and good (but nowhere near as good as they used to be) people and fighting gear. The tactical, operational and strategic are all very much in play. The initial volley and the U.S. response are obviously critical...do we respond and how if we do (an open question, in my mind)? If we do, frankly, an incremental approach is likely to fail as we lack the ability to support the operation for any length of time in a permissive environment (lack of on hand supply depth, inability to replenish magazines), and moving logistics into this environment will not be benign. So, if we choose to respond, we have to go hard and violent to overcome the home field advantage of the Chinese. None of these factors are new, have been studied to death for many years. Certainly has generated lots of wargames, experiments, concepts and .ppt briefs. We sure do seem to keep looking for silver bullets in the couch cushions...
We are assuming that China is planning an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
I am not so sure.
The U. S. briefly considered a similar assualt on North Vietnam in 1965 and it was quickly rejected for a variety of reasons.
What were to happened if China just launched missiles to knock out Taiwan's critical infrastructure - power, water, transportation, ports, etc. and impose a blockade?
The choice for Taiwan might then be surrender or starvation. I don't see the U. S. going to war with China or escorting commercial ships on a daily basis for years to come.
(written in my first book "Helium Phoenix" in 1996 ):
"only Turtle Airships had the proven track record with airships of greater load carrying ability. Also, no other airships have the ro-ro capability of Turtle Airships.
Q: Ro-Ro?
A: Excuse me Senator. "Roll on, roll off". The ability to have vehicles roll on; or drive onto the aircraft or ship, and roll off, or drive off.
Turtle Airships are the only airships designed for this type of loading. It is an important part of their overall utility; and extremely advantageous in the field. The importance of this cannot be stressed enough.
Even with the ability to forego any need for an airstrip and to deliver supplies anywhere in he field; airships have always been hampered by their need for special mooring masts and ground crews. One of the major factors contributing to the success of the Turtle Airships craft in exercise HARBOR REACH was this ability of the airships to load or unload very quickly at any site chosen. "
Fans of Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising may remember the part played by RoRo vessels getting armored vehicles across the Atlantic for deployment against the Red Army. If I remember correctly, Clancy derived a lot of his plot from an old war game called "Harpoon." The point is that a lot of the requirements of a cross-Pacific effort to reinforce Taiwan are explored in an accessible way in Clancy's book. Except, of course, for the minor fact that the distance across the Pacific is a hell of a lot longer than crossing the Atlantic, with all the complications that entails.
And yes, it supposedly played a significant role in his concept, but so did all the REFORGER exercises we ran.
The thing is, though, Taiwan doesn't need a lot of ground reinforcements.
Taiwan isn't Europe. There is nowhere for armored brigades to maneuver.
Taiwan is a missile fight, and the determinant will be the side with more and better missiles and the appropriate platforms from which to launch and counter them.
But this was my favorite. We wasted hundreds of hours on this. Still have a set somewhere. I wish someone would update it. Great naval power battles are upon us again.
Our own mine warfare is sadly in pathetic shape. There is no unified command or strategy for mine warfare. We have almost no offensive mining capability, because our modern Naval command did not think a 'civilized' high tech service needed it. Almost all USN mine capability is counter-mine.
And then take a gander at the recent articles in proceedings on mine warfare. Lots of great ideas - but the take away is we are NOT doing any of that now.
Presumably Taiwan has plans to render those facilities unusable in the very early hours of such a war - flooding a couple of ships in the way would do.
On a related note: I am always suspect of capability claims regarding Chinese and Russian military equipment that has not been subjected to the test of battle (and we've seen how that has played out in Ukraine).
How in all that is holy did the PLAN manage to build a better version of the EFV that can move at FIFTEEN KNOTS in the water???
And we have a Mother F#@&&&@ 8 wheeled TOY that can't even remain upright in low surf?!?!
Now, I doubt these things can transit the Straits by themselves, so that's where those car carriers come in, Sal. As that earlier USNI article highlighted, they can drive these Type-05's off the car carriers into the water, so every one of those car carriers becomes an improvised LPD with a super-sized well deck.
They don't need the ports. They just need to get those car carriers within 10nm of shore to disgorge thousands of these things.
They have 6 Brigades of Marines, and each has 2 battalions of these little shits. The PLA has another 2 Amphibious assault brigades in the Southern military command, also comparably equipped.
So they have between 16 and 20 battalions equipped with these things. That's about 800, give or take.
Figure those are designed to open the beach, so they can land more troops via more conventional craft.
So, how about a surprise attack instead of the missile blockade.
20 car carriers floating in a line, 13 miles off-shore, at night.
Will the PRC be able to conduct ASW zone defense in those waters long enough to win the war in their favor? ASW isn’t an easy task, and all it will take for a change in nerves could be the ROC getting lucky a few times. Loose one or two car carriers, and that’s a serious impact on operational plans.
Taiwan straits are VERY shallow. Too shallow for our SSN's to operate during a war. We will be restricted to operating from the north and south of the island.
There is a very good question as to whether our SSN's will be able to get close enough to fire torps into the straits. This has been a major issue of discussion and debate in a number of the war games run by outside groups trying to get a handle on this issue.
It sounds like a job for USVs (if any)?
They will definitely have a role, but the question is capability in a heavy EW environment. Ukrainian USV's have had some big success, but the Black Sea is big, and they have mostly taken advantage of Russian incompetence. Isolated ships without support, not running EW.
I'd be looking at things like the Hellfire missiles we use on Apache's, and focusing on optical guidance packages with heavy EW shielding, so they can lock and fire and forget, and be immune to any EW.
I'd also be willing to bet that Javelins will do really wonderful things to mid-size landing craft. We've proven they can work out to 3 miles in Ukraine.
Over water? With no terrain to block them? In top-attack mode? (how they strike tanks, fly overhead and warhead fires downward into roof of tank)
In top attack mode, a Javelin would punch a nice 12" hole through the hull of that boat.
My fear is the whole thing boils down to the missile/air blockade. I think if the blockade is successful, Taiwan will surrender before the first Chinese boot hit's the sand, and the landing will be unopposed.
That presuming the Taiwanese are aware of the initial attack. China plans to send in several RORO in a non kinetic fashion to take the ports first. Then and only after that does it go kinetic.
See my other post - they are on record using RoRo car carriers as improvised LPD to off-load amphibious assault craft (Type-05) at sea.
More to that point, they have active ferry contracts with Taiwan even now. It wouldn’t be hard to unload several brigades from these vessels. It’s in their war planning.
Shallow water? Bring on the LCS fleet.
You really need a smiley face emoji or something in there so the few on here who don't understand the debacle that is the LCS can keep themselves from getting excited.
:)
IDK. Those are probably too lightweight to sink in the ways to block the RoRos....
That was subtle, and took me a moment. Thank you! :)
Why use sub-launched torpedoes? Drop 'em from helos. You can lay out a SOSUS style of system of passive sensors in the strait, if one isn't there already, and fixed wing sub hunters (with fighter escorts) can scatter sonobuoys anywhere they're needed.
Need to mine the straits? Call up the B-52 guys:
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/06/usaf-b-52-conducts-long-range-offensive-mine-warfare-test/
While I have no doubt we will be shooting down a lot of Chinese aircraft over the straits, I seriously doubt any US aircraft other than F-35 or F-22 will actually be able to fly through that airspace.
China is a peer competitor. Their gear may not be quite as good as ours, but it is very much better than the Russians and they have a lot of it.
Our helo's will be even further from the straits than our subs.
And we don't have competent air-delivered offensive naval mining anymore. And the Chinese would blow our B-52's out of the sky before they got within 100 miles of the straits.
B-52's will have a role. Volley firing LRASM and other missiles from standoff distance.
Zero chance the Air Force risks B-52's within range of any Chinese air-defense missiles. Same for any kind of US helo's.
Now, if we had bothered to build non-nuclear subs, smaller boats that could operate in the straits, things would be different. The Japanese have some excellent AIP diesel boats that we could license build to do this.
As it stands, the only substantive way we have to stop Chinese surface vessels from transiting the straits is with missiles, either fired from ships, submarines, aircraft or land.
B-2 can fly low. Let it lay the mines, if it doesn't have a higher priority mission at the time. Reality is they have the nuke mission and we have seen over time that they seem to only turn them loose in 3s for conventional missions. Plus, we will have to distribute the fleet to remote fields in time of war just to avoid Chinese surveillance being able to say when we take off.
B-52 has rotary magazines for LRASM and JASSM. It has a MAJOR mission as part of strike packages. It can carry 20 LRASM/JASSM
That's 60 missiles on a flight of 3 birds. That is the job they will be doing.
But again, we don't send planes on suicide missions and B-52's within 100nm of the straits in war time, even at NOE, is suicide.
I'm an idiot. I just re-read your comment for the 3rd time and only just realized you said B-2, not B-52
Now it makes more sense, but I still think it's too high a risk mission.
Do we even have air-droppable offensive mines?
But like the B-52, B-1 and B-2 can carry a crap ton of missiles.
Also, B-2 stealth is predicated on high altitude operation. And those are strategic assets until we get enough B-21's built. They won't risk them like that.
Yep, it would have to be some wild scenario to prioritize it.
A while back this came up, and Ill re-propose my thoughts. We see subs and their torps as potentially the best way to derail an invasion. But we know the strait is NOT a good playspace for subs. Missile defences seem like the answer, but very likely, the airspace over Taiwan will be solidly under Chinese control, and above ground missile facilities probably will have a life span measured in hours if not minutes. So how to stop the invasion fleet? I always remember the saying "bombs (missiles) let in air, torpedoes let in water"... I think the answer comes from the past- ala the Oscarborg Fortress. Id suggest all the potential landing spots get shoreline underground torpedo armed bunkers. Yes, lots of ugly reinforced concrete and steel, but theyd have to be fairly survivable against an air onslaught. Arm them with submerged torpedo tubes, and warehoused with as many Mark 48s as they can afford. Or maybe skip the bunkers, and seafloor placed VLS-style containers full of torps, launched by remote control, is the answer. Fat spreads of torps sent out when the invasion fleet nears or crosses the horizon would be devastating to the troop ships and escorts alike, and compared to missiles, would be hard to defend against. I know this is a napkin-doodle level idea, but I also feel that inside the box thinking and relying on things that fly thru Chinese owned airspace isnt the best recipe for success.
I like it. How might Taiwan put the torpedoes in position on the seafloor without being detected?
Something along the lines of CAPTOR, maybe?
The Ukrainians have used British Brimstone missiles mounted on flat-bed trucks, with standard cargo covers.
That's about 100 times cheaper and easier to distribute and move around.
Static assets that can be pre-sighted will be dead at zero+10 minutes, long before any landing craft approach the shore.
The Chinese won't be able, however, to destroy all road mobile assets, and since you can buy dozens of road mobile for every hardened bunker, road mobile wins.
Im not convinced thats accurate. And Taiwan is nothing at all like Ukraine. At all. I keep hearing road mobile being used like its magically immune. China will have absolute air dominance over Taiwan very quickly. After that, I would NOT want to be attatched to any above ground military unit, especially anything like a missile battery, on a truck or otherwise. And assuming that underground/underwater installations are easilly destroyed...well i dont see that being the case either. Making a statement doesnt make it fact...
So how many ships do you think will comprise an invasion fleet and escorts?? The thing being, anti-ship missiles arent going to stop or sink large cargo carriers like torpedoes will. Sure...maybe if you get 3+ hits in each one. But how many missiles do you need to launch to get three hits?? Six?? Nine?? More?? What if the invasion fleet is 100 ships, or more?? Good luck having the better part of a thousand antiship missiles still in existence when the fleet comes over the horizon. A great dream, but I wouldnt hold my breath.
So, we are discussing 2 different things here.
Mostly the missiles from shore conversation is focused on Taiwan's ability to defeat the landing force.
Not shooting at car carriers - shooting at Type-05 landing craft. The Chinese equivalent to our AAV (actually to the EFV that we cancelled and never built, but they did)
Also, I've seen video of the Ukrainians launching Brimstone like that at Russian naval targets. Brimstone is basically a limey Hellfire on steroids. Can easily be quad or 8 packed in side-facing racks on a flat bed with a protective screen so it looks like a normal heavy cargo truck until it stops.
Now, the truck isn't a magic tank, it has zero targeting capability. It has to be plugged into a larger network that is getting target designation from somewhere else.
Also, respectfully disagree with your assessment on Air control.
I think Taiwan airspace will be heavily contested and unsafe for BOTH sides.
That will make it hard for friendly aviation, but will also make it hard for enemy aviation.
If China thought they had a reasonable chance of obtaining Air Supremacy quickly, they would have ZERO need for an Amphibious invasion force.
They'd just fly the troops in on helo's.
They won't be able to do that until they take some ground and clear the area of local air defense. That's why they need the invasion force.
As for fleet size, why is everyone so obsessed with D-Day numbers?
That was the Invasion of France. The Entire Normandy peninsula is larger than Taiwan.
Will they have 100 ships? Sure, in that general area, but not part of a landing fleet.
They will not be landing masses of heavy armor. It's a little island, and 90% of the terrain is Urban or mountain.
It's an infantry fight, and both China and Taiwan know the population and politico's will capitulate rather than fight it out and destroy the cities.
That means BOTH sides are planning that the battle is 90% over once the Chinese get a sizeable landing force ashore and able to push into the cities.
So the Taiwanese need to PREVENT that landing force from getting ashore and the Chinese need to ASSURE that landing force can get ashore.
If the Chinese think the Taiwanese can be successful at preventing the landing force from reaching shore (and we are talking combat effective here, sure a few units may get ashore, but they need enough ashore to form cohesive units under fire and prosecute the mission) Then they Chinese won't risk the invasion.
Conversely, if the Taiwanese don't think they can hold back enough of the landing force, they will probably capitulate before the invasion fleet sights shore.
Mines, mines mines. A job for those XLUUVs we are supposed to get before the end of this year.
I'll believe it when I see it.
Meanwhile, 10,000 Javelins in the hands of the militia means No PLAN Marine amphib craft make it to shore.
KISS principle.
Agreed. Plus lots of other easy things no one seems to be trying. Why not a mine launched by MLRS or 155mm artillery. That way the obstacle is already there in case they try and wipe out the shooters.
I'm not sure if FASCAM will work in salt water. Not saying it won't, but not sure if it was designed to be laid in shallow water.
The other option is Volcano on a truck or blackhawk. Again, not sure about deployment in water.
yeah, that would need to be a new development, but I like the idea.
Yet another for the rapid prototype list.
But using DPICM cluster munitions from concealed artillery batteries that are pre-sighted to fire on landing beaches would be effective.
Simple spotter system with pre-ranged tube artillery positioned 15km+ back from the beach.
DPICM fired 500m off-shore, maybe more.
Pre ranging would allow batteries to fire a line of shells. Using modern auto-loaders on SP 155mm allows for MRSI, (multiple round, simultaneous impact) from same gun, (time on target- on steroids)
Doesn't have to be catastrophic damage. What might only cause minor damage to an IFV or tank on land would probably be nearly instantly fatal to a swimming IFV or tank, with likely 100% fatality for all embarked personnel as well. even if the water is only 20 feet deep.
♫ Ro-Ro, Ro your boat gently drown and scream...♪
Thanks for the earworm, William. : (
https://news.usni.org/2023/12/21/navy-receives-first-of-six-prototype-extra-large-orca-underwater-drones
The Strait is shallow, but according to marineinsight.com, half of the major ports are on the eastern side of the island. I see the ferry ports in Sal's illustration, but it looks like all of those ports are pretty close to the 100 m line. We've put subs in the Gulf in waters shallower than that. I think the key question of subs in the area is who owns the air space.
Subs can travel in water that deep to be sure.
In war time, water that shallow gives the sub NOWHERE to run if it is detected.
Subs don't run left and right. They run DOWN.
In water that shallow, subs can be seen from aircraft even when submerged due to contrast.
It's a death sentence. Our subs are fantastic, but their survival is based on stealth that they cannot maintain under heavy wartime sonar environment in a space like that.
In other words, No admiral will ever order a US sub anywhere near those shallower waters, because no admiral wants to be the first admiral to lose a US nuclear submarine to an attack they could have survived had they been in deeper water.
So, combine the risk to the subs, with the fact that there will still be PLENTY of targets for them to prosecute outside the straits, and you will not be using US subs to close the straits.
They will be hunting down Chinese surface vessels outside the Straits, as well as hunting/defending against Chinese subs that are hunting our fleet.
What about small diesel subs? Is the area too shallow for them?
They have a better chance of remaining undetected, just based on size, but again, if your talking about water that is 200' deep...
Let's look at a good example. Japanese Soryu class Diesel AIP. Several good Navalists have proposed that the US should buy or license build these
Virginia SSN (Block IV): 10,200 tons disp, 460' length, 34' beam, 54' depth (keel to top of sail).
Soryu SS: 4,200 tons disp, 275' length, 30' beam, 50' depth (keel to top of sail).
Even small subs are still tall.
Assuming you need at least 20' of water over the sail to stay hidden (and probably more) that means your keel is already at 70'.
Assuming you want to keep at least 50' under your keel for safety, because the bottom of the deep blue ain't a super-highway, that means the skipper has exactly 80' of leeway in depth. That's like being tied up in chains. No room to maneuver.
It's not that they CAN'T stay hidden. It's iffy. And unlike in deep water, IF they are detected, they are DEAD. Period. End of Question.
Please let me add a perhaps quixotic, perhaps practical, variable to the mix of potential defensive solutions. Recently I came across reports from several news agencies on the training of civilians in small arms and small infantry unit tactics. A professional, well trained, well equipped force? No. For safety’s sake they were drilling with airsoft rifles. But that in itself is OK. Let’s not get good people killed in training if we can help it. My thought is that if they can be trained to that level, there may be some way to give them hands-on experience with SAMs and anti-armor weapons. Just this morning’s nickel (my 0.02 w/ inflation).
A LAW in every closet would be pretty useful if you're looking at stopping an invasion.
A chicken in every pot and a LAW in every closet. 😀
A "Well-regulated" militia, indeed.
Everyone gets an M4 equivalent, accoutrements and 1000 rounds of ammo
Families get 4 laws, 2 manpads, and a 60mm mortar
;-) I assume you mean this to be the initial outfitting allowance for a family of four......
Yep, and that much more ammo a year - to allow for practice.
Larger families can apply for other crew served weapons - M249, the XM250 (6.8mm belt feed), maybe some mines...
I live in a very 2A-friendly state, but you are starting to make me drool. Well, some members of the HOA community might have something to say about the mines. OTOH, the president is a retired woman Marine, the VP s a former Ranger, …. You get the idea.
For the Children!
https://www.reddit.com/media?url=https%3A%2F%2Fi.redd.it%2Fpcifgdtgmbb41.jpg&rdt=60373
See my earlier. Javelin. easy, fire and forget, has the range and a large enough warhead.
Javelin could reach amphib craft (be they tracked or just boats) when still 3,000m offshore
Put a hole in that boat and those Marines or soldiers ain't swimming to shore.
So, you know anyone who has a whole bunch of spare javelins they want to give to Taiwan? I thought just about every one in NATO inventory had already been sent to UKR and that resupply is a very long term problem.
Tactics vs logistics.
not even close to all in inventory. For sure, a lot, and yes, we need more, but that would have been true regardless.
Also, the British made NLAW might also be effective in this scenario, as it has greater range than AT-4 and packs a bigger punch. Not sure on tracking moving target, as I've never had my hands on one.
I like how you think. Play the away game as long as you can. Thinking in terms of short, limited training opportunities, how does the learning curve for Javelin compare to that of the LAW?
well, it is obviously longer, but since no one can hit a moving target at 500m with a LAW, it doesn't matter.
LAW's disable amphibious assault craft on the beach, after they have disembarked their troops. ie.. LAW's (and AT-4's which is our more modern equivalent to the LAW) are not going to make a substantive difference in stopping them at the waters edge.
AT-4's do the same thing at slightly greater range, but again, mostly useless against a moving target unless you are Davy freakin' Crockett with a missile.
Javelins and TOW's can track moving targets. TOW has more punch and range, but is wire guided and therefore susceptible to operator error or flinch from return fire. Javelin is fire and forget.
And we COULD be deploying lots of Javelin.
I'll freely admit I've supported sending Javelin to Ukraine on the theory that it was not a weapon we needed in Taiwan.
I only just came to the realization that it would make an effective stand-off weapon for amphibious assault fighting vehicles.
So we open a new freaking assembly line, or license the Ukrainians to build their own and keep ours from here out.
The targeting solution for a LAW or Jav is considerably simpler when it's coming right at you.
Type-05 in the surf is going to have a target area from the front of about 2-3 ft in height and 8 ft in width
Imagine ripping a sheet of plywood in half lengthwise. Then paint that piece camo, and float it in the surf.
Then try hitting it with an unguided rocket fired with plastic sights measured in 50m increments, while it's bobbing in the surf coming toward you - and shooting at you.
Those Type-05's have thermal sights like the Bradley. Any exposed infantry on the beach are going to get ripped to shreds.
Javelin has thermal and can lock and fire and forget from 3,000m, so the shooter can be hundreds of yards off the beach in cover and still engage the type-05's when they are more than 2k out to sea.
Max range on the LAW is about 250m
I'm not even certain a LAW can penetrate the frontal armor on a Type-05
Javelin would use top attack and so would be coming down onto a much larger target - 8'x20' give or take.
LAW was created to give infantry a point blank option against enemy armor and IFV/APC when those units are penetrating your position, so they can be fired from the side or rear. It was never intended to hit armor at range, or from the front, or while it is moving.
And the "light anti-tank weapon" designation was based on when it was first deployed - 1963
Now days it is primarily a bunker ( or goat raping terrorist hut) buster
It's simply not suited to use against modern armor or IFV in this scenario.
Maybe stock them up so the Taiwanese could ostensibly continue to threaten Chinese forces once they get into the cities, but honestly, there are better weapons for that as well.
But the point of using AT missiles to engage the Type-05 is to do it before they reach land. Troops in body armor with weapons aboard an enclosed IFV will all die when it takes a hard hit in water deeper than 10 ft.
Hitting them with weapons after they land means the embarked troops are still on the ground
But the point of all these mental exercises is to DETER China from acting.
China knows once they have a decent toe-hold, the odds of capitulation are pretty good, to avoid massive civilian casualties and destruction of the cities.
So Taiwan needs to arm with weapons that create a credible threat to China's capacity to get that toe-hold.
Javelin (in sufficient numbers) does that. LAW/AT-4/RPG etc does not.
France, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, Israel and India all make their own comparable fire-and-forget ATGM with top attack that would also be equally appropriate to the requirement.
Taiwan should stock up on any and all of these it can get it's hands on.
10,000 would be ideal.
Even 1,000 creates a credible threat to any initial landing force.
I used to think that the Taiwanese military was organized like the ROK military until I watched an interview with the former Taiwanese CoS. The reality is that the Taiwanese military is very small and their reserves are not adequately organized or equipped. They need to get on the ball immediately! The answer to your question is probably land based Harpoon missiles. I would have a mix of fixed and mounted ones for survivability.
NSM would be better, and better able to defeat Chinese EW.
And they need a ton of anti-missile air defense. Aegis (ashore, distributed) and massive quantities of ESSM cells distributed
ESSM with an anti-ship capability is something we should already have.
The ESSM warhead is too small for anti-ship.
Remember, we pack 4 ESSM into the same VLS cell that holds a single LRASM or SM-2/3/6
LRASM is awesome but expensive.
NSM can terrain maneuver over land to strike a target in the water.
That means the Taiwanese could use my magazine ship idea and slap hundreds of NSM on the crew-boat decks that stay in open water off the east coast, able to fire at targets painted on the west coast.
I seem to remember us putting a Turkish frigate out of action after a screwup during maneuvers with an ESSM. Half a dozen slamming into a troop ship would be better than nothing. At the very least, eat up enemy missile defense so bigger stuff can get them.
no doubt, but I think every one of those ESSM is going to be busy interdicting Chinese GLCM and ASCM.
The more damage Taiwan sustains, the faster it folds.
I think we all agree here we could use a 2nd AMRAAM production line.
Original Sea Sparrow on a Turkish WWII Destroyer Minelayer. Took out the bridge and CIC.
IIRC, they ended up scrapping the ship due to the damage. What a complete cluster fuck combined with the good idea fairy.
My bet is they make an honorable stand then capitulate ASAP, Taiwan nor China wants to live or acquire a smoking hole in the ground.
unfortunately, I think that is the more likely scenario, but it depends heavily on how the missile campaign bears out. If we and our allies can stop enough of the inbound missiles, and sink enough of the potential amphibious assault wave before it departs, it could give the Taiwanese reason to hang in there.
It would take the will of the government to engage in such a fight.
Now? Not Likely election year, after 2024 and who wins makes the idea a 50/50.
Which is why I'm really worried at the moment. Worried they Chinese might make a play before the election, and we get sucked into a half-assed response that just gets a bunch of sailors and Marines killed while still ceding Taiwan to China, and we won't even have the balls to destroy the microchip industry to deny it to the Chinese.
Yeah, I am worried about the October surprise this year.
A Black Swan event.
I don’t think they will make a play for Taiwan. Perhaps a feint. They plan to knock the US Navy out. Even if they half succeed, Taiwan will likely vote to “reunify” after seeing the worlds “most powerful navy” punched in the face.
The old idea and tactics of the IJN the great single battle decisive battle "Kantai Kessen "of world war two fame.
Draw the fleet into battler and nuke them out of existence or nullify them with massive losses.
And we have a habit of cutting our losses and bailing…
he last of the old folk need to shame there kids to take up the good work of their ancestors. Filial piety.
They are mitigating this by increasing length of enlistment and retraining of reserves.
Kind of irritating that they were relying on the US the whole time and weren't very serious about their military preparedness. I should have realized something was up when I read an article about them retiring the M-47 tank fleet a couple years ago.
Its the left-over mentality that re-unification was always possible, the KMT was always holding-out hope, and infected a great deal of the population that reunification and resolution were the paths forward. Meanwhile, mainland China ran-over Tibet, ignored the statues of reunification with HK and just walked right into Macau.
Taiwan should be building Kamakazi drones by the millions, and housing them underground and mines built into Harpoon like cruise missiles so they can mine every Chinese port that can be used against them. Any war is going to be a "come as you are" affair with little spin up or production time.
They also need to invest in massive quantities of air defense missiles.
We should be selling them Aegis ashore in a distributed node fashion, and they should be putting ESSM cells onto every roof top
Very good point. Fingers crossed for the next 18 months.
Sal,
I agree, and was looking at the same map in some detail recently asking myself the same questions.
There are some important distinctions though that give me pause.
Our need for Cherbourg was based on the need to push forward an armor and mechanized army, fighting in mostly open terrain, for a maneuver centric style of warfare, and the logistical tail to feed it.
I think everybody on our side needs to step back and ask "How does China plan to defeat Taiwan"?
I don't see that as a war based on lot's of thirsty vehicles maneuvering around. There is no space for it.
Furthermore, a war by China to conquer Taiwan will not be a genocidal war of elimination, as the Chinese see the Taiwanese as their wayward little brothers who need to be brought back into the fold.
What I'm getting at is this: The PEOPLE of Taiwan are the strategic terrain. China's plan will be based on isolating and holding the major population centers (Taiwan is highly urbanized and the vast majority of the population are concentrated on the western (China facing) shore.
You don't need nearly as large a logistical tail to support Infantry, light vehicles, and light artillery, when you have air and sea power.
While I have no doubt the PLAN will plan to capture western ports, I suspect there may be far less use for those car carriers, as the PLA and PLAN Marines will not need that many vehicles.
I think their focus will be on carving out a defensible and reliable sea and air lane to the western beaches.
If they can put enough infantry ashore via landing craft or helo, Taiwan will surrender.
The population are NOT die hard willing to fight to the death. political pressure to end the fight and prevent more civilian casualties will be significant.
I expect the Chinese plan is to force that decision as fast as possible by swamping the Western populated side of the island with massive missile attacks against both military and civilian infrastructure, as well as just enough well placed attacks on purely civilian targets to create widespread fear and panic.
And as soon as they can clear the air and waters enough, they will land upwards of 30 divisions of Infantry and seize the urban centers on the west coast and apply pressure until the government surrenders.
True assessment.
Probably an unbreakable Air, Sea and land blockade would bring Taiwan down fast, the US will not try to break that blockade with a weak government and weaker recruit pool of men and women who refuse to be drafted.
Right now, today, there is a very realistic question as to how effectively China could implement such a blockade.
Setting aside our militaries issues (on which we no doubt agree), we are not toothless.
And China still has major issues with some of their tech, and especially missiles.
The Chinese are also not 'cowboys' or gamblers, willing to risk it all on a 'maybe'.
Right now, today, China's odds at succeeding on that blockade are in the 50/50 range
Multiple war game scenarios have been played out tending to support that 'Any Given Sunday' current status. Not saying it wouldn't be bloody and painful for us, but I tend to think we could pull it out, but it's close right now.
So China is working hard to tilt those odds. More missiles, more ships, more aircraft.
We and the Taiwanese need to be countering the things China is building to upset the odds.
Adding capabilities that are NOT directly balanced against Chinese new capabilities will not change the math enough.
Taiwan needs more air defense, most specifically an Aegis ashore type setup with thousands of ESSM interceptor missiles.
And they need anti-ship missiles in many varieties. NSM, Harpoon, and even smaller systems that could be used LoS from shore to strike landing craft.
Good info.
If the people of Taiwan aren't on board with their defense in the face of the PLA, likely outcome is for them to destroy the high end chip making factories and submit. The rest of the neighborhood will take notice, adjust their opinions of the "winners" and "losers" and carry on as they always have.
Why would the Taiwanese destroy the heart of their economy? They won't do it (We on the other hand, SHOULD if it looks like China will win)
The people of Taiwan are as divided on this as Americans are on Trump.
Not many really want to be ruled by China.
But Chinese propaganda on reunification is strong. 2 of the 3 major political parties in Taiwan want 'less antagonism' toward China, and improved relations. Fortunately, the one that just won the election for President is the one that prefers independence (without saying it).
So many people would fight.
If China does win, the message to the neighborhood will be "Your going to lose anyway, so why fight in the first place. Just concede to our demands and it won't have to come to a fight."
And we will see alliances dry up, and more and more China will become the dominant global economic force, until we are nothing but an impoverished client state with a ton of military hardware, and a perpetual debt to China. They will leverage that to control our internal politics so that we CAN'T bring back manufacturing, or do anything other than be the junkie buying their dope.
Quote: If China does win, the message to the neighborhood will be "Your going to lose anyway, so why fight in the first place. Just concede to our demands and it won't have to come to a fight." And we will see alliances dry up, and more and more China will become the dominant global economic force, until we are nothing but an impoverished client state with a ton of military hardware, and a perpetual debt to China. They will leverage that to control our internal politics so that we CAN'T bring back manufacturing, or do anything other than be the junkie buying their dope. End Quote
I think you nailed it...
Will the Taiwanese fight? There is an object lesson in recent history...Hong Kong. Destruction of the chip factories is a threat, and in theory a deterrent to invasion only if the mainland leadership views those factories as critical to bringing Taiwan to heel. Logic says they do, that's the western, enlightened way of thinking. Getting into the mind of a seventy year old autocrat obsessed with his legacy gives me pause...what if he has a different critical path calculus?
Now you get it. The 'logic' is western logic.
And it's not just Xi. It's the entire CCP mindset and structure.
Our diplomats and foreign policy geniuses cannot understand the idea of going to war and killing tens of thousands over 'national pride', but the Chinese can.
IMHO, the CCP would absolutely be willing to risk the impoverishment of the Island in order to resolve an issue they see as a stain on their honor.
The chip factories are NOT a deterrent. They ARE a strategic asset that we MUST ensure the Chinese to not obtain.
Ergo, the Chinese are willing to risk their destruction. We CANNOT risk their capture intact.
Now? Laid this out several...some time ago to higher, wasn't popular line of thinking, dismissed out of hand. Ownership of chip production requires potentially "unwestern" thinking. I'll leave it at that.
This is why we (the US) continually perform so poorly with such a capable military. Our 'decision makers' are so in love with themselves they cannot imagine that anyone else with power and intellect would NOT see the world though the same 'enlightened' manner that they do.
A well reasoned POA, I do not disagree. However, success is implied by simply pushing numbers ashore? I would think it also predicated on breaking out of those beachheads and successfully engaging in continual MOUT. Any given Sunday if Taiwan has the collective will to resist.
to be certain. What I'm suggesting is that the proximity of the population centers to the west coast will make the task of investing those population centers much easier.
I don't think the Taiwanese will fight in the streets, and I suspect the Chinese have similar expectations.
Once you have a large enough force ashore on those beachheads, they don't have to break out very far
Cherbourg is 24 miles from Utah beach.
Every single urban center on the west coast of Taiwan has multiple beaches either within the city proper, or within 1 or 2 miles.
If they can get combat effective forces ashore they are already in the cities.
Now, maybe the Taiwanese can throw them back, but that's a hell of a gamble.
My sense is that the Taiwanese have to hold them at the water's edge, or the gig is up.
That means creating the capability to hold-at-risk the Chinese capacity to reach the beach
I understand and agree. They must beat them at the waterline, control the airspace, weather the missile barrage, and do so decisively or it's over quickly. Urban combat is a losing proposition for Taiwan. I also agree with your suggestion that "Western" thinking interferes with conceiving potential outcomes. They simply do not think like us.
Interesting. My opinion is there is no way an invasion of Taiwan doesn't immediately devolve into urban combat. The entire island has an area of ~36k km2 and a population of 23M (slightly more area than the state of Delaware - pop. 1M). A light pollution map shows the western half of island as heavily populated and the eastern half essentially rural. So let's say half of the island's area (18k km2) is urban. For perspective the New York–Newark–Jersey City, NY-NJ metropolitan statistical area in the US has a population of 20M and an area of 12k km2. I can't imaging planning a half dozen landing site along the that portion of the east coast and not immediately engaging in street-by-street urban warfare. Once you get the eastern half Taiwan you are in the mountainous sticks. Imagine West Virginia butting up against NY-Newark. Uggh! <shudder>
you are correct about the urban congestion.
What we are saying is that the Taiwanese government and people probably lack the will-power to continue the fight once it gets off the beach and into the citites.
Now, that doesn't mean there won't be some urban combat.
The Chinese won't land on 1 beach, or even 5. They'll land on 15 small beaches, each getting the equivalent of what we (in the Marines) would call a Battalion Landing Team.
And the idea is that if the Taiwanese can present a credible threat, that those landings will be effectively opposed and a majority of the landing craft destroyed BEFORE they hit the beach, then that alone may be enough to prevent China from undertaking the risk in the first place.
The CCP are not going to gamble on a bunch of Omaha beach outcomes. They want a bunch of Sword and Utah beach landings.
CDR Sal,
Discussions on the topic of Taiwan always end up with logistics and supportability if the fight goes past a short period of time. Both for Red and Blue. Beans, bullets, fuel and people; get them to the fight and support them when they get there. China seems to be playing the role of the U.S. in WWII; large quantities of perhaps dubious quality (Shermans vs Leopards? At some point quantity becomes a quality as someone said...). We seem to have limited amounts of aging but reasonable quality stuff and good (but nowhere near as good as they used to be) people and fighting gear. The tactical, operational and strategic are all very much in play. The initial volley and the U.S. response are obviously critical...do we respond and how if we do (an open question, in my mind)? If we do, frankly, an incremental approach is likely to fail as we lack the ability to support the operation for any length of time in a permissive environment (lack of on hand supply depth, inability to replenish magazines), and moving logistics into this environment will not be benign. So, if we choose to respond, we have to go hard and violent to overcome the home field advantage of the Chinese. None of these factors are new, have been studied to death for many years. Certainly has generated lots of wargames, experiments, concepts and .ppt briefs. We sure do seem to keep looking for silver bullets in the couch cushions...
Simply really, Taiwan must be prepared to utterly destroy all their ports.
Make them unusable for China and since the US won't be landing any forces on Taiwan what's the point in keeping them open and functional?
Airfields and airports as well.
Not very smart or makes sense but the scorched earth policy and tactics do work.
My apologies, Just my WAG not something I actually know a lot about.
We are assuming that China is planning an amphibious assault on Taiwan.
I am not so sure.
The U. S. briefly considered a similar assualt on North Vietnam in 1965 and it was quickly rejected for a variety of reasons.
What were to happened if China just launched missiles to knock out Taiwan's critical infrastructure - power, water, transportation, ports, etc. and impose a blockade?
The choice for Taiwan might then be surrender or starvation. I don't see the U. S. going to war with China or escorting commercial ships on a daily basis for years to come.
Maybe if there's an immediate threat of an invasion, give Xi a variant of the letter Johnson received.
I think Xi understands that war is the highest priority of a leader whereas LBJ looked at war as a distraction from his beloved domestic agenda.
True, but even Xi might hesitate if he thought we'd start using kilotons on his ships.
Our leaders might stop if they thought they would no longer receive bribes form China.
You have a point, unfortunately.
thankyou CDR, for a big smile this morning!
gotta go to work, but I'll leave this......
(written in my first book "Helium Phoenix" in 1996 ):
"only Turtle Airships had the proven track record with airships of greater load carrying ability. Also, no other airships have the ro-ro capability of Turtle Airships.
Q: Ro-Ro?
A: Excuse me Senator. "Roll on, roll off". The ability to have vehicles roll on; or drive onto the aircraft or ship, and roll off, or drive off.
Turtle Airships are the only airships designed for this type of loading. It is an important part of their overall utility; and extremely advantageous in the field. The importance of this cannot be stressed enough.
Even with the ability to forego any need for an airstrip and to deliver supplies anywhere in he field; airships have always been hampered by their need for special mooring masts and ground crews. One of the major factors contributing to the success of the Turtle Airships craft in exercise HARBOR REACH was this ability of the airships to load or unload very quickly at any site chosen. "
Well would you look at that...
https://news.usni.org/2022/09/28/chinese-launch-assault-craft-from-civilian-car-ferries-in-mass-amphibious-invasion-drill-satellite-photos-show
Yep. This is the way.
Big difference between a rear ramp and a side ramp
True. China has exercised loading and unloading both.
But in this scenario, they don't really need to be able to re-load them. Just to get them across the strait and let them roll out.
Again, specs could be lies, but those Type-05 amphibious assault craft are supposed to be capable of 15kt in water. 1200hp water jets
They can stay in international waters and then launch theType-5's at night.
Fans of Tom Clancy's Red Storm Rising may remember the part played by RoRo vessels getting armored vehicles across the Atlantic for deployment against the Red Army. If I remember correctly, Clancy derived a lot of his plot from an old war game called "Harpoon." The point is that a lot of the requirements of a cross-Pacific effort to reinforce Taiwan are explored in an accessible way in Clancy's book. Except, of course, for the minor fact that the distance across the Pacific is a hell of a lot longer than crossing the Atlantic, with all the complications that entails.
Harpoon was/is fantastic!!
And yes, it supposedly played a significant role in his concept, but so did all the REFORGER exercises we ran.
The thing is, though, Taiwan doesn't need a lot of ground reinforcements.
Taiwan isn't Europe. There is nowhere for armored brigades to maneuver.
Taiwan is a missile fight, and the determinant will be the side with more and better missiles and the appropriate platforms from which to launch and counter them.
I still have my Amiga version of Harpoon - alas no Amiga to run it on :)
This was weekends at my buddy's house in middle & High school - we were total military geeks.
https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/5928/harpoon-third-edition
Computers? Sheesh. Carboard cutouts on a map, baby. :)
But this was my favorite. We wasted hundreds of hours on this. Still have a set somewhere. I wish someone would update it. Great naval power battles are upon us again.
https://boardgamegeek.com/boardgame/1668/modern-naval-battles
Where is mine warfare in the mix? Just asking
Our own mine warfare is sadly in pathetic shape. There is no unified command or strategy for mine warfare. We have almost no offensive mining capability, because our modern Naval command did not think a 'civilized' high tech service needed it. Almost all USN mine capability is counter-mine.
https://news.usni.org/2018/10/31/navy-crafting-master-plan-new-mine-warfare-capabilities
https://news.usni.org/2018/11/02/navy-thinking-beyond-littoral-combat-ship-future-mine-warfare
And then take a gander at the recent articles in proceedings on mine warfare. Lots of great ideas - but the take away is we are NOT doing any of that now.
https://www.usni.org/search?search_api_fulltext=mine+warfare&sort_by=search_api_relevance&sort_order=DESC
Seems like there may be some need for more technical data here.
This is the terrain folks.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_Strait#/media/File:Bathymetry_and_ocean_currents_of_the_Taiwan_Strait_and_nearby_areas.png
And also this: Legend: everything dark green = No people here
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7a/Taiwan_NASA_Terra_MODIS_2022-07-21.jpg
Presumably Taiwan has plans to render those facilities unusable in the very early hours of such a war - flooding a couple of ships in the way would do.
Mines.
You are correct, however... See my earlier reply on the current pathetic state of US offensive counter-mine capability
On a related note: I am always suspect of capability claims regarding Chinese and Russian military equipment that has not been subjected to the test of battle (and we've seen how that has played out in Ukraine).
But WTF??!! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_05_amphibious_fighting_vehicle
How in all that is holy did the PLAN manage to build a better version of the EFV that can move at FIFTEEN KNOTS in the water???
And we have a Mother F#@&&&@ 8 wheeled TOY that can't even remain upright in low surf?!?!
Now, I doubt these things can transit the Straits by themselves, so that's where those car carriers come in, Sal. As that earlier USNI article highlighted, they can drive these Type-05's off the car carriers into the water, so every one of those car carriers becomes an improvised LPD with a super-sized well deck.
They don't need the ports. They just need to get those car carriers within 10nm of shore to disgorge thousands of these things.
They have 6 Brigades of Marines, and each has 2 battalions of these little shits. The PLA has another 2 Amphibious assault brigades in the Southern military command, also comparably equipped.
So they have between 16 and 20 battalions equipped with these things. That's about 800, give or take.
Figure those are designed to open the beach, so they can land more troops via more conventional craft.
So, how about a surprise attack instead of the missile blockade.
20 car carriers floating in a line, 13 miles off-shore, at night.
8 brigades of troops coming ashore an hour later