72 Comments

No fuel, no sorties, no escorts. Best fix the "for but not with" problem right now.

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When I commanded an AO during a North Atlantic exercise I made multiple trips into a Norwegian Fjord NATO fuel pier. I suggested that it might give the exercise more realism if I was escorted on each run. Nope. It seems that there were not enough escort assets to pull them out of the "shooting war" to exercise that lumbering AO into the pier. Of course, real world I would have probably made one of none successful trips, thus leaving the precious shooters dead in the water for lack of fuel.

Just sayin!

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I can echo your thought, sir. During the Vietnam War, the good ship Niagara Falls (AFS 3) was exclusively on ISE when not alongside for deliveries or REFTRA drills. We were minimally armed (four twin 3"/50 open gun tubs), with a single fire control radar was only good for 45 minutes of operation before it died and had to be revived by the ETs.. She was built in 1963 to fight WW2. Now we build logistics ships to fight the Non-War. Not what I would call progress.

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3"/50s would be PLENTY good for small combatants and other modest threats. Even if over open sights/local control. Better than a .30 or .50 on a pedestal.

The range to reach out and touch AND prox fuzing. A good duplicated director mounted high up would be awesome as a start.

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What about some fire and forget Torpedoes?

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Nov 13·edited Nov 13

Again, to barrow from another under-appreciated part of another service, NKAWTG...Never.

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To repeat the old saying... "Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics."

To expand to current times: Real amateurs -- absolute children in a grownup world -- study DEI, CRT, etc.

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Not for looongggthey won't!

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Nov 13·edited Nov 13

The Department will tell you they are planning for this, but they should be forced to show their wargaming assumptions. I guarantee those assumptions do not reflect the true level of adversity for our logisticians in the event of a great war west of Guam.

Also, this is more than a DoD problem. It is inevitable that we will lose supply and merchant ships in a war. Our greatest weakness is our ability to repair and replace them. We don't have enough shipyards, shipyard workers, marine engineers, or sufficient supply chains to repair or replace what we lose. Relying on allies also is not a solution - Korean shipyards won't be available to us and the Europeans don't have enough for their own needs.

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Planning for this is all fine and dandy. Are they *doing* anything about it? Yes, rhetorical question.

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The 64 thousand dollar question.

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Yes, a mission kill from lack of supply--or the inability to quickly repair a damaged ship because of lack of shipyards--is as good as a sinking for a campaign early in a war.

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"mission kill from lack of supply" Excellent point, Brian. At the surrender the winner claims the intact capital ship as prizes from the defeated navy. ~ "Duty is heavier than a mountain; winning can be lighter than a feather."

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The CIMMARONs, in WWII, were supposed to be armed as BENSONs, except for torpedoes, of course, because it was known they would be going into harm's way.

In Beans, Bombs, and Black Oil, I found out that, at the end of the war, it was policy to have four escorts for each HVU, ( which could be shared, so three AOs could get by with four DEs.

Doesn't the Navy read it's own history?

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Too busy studying for the DEI exam.

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True that. Knowing nothing about either of the following individuals, it would be nice to know what our training pipeline is full of.

Is it ENS Barbero

Proceedings June 2024 - There’s a Diversity Gap in the Wardroom

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/june/theres-diversity-gap-wardroom

... or is it LTJG Roop

Proceedings March 1923 - The Naval Policy Of The United States In The Pacific Area

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1923/march/naval-policy-united-states-pacific-area

... who has the capacity to rise and become CAPT Roop

Proceedings September 1944 - Technologic Warfare

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1944/september/technologic-warfare

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It is illuminating that what was written in 1923 could have been written in 2023, with all the same players and concerns. It fills me with great concern that not only have we not fortified our positions west of Pearl, we no longer have the industrial capacity to threaten a "potential" Navy. As CAPT (then LTJG) Roop states that the captains of Industry will inevitably set to the task of building a Navy once hostilities begin, it will be too late.

The Master Caution light has been flashing...with secondaries. The Land as Soon as Practicable has metastasized into a Land as Soon as Possible. Without decisive action soon, we will surely be in the Land Immediately category.

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Despite what the Smartest People in the Room (TM) believe, things like geography, natural resources distribution, the Great Circle, and human nature don't change despite how hard you wish to believe otherwise. At my American Legion meeting this week one of our officers had returned from TAD at Guam. He talked about diving wrecks and being able to see a WW1 hulk right next to a WW2 one. No doubt at some point there will be a hulk on the bottom from the next war.

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The signals are always out there, strong or weak (and for the strong & weak), that tell the smart set what they must do to prosper. You do what you have to do to promote. Or you leave the field to pursue excellence somewhere else. I remember my first taste of DEI back in 1973. It was neither fruitful nor uniting, just "mandatory". That D.E.I. turd had yet to be polished. The touchy-feely seminar was run by True Believers with Cheka-like zeal and what we learned was to say nothing that could be twisted into something that was "racist". You kinda had to be there and feel the vibe to know its horror. I was ready to pursue excellence elsewhere after my 9 years was to be up in 1975 but promoted to Chief in 1974 and got sent back to a Frigate.

https://www.navysite.de/cruisebooks/cv19-73/056.htm

https://www.navysite.de/cruisebooks/cv19-73/057.htm

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That pays off sometimes. The new incoming CO of NAS Pensacola is a DEI zealot. Seriously, she literally heads the navy diversity directorate. Selected to command NAS Pensacola on the way out the door.

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I bet that delighted Congressman Matt Gaetz.

NAS Pensacola (aka "the Navy Yard" to us locals) is in Gaetz' district. Or was before he resigned to be AG.

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founding

'They' need to go.

DOGE question...

How much money got spent on the old Photo School to make it the new Admin building?

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It’s still under construction/remodel

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Multiple ships of this class (AOE)? You mean both of them? This is no attempt at being snarky. Having steamed tens of thousands of miles on multiple replenishment oilers; we have always been by ourselves. As I am sure you know we (AO) are incapable of operating within a battle group. And with the current manning and material condition we are vulnerable even without an adversary.

But to your greater point, yes we need to wake up. I pray we do.

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founding

Actually we did war game this, way back in 1973 at the NWC. The results were as you might suspect, and have predicted.; and then there were enough escorts to cover some of the replenishment runs.

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As I asked the strike group commander during my one and only waterside tactics symposiums, “nice plan Admiral, but where the fuck are the replenishment ships?” Crickets. I was “excused” from further mandatory circle jerks by the big XO.

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Winning Friends & influencing people with cold hard facts.

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As noted, professionals study logistics...UKR and the middle east are NOT the Pacific...(no, I'm not running for president...(-; . Whether it's fleet oilers, airborne air refueling assets, beans and bullets to the ground forces, without the logistics support, you can't fight for long. That's why, in the Pacific, we win fast or lose, choose not to fight, or credibly threaten to go nuclear. (Begs the question how do you credibly show intent to use nukes over man built atolls?). Not a great pull down menu of options. Oh, and to the "show your wargaming assumptions" comment above, "sorry, classified".

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founding

Paycheck bet says much of the logistics components in those games are "approximated" (fancy word for pencil whipped).

Also have no doubt that's how the Marines came up with the fantasy scenarios of using their pet LSM's.

They won't last a day after the war goes hot...

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"Pencil whipped" sounds so...harsh. "Logistics fairy dust" is much more "acceptable" and "inclusive"...isn't it? Right?

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UKR may not be the Pacific, nevertheless it's been a heavy lift & complex supply line with issues in a permissive environment.

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Concur 100%. Pacific will be a VERY heavy lift and complex supply line with issues in a non-permissive cyber and kinetic environment at every link in the supply "chain".

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founding

If the IJN has concentrated on targeting the 6 fast AO's in 1942, which were still heavily employed making shuttle runs to and from San Pedro and Hawaii barely escorted, the Pacific war would have been very, very different.

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Game set and match

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How bloody hard is it to simply bolt on some surface mount weapon stations in the .50 to 20mm caliber? We had auxiliaries in WWII that were able to be armed.

The smart thing to do would be to start building a stock of these to be rapidly flown out to these ships to be added to if things hot up.

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How much good would that do against incoming anti-ship missiles? Better than nothing but not much better? What they need at minimum is CWIS.

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Uncle Joe's Amazing Floating (Sinking) Pier and Amusement Park, off the coast of Gaza, should never have been allowed to happen. A serviceman was fatally injured and the mission was a self-inflicted black eye, conducted for all the world to see. Our troops and sailors were put in a lousy situation, because people in DC failed to speak up.

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DC saw it as a photo-op. I really hope Trump clears out all the brass who are more interested in propaganda pieces than actually doing something to the enemy

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founding

Having a sharp 'Weather Eye' is no longer an important skill in these Intersectional times.

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Everyone in DC who authorized that decision should be fired come 22 JAN 25.

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Nov 13·edited Nov 13

All we can hope for;

1. Finding a flaw in Chinese operational doctrine that we can exploit faster than they can exploit ours.

2. That we haven't lost the tactical innovation mojo at the staff level.

You have to wonder if we still have the depth that Lincoln and FDR reached into to find the talent. Can Lockwood still find the aggressive sub skippers?

Edit; it would be nice if our drive-by Flag would share his views on this.

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founding

" it would be nice if our drive-by Flag would share his views on this."

You are not worthy of such an intellect spending time speaking down to you.

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Shame too. A SME is always welcome when it comes to matters like these.

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I think we have the depth, though it might have to go down to O-5, perhaps ask some retired to come back in.

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So glad we embraced concurrence & transformation, we don't need those pesky Perry's. Don't you know we are in the age of transformation and the end of history.

What's that saying about Roosters?

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