I think if we had that list we'd understand why the changes are needed. The deception was that the parent design could possibly use American systems and remain remotely similar.
Part of this is deciding the Conops. For an SM-2, 32 cell AAW frigate, we probably decided right in a world where time and numbers don't matter. I think the LCS-1 based frigate based on the ships being built for Saudi Arabia would suck less than commonly understood. Those Saudi ships have the propulsion fix, the chines are gone, the stabilizers are back (I think), adds a bow thruster, larger crew, heavier hull, likely larger range at what would still be a very slow cruise speed on diesels. As an ESSM level combatant we could have had 2 of them per year happening much sooner.
Good point on the type 26 being a better fit. Connie uses the exact same gensets.
Agreed, unmanned is not there yet. Our human timeline to solve it is what is off. 10-11 years and we will wonder how we ever thought it would take 20 years.
My understanding, is NAVSEA required dual engineering compartments and the extra-plug was to accommodate the extra steel/weight necessary to create the two separate engine spaces. Survivability was the reason given, valid concerns HOWEVER this points to the lack of clarity and understanding of the entire program, when the designs were originally considered.
I find that incredibly confusing. As it was, the motors and the LM2500+G4 were already in separate compartments. I think the reduction gear was with the gas turbine. The 4 gensets were also split 2+2 in separate compartments. I'd hate to think they lengthened the shaft line just to put one motor in one room and the second in another. The ship is already to have an azipod up front for redundancy.
I'm not a Navy veteran or naval architect so I can't comment about the ship design features. But I do have expertise in innovation, particularly regarding engineering and technology. The current USN approach to shipbuilding runs completely counter to all lessons about innovation and the Agile Loop, which uses a Model-Build-Lean loop. In simple terms, start with a basic model. Build the first one. Put it in the hands of the professional sailors to see what works, what doesn't and why. Take those insights back to the designers to make modifications, build the second one and repeat. By the 4th or 5th version, you're pretty close to your optimal design. We use this technique every day and it's just the standard approach to technology development.
So why does the Pentagon have such difficulty utilizing this proven method? The Chinese are clearly doing so with great effect. The concerns in the podcast about starting and stopping the production lines are certainly valid but are also easily resolved by instilling this innovation model into the production and evaluation cycle. I consider the shipbuilder's threats about laying off people to be little more than posturing. Many other industries have successfully implemented this innovation model with great success. There is no reason why the shipbuilders cannot do so as well.
So how do you solve this? Is it a political function? If so, does it get handled at the legislative branch when funding is approved or at the executive branch where funding is requested and projects executed? This is a solvable problem and frankly one that can be solved within 2 years if a true innovation model was widely embraced. As a nation, we are setting ourselves up for failure by not doing so.
Did this episode start at 5pm eastern? I clicked the link but just got “The host hasn’t started yet”
I think if we had that list we'd understand why the changes are needed. The deception was that the parent design could possibly use American systems and remain remotely similar.
Part of this is deciding the Conops. For an SM-2, 32 cell AAW frigate, we probably decided right in a world where time and numbers don't matter. I think the LCS-1 based frigate based on the ships being built for Saudi Arabia would suck less than commonly understood. Those Saudi ships have the propulsion fix, the chines are gone, the stabilizers are back (I think), adds a bow thruster, larger crew, heavier hull, likely larger range at what would still be a very slow cruise speed on diesels. As an ESSM level combatant we could have had 2 of them per year happening much sooner.
Good point on the type 26 being a better fit. Connie uses the exact same gensets.
Agreed, unmanned is not there yet. Our human timeline to solve it is what is off. 10-11 years and we will wonder how we ever thought it would take 20 years.
My understanding, is NAVSEA required dual engineering compartments and the extra-plug was to accommodate the extra steel/weight necessary to create the two separate engine spaces. Survivability was the reason given, valid concerns HOWEVER this points to the lack of clarity and understanding of the entire program, when the designs were originally considered.
I find that incredibly confusing. As it was, the motors and the LM2500+G4 were already in separate compartments. I think the reduction gear was with the gas turbine. The 4 gensets were also split 2+2 in separate compartments. I'd hate to think they lengthened the shaft line just to put one motor in one room and the second in another. The ship is already to have an azipod up front for redundancy.
I'm not a Navy veteran or naval architect so I can't comment about the ship design features. But I do have expertise in innovation, particularly regarding engineering and technology. The current USN approach to shipbuilding runs completely counter to all lessons about innovation and the Agile Loop, which uses a Model-Build-Lean loop. In simple terms, start with a basic model. Build the first one. Put it in the hands of the professional sailors to see what works, what doesn't and why. Take those insights back to the designers to make modifications, build the second one and repeat. By the 4th or 5th version, you're pretty close to your optimal design. We use this technique every day and it's just the standard approach to technology development.
So why does the Pentagon have such difficulty utilizing this proven method? The Chinese are clearly doing so with great effect. The concerns in the podcast about starting and stopping the production lines are certainly valid but are also easily resolved by instilling this innovation model into the production and evaluation cycle. I consider the shipbuilder's threats about laying off people to be little more than posturing. Many other industries have successfully implemented this innovation model with great success. There is no reason why the shipbuilders cannot do so as well.
So how do you solve this? Is it a political function? If so, does it get handled at the legislative branch when funding is approved or at the executive branch where funding is requested and projects executed? This is a solvable problem and frankly one that can be solved within 2 years if a true innovation model was widely embraced. As a nation, we are setting ourselves up for failure by not doing so.