Very interesting, thanks. The section in the linked report about why Sydney got so close to the Kormoran only raises more questions.
Without having had the context of people who were in the navy, and for whatever reasons, isn't 1 mile distance to an unknown ship in times of war, basically dumb? No matter if it _looked_ like a freighter, no matter if you're in a hurry. But it was a war, and Australia was part of the British Empire, so at that time, at war, right?
"Do all your watch standers know how critical their position and responsibility is? From the OOD to the YN3 on the 50cal.; do they appreciate that they are as important as the Commanding Officer?"
That seems like it should be reworded slightly.... wouldn't it make more sense to say that they have the "potential" to be as important as the Commanding Officer?
The .50cal guy might have one or two ship-saving decisions to make on the worst day of his life. The Commanding Officer on the same day would potentially be making dozens of ship-saving decisions.
FBF...come for the tale, stay for the comments. Having actual testimony from only one side of the battle (Sydney been lost with all hands) is tragic for the obvious loss of life but also for never being alble to answer the "what the hell happened here" questions. Forget where I originally heard / read it, but "surprise is something that occurs in the mind of a commander". The Sydney was "surprised". The "why" is something we will never know, so we can only speculate unfairly. The linked article details the prior assignment / career arc of her Captain, he was (perhaps) on his way up, and had recently been a staff officer...not sure how much time at sea he actually had, apologies for not reading more closely. BUT, another ship had been criticized for "excessive expenditure of ordinance while engaging another ship in the recent past". Using "20 - 20 hindsight" his decision to close to knife fighting range and giving away his long range gunnery advantage may well have been influenced by that "excessive expenditure of ordinance" knowledge from his staff tour, and as a rising star, he expected to go back to staff. So (unfairly speculating) he elected to close the range in the failing light. In retrospect, a bad decision. This is an unfair "big conclusion on scant data" conclusion on my part...but have to point out the USN was going thru similar wartime purge of "suitable for staff only" captains (particularly in the sub force) at that time. May they all rest in peace.
You lose a Cruiser with all hands early in the war, you'll darn sure want to know how & why. So reaching big conclusions on scant data as the path forward isn't necessarily unfair. It's just what you do to try to prevent it from happening again. Every sailor should be asking himself, "What if?" and have a plan for it. Train, train, train. Stay alert. Be prepared. "Training. Drills. PMS. PQS. Attention to detail." You know...the thing. You do your speculating with the information at hand. Nothing unfair about it
So many of these FbF stories should be required reading. I think there'd be an appetite for it out in the Fleet. Wish I'd had access to such material when I was a Training PO or Training Officer. Imagine James Earl Jones (RIP) narrating this story on tape to 1st or OI Division on a DDG or LHA.
If you ignore the nationalities up front, the Kormoran acts like a ship of Nelson's day. Hold fire, double shot, let them get close and make the first salvo a killer. Then rapid reload and pour it on. The Kormoran also clearly had the psychological edge as well. Their crew knew what needed to be done and how important early salvos were. On the other side, complacency.
Not a Surface Warfare guy, but my tank gunnery experience at 1000 meters (battlesight range) fits here. Always shoot a bit lower than center of mass:
1. The ballistic arc gives you a high prob of a hit, even if ranging is off
2. it's hard to get a good correction from an 'over'
3. shorts can skip into the target, are easy to correct, and hurt enemy morale
They should have gotten a response to NK at longer range
Am a big fan and reader of Royal Navy novels set in the Napoleonic War. The guile, the cunning, the esprit de corps of the lower decks and gun room, the education of Middies boarding & cutting out parties, the rabid belligerence of the fight and the benevolence to the defeated afterward. Honorable men, as it should be in the military.
If you’re sloppy and your opponent is not, there is a good chance you’re gonna get wrecked…
Don’t be sloppy… and have a good day!
That is another gripping tale! You always have the best.
Very interesting, thanks. The section in the linked report about why Sydney got so close to the Kormoran only raises more questions.
Without having had the context of people who were in the navy, and for whatever reasons, isn't 1 mile distance to an unknown ship in times of war, basically dumb? No matter if it _looked_ like a freighter, no matter if you're in a hurry. But it was a war, and Australia was part of the British Empire, so at that time, at war, right?
"Do all your watch standers know how critical their position and responsibility is? From the OOD to the YN3 on the 50cal.; do they appreciate that they are as important as the Commanding Officer?"
That seems like it should be reworded slightly.... wouldn't it make more sense to say that they have the "potential" to be as important as the Commanding Officer?
The .50cal guy might have one or two ship-saving decisions to make on the worst day of his life. The Commanding Officer on the same day would potentially be making dozens of ship-saving decisions.
While no one survived Sydney, one body recovered from raft well north of the battle near Christmas Island was buried there, and recently DNA testing established it was a crewmember who had apparently gotten into a raft and lived for a day or two. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Welsby_Clark#:~:text=20%20February%201941.-,Formal%20identification,80th%20anniversary%20of%20the%20battle.
FBF...come for the tale, stay for the comments. Having actual testimony from only one side of the battle (Sydney been lost with all hands) is tragic for the obvious loss of life but also for never being alble to answer the "what the hell happened here" questions. Forget where I originally heard / read it, but "surprise is something that occurs in the mind of a commander". The Sydney was "surprised". The "why" is something we will never know, so we can only speculate unfairly. The linked article details the prior assignment / career arc of her Captain, he was (perhaps) on his way up, and had recently been a staff officer...not sure how much time at sea he actually had, apologies for not reading more closely. BUT, another ship had been criticized for "excessive expenditure of ordinance while engaging another ship in the recent past". Using "20 - 20 hindsight" his decision to close to knife fighting range and giving away his long range gunnery advantage may well have been influenced by that "excessive expenditure of ordinance" knowledge from his staff tour, and as a rising star, he expected to go back to staff. So (unfairly speculating) he elected to close the range in the failing light. In retrospect, a bad decision. This is an unfair "big conclusion on scant data" conclusion on my part...but have to point out the USN was going thru similar wartime purge of "suitable for staff only" captains (particularly in the sub force) at that time. May they all rest in peace.
You lose a Cruiser with all hands early in the war, you'll darn sure want to know how & why. So reaching big conclusions on scant data as the path forward isn't necessarily unfair. It's just what you do to try to prevent it from happening again. Every sailor should be asking himself, "What if?" and have a plan for it. Train, train, train. Stay alert. Be prepared. "Training. Drills. PMS. PQS. Attention to detail." You know...the thing. You do your speculating with the information at hand. Nothing unfair about it
So many of these FbF stories should be required reading. I think there'd be an appetite for it out in the Fleet. Wish I'd had access to such material when I was a Training PO or Training Officer. Imagine James Earl Jones (RIP) narrating this story on tape to 1st or OI Division on a DDG or LHA.
If you ignore the nationalities up front, the Kormoran acts like a ship of Nelson's day. Hold fire, double shot, let them get close and make the first salvo a killer. Then rapid reload and pour it on. The Kormoran also clearly had the psychological edge as well. Their crew knew what needed to be done and how important early salvos were. On the other side, complacency.
Not a Surface Warfare guy, but my tank gunnery experience at 1000 meters (battlesight range) fits here. Always shoot a bit lower than center of mass:
1. The ballistic arc gives you a high prob of a hit, even if ranging is off
2. it's hard to get a good correction from an 'over'
3. shorts can skip into the target, are easy to correct, and hurt enemy morale
They should have gotten a response to NK at longer range
Am a big fan and reader of Royal Navy novels set in the Napoleonic War. The guile, the cunning, the esprit de corps of the lower decks and gun room, the education of Middies boarding & cutting out parties, the rabid belligerence of the fight and the benevolence to the defeated afterward. Honorable men, as it should be in the military.
More of the lead up but far less of the battle can be found in this 1950 Proceedings. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1950/december/german-raider-kormoran-sydneys-nemesis
HMAS SYDNEY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d7EJREqsDTw
NAVAL Society AUSSIELANDIA ... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ujo9VX1OScY
Even the lion uses all his strength to catch a mouse.