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“we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex”
- The money shot. We see it at every sportsball flyover.
After reading Bryan’s admiration and cumulative results of the MIC here a few of my immediate thoughts: Using the example of the current Red Sea operations…
“we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex”
- The money shot. We see it at every sportsball flyover.
After reading Bryan’s admiration and cumulative results of the MIC here a few of my immediate thoughts: Using the example of the current Red Sea operations as a metric for MIC success is a bit disingenuous. Our current Navy doctrine is a result of an evolutionary process that is based on decades of sea duty and exercises and fleet battle experiments that is boiled down into DOCTRINE/OPORDS/ROE/BATTLE ORDERS. We are using our navy in an effort to clear the sea lines of commerce (which is absolutely our duty and responsibility as a Naval power) while putting our naval doctrine and individual tactics to practical use as designed. We have been attacking Islamic pirates literally since the 1800’s. While fighting the sand people of the straits of Barbara Mandrell and winning, we are potentially leading ourselves down the dangerous path of hubris while patting ourselves on the back as to our self declared metrics of success. Caution, We are using up valuable stores from our big Navy magazine. A magazine that everyone knows is over priced, under funded, under supplied yet critically needed for the SURVIVAL of our Navy ergo our republic. We won’t truly be able to judge maritime quality and success until we read the after actions of the coming sea battles against the Chinese.
Regarding the technical side of the argument, evolution of naval systems is more pennywise than the pound foolish revolution of systems. Like Bryan, I was on an FF in the late 80’s where we slowly introduced JOTS (very early precursor to JMCIS and later GCCS) and a world of wonder opened up with tactical pictures being shared. I don’t ascribe this evolution necessarily to the MIC so much as the natural evolution of naval warfare. The MIC is simply the means to achieve it. Or that should have been the path. In later years on board a CVN while in the yards, I would see NAVAIR contractors invade my CDC and install equipment that literally no one knew how to operate or even understand what its purpose was. A NAVAIR civil servant would hand over a bunch of technical information and we would get a few contractors to ride along on our first underway to test the system/equipment and “train” the operators and maintenance techs. Was the equipment needed? I don’t know. Did the equipment improve our fighting ability? In my opinion, no. We had to redirect training a new crew on a new system that negated our previous experience operating an “older” system. The new system lost all the experience and everyone was now a new learner on an immature combat system. The old “give it to them and let them figure it out” seemed the order of the day and the way to force success. Is the fault of the “MIC” I don’t know. I suspect that the equipment was sold to a room of admirals by a group of retired admirals as very necessary “across the naval enterprise” and well the next thing we know, we are having it installed. Some worked (GCCS) some didn’t (SDC). The gear came aboard before the “integration cut off date”. Funny thing is the new equipment and the manpower requirements and actual new transfers of Sailors never coincided. That’s another story.
I saw the same thing happen while I was in my twilight years at a naval technical training command. I watched as we were sold a bundle of training aids as a way to induce faster learning. Our ISIC swallowed the pitch and the training aids were forced into the curriculum. Unsupported and unable to perform, the navy instructors were able to make the training aids limp along for a DECADE until a new set of training aids were developed. The result? The manpower and instruction hour reductions sold to the navy by the MIC as an efficiency actually led to fewer instructors (course ratios and time to train = fewer instructors) more training time and lost training days and fewer training stations due to broken and unsupported and unsustainable equipment. Let’s not even talk about NMCI or “not mission capable internet”. Who can forget the doctor evil meme of the day about NMCI?
Have there been successes? Sure. Have there been colossal failures? Absolutely.
Is the MIC necessary for our evolution as a military? Yes.
I can’t bring myself however to praise the MIC as angelic where the board of directors of these companies are made in the noble mode of Lancelot. I have been under the dress of the fat lady (worked for LM for a couple of years) and have seen the view. Let’s not gloss over the revolving door and it’s effects as Flag officers move into the MIC as members of the board and company / corporate officers.
"...We are using up valuable stores from our big Navy magazine."
And if we are not using it, we are shipping it at a faster rate to a war of dubious concerns.
I don't think there is going to be a huge years-long demand for 155mm in Taiwan. If the PLA gets ashore there isn't going to be any convenient way to ship bulk ammo into Taiwan, not by ship or by air. They will have to shoot what they have, not count on Uncle Sugar to help them out.