Great article, in which personal history well illustrates the core idea. A few more thoughts:
.
In general, a nation’s military power is the first derivative of its industrial power. That is, military power can only flow out of the national energy base plus all the mines, mills, factories, design shops, construction yards and more; including a robust education system, K-12/college/grad/professional.
.
Point being… If you want any sort of military capability and power, you must have industry. And since almost every military thing flows from many different elements of many different industries, there must be some sort of “complex” that unifies the whole. In that sense, the idea of the military-industrial complex (MIC) is really just a shorthand statement of a basic fact of national life. The MIC-term ought not be pejorative.
.
Then again, building and maintaining military power is expensive. So we get the anti-MIC argument that every military article or service means that tax dollars don’t go to some other project; schools, roads, national parks, more bureaucrats, etc. Aka competition for resources/tax dollars.
.
At political levels the scale of MIC comes back to national levels of strategy, of “deciders” deciding how to marry up national goals with national capabilities and resources. In the case of the Navy, Coast Guard and related institutions, it’s critical that leadership clearly define the threats, missions, needs, goals… and understand national industrial capabilities. Focus on clear thinking — know your history, discern present situations, and look forward — and then find suitable pathways within the arena of resources that are out there.
Well said; and, all correct. Alas, the entire also eats up a critical resource that we are desperately short on........time.
we need to make immense, even risky, leaps into ways and means to quickly create, modify, improve, build, test, and produce, all things upon which this nation, and the Navy, depend so much.
Quite eloquent, but I still have this feeling that we are engaging in endless wars that are not in our national interest but enhance the bottom lines of defense contractors and line the pockets of politicians.
Great article! I wish that the stated dedication of the surface warfare industrial complex also applied to the private shipyard industrial complex. I don't see anywhere near the same level of stated dedication and only see decisions made to do what's best for their bonuses and not the US Navy.
Hats off to Bryan. Timely, and spot-on, especially the "Navy is often a difficult, if not terrible customer". But we beg for more money for ships, subs, ships, and then let those hard-won and precious assets suffer due to insufficient funding for maintenance. We've all seen the "rust bucket" photo of USS Cutting Edge in some multi-nat exercise when all the other elements are at least well maintained on the exterior (their combat systems may suck, but they LOOK good).
So Bryan, get back on that horse and start attacking the ones that won't cough up the funds for shipyards, floating drydocks, and systems that prevent incidents like the Miami and BHR, and now over 35% of SSNs awaiting maintenance.
There is nothing in this article to justify the uses to which our military might has been put. Defense is all well and good, but that’s not why we have military hardware all over the globe. I realize those kinds of choices are beyond the remit of this author. But the choices that matter most are not how to build up a great force. It’s what we do with it that counts most. If only the fairy tale were true: the story that says this is all about defense. Maybe someday soon it will be. But not because of the great job we did spending our blood and treasure around the world.
Well written article that highlights the potential pitfalls of applying lived experience to current and near future events. The Browning .50 cal and C-130 are prominent success stories of the MIC. Despite multiple (and expensive) efforts to provide new designs that the MIC would sell to DoD, they are still very much in the inventory, and will be for the foreseeable future. There was a time when the MIC was all about winning wars (see War, WW II, War, Cold for reference). Over time, the people and boards running the MIC gradually became less concerned with developing capabilities to deter threats and win wars more concerned with, to put it crudely...profit. That shift has been a gradual shift on a vernier scale over time, but seems to be accelerating from the capability side towards the profit side. The F15, AEGIS Radar Systems, M1 were all designed and produced many years ago. They are in our memory banks, and influence our thinking about the MIC (and Dod) today. We are personally not what we were 20 years ago, but that memory influences our thinking about today. What the MIC was, and what it is today requires constant evaluation and assessment to achieve an accurate assessment of what they say they do, what they actually do, and the money sources that pay them. Investment in shipyards and critical defense mineral procurement are not sexy and / or profitable. But they are crucial to national defense. If more money is spent by the MIC on lobbying congress than on maintaining shipyards, that speaks quite clearly.
The devil is in the details. Most people have no idea what it costs to do business with the Government. It is true that the profit margin is low, usually less than 5.5% on a Cost Plus contract but that is just the tip of the iceberg when you discuss total expenses. The system is codified into law (read, many lawyers and Government Compliance personnel) and the people who write the Request for Proposals and the contracts themselves can bake a ton of unnecessary spending into the cake. Add the contract managers and auditors, and you are off to the spending races. Besides cost, the process also frequently adds time.
“we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex”
- The money shot. We see it at every sportsball flyover.
After reading Bryan’s admiration and cumulative results of the MIC here a few of my immediate thoughts: Using the example of the current Red Sea operations as a metric for MIC success is a bit disingenuous. Our current Navy doctrine is a result of an evolutionary process that is based on decades of sea duty and exercises and fleet battle experiments that is boiled down into DOCTRINE/OPORDS/ROE/BATTLE ORDERS. We are using our navy in an effort to clear the sea lines of commerce (which is absolutely our duty and responsibility as a Naval power) while putting our naval doctrine and individual tactics to practical use as designed. We have been attacking Islamic pirates literally since the 1800’s. While fighting the sand people of the straits of Barbara Mandrell and winning, we are potentially leading ourselves down the dangerous path of hubris while patting ourselves on the back as to our self declared metrics of success. Caution, We are using up valuable stores from our big Navy magazine. A magazine that everyone knows is over priced, under funded, under supplied yet critically needed for the SURVIVAL of our Navy ergo our republic. We won’t truly be able to judge maritime quality and success until we read the after actions of the coming sea battles against the Chinese.
Regarding the technical side of the argument, evolution of naval systems is more pennywise than the pound foolish revolution of systems. Like Bryan, I was on an FF in the late 80’s where we slowly introduced JOTS (very early precursor to JMCIS and later GCCS) and a world of wonder opened up with tactical pictures being shared. I don’t ascribe this evolution necessarily to the MIC so much as the natural evolution of naval warfare. The MIC is simply the means to achieve it. Or that should have been the path. In later years on board a CVN while in the yards, I would see NAVAIR contractors invade my CDC and install equipment that literally no one knew how to operate or even understand what its purpose was. A NAVAIR civil servant would hand over a bunch of technical information and we would get a few contractors to ride along on our first underway to test the system/equipment and “train” the operators and maintenance techs. Was the equipment needed? I don’t know. Did the equipment improve our fighting ability? In my opinion, no. We had to redirect training a new crew on a new system that negated our previous experience operating an “older” system. The new system lost all the experience and everyone was now a new learner on an immature combat system. The old “give it to them and let them figure it out” seemed the order of the day and the way to force success. Is the fault of the “MIC” I don’t know. I suspect that the equipment was sold to a room of admirals by a group of retired admirals as very necessary “across the naval enterprise” and well the next thing we know, we are having it installed. Some worked (GCCS) some didn’t (SDC). The gear came aboard before the “integration cut off date”. Funny thing is the new equipment and the manpower requirements and actual new transfers of Sailors never coincided. That’s another story.
I saw the same thing happen while I was in my twilight years at a naval technical training command. I watched as we were sold a bundle of training aids as a way to induce faster learning. Our ISIC swallowed the pitch and the training aids were forced into the curriculum. Unsupported and unable to perform, the navy instructors were able to make the training aids limp along for a DECADE until a new set of training aids were developed. The result? The manpower and instruction hour reductions sold to the navy by the MIC as an efficiency actually led to fewer instructors (course ratios and time to train = fewer instructors) more training time and lost training days and fewer training stations due to broken and unsupported and unsustainable equipment. Let’s not even talk about NMCI or “not mission capable internet”. Who can forget the doctor evil meme of the day about NMCI?
Have there been successes? Sure. Have there been colossal failures? Absolutely.
Is the MIC necessary for our evolution as a military? Yes.
I can’t bring myself however to praise the MIC as angelic where the board of directors of these companies are made in the noble mode of Lancelot. I have been under the dress of the fat lady (worked for LM for a couple of years) and have seen the view. Let’s not gloss over the revolving door and it’s effects as Flag officers move into the MIC as members of the board and company / corporate officers.
Bryan McGrath seems to have conflated, deliberately or by accident - I will let other decide- weapons development and the Military-Industrial Complex. Weapon development is useful, essential and really cool.
The Military-Industrial Complex is where Captains and Admirals leave service to go to work for defense contractors and then lobby for the purchase of weapons systems whether needed or not. It influences policy, it makes policy by sliding into bed quite willingly with the Intelligence Community to father unholy children which then emerge with a taste for more. More control, more influence, money is just a means to an end. It consumes budget needed for maintenance, training and raw numbers of ships/munitions/etc as it chases newer, more expensive, less reliable ships/weapons/munitions.
I won't fisk the article fully but think many of the assertations above can be challenged on grounds of fact rather than just on personal anecdote.
Great article, in which personal history well illustrates the core idea. A few more thoughts:
.
In general, a nation’s military power is the first derivative of its industrial power. That is, military power can only flow out of the national energy base plus all the mines, mills, factories, design shops, construction yards and more; including a robust education system, K-12/college/grad/professional.
.
Point being… If you want any sort of military capability and power, you must have industry. And since almost every military thing flows from many different elements of many different industries, there must be some sort of “complex” that unifies the whole. In that sense, the idea of the military-industrial complex (MIC) is really just a shorthand statement of a basic fact of national life. The MIC-term ought not be pejorative.
.
Then again, building and maintaining military power is expensive. So we get the anti-MIC argument that every military article or service means that tax dollars don’t go to some other project; schools, roads, national parks, more bureaucrats, etc. Aka competition for resources/tax dollars.
.
At political levels the scale of MIC comes back to national levels of strategy, of “deciders” deciding how to marry up national goals with national capabilities and resources. In the case of the Navy, Coast Guard and related institutions, it’s critical that leadership clearly define the threats, missions, needs, goals… and understand national industrial capabilities. Focus on clear thinking — know your history, discern present situations, and look forward — and then find suitable pathways within the arena of resources that are out there.
Well said; and, all correct. Alas, the entire also eats up a critical resource that we are desperately short on........time.
we need to make immense, even risky, leaps into ways and means to quickly create, modify, improve, build, test, and produce, all things upon which this nation, and the Navy, depend so much.
time is NOT on our side
Thanks Bryan / thanks Sal. Superb description of how the surface navy needs a robust and profitable industrial base.
Quite eloquent, but I still have this feeling that we are engaging in endless wars that are not in our national interest but enhance the bottom lines of defense contractors and line the pockets of politicians.
Great article! I wish that the stated dedication of the surface warfare industrial complex also applied to the private shipyard industrial complex. I don't see anywhere near the same level of stated dedication and only see decisions made to do what's best for their bonuses and not the US Navy.
Hats off to Bryan. Timely, and spot-on, especially the "Navy is often a difficult, if not terrible customer". But we beg for more money for ships, subs, ships, and then let those hard-won and precious assets suffer due to insufficient funding for maintenance. We've all seen the "rust bucket" photo of USS Cutting Edge in some multi-nat exercise when all the other elements are at least well maintained on the exterior (their combat systems may suck, but they LOOK good).
So Bryan, get back on that horse and start attacking the ones that won't cough up the funds for shipyards, floating drydocks, and systems that prevent incidents like the Miami and BHR, and now over 35% of SSNs awaiting maintenance.
There is nothing in this article to justify the uses to which our military might has been put. Defense is all well and good, but that’s not why we have military hardware all over the globe. I realize those kinds of choices are beyond the remit of this author. But the choices that matter most are not how to build up a great force. It’s what we do with it that counts most. If only the fairy tale were true: the story that says this is all about defense. Maybe someday soon it will be. But not because of the great job we did spending our blood and treasure around the world.
We need to provide the Navy with full magazines, and a functional Fleet Train, to keep them, the fuel bunkers, and gallies full.
We need weapons, lethal and modern, the MIC supplies those, for a cost.
They can get out of hand and begin to go Missile gap.
I understand Carter cut the military to the bone, but was instrumental and spent that money on developing Cruise missiles.
Take good with the bad.
Phenomenal - with all the doom and gloom reports on acquisition this is timely. The question thus becomes, "So what the hell happened with LCS?"
God, I loved my years as a civilian military contractor…
Well written article that highlights the potential pitfalls of applying lived experience to current and near future events. The Browning .50 cal and C-130 are prominent success stories of the MIC. Despite multiple (and expensive) efforts to provide new designs that the MIC would sell to DoD, they are still very much in the inventory, and will be for the foreseeable future. There was a time when the MIC was all about winning wars (see War, WW II, War, Cold for reference). Over time, the people and boards running the MIC gradually became less concerned with developing capabilities to deter threats and win wars more concerned with, to put it crudely...profit. That shift has been a gradual shift on a vernier scale over time, but seems to be accelerating from the capability side towards the profit side. The F15, AEGIS Radar Systems, M1 were all designed and produced many years ago. They are in our memory banks, and influence our thinking about the MIC (and Dod) today. We are personally not what we were 20 years ago, but that memory influences our thinking about today. What the MIC was, and what it is today requires constant evaluation and assessment to achieve an accurate assessment of what they say they do, what they actually do, and the money sources that pay them. Investment in shipyards and critical defense mineral procurement are not sexy and / or profitable. But they are crucial to national defense. If more money is spent by the MIC on lobbying congress than on maintaining shipyards, that speaks quite clearly.
Almost wish the Houthis get lucky once, so the world gets reminded "DON'T TOUCH THE BOATS".
The devil is in the details. Most people have no idea what it costs to do business with the Government. It is true that the profit margin is low, usually less than 5.5% on a Cost Plus contract but that is just the tip of the iceberg when you discuss total expenses. The system is codified into law (read, many lawyers and Government Compliance personnel) and the people who write the Request for Proposals and the contracts themselves can bake a ton of unnecessary spending into the cake. Add the contract managers and auditors, and you are off to the spending races. Besides cost, the process also frequently adds time.
“we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex”
- The money shot. We see it at every sportsball flyover.
After reading Bryan’s admiration and cumulative results of the MIC here a few of my immediate thoughts: Using the example of the current Red Sea operations as a metric for MIC success is a bit disingenuous. Our current Navy doctrine is a result of an evolutionary process that is based on decades of sea duty and exercises and fleet battle experiments that is boiled down into DOCTRINE/OPORDS/ROE/BATTLE ORDERS. We are using our navy in an effort to clear the sea lines of commerce (which is absolutely our duty and responsibility as a Naval power) while putting our naval doctrine and individual tactics to practical use as designed. We have been attacking Islamic pirates literally since the 1800’s. While fighting the sand people of the straits of Barbara Mandrell and winning, we are potentially leading ourselves down the dangerous path of hubris while patting ourselves on the back as to our self declared metrics of success. Caution, We are using up valuable stores from our big Navy magazine. A magazine that everyone knows is over priced, under funded, under supplied yet critically needed for the SURVIVAL of our Navy ergo our republic. We won’t truly be able to judge maritime quality and success until we read the after actions of the coming sea battles against the Chinese.
Regarding the technical side of the argument, evolution of naval systems is more pennywise than the pound foolish revolution of systems. Like Bryan, I was on an FF in the late 80’s where we slowly introduced JOTS (very early precursor to JMCIS and later GCCS) and a world of wonder opened up with tactical pictures being shared. I don’t ascribe this evolution necessarily to the MIC so much as the natural evolution of naval warfare. The MIC is simply the means to achieve it. Or that should have been the path. In later years on board a CVN while in the yards, I would see NAVAIR contractors invade my CDC and install equipment that literally no one knew how to operate or even understand what its purpose was. A NAVAIR civil servant would hand over a bunch of technical information and we would get a few contractors to ride along on our first underway to test the system/equipment and “train” the operators and maintenance techs. Was the equipment needed? I don’t know. Did the equipment improve our fighting ability? In my opinion, no. We had to redirect training a new crew on a new system that negated our previous experience operating an “older” system. The new system lost all the experience and everyone was now a new learner on an immature combat system. The old “give it to them and let them figure it out” seemed the order of the day and the way to force success. Is the fault of the “MIC” I don’t know. I suspect that the equipment was sold to a room of admirals by a group of retired admirals as very necessary “across the naval enterprise” and well the next thing we know, we are having it installed. Some worked (GCCS) some didn’t (SDC). The gear came aboard before the “integration cut off date”. Funny thing is the new equipment and the manpower requirements and actual new transfers of Sailors never coincided. That’s another story.
I saw the same thing happen while I was in my twilight years at a naval technical training command. I watched as we were sold a bundle of training aids as a way to induce faster learning. Our ISIC swallowed the pitch and the training aids were forced into the curriculum. Unsupported and unable to perform, the navy instructors were able to make the training aids limp along for a DECADE until a new set of training aids were developed. The result? The manpower and instruction hour reductions sold to the navy by the MIC as an efficiency actually led to fewer instructors (course ratios and time to train = fewer instructors) more training time and lost training days and fewer training stations due to broken and unsupported and unsustainable equipment. Let’s not even talk about NMCI or “not mission capable internet”. Who can forget the doctor evil meme of the day about NMCI?
Have there been successes? Sure. Have there been colossal failures? Absolutely.
Is the MIC necessary for our evolution as a military? Yes.
I can’t bring myself however to praise the MIC as angelic where the board of directors of these companies are made in the noble mode of Lancelot. I have been under the dress of the fat lady (worked for LM for a couple of years) and have seen the view. Let’s not gloss over the revolving door and it’s effects as Flag officers move into the MIC as members of the board and company / corporate officers.
Bryan McGrath seems to have conflated, deliberately or by accident - I will let other decide- weapons development and the Military-Industrial Complex. Weapon development is useful, essential and really cool.
The Military-Industrial Complex is where Captains and Admirals leave service to go to work for defense contractors and then lobby for the purchase of weapons systems whether needed or not. It influences policy, it makes policy by sliding into bed quite willingly with the Intelligence Community to father unholy children which then emerge with a taste for more. More control, more influence, money is just a means to an end. It consumes budget needed for maintenance, training and raw numbers of ships/munitions/etc as it chases newer, more expensive, less reliable ships/weapons/munitions.
I won't fisk the article fully but think many of the assertations above can be challenged on grounds of fact rather than just on personal anecdote.
*edited*