The Great Pacific War You Need to be Ready For

ten months into a 72-hour war isn’t easy

As the saying goes: history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.

Ten months into a 72-hour war isn’t easy.

In autumn 2027, Adm. Admiral Samuel Paparo, the Chief of Naval Operations, was still trying to fully understand his new responsibilities under the new Reed-Wicker Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 2027 that passed in September, two months after he was brought out of a very brief retirement. He was still mostly making it up as he went along, and he now faced a dilemma: The battles of the Sulu Sea and Guam, and the still-ongoing Solomons campaign had severely weakened the U.S. Navy’s fleet carrier presence in the Pacific. USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) had been lost at Sulu Sea, Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) at Guam, and George Washington (CVN 73) during the Battle of Senkaku Islands. USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) had been torpedoed and sunk south of the Solomons in September. Although she remained operational, USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) had been repeatedly damaged during the naval engagements around Taiwan and would eventually require repairs at a U.S. shipyard. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), which had also been damaged at Guam, was undergoing repairs at Pearl Harbor. USS Nimitz (CVN 68) was quickly brought back online a month after deactivation began, but despite taking part in the Allied strikes off Pakistan in November (Operation Cricket), she was not deemed suitable for combat in the Pacific. Its teething problems solved, USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79) and the maintenance delayed USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) were not expected to join the fleet until late 2028. The next FORD Class carrier, Enterprise, won’t even commission for another year at best with even the most optimistic timelines to get HII itself up and running properly in addition to the damage Enterprise received at HII at D+0. Between maintenance and just plain bad luck at D+0, our Atlantic carriers were at least a year from having any ability to come to the fight in the Pacific. Don’t even get started discussing how we will find airwings to put on them.

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Because of the infuriatingly still unknown status of HII shipyard’s full recovery, and the resulting unknown timeline for repairs of the Norfolk-based carriers damaged at the D+0 attacks, immediately following the Battle of Senkaku Islands, Paparo had requested assistance from the British Admiralty for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, but the two Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers were heavily engaged keeping the Russians east of Bear Island and with the Italians and French to keep the Turks in the Eastern Mediterranean at the time. Now, he again approached the British with a similar request, one that quickly made its way into communications between Washington DC and London. Despite its continuing heavy operational commitments, the Royal Navy detached the carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth from the Home Fleet for service with the U.S. Navy. After a hasty replenishment at Portsmouth, England, Queen Elizabeth departed British waters on Dec. 20, making a brief stop in Bermuda, and arriving in port at Mayport, FL., on the last day of 2027.

As regulars know, here and on Midrats I continue to warn of this simple fact: When the Great Pacific War comes—regardless of what people may wish—we will send our ships in to harm’s way. We will lose ships, a lot of them, and quickly. Irrespective of that, the war will have its own inertia and we will have to keep fighting.

What? You think the above seems like bad, poorly thought-out military fiction? Perhaps

Something that could never happen? I mean, really … what would they do, take the HMS Queen Elizabeth and call it … the what exactly … the USS Bluebird?

Just silly stuff, right?

No, not really.

My friend Chuck reminded me last week of a post of mine from 2018 based on a great bit of under-known naval history via Carsten Fries at NHHC. Though I added a twist or two at the opening, we have been here before;

In autumn 1942, Adm. Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations, faced a dilemma: The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, and the still-ongoing Guadalcanal campaign had severely weakened the U.S. Navy’s fleet carrier presence in the Pacific. USS Lexington (CV 2) had been lost at Coral Sea, USS Yorktown (CV 5) at Midway, and Hornet (CV 8) during the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. USS Wasp (CV 7) had been torpedoed and sunk south of the Solomons in September. Although she remained operational, USS Enterprise (CV 6) had been repeatedly damaged during the naval engagements around Guadalcanal and would eventually require repairs at a U.S. shipyard. USS Saratoga (CV 3), which had also been damaged in the Solomons, was undergoing repairs at Pearl Harbor. USS Ranger (CV 4), despite taking part in the Allied landings in North Africa in November (Operation Torch), was not deemed suitable for combat in the Pacific. The first new Essex-class carriers were not expected to join the fleet until late 1943.
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Immediately following the Battle of Midway, King had requested assistance from the British Admiralty for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, but the Royal Navy’s flattops were heavily engaged against the Germans in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean at the time. Now, he again approached the British with a similar request, one that quickly made its way into communications between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Despite its continuing heavy operational commitments, the Royal Navy detached the carrier HMS Victorious from the Home Fleet for service with the U.S. Navy. After a hasty replenishment at Greenoch, Scotland, Victorious departed British waters on Dec. 20, making a brief stop in Bermuda, and arriving in port at Norfolk, Va., on the last day of 1942.
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At Norfolk, Victorious was dry-docked from Jan. 1-31, 1943.
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Victorious departed Norfolk on Feb. 3 en route to the Panama Canal—and assigned the U.S. Navy two-syllable call sign “Robin.” Intensive flight operations utilizing U.S. Navy procedures, both with Martlet IV (Wildcat F4F-4) fighters and the still-unfamiliar TBMs,
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On May 17, Victorious reached Noumea, New Caledonia, and joined Saratoga in Rear Adm. DeWitt Ramsey’s Carrier Division 1.
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As part of Rear Adm. Forrest P. Sherman’s Task Group 36.3, the carriers left Noumea on June 27 to take part in Operation Toenails, the invasion of New Georgia. The Task Group was not involved in the amphibious landings themselves, but instead remained on station for 28 days to provide air cover for the transports and landing force. Victorious’s crew’s extensive training in U.S. procedures and the mutual exchange of practical experience paid off as U.S. and British sailors kept patrol aircraft in the air for nearly 12 hours per day.
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On July 31, “Robin” detached to rejoin the British Home Fleet by way of Pearl Harbor and Norfolk, where her U.S. Navy communications, radar, and flight operations gear were removed.

She returned, with style.

Victorious returned to the Pacific in early 1945. As a component of the British Pacific Fleet, she took part in Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa, where, on May 9, she was struck by two kamikaze aircraft. Her armored flight deck absorbed the blows and, despite fire damage, she resumed flight operations within hours of the strikes. In contrast, the unarmored Essex-class carriers USS Franklin (CV 13), severely damaged by a kamikaze in March 1945, and USS Hancock (CV 19), hit by a kamikaze during Iceberg, had to withdraw completely from combat operations.
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Of note: All U.S. Navy carriers in use since World War II have had armored flight decks.

So, with our industrial capacity only a fraction of what it was 85 years ago, and our allies’ industrial capacity in even worse shape…how would we find the capabilities we know we will need to push the fight?

Who, if anyone, would we be able to rely on? How? With what?

Do we abandon the field, or do we push the fight forward?