I teach high school AFJROTC and we have been told not to order blue uniforms for our cadets as the AF doesn't have enough for active duty (and OCPs are off the table as the Air National Guard and Reserves don't have enough even though Army JROTC has been issuing them). FFS, if we can't even deliver enough basics like uniforms, how are we going to sustain operations in a major war with bombs, aircraft and naval vessel parts, etc.?
So are you putting them in M81 Woodland? Or Olive Drab? Or can you even get the old stuff anymore?
One has to wonder what the situation would have been if the services had not been playing the "completely new pattern/uniform of the month" game over the past decades.
I believe you have a typo, ..."or everything from 5.56mm to 48-inch torpedoes." Heavyweight/submarine torpedoes are Mk48. They are 21 inches in diameter.
Also the Falklands was a short victorious war (for the British). They quickly ran out of lightweight torpedoes, had to ask US for some in the war reserve stock, and still did not sink an Argentine sub.
Logistics and math are hard, and this is a hard subject to get explain. This is one of the most important pieces I've seen from you Sal. I hope some of the Pentagon guys see this and heed the warning.
Oh, exquisite. I thought exquisite intel would solve these issues. Nice.
Amen to your last three paragraphs. I submit that the Navy’s biggest problem in this regard is itself because executing this effort will expose the complicit silence of too many in the Potomac Fleet. As you have said many, many times - the only thing you’re going to get is what you measure, and we have been measuring social programs at the expense of readiness shortfalls.
Immediately after 9/11, I contacted the Coast Guard, and based on my experience and observations explained several simple ways that a hostile asymmetric force could shut down most U.S. ports. Crickets. No observable response.
I shared this article on twitter. It's incredibly relevant and compelling. I've seen the internal debates first hand regarding munitions procurement vs. inventory. They're not pretty - and because of the resource constrained fiscal environment - some contorted decisions are made. But when weapons manufacturers get to min sustain rate production, its hard and long for them and their suppliers to ramp back up again. See Javelin and Stinger production...
As the PEO in charge of all Navy/Marine Corps air to ground weapons and the Tomahawk weapons system during and after 9/11 I can attest to the difficulty for both government and industry to gear up to wartime production from peacetime status. While congress was fairly quick i providing funding for increased production of much needed weapons there are still the requirements to put contracts in place to officially start the ball rolling. But, alas, having timely funding in hand doesn't mitigate long lead on critical components. Many of the more critical electronic components had a six month lead time. INS's for JDAM munitions is a case in point. In response to discussions with our weapons suppliers, many of them committed company funds to purchase long lead items even before they had a government contract.
One partial solution to the "peacetime inventory" issue would be to have a stockpile of critical long lead items. We need to caution ourselves when we have a single source for our most highly used munitions. As pointed out in your article, during hostilities a lot of ordnance goes down range in a short period of time. One peacetime contractor may not be able to ramp up to wartime production.
I teach high school AFJROTC and we have been told not to order blue uniforms for our cadets as the AF doesn't have enough for active duty (and OCPs are off the table as the Air National Guard and Reserves don't have enough even though Army JROTC has been issuing them). FFS, if we can't even deliver enough basics like uniforms, how are we going to sustain operations in a major war with bombs, aircraft and naval vessel parts, etc.?
Interesting shortfall in light of the parallel shortfalls in recruiting.
So are you putting them in M81 Woodland? Or Olive Drab? Or can you even get the old stuff anymore?
One has to wonder what the situation would have been if the services had not been playing the "completely new pattern/uniform of the month" game over the past decades.
Nope, still issuing the Airmen Battle Uniform (grey tiger stripe), which are hard to get because the USAF doesn't use them anymore.
CDR,
I believe you have a typo, ..."or everything from 5.56mm to 48-inch torpedoes." Heavyweight/submarine torpedoes are Mk48. They are 21 inches in diameter.
Also the Falklands was a short victorious war (for the British). They quickly ran out of lightweight torpedoes, had to ask US for some in the war reserve stock, and still did not sink an Argentine sub.
Yikes, you are correct. Mefixie
Logistics and math are hard, and this is a hard subject to get explain. This is one of the most important pieces I've seen from you Sal. I hope some of the Pentagon guys see this and heed the warning.
Oh, exquisite. I thought exquisite intel would solve these issues. Nice.
Amen to your last three paragraphs. I submit that the Navy’s biggest problem in this regard is itself because executing this effort will expose the complicit silence of too many in the Potomac Fleet. As you have said many, many times - the only thing you’re going to get is what you measure, and we have been measuring social programs at the expense of readiness shortfalls.
Immediately after 9/11, I contacted the Coast Guard, and based on my experience and observations explained several simple ways that a hostile asymmetric force could shut down most U.S. ports. Crickets. No observable response.
I shared this article on twitter. It's incredibly relevant and compelling. I've seen the internal debates first hand regarding munitions procurement vs. inventory. They're not pretty - and because of the resource constrained fiscal environment - some contorted decisions are made. But when weapons manufacturers get to min sustain rate production, its hard and long for them and their suppliers to ramp back up again. See Javelin and Stinger production...
Note the subtitle on that last link:
Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS)
Excess Stockpiles as Liabilities rather than Assets
TL;DR: Don't stockpile so much ammo 'cause it'll all just get blowed up in storage and make a mess.
Interesting quandary: One has far too much in storage until one needs it and doesn't have nearly enough in storage.
As the PEO in charge of all Navy/Marine Corps air to ground weapons and the Tomahawk weapons system during and after 9/11 I can attest to the difficulty for both government and industry to gear up to wartime production from peacetime status. While congress was fairly quick i providing funding for increased production of much needed weapons there are still the requirements to put contracts in place to officially start the ball rolling. But, alas, having timely funding in hand doesn't mitigate long lead on critical components. Many of the more critical electronic components had a six month lead time. INS's for JDAM munitions is a case in point. In response to discussions with our weapons suppliers, many of them committed company funds to purchase long lead items even before they had a government contract.
One partial solution to the "peacetime inventory" issue would be to have a stockpile of critical long lead items. We need to caution ourselves when we have a single source for our most highly used munitions. As pointed out in your article, during hostilities a lot of ordnance goes down range in a short period of time. One peacetime contractor may not be able to ramp up to wartime production.
Excellent! And, very scary.