Lots of minable waters there between China and Taiwan. Submarines can deliver mines fairly covertly, albeit in limited numbers, but air/surface delivery would most likely be the key.
Something unmanned could actually do? Or very minimal manning? Fuel, engine, steering with GPS+ improved INS, mines to roll over the side. Proceed to X, turn Y degrees, release 1 cargo item every 500 meters. Sound doable?
If we can't get a C-17 to Taiwan in a crisis, I hope we could get it to Okinawa. From there we could base and launch XLUUVs to deliver mines. Still, this would be much slower than aircraft and slower than what Taiwan can do for itself. Plus, capacity. It would be much better if they were on patrol and loaded out in the strait beforehand. I guess this might also work from the northern Philippines.
Agreed. I am not sure what the mine stocks/delivery capacity is in Taiwan, but providing them with copious amounts of both would seem to be a good investment.
We need a cruise missile that can cruise around and drop lots of just big enough mines. Get them to Taiwan en masse. Think TLAM D but the 22 bomblet dispensers are instead just 22 small mines.
I don't know what such small mines would do to a ship. We're talking about a missile with a 1,000 pound unitary warhead. The Mk62 mine is 500 pounds, and they mostly get bigger from there.
Taiwan has four indigenously build minelaying ships.24 While the mine magazine of each is unknown, these ships are roughly a third of the size of the Finnish Hämeenmaa-class minelayers, each capable of carrying roughly 150 mines.25 As such, for this campaign analysis each Taiwanese minelayer will be capable of carrying 50 mines per sortie. Additionally, Taiwan has four submarines: two Hai Shih-class subs and two Hai Lung-class subs.26 The Hai-Lung subs are roughly the same size as the Type 877 Kilo-class submarines assessed in Caitlin Talmadge’s “Closing Time,” while the Shih-class subs are two thirds of the size of the Kilos.27 With these considerations, the average mine payload for the four submarines will be set at 20 mines each. Each minelaying craft (submarine and surface ship) can conduct one minelaying sortie a day. Tasked with overcoming these explosive obstacles will be the 57 minesweepers of the PLAN.
Thanks for this. As you know, we should add aircraft to the minelaying mix, as well as light forces such as repurposed fishing boats etc. Counter sweeping engagements need to be a part of any defensive mining scheme.
It looks like a good chunk of water to avoid if you’re in a submarine. It’s shallow, narrow, and would likely be a graveyard. I would mine it from Taiwanese fishing trawlers or from the air. I would bet that both sides and others have ranged, surveyed, and gamed a potential crossing. If I were the PLAN, I would attack from the east and set up a blockade; however, that would open me up to the strength of the USN submarine force. It really depends on how many ships they are willing to lose.
Agreed . Mines mines and more mines. Taiwan has some fairly impressive mining ability but needs more Also the answer of the island itself scatterable mines at every possible LZ and beach landing site at first sign of possible invasion
Great point! My theory has always been a more subtle “political” takeover - China will simply move their puppets into the leadership, arrest everyone else and Voila!
why not something along the size of the stuff they test in the Idaho lake (Pend Oreille) to mimic our nuke subs, save they are like a quarter of the size? AIP subs are still big, still expensive, jut not billions $. But a 90 to 120 foot sub, choose the propulsion, maybe it's a drone, but basically still a sub, would be very deadly in that area. Long charge battery of lithium, hell, a mini Nuke, don't care, but manned or unmanned, the reality is it could be deadly, carry maybe 2 large, 2 smaller torps. Can even service them on the east side of Taiwan. These need not be perfect, but good enough.
I've often said we should be working on long range flyable (or drone launched) mines and at the first outbreak of hostilities, mine every port in China. Cut off their supply lines and keep ships still in port bottled up, and those at sea, depending upon stores already at sea. Since they aren't used to resupply at sea, it will be a major dent in their operations.
Their supply lines are going to be a lot shorter than ours and it is going to take a major effort to shut theirs down. Not enough work being done on that.
Nice idea. Sounds like a DARPA or Skunk Works project to keep the development out of sight. Stealthy, wave-hugging UAS that either sink on arrival or deploy a mine and then return for another sortie.
Trick is starving a nuclear power might change their calculus in a dire direction. A rational actor concluding its time for nukes. Especially if we don't offer a way to save face. Dumb, but real.
Oh, absolutely. I wasn’t suggesting their use, except in the event of all-out war. OTOH, if the PRC knew we had the capability, they might be less likely to try a Taiwan takeover. I would also point out that sinking a single ship would require them to expend more of their forces simply to ensure that was the only mine we emplaced.
Or an artillery-deliverable naval mine, something akin to a Limpet mine 2.0. Cheap enough to mass produce and quickly seed off the beachline when the balloon goes up. Probably wouldn't be powerful to sink anything big but good enough to mission kill a landing craft or AAV.
How about a GLSDB with a mine package as opposed to the SDB. Only 250lb warhead but with the right fuse it would probably hurt under the keel in shallow water.
The Pentagon is assuming that invasion is the only scenario. What happens if China destroys Taiwan's infrastructure with missiles and imposes a blockade?
It can be a blockade at a distance focused on the oil tankers. Not sure what % of Chines oil imports comes in on CCP hulls, but the insurance carriers will waive the other Flags off. As for the invasion pots. mines. as Haiphong proved, it doesn't take many. What we need are some UUV minelayers and some JASSM or JDAM-ER mines
As Russian oil starts pointing away from Europe we may have inadvertently fixed some of their problem. Plus as Iran and Saudi Arabia reconcile it gets much easier to secure a pipeline.
So if you end up with the USN covering the beaches of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia with a million barrels of crude what are the second order effects?
Who says the blockade involves torpedoing tankers? The USN & USCG need only stop & board them until the ones bound for China are identified ... and diverted to a convenient anchorage. Or to an offloading point like, say … Singapore. No pollution necessary.
Folks presume that target is acquiring the TSMC factory/workforce. If instead they simply take that facility offline they've accomplished a significant victory. If no one has access to those chips then the Chinese chips become among the higher technologically sophisticated chips available. The ideal way to take it offline is temporarily and deniably (flux compression generator, uncommanded power surges at the local power plant, nearby chemical plant explosion, etc.). Without the crown jewels, the rest of the Taiwanese economy is much more mundane and digestible. The upcoming election won't have a pro-Chinese faction take power.
That suggests that the continued slow ratcheting up of pressure will continue for some time. Constantly probing the Taiwanese defenses burns hours off the Air Force fighters accelerating D-checks / degrading long term readiness and creates a more blasé response by the flight crews over time. If they can kick the can to 2030 this would probably be a fait accompli.
It is the infrastructure that China wants...intact....along with the workers they can force to work for them to make the products. They may blockade, but the problem with any blockade is that it has to be sustainable over a wide area of interlocking fires and support. Your opponent can pick areas to concentrate and overwhelm forces, taking you apart a piece at a time, and every piece lost makes keeping up the blockade even harder.
Choke points with subs will work...but that works for us against them in the Malacca Straits, not them trying to keep us out of the First Island Chain (that we are already in) somewhere East of Taiwan.
Maybe. Or maybe they want Taiwan with or without the infrastructure. Who knows for sure? I wonder if insurance companies will issue policies to merchant ships in the area.
China's intense desire for reunification with Taiwan predates any significantly valuable Taiwanese infrastructure. China would probably be satisfied with reunification if Taiwan resembled Berlin in 1945.
It isn't an intense desire for reunification, it is an intense desire for power and retribution against the opposing ideology and government that still exists from their civil war. That is simply spiced up by their additional desire to control semiconductor/chip manufacturing for their own use - and to deny those electronics to the rest of the world.
They would be satisfied on some tactical level with destruction as it gets them revenge and denies the electronics to the world. But it doesn't advance them and leaves them at a technological disadvantage. We can make those chips here - have already started multiple plants - while China still wouldn't be able to, would be a pariah state, would lose Western trade - possibly be under a blockade of oil and trade goods - and would suffer some notable attrition in their forces from the war. If they don't win outright and get that manufacturing base intact, it is a strategic loss for them all the way around.
The problem, as I stated elsewhere, is that isn't where China stops. Once they can break the First Island Chain easier and possess Taiwan for forward military staging, Japan, SK, the Philippines, New Guinea, Micronesia, and Australia are next...either conquered or as vassal states.
We spent quite a lot of blood and money preventing the Japanese from doing the same in WWII...those strategic imperatives still apply and our OTHER allies are counting on us to deter the Chinese from even getting started. Abandon Taiwan and it all starts going downhill.
The blockade is closely studied by PLA. It poses difficult political problems for Taiwan and its nominal "friends." Compounded by insurmountable logistical problems if sustained.
I don't understand what that changes. But, arguendo, why then not say the CCP should renounce any claim to Taiwan, which was part of Japan most recently - not China?
Taiwan renouncing any claim to the Chinese mainland opens the door for a new interpretation of the One China policy. You have a frozen civil war between the communists and what's now the government of Taiwan. By that government renouncing their claim to the mainland, the US can say that there's one China (mainland) and one independent nation of Taiwan.
That doesn't change anything. The Taiwanese have said there is one China...they just disagree about who is legally the government of China as a whole. The "One China" policy, and our changes relative to Taiwan, mirrored that and was simply done to feed the naïve effort to bring the Chinese onto the world stage as a first world country in a peaceful, friendly manner.
They played us. Their aims are nefarious and duplicitous and always were. So the two sides are not "equal" morally or politically.
Your solution would be ipso facto declaring independence, which is a red line for China. That would provoke war, not prevent it.
Right, Taiwan needs to acknowledge that there is one China, and they aren't it, which of course means independence. This would recognize the de facto situation: Taiwan is independent of China.
As long as the US can create a situation where there's reasonable doubt a Chinese invasion would succeed, China will have to suffer this, which of course will create all kind of domestic instability for them.
And, as I said, that is exactly where we are now. So not really a change strategically re our commitment in that, but a definite change politically if they move towards independence. And that would forced Xi's hand on rolling the dice...especially now vs a few years from now when we'll have straightened (hopefully) a few things out and be in a better position to deny their invasion.
Putting too much faith in the ability of U.S. submarines to defeat an a heavily escorted amphibious invasion of a large Asian island? I hope that SUBPAC has learned from the lessons of 1941...
I don't know how they might think China can put enough patrolling out there to shut our limited number of subs down for awhile. Their destroyers can actually focus on AAW since they have their horde of corvettes with VDS on top of patrol planes. What gets me is XLUUV is supposed to be cheap with a conventional diesel setup, but again we are paying top dollar. I feel like we should try for the world's smallest AIP sub, unmanned.
We’re raised on the exploits of Fluckey, Morton, and O’Kane in those waters. If you ask my opinion, the hard part would be keeping submarines out of there. Even with Rickover’s caution, when “Thunder Below” is part of the reading list, a certain aggressiveness is part of the force. What’s needed is precision bathymetric information. Understanding the sea floor is better places to hide. On the other hand, how many successful torpedo attacks would it take for the PLAN to back off? And keeping the beachhead open is more difficult when ships are lost.
I've been told that operating "off country Orange" its sporty even during peacetime dodging all the pesky fishing boats and their nets; in wartime I'm sure maritime militia boys will be out in force to complicate the targeting picture and dragging the straits hoping to catch "the big one"!
In reference to O'Kane and TANG - it's amazing to see how close to the beach she actually got. Hard to believe that the locals haven't located her and surveyed the wreck; hopefully they haven't disturbed it but given the fate of other WW2 wrecks in the region I doubt it: https://www.oneternalpatrol.com/uss-tang-306-loss.htm
First time I've ever seen that Taiwan Strait bathymetric chart, and it is eye-opening. My inner-geologist tells me that in Pleistocene time, when sea levels were 300-400 feet lower than today, it was a land bridge. So bottom conditions are likely a bedrock erosional surface, now covered by relatively thin layers of silt, mud and other outwash sediment from the mainland and the island. I suspect that Chinese scholars have performed extremely thorough studies on acoustic propagation and bottom bounce. And along those lines, the "other side" can lay mines as well. No doubt, readers can envision what kinds of mines.
Mining Guam is almost impossible due to the extreme dropoff. Look at Chart 81048 (soundings in fathoms, by the way, not feet) and check the depths outside Apra Harbor. If you're a Chinese minelayer, no es bueno. Wanna mine Apra Harbor itself? Suicide mission.
A relatively safe assumption would be invasion-1 some incompetent Chinese mariners accidentally causing Suez and Panama to be inoperable for a couple weeks.
Well, it's not like there is a lot of Chinese traffic into US ports, right? But I'm sure they would never have the top layer of a container ship full of disguised cruise missiles launchers. How good are the air defenses at San Diego, Lemoore and Bremerton at 3am?
Given the karst topography on the east side of China up to the shore, I suspect that you have something like the Florida Platform - a bottom filled with sinkholes and freshwater springs dumping out onto the seabed. If so, the pockets of salinity ought to make an "interesting" sonar environment.
To put these numbers in two very simple perspectives - (a) If a 688 Class sub we’re standing vertical in most of the Taiwan Straight, half of it would be sticking out above the water; and (b) The extensive PRC fishing fleet (a wholly owned subsidiary of the CCP) would be able to trawl for enemy submarines. As said, I realize that both of these pictures are simplistic, but I think they make Sal’s point.
Why we need a combined arms fleet. AAW umbrella with advancing smaller ships under it and subs below. The other thing to consider is the entire Chinese fleet won't advance straight across the strait. Some loading will take place as far south as Hainan. Clip off the fangs of their pincer to allow Taiwan to focus their energy.
Based on the collection of unions inside he Navy, that would be the only viable path in sight. My memory is that USAF is experimenting with “optionally manned aircraft” as a path to autonomous aircraft. So…….XLUUV to optionally manned UUV, which would have to be larger, simply to accommodate the human support systems. Could be an interesting DARPA project. Just an experiment, you see. ;-)
I've actually thought about aSEAL delivery module for XLUUV. Its about the same size the Advanced Seal Delivery system was. One might also develop a rescue module for sub rescue DSRV. Lots of possibilities here.
Not to mention the defensive minefields deployed by the Chinese to the north and south ends of Taiwan to protect the sea lanes used by their invasion forces.
Yes, the Chinese are going to set up traps for attack subs. They would have trouble reading us in those red and yellow areas due to acoustic returns - heck ocean noise and shrimp - but we would also have a lot of trouble hearing them. But they have a lot of noisy old subs and we would only commit a limited number of subs due to commitments, perceived overmatch, etc....so they would hide their quieter Type 95s and run some noisy boats. We respond by firing and reveal ourselves and get sniped. War of attrition and they have the local correlation of forces on their side.
For now, I would actually build as many B-21s and LRASM-ERs as I can. China invades, hit their surface fleet with a few thousands LRASMs, no more invasion (and hit the sub pens and Refueling and Replenishment hubs). Subs aren't going to launch an invasion. Maximum effect, minimal risk.
I think your strategy is on, but I don't think they have any type 95s yet. The current threat is the Yuan's for stealth. The other threat is their new sub yard they claim can build 6 subs a year.
Which would mean, potentially, 6 new type 95s per year...or others. Whichever boats they use as bait and which as sniper, our hunter/killers are getting ambushed. How many attack boats can we put in the SCS?
Or they could the pursue an unsexy, asymmetrical, sustainable offensive mine strategy of 24/7/365 sentinels that can be deployed in such a manner as to make the most of the features of ocean floor topography to hide their presence. Come to think of it, there's no history there to suggest that would work... nevermind.
The problem is war vs not war...we aren't at war so seeding international waters with sentinel mines would be objected to by one and all. Once war starts, probably too late...the LRASM-ERs can be launched from a lot farther away in greater numbers than air-launched mines with the same effect. I suspect that Taiwan does have some near shore mines on those dozen or so potential invasion beaches...and probably some nasty surprises buried for any airborne troops that try to land and take airfields or ports.
As I recall, LRASM-ER is not a thing that exists in volume and will take years to produce in meaningful quantities. It also presumes that the means to deliver said ASM coincides with having the proper assets in the right place and at the right time. And to be clear, once the shooting or a blockade starts, I don't imagine an insurance company is going to indemnify commercial fleet traffic transiting these waters whether international waters are seeded or not.
There is a rather significant amount of shallow ocean floor property that abuts the most likely avenues of transit by PLAN amphibs and that falls within the line of demarcation between Taiwan and the PRC. Given the multiple pathways by which one can seed a minefield to stand as a sentinel - long before things get interesting - the mere hint that a minefield exists in the likely path of PLAN amphibs should make PRC planning a wee bit more challenging. Lastly, I tend to favor an answer that's already in place vs. one that you have to bank on after things go hot.
As you will note, there are 2,000 existing JASSMs in inventory and they can be converted, quickly, to maritime strike.
The war will not be over in a day - and loading up long-range bombers in the US, Hawaii, the Philippines, Australia, Guam, and/or Diego Garcia will take a little time. But today, with the remaining B-1 supersonic bombers, you could load up and hit the Chinese fleet in the Strait within 24 to 36 hours from beyond the range of the Chinese fleet to respond. With ONLY B-1s, you could launch over 1,000 LRASM-ERs into the PLAN invasion fleet packed in the Strait. LRASMs can distinguish between ships and deconflict, so they will be able to concentrate on capital ships and transports.
So, if we are talking 2027 or beyond, which is the supposed timeline, yes you will have enough missiles - though more is always better.
It isn't a matter or economic consideration or risk relative to the mines, it it international law - prior to a war and the shooting and blockade, you have no writ to go about mining international water with no cordon sanitaire established.
I think that the PLAN has probably anticipated that the ROC has mined the waters near their shores, particularly any potential invasion beaches. Being able to seed extensive minefields with air delivered mines would be more difficult once the balloon goes up than delivering long range anti-ship missiles on target due to the ranges (50 miles flight radius from release for a mine vs hundreds of miles for LRASMs or Naval Tomahawks).
I stand corrected as I understood the -ER to be down the road quite a ways. As for JASSM converted to maritime strike, I've seen articles suggesting as much especially given the quantities on hand. My concern stems from the likelihood that should the U.S. engage the PRC over Taiwan, that conflict will rapidly escalate far beyond what the public likely anticipates or will accept. From my perspective, Taiwan is a 1st world economy and is quite capable of making the investments to defend herself and if that includes Taiwan taking steps that violate international law, vis.a.vis. an offensive mine warfare strategy, I'm not going to shed a tear here. Offensive mine warfare that steps over the boundaries of international law may get the panties of the political "elites" here in the U.S. and Europe in a knot but rest assured that the PRC will pursue a "by any means necessary" approach. And frankly, I don't give a flip what "elites" think these days given their track record and especially when 10's of thousands of dead American service members is in the offing should this unfold. And last time I checked, the elites are not the ones who pay the ultimate price in such conflicts. Sorry... not sorry.
Well, suffice it to say that geopolitics on both sides of a conflict matter relative to who will be your allies during and after such a conflict, assuming you survive. The fact is that Taiwan is too small, geographically and in terms of demographics, to host or organically create the amount of forces that would be necessary to defend against China. So their choice has been allies like the US or just....giving up. Assuming that you aren't down with them subjugating themselves to the CCP, with inevitable deaths of officials and reeducation camps and the consequences to the world, our strategic national security interests, and our economy, it seems they must be prepared to fight with adequate backup from allies.
As such, it is important for them to play the game - as long as they have those allies - to do what is necessary to keep all the frilly skirts in line while they arm up as they can to prepare for a dark day when Xi decides to roll the dice. I don't hold much truck with international law - it is pretty much what people make it - but it is the rule book by which we operate.
If they felt that we were NOT going to support them if attacked, then they would have no choice but to do as you suggest and mine the Taiwan Strait to a point where nobody could transit it safely - which would provoke the very war they are trying to avoid as China would be strangled without sea trade (and as you note, insurance companies aren't letting shipment happen in that environment). Among other defensive steps they may also, being a first world economy, start a covert nuclear program and we know where that might lead.
I assume you are OK with Japan as an ally? Because they would be next on the list after Taiwan...settling scores from WWII is on China's list. Then the Philippines. Then Australia, New Zealand, and Micronesia perhaps. Maybe India sides with China or goes to war with them. You see how this goes south. We spent an awful lot of blood and treasure to prevent the Japanese from doing the same in WWII...one would assume the same strategic truths hold for the CCP.
So, we are stuck with deterrence. Part of that is letting the PLAN and CCP know that with the use of only a small portion of our assets (bombers with missiles), we can put all of their ships on the bottom of the Taiwan Strait. You cannot win conventionally or prevent us from halting your invasion, so why start the war and take on all the political and economic consequences? It will only happen if THEY think they can win...we need to disabuse them of this notion.
We need a competition between the Navy and Air Force on who can move up, lob and reload missiles faster. Right now, the Navy loses. They need fast ships that are just big enough to race back and forth to reload while allowing DDG/FFG SSN etc to use their rounds for sea and air control allowing the strike shuttle =s to move back and forth. What really unlocks it is moving from single mk 41 reloads in port to loading 4 cells at a time at about a minute apart from a container port via container.
That would all help, of course, but ships aren't stealthy - more launch platforms from range, if you can get a target and complete the kill chain - will of course work. But they are at hazard. And, again, those hulls and that capability will take years to build out - not that we don't need the capability anyway. That doesn't mean we shouldn't build more hulls and have more shipyards - we need more to meet our commitments and back up our ability to wage surface actions.
I am sure what some in the Navy/DoD are looking at is the fact that there are only 1-1/4 (China and Russia) countries we have to worry about fighting a near peer conflict with that would require aggressive at sea replenishment capabilities in forward deployed surface action groups. So how much do you put into that capability vs. the 99% of conflicts that allow you to rearm in port. Never mind we might need it for THIS particular conflict, there is no other conflict where they would need to take the risk. And they don't need to take the risk HERE if they can achieve the same aims through other means.
Again, if you can launch long-range stealthy missiles from range from aircraft in sufficient numbers to take out the PLAN concentrated in the Taiwan Strait, that solves THIS conflict without the need to resort to extremes or spend money you don't have (due to appropriations BS). If you can also launch those missiles from islands and ships, all the better. But it is easier to hit a ship or an island than it is to find a B-2, B-21, B-52, or B-21 (eventually) or even transport aircraft (Rapid Dragon) hundreds of miles out of your range that is/are launching missiles.
SSN(X) estimated cost per hull at $6.2 billion? So that likely translates into what? $7 to $8 billion per hull once things get dialed in?? Or maybe we'll get lucky and break $10B/hull...
Said this on the Midrats chain yesterday. SSNX can rule the deep blue, but will have to send UUVs into the littoral.
SSNX will use Columbia's propulsion plant and be between 434 and 476 (476.8 actually) feet and between 14560 and 17345 metric tons submerged.
Now guessing we will see a front end that has at least 1 87" tube based on this discussion. Probably 8 26" tubes again like Seawolf. Time to grow. Build 2 a year once we are done with Columbia. 40 year service life and eventually the fleet will grow.
I don't presume anything here other than making an observation that there doesn't seem to be any kind of throttle on pursuing huge $/hull cost escalations to the point that a single SSN(X) is VERY LIKELY to come at a price tag 3x's the cost of an existing VA SSN... because the advantages to be gained here make the extraordinary fiscal investment of no consequence. How about the $3.4b/hull for the DDG(X) (I'm going to go with the likelihood that will creep up to $4b+/hull when all said and done)? I've not understood a rationale that consistently adheres to a strategy of pursuing substantially more expensive derivatives of the same weapons platforms despite the rapid evolution of ISR and long range PGMs tech. Apparently, the prevailing conclusion is that these risks can be mitigated with commensurate leaps in technical advancements (despite whatever the fiscal costs that might entail and the decade of time that lapses while to put these new platforms in the fleet). Confidence overfloweth...
Understood... Does that 40-year, $10b/hull SSN(X) mitigate the risks posed by the emerging offensive capabilities of unmanned platforms? Perhaps but there is also evidence that the ingenuity of a determined adversary can mess up the status quo pretty nicely. I'd rather have a lot of the sustainable and evolvable "more than good enough" answer than banking on the answer of having too few of something that takes nearly half a decade before the first deployment.
What do we do when one day we wake up and find that multiple 747 passenger jets have landed in Twain full of troops and that cargo ship that just pulled into the harbor is full of Chinese Marines also those Chinese tourists are actually Chinese sabototors and most of Twain military was wiped out in a mass suprise blastic missle attack do we still go to was to defend Twain win the war is half lost ? Everyone keeps dream like the invasion of Twain we be like the Allie invasion of Europe and I'm like why should it be
Exactly. This will be an Alvin and Heidi Toffler war not Mahan, Clauswitz, or Corbett unless we are lucky and ready like Ukraine at the start of the final Chinese push.
And, the thousands of illegal immigrants from CHINA who have entered across our southern border are here for what purpose? (And those are just the ones who were caught!)
And the fentanyl to kill off the personnel who usually join the military. Look at the geographic distribution of the drugs and follow the strategy. The stuff comes from China - military operations other than war (MOOTW) anyone?
Ask the Russians that invaded Ukraine how taking an airport in a hostile country with light airborne forces and no heavy equipment - with no heavy armor coming anytime soon - works out. Yeah, it would be surprising - maybe - but I doubt that flights coming into Taiwan from China aren't heavily monitored. And they're launching missiles in any scenario - just a lot Taiwan stuff is hidden and/or underground in reinforced locations.
Everyone dreams they can come up with an asymmetric solution that will obviate the need for battle and result in a coup de main. But that rarely is possible to execute and more rarely successful.
By this time, with their stated goals of "reunification", the Chinese have most certainly set up a SOSUS line style thing in areas they feel would be the most likely avenues of approach for an underwater vehicle. So "stealth" would be a rare commodity particularly in that area. I mean seriously, the channel of the Taiwan Straits in 80 miles? Talk about hemming in your forces.
The islands themselves are extremely vulnerable and isolated. Those hubs could be taken out and the SOSUS net fails. Why do you think the Chinese bullied our hydrographic research ships in international waters recently? Oh, and we *might* have our own stuff in the water, too.
Lots of minable waters there between China and Taiwan. Submarines can deliver mines fairly covertly, albeit in limited numbers, but air/surface delivery would most likely be the key.
Something unmanned could actually do? Or very minimal manning? Fuel, engine, steering with GPS+ improved INS, mines to roll over the side. Proceed to X, turn Y degrees, release 1 cargo item every 500 meters. Sound doable?
Sure does.
If we can't get a C-17 to Taiwan in a crisis, I hope we could get it to Okinawa. From there we could base and launch XLUUVs to deliver mines. Still, this would be much slower than aircraft and slower than what Taiwan can do for itself. Plus, capacity. It would be much better if they were on patrol and loaded out in the strait beforehand. I guess this might also work from the northern Philippines.
Agreed. I am not sure what the mine stocks/delivery capacity is in Taiwan, but providing them with copious amounts of both would seem to be a good investment.
We need a cruise missile that can cruise around and drop lots of just big enough mines. Get them to Taiwan en masse. Think TLAM D but the 22 bomblet dispensers are instead just 22 small mines.
Would that get wrapped up in the Cluster bomb ban?
I don't know what such small mines would do to a ship. We're talking about a missile with a 1,000 pound unitary warhead. The Mk62 mine is 500 pounds, and they mostly get bigger from there.
https://cimsec.org/island-blitz-a-campaign-analysis-of-a-taiwan-takeover-by-the-pla/
Taiwan has four indigenously build minelaying ships.24 While the mine magazine of each is unknown, these ships are roughly a third of the size of the Finnish Hämeenmaa-class minelayers, each capable of carrying roughly 150 mines.25 As such, for this campaign analysis each Taiwanese minelayer will be capable of carrying 50 mines per sortie. Additionally, Taiwan has four submarines: two Hai Shih-class subs and two Hai Lung-class subs.26 The Hai-Lung subs are roughly the same size as the Type 877 Kilo-class submarines assessed in Caitlin Talmadge’s “Closing Time,” while the Shih-class subs are two thirds of the size of the Kilos.27 With these considerations, the average mine payload for the four submarines will be set at 20 mines each. Each minelaying craft (submarine and surface ship) can conduct one minelaying sortie a day. Tasked with overcoming these explosive obstacles will be the 57 minesweepers of the PLAN.
Thanks for this. As you know, we should add aircraft to the minelaying mix, as well as light forces such as repurposed fishing boats etc. Counter sweeping engagements need to be a part of any defensive mining scheme.
You and Captain Mongo need to listen to yesterday's Midrats.
Just did. Obviously, great minds think alike!😉 I would listen live, but I'm asleep at the time. 11:30pm-6am shift.
Sounds like a job tailor-made for our Littoral Combat Ship with mine warfare module! Problem sol-ved!
It looks like a good chunk of water to avoid if you’re in a submarine. It’s shallow, narrow, and would likely be a graveyard. I would mine it from Taiwanese fishing trawlers or from the air. I would bet that both sides and others have ranged, surveyed, and gamed a potential crossing. If I were the PLAN, I would attack from the east and set up a blockade; however, that would open me up to the strength of the USN submarine force. It really depends on how many ships they are willing to lose.
Agreed . Mines mines and more mines. Taiwan has some fairly impressive mining ability but needs more Also the answer of the island itself scatterable mines at every possible LZ and beach landing site at first sign of possible invasion
Great point! My theory has always been a more subtle “political” takeover - China will simply move their puppets into the leadership, arrest everyone else and Voila!
Seems to be working here...why not Taiwan? ;-)
Spot on. Emperor Xi has many court eunuchs in the USA, Canada, and Taiwan: https://yuribezmenov.substack.com/p/tiananmen-square-massacre-cultural-revolution
Well, that makes things.... unpleasant.
Time for Phillipines-based conventional subs?
Yes. Yes. Yes. We need to build 100 AIP subs, not gold-platers. 100 = ⅓ active, ⅓ in maintenance, and ⅓ in rest in refurbishment. Same stats as WWII.
Navy focus on gold-plated everything will sink the Navy.
Time to go simple, and large volume.
why not something along the size of the stuff they test in the Idaho lake (Pend Oreille) to mimic our nuke subs, save they are like a quarter of the size? AIP subs are still big, still expensive, jut not billions $. But a 90 to 120 foot sub, choose the propulsion, maybe it's a drone, but basically still a sub, would be very deadly in that area. Long charge battery of lithium, hell, a mini Nuke, don't care, but manned or unmanned, the reality is it could be deadly, carry maybe 2 large, 2 smaller torps. Can even service them on the east side of Taiwan. These need not be perfect, but good enough.
Grow an XLUUV to about the size of a type 207 and use those out of service ESDs as their tender.
Ah, maps and charts. Where would operational planning, or historical understanding, be without them?
Afghanistan, 2001-2021.
I've often said we should be working on long range flyable (or drone launched) mines and at the first outbreak of hostilities, mine every port in China. Cut off their supply lines and keep ships still in port bottled up, and those at sea, depending upon stores already at sea. Since they aren't used to resupply at sea, it will be a major dent in their operations.
Their supply lines are going to be a lot shorter than ours and it is going to take a major effort to shut theirs down. Not enough work being done on that.
Nice idea. Sounds like a DARPA or Skunk Works project to keep the development out of sight. Stealthy, wave-hugging UAS that either sink on arrival or deploy a mine and then return for another sortie.
Trick is starving a nuclear power might change their calculus in a dire direction. A rational actor concluding its time for nukes. Especially if we don't offer a way to save face. Dumb, but real.
Oh, absolutely. I wasn’t suggesting their use, except in the event of all-out war. OTOH, if the PRC knew we had the capability, they might be less likely to try a Taiwan takeover. I would also point out that sinking a single ship would require them to expend more of their forces simply to ensure that was the only mine we emplaced.
Or an artillery-deliverable naval mine, something akin to a Limpet mine 2.0. Cheap enough to mass produce and quickly seed off the beachline when the balloon goes up. Probably wouldn't be powerful to sink anything big but good enough to mission kill a landing craft or AAV.
227mm might be big enough... But we have to make them.
Better get the mine gnomes cracking away on them then! Because Taiwan's small number of naval minelayers ain't gonna cut it when things go kinetic.
How about a GLSDB with a mine package as opposed to the SDB. Only 250lb warhead but with the right fuse it would probably hurt under the keel in shallow water.
The Pentagon is assuming that invasion is the only scenario. What happens if China destroys Taiwan's infrastructure with missiles and imposes a blockade?
counter blockade?
The more difficult of the 2 blockades. Basically puts them in Caesar's position at Alesia except on water.
It can be a blockade at a distance focused on the oil tankers. Not sure what % of Chines oil imports comes in on CCP hulls, but the insurance carriers will waive the other Flags off. As for the invasion pots. mines. as Haiphong proved, it doesn't take many. What we need are some UUV minelayers and some JASSM or JDAM-ER mines
As Russian oil starts pointing away from Europe we may have inadvertently fixed some of their problem. Plus as Iran and Saudi Arabia reconcile it gets much easier to secure a pipeline.
That's what TLAMs are for. (Block ((whatever)), even if we have to build a new frame to fit enough fuel.)
And now you are attacking another country.
To relieve "Vercingetorix" at "Alesia" here, we'd only need to put our counter blockade at the Strait of Malacca.
https://zeihan.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/5.11-top-oil-exporters-2020.jpg
exactly. and that's not a good spot for PLAN P-3s
And Sunda Strait. Keep Indonesia happy.
So if you end up with the USN covering the beaches of India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia with a million barrels of crude what are the second order effects?
Who says the blockade involves torpedoing tankers? The USN & USCG need only stop & board them until the ones bound for China are identified ... and diverted to a convenient anchorage. Or to an offloading point like, say … Singapore. No pollution necessary.
Folks presume that target is acquiring the TSMC factory/workforce. If instead they simply take that facility offline they've accomplished a significant victory. If no one has access to those chips then the Chinese chips become among the higher technologically sophisticated chips available. The ideal way to take it offline is temporarily and deniably (flux compression generator, uncommanded power surges at the local power plant, nearby chemical plant explosion, etc.). Without the crown jewels, the rest of the Taiwanese economy is much more mundane and digestible. The upcoming election won't have a pro-Chinese faction take power.
That suggests that the continued slow ratcheting up of pressure will continue for some time. Constantly probing the Taiwanese defenses burns hours off the Air Force fighters accelerating D-checks / degrading long term readiness and creates a more blasé response by the flight crews over time. If they can kick the can to 2030 this would probably be a fait accompli.
It is the infrastructure that China wants...intact....along with the workers they can force to work for them to make the products. They may blockade, but the problem with any blockade is that it has to be sustainable over a wide area of interlocking fires and support. Your opponent can pick areas to concentrate and overwhelm forces, taking you apart a piece at a time, and every piece lost makes keeping up the blockade even harder.
Choke points with subs will work...but that works for us against them in the Malacca Straits, not them trying to keep us out of the First Island Chain (that we are already in) somewhere East of Taiwan.
Maybe. Or maybe they want Taiwan with or without the infrastructure. Who knows for sure? I wonder if insurance companies will issue policies to merchant ships in the area.
China's intense desire for reunification with Taiwan predates any significantly valuable Taiwanese infrastructure. China would probably be satisfied with reunification if Taiwan resembled Berlin in 1945.
It isn't an intense desire for reunification, it is an intense desire for power and retribution against the opposing ideology and government that still exists from their civil war. That is simply spiced up by their additional desire to control semiconductor/chip manufacturing for their own use - and to deny those electronics to the rest of the world.
They would be satisfied on some tactical level with destruction as it gets them revenge and denies the electronics to the world. But it doesn't advance them and leaves them at a technological disadvantage. We can make those chips here - have already started multiple plants - while China still wouldn't be able to, would be a pariah state, would lose Western trade - possibly be under a blockade of oil and trade goods - and would suffer some notable attrition in their forces from the war. If they don't win outright and get that manufacturing base intact, it is a strategic loss for them all the way around.
Perfect reasons for the U.S. to stay out of their family feud.
The problem, as I stated elsewhere, is that isn't where China stops. Once they can break the First Island Chain easier and possess Taiwan for forward military staging, Japan, SK, the Philippines, New Guinea, Micronesia, and Australia are next...either conquered or as vassal states.
We spent quite a lot of blood and money preventing the Japanese from doing the same in WWII...those strategic imperatives still apply and our OTHER allies are counting on us to deter the Chinese from even getting started. Abandon Taiwan and it all starts going downhill.
China existed long time ago as most powerful economy and didn;t do what you wish.
China is already huge trade partner with SEA (vassels). Why do they need to invade again? Isn't this just domino theory?
The blockade is closely studied by PLA. It poses difficult political problems for Taiwan and its nominal "friends." Compounded by insurmountable logistical problems if sustained.
How many personnel and how much money is this country willing to sacrifice for Taiwan? My guess is zero.
unfortunately few and the PLA knows it
Need to get the American people interested in real economics and geopolitics again.
Sure.
It's quite the microchip manufacturing capability that Taiwan has; it be a shame if something happened to it.
“it be a shame if something happened to it.” You sound like a mafioso talking like that.
CPC would take TW even with no TSMC.
Unless Taiwan renounces any claim to the Chinese mainland, little interest in getting involved in a civil war.
I don't understand what that changes. But, arguendo, why then not say the CCP should renounce any claim to Taiwan, which was part of Japan most recently - not China?
Taiwan renouncing any claim to the Chinese mainland opens the door for a new interpretation of the One China policy. You have a frozen civil war between the communists and what's now the government of Taiwan. By that government renouncing their claim to the mainland, the US can say that there's one China (mainland) and one independent nation of Taiwan.
That doesn't change anything. The Taiwanese have said there is one China...they just disagree about who is legally the government of China as a whole. The "One China" policy, and our changes relative to Taiwan, mirrored that and was simply done to feed the naïve effort to bring the Chinese onto the world stage as a first world country in a peaceful, friendly manner.
They played us. Their aims are nefarious and duplicitous and always were. So the two sides are not "equal" morally or politically.
Your solution would be ipso facto declaring independence, which is a red line for China. That would provoke war, not prevent it.
Right, Taiwan needs to acknowledge that there is one China, and they aren't it, which of course means independence. This would recognize the de facto situation: Taiwan is independent of China.
As long as the US can create a situation where there's reasonable doubt a Chinese invasion would succeed, China will have to suffer this, which of course will create all kind of domestic instability for them.
And, as I said, that is exactly where we are now. So not really a change strategically re our commitment in that, but a definite change politically if they move towards independence. And that would forced Xi's hand on rolling the dice...especially now vs a few years from now when we'll have straightened (hopefully) a few things out and be in a better position to deny their invasion.
Putting too much faith in the ability of U.S. submarines to defeat an a heavily escorted amphibious invasion of a large Asian island? I hope that SUBPAC has learned from the lessons of 1941...
https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2021/december/bleak-december
I don't know how they might think China can put enough patrolling out there to shut our limited number of subs down for awhile. Their destroyers can actually focus on AAW since they have their horde of corvettes with VDS on top of patrol planes. What gets me is XLUUV is supposed to be cheap with a conventional diesel setup, but again we are paying top dollar. I feel like we should try for the world's smallest AIP sub, unmanned.
We’re raised on the exploits of Fluckey, Morton, and O’Kane in those waters. If you ask my opinion, the hard part would be keeping submarines out of there. Even with Rickover’s caution, when “Thunder Below” is part of the reading list, a certain aggressiveness is part of the force. What’s needed is precision bathymetric information. Understanding the sea floor is better places to hide. On the other hand, how many successful torpedo attacks would it take for the PLAN to back off? And keeping the beachhead open is more difficult when ships are lost.
I've been told that operating "off country Orange" its sporty even during peacetime dodging all the pesky fishing boats and their nets; in wartime I'm sure maritime militia boys will be out in force to complicate the targeting picture and dragging the straits hoping to catch "the big one"!
In reference to O'Kane and TANG - it's amazing to see how close to the beach she actually got. Hard to believe that the locals haven't located her and surveyed the wreck; hopefully they haven't disturbed it but given the fate of other WW2 wrecks in the region I doubt it: https://www.oneternalpatrol.com/uss-tang-306-loss.htm
First time I've ever seen that Taiwan Strait bathymetric chart, and it is eye-opening. My inner-geologist tells me that in Pleistocene time, when sea levels were 300-400 feet lower than today, it was a land bridge. So bottom conditions are likely a bedrock erosional surface, now covered by relatively thin layers of silt, mud and other outwash sediment from the mainland and the island. I suspect that Chinese scholars have performed extremely thorough studies on acoustic propagation and bottom bounce. And along those lines, the "other side" can lay mines as well. No doubt, readers can envision what kinds of mines.
And if China returns the favor and mines a few U.S. ports? Or waters of South Korea, Guam, Japan?
Mining Guam is almost impossible due to the extreme dropoff. Look at Chart 81048 (soundings in fathoms, by the way, not feet) and check the depths outside Apra Harbor. If you're a Chinese minelayer, no es bueno. Wanna mine Apra Harbor itself? Suicide mission.
Subcontract it to the N. Koreans--they don't seem to mind suicide missions.
A relatively safe assumption would be invasion-1 some incompetent Chinese mariners accidentally causing Suez and Panama to be inoperable for a couple weeks.
Well, it's not like there is a lot of Chinese traffic into US ports, right? But I'm sure they would never have the top layer of a container ship full of disguised cruise missiles launchers. How good are the air defenses at San Diego, Lemoore and Bremerton at 3am?
Given the karst topography on the east side of China up to the shore, I suspect that you have something like the Florida Platform - a bottom filled with sinkholes and freshwater springs dumping out onto the seabed. If so, the pockets of salinity ought to make an "interesting" sonar environment.
To put these numbers in two very simple perspectives - (a) If a 688 Class sub we’re standing vertical in most of the Taiwan Straight, half of it would be sticking out above the water; and (b) The extensive PRC fishing fleet (a wholly owned subsidiary of the CCP) would be able to trawl for enemy submarines. As said, I realize that both of these pictures are simplistic, but I think they make Sal’s point.
Why we need a combined arms fleet. AAW umbrella with advancing smaller ships under it and subs below. The other thing to consider is the entire Chinese fleet won't advance straight across the strait. Some loading will take place as far south as Hainan. Clip off the fangs of their pincer to allow Taiwan to focus their energy.
US Navy could use some small AIP subs in its toolbox, to bad they'll never get them.
AIP XLUUV
Based on the collection of unions inside he Navy, that would be the only viable path in sight. My memory is that USAF is experimenting with “optionally manned aircraft” as a path to autonomous aircraft. So…….XLUUV to optionally manned UUV, which would have to be larger, simply to accommodate the human support systems. Could be an interesting DARPA project. Just an experiment, you see. ;-)
I've actually thought about aSEAL delivery module for XLUUV. Its about the same size the Advanced Seal Delivery system was. One might also develop a rescue module for sub rescue DSRV. Lots of possibilities here.
Unmanned is a money pit that won't deliver on what it promises, particularly against peer competitors.
Not to mention the defensive minefields deployed by the Chinese to the north and south ends of Taiwan to protect the sea lanes used by their invasion forces.
Yes, the Chinese are going to set up traps for attack subs. They would have trouble reading us in those red and yellow areas due to acoustic returns - heck ocean noise and shrimp - but we would also have a lot of trouble hearing them. But they have a lot of noisy old subs and we would only commit a limited number of subs due to commitments, perceived overmatch, etc....so they would hide their quieter Type 95s and run some noisy boats. We respond by firing and reveal ourselves and get sniped. War of attrition and they have the local correlation of forces on their side.
Then there is this, if it is real: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-claims-its-new-submarines-are-quieter-ever-190011?page=0%2C1
Which may explain this: https://www.naval-technology.com/features/darpa-silent-mhd-magnetic-drives-for-replacing-naval-propellers/#:~:text=The%20US%20Defense%20Advances%20Research,magnets%20and%20an%20electric%20current.
For now, I would actually build as many B-21s and LRASM-ERs as I can. China invades, hit their surface fleet with a few thousands LRASMs, no more invasion (and hit the sub pens and Refueling and Replenishment hubs). Subs aren't going to launch an invasion. Maximum effect, minimal risk.
I think your strategy is on, but I don't think they have any type 95s yet. The current threat is the Yuan's for stealth. The other threat is their new sub yard they claim can build 6 subs a year.
Which would mean, potentially, 6 new type 95s per year...or others. Whichever boats they use as bait and which as sniper, our hunter/killers are getting ambushed. How many attack boats can we put in the SCS?
Agreed, not enough. Don't play into their hand.
Or they could the pursue an unsexy, asymmetrical, sustainable offensive mine strategy of 24/7/365 sentinels that can be deployed in such a manner as to make the most of the features of ocean floor topography to hide their presence. Come to think of it, there's no history there to suggest that would work... nevermind.
The problem is war vs not war...we aren't at war so seeding international waters with sentinel mines would be objected to by one and all. Once war starts, probably too late...the LRASM-ERs can be launched from a lot farther away in greater numbers than air-launched mines with the same effect. I suspect that Taiwan does have some near shore mines on those dozen or so potential invasion beaches...and probably some nasty surprises buried for any airborne troops that try to land and take airfields or ports.
As I recall, LRASM-ER is not a thing that exists in volume and will take years to produce in meaningful quantities. It also presumes that the means to deliver said ASM coincides with having the proper assets in the right place and at the right time. And to be clear, once the shooting or a blockade starts, I don't imagine an insurance company is going to indemnify commercial fleet traffic transiting these waters whether international waters are seeded or not.
There is a rather significant amount of shallow ocean floor property that abuts the most likely avenues of transit by PLAN amphibs and that falls within the line of demarcation between Taiwan and the PRC. Given the multiple pathways by which one can seed a minefield to stand as a sentinel - long before things get interesting - the mere hint that a minefield exists in the likely path of PLAN amphibs should make PRC planning a wee bit more challenging. Lastly, I tend to favor an answer that's already in place vs. one that you have to bank on after things go hot.
There are about 350 LRASM-ERs on hand with the Navy at the moment and Lockheed Martin makes about 500 LRASM/JASSMs a year...boosting that to 1,000. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lockheed-martin-double-lrasm-production/
As you will note, there are 2,000 existing JASSMs in inventory and they can be converted, quickly, to maritime strike.
The war will not be over in a day - and loading up long-range bombers in the US, Hawaii, the Philippines, Australia, Guam, and/or Diego Garcia will take a little time. But today, with the remaining B-1 supersonic bombers, you could load up and hit the Chinese fleet in the Strait within 24 to 36 hours from beyond the range of the Chinese fleet to respond. With ONLY B-1s, you could launch over 1,000 LRASM-ERs into the PLAN invasion fleet packed in the Strait. LRASMs can distinguish between ships and deconflict, so they will be able to concentrate on capital ships and transports.
So, if we are talking 2027 or beyond, which is the supposed timeline, yes you will have enough missiles - though more is always better.
It isn't a matter or economic consideration or risk relative to the mines, it it international law - prior to a war and the shooting and blockade, you have no writ to go about mining international water with no cordon sanitaire established.
I think that the PLAN has probably anticipated that the ROC has mined the waters near their shores, particularly any potential invasion beaches. Being able to seed extensive minefields with air delivered mines would be more difficult once the balloon goes up than delivering long range anti-ship missiles on target due to the ranges (50 miles flight radius from release for a mine vs hundreds of miles for LRASMs or Naval Tomahawks).
I stand corrected as I understood the -ER to be down the road quite a ways. As for JASSM converted to maritime strike, I've seen articles suggesting as much especially given the quantities on hand. My concern stems from the likelihood that should the U.S. engage the PRC over Taiwan, that conflict will rapidly escalate far beyond what the public likely anticipates or will accept. From my perspective, Taiwan is a 1st world economy and is quite capable of making the investments to defend herself and if that includes Taiwan taking steps that violate international law, vis.a.vis. an offensive mine warfare strategy, I'm not going to shed a tear here. Offensive mine warfare that steps over the boundaries of international law may get the panties of the political "elites" here in the U.S. and Europe in a knot but rest assured that the PRC will pursue a "by any means necessary" approach. And frankly, I don't give a flip what "elites" think these days given their track record and especially when 10's of thousands of dead American service members is in the offing should this unfold. And last time I checked, the elites are not the ones who pay the ultimate price in such conflicts. Sorry... not sorry.
Well, suffice it to say that geopolitics on both sides of a conflict matter relative to who will be your allies during and after such a conflict, assuming you survive. The fact is that Taiwan is too small, geographically and in terms of demographics, to host or organically create the amount of forces that would be necessary to defend against China. So their choice has been allies like the US or just....giving up. Assuming that you aren't down with them subjugating themselves to the CCP, with inevitable deaths of officials and reeducation camps and the consequences to the world, our strategic national security interests, and our economy, it seems they must be prepared to fight with adequate backup from allies.
As such, it is important for them to play the game - as long as they have those allies - to do what is necessary to keep all the frilly skirts in line while they arm up as they can to prepare for a dark day when Xi decides to roll the dice. I don't hold much truck with international law - it is pretty much what people make it - but it is the rule book by which we operate.
If they felt that we were NOT going to support them if attacked, then they would have no choice but to do as you suggest and mine the Taiwan Strait to a point where nobody could transit it safely - which would provoke the very war they are trying to avoid as China would be strangled without sea trade (and as you note, insurance companies aren't letting shipment happen in that environment). Among other defensive steps they may also, being a first world economy, start a covert nuclear program and we know where that might lead.
I assume you are OK with Japan as an ally? Because they would be next on the list after Taiwan...settling scores from WWII is on China's list. Then the Philippines. Then Australia, New Zealand, and Micronesia perhaps. Maybe India sides with China or goes to war with them. You see how this goes south. We spent an awful lot of blood and treasure to prevent the Japanese from doing the same in WWII...one would assume the same strategic truths hold for the CCP.
So, we are stuck with deterrence. Part of that is letting the PLAN and CCP know that with the use of only a small portion of our assets (bombers with missiles), we can put all of their ships on the bottom of the Taiwan Strait. You cannot win conventionally or prevent us from halting your invasion, so why start the war and take on all the political and economic consequences? It will only happen if THEY think they can win...we need to disabuse them of this notion.
We need a competition between the Navy and Air Force on who can move up, lob and reload missiles faster. Right now, the Navy loses. They need fast ships that are just big enough to race back and forth to reload while allowing DDG/FFG SSN etc to use their rounds for sea and air control allowing the strike shuttle =s to move back and forth. What really unlocks it is moving from single mk 41 reloads in port to loading 4 cells at a time at about a minute apart from a container port via container.
That would all help, of course, but ships aren't stealthy - more launch platforms from range, if you can get a target and complete the kill chain - will of course work. But they are at hazard. And, again, those hulls and that capability will take years to build out - not that we don't need the capability anyway. That doesn't mean we shouldn't build more hulls and have more shipyards - we need more to meet our commitments and back up our ability to wage surface actions.
I am sure what some in the Navy/DoD are looking at is the fact that there are only 1-1/4 (China and Russia) countries we have to worry about fighting a near peer conflict with that would require aggressive at sea replenishment capabilities in forward deployed surface action groups. So how much do you put into that capability vs. the 99% of conflicts that allow you to rearm in port. Never mind we might need it for THIS particular conflict, there is no other conflict where they would need to take the risk. And they don't need to take the risk HERE if they can achieve the same aims through other means.
Again, if you can launch long-range stealthy missiles from range from aircraft in sufficient numbers to take out the PLAN concentrated in the Taiwan Strait, that solves THIS conflict without the need to resort to extremes or spend money you don't have (due to appropriations BS). If you can also launch those missiles from islands and ships, all the better. But it is easier to hit a ship or an island than it is to find a B-2, B-21, B-52, or B-21 (eventually) or even transport aircraft (Rapid Dragon) hundreds of miles out of your range that is/are launching missiles.
P-8s, too. And maybe C-130s as cruise missile carriers.
SSN(X) estimated cost per hull at $6.2 billion? So that likely translates into what? $7 to $8 billion per hull once things get dialed in?? Or maybe we'll get lucky and break $10B/hull...
Said this on the Midrats chain yesterday. SSNX can rule the deep blue, but will have to send UUVs into the littoral.
SSNX will use Columbia's propulsion plant and be between 434 and 476 (476.8 actually) feet and between 14560 and 17345 metric tons submerged.
Now guessing we will see a front end that has at least 1 87" tube based on this discussion. Probably 8 26" tubes again like Seawolf. Time to grow. Build 2 a year once we are done with Columbia. 40 year service life and eventually the fleet will grow.
I don't presume anything here other than making an observation that there doesn't seem to be any kind of throttle on pursuing huge $/hull cost escalations to the point that a single SSN(X) is VERY LIKELY to come at a price tag 3x's the cost of an existing VA SSN... because the advantages to be gained here make the extraordinary fiscal investment of no consequence. How about the $3.4b/hull for the DDG(X) (I'm going to go with the likelihood that will creep up to $4b+/hull when all said and done)? I've not understood a rationale that consistently adheres to a strategy of pursuing substantially more expensive derivatives of the same weapons platforms despite the rapid evolution of ISR and long range PGMs tech. Apparently, the prevailing conclusion is that these risks can be mitigated with commensurate leaps in technical advancements (despite whatever the fiscal costs that might entail and the decade of time that lapses while to put these new platforms in the fleet). Confidence overfloweth...
The good news side is we are probably looking at a 40 year hull that might be able to deploy more of the time.
Understood... Does that 40-year, $10b/hull SSN(X) mitigate the risks posed by the emerging offensive capabilities of unmanned platforms? Perhaps but there is also evidence that the ingenuity of a determined adversary can mess up the status quo pretty nicely. I'd rather have a lot of the sustainable and evolvable "more than good enough" answer than banking on the answer of having too few of something that takes nearly half a decade before the first deployment.
What do we do when one day we wake up and find that multiple 747 passenger jets have landed in Twain full of troops and that cargo ship that just pulled into the harbor is full of Chinese Marines also those Chinese tourists are actually Chinese sabototors and most of Twain military was wiped out in a mass suprise blastic missle attack do we still go to was to defend Twain win the war is half lost ? Everyone keeps dream like the invasion of Twain we be like the Allie invasion of Europe and I'm like why should it be
Exactly. This will be an Alvin and Heidi Toffler war not Mahan, Clauswitz, or Corbett unless we are lucky and ready like Ukraine at the start of the final Chinese push.
And, the thousands of illegal immigrants from CHINA who have entered across our southern border are here for what purpose? (And those are just the ones who were caught!)
they are the hookers bring the money and drugs for hunter to get his dad to look the other way
And the fentanyl to kill off the personnel who usually join the military. Look at the geographic distribution of the drugs and follow the strategy. The stuff comes from China - military operations other than war (MOOTW) anyone?
Ask the Russians that invaded Ukraine how taking an airport in a hostile country with light airborne forces and no heavy equipment - with no heavy armor coming anytime soon - works out. Yeah, it would be surprising - maybe - but I doubt that flights coming into Taiwan from China aren't heavily monitored. And they're launching missiles in any scenario - just a lot Taiwan stuff is hidden and/or underground in reinforced locations.
Everyone dreams they can come up with an asymmetric solution that will obviate the need for battle and result in a coup de main. But that rarely is possible to execute and more rarely successful.
Use Drones to target ships, lock them up for a stand off attack by a Surface or subsurface engagement at distance.
All mines laid don't have to be live or hidden, a few Swift boat style runs dropping a few mines and a lot of decoys and dummies.
Can a Mine or two be delivered off a small fast boat?
By this time, with their stated goals of "reunification", the Chinese have most certainly set up a SOSUS line style thing in areas they feel would be the most likely avenues of approach for an underwater vehicle. So "stealth" would be a rare commodity particularly in that area. I mean seriously, the channel of the Taiwan Straits in 80 miles? Talk about hemming in your forces.
you know all those islets in the SCS host SOSUS terminals
This is why the Midrats discussion was about decoys emitting noise. The future concedes your point.
The islands themselves are extremely vulnerable and isolated. Those hubs could be taken out and the SOSUS net fails. Why do you think the Chinese bullied our hydrographic research ships in international waters recently? Oh, and we *might* have our own stuff in the water, too.